

**A
SOURCE
BOOK
IN
JAINA
PHILOSOPHY**

Devendra Muni Shastri

A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

[An Exhaustive and Authoritative Book in Jaina Philosophy]

By

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
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BENEDICTION—BLESSINGS

Human mind can be compared to a vast ocean. As the ocean never becomes calm, so is the condition of human mind. In it the waves of inquisitiveness always remain in existence. The different questionnaires regarding life and universe, mundane soul and living and non-living substances, either the universe is a chaos or a cosmos, how the activities of the world are going on, etc., perturbs human mind.

The Philosophy reconciles all the queries of human mind by logic, by intelligence and with the medium of insight. The philosophy removes all such doubts of human mind. So the philosophy can be recognised as 'Divine Eye'.

Philosophy is divided into numerous currents. But all those currents can be classified into two distinctions, viz., (1) Materialism and (2) Spiritualism. Jaina philosophy is spiritualistic by its nature.

Jaina philosophy maintains its unique and magnificent position, not only among Indian philosophies but also among the world philosophies.

The vast canvas of Jaina philosophy is woven by four elements, viz., (i) Non-violence in conduct, (ii) Many-sidedness in views, thinking and mind, (iii) stand-point-based speech, and (iv) Non-possessiveness in social life. These are the four strong pillars upon which the magnificent building is standing of Jaina metaphysics and philosophy. It is neither a fool's paradise, nor irrelevant imagination, but based on sound footings and solid ground of life and that is why it gives due force to right conduct in the light of holy thinking.

I wished that at the auspicious occasion of 25th Nirvana centenary of Bhagavana Mahavira, two books should be prepared, one should be biography of Bhagavana Mahavira and the other should be about his Philosophy and Metaphysics. I desired that the style may be comparative but the language should be easy

and simple ; so every man can be benefitted and know ins and outs about Jainism by this one and single volume.

I expressed the wish to my worthy disciple *Devendra Muni*. He prepared both the precious volumes with full zeal, enthusiasm and hardship.

The present volume discusses the Jaina Philosophy. The typical and rough subjects, like—theory of karman, theory of knowledge, intuition, many-sided approach to the reality, noumenal and phenomenal points of view, conception of soul, consciousness-unconsciousness, theory of valid knowledge, the objects of knowledge, theory of auspicious and inauspicious activities, inflow and bondage, checking the inflow and annihilation of karmans, state of liberation of soul have been discussed with open-mindedness and giving the views of other philosophies—Eastern and Western. So it became a complete book of philosophy.

Due to the rare qualities of this work, I liked it much and am sure that every and any inquisitive, who wishes to know about Jaina philosophy can quench his thirst by this one single volume.

Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi has rendered English translation of the book with keen interest and due labour. So he fulfilled a great gap in the field of philosophy. I am hopeful that this English version will also be cordially welcomed.

It is my hearty desire that my favourite and worthy pupil *Devendra Muni* may enrich the treasure of literature by deep creative intelligence and knowledge and with his ever-flowing pen. He may create new mile-stones in the field of literature and serve the Jainology and flag it. These are my heartiest blessings !

Adinath Jayanti
April 5, 1983.

—*Upadhyaya Pushkar Muni*



PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Subtitie

It would be apt to say that without understanding Jaina Philosophy, the study of Indian philosophy and metaphysics would remain incomplete; not only this, but the philosophic and metaphysical background of Indian thinking would remain unclear and un-understood.

Not only among Indian philosophies, but among the philosophies of the world, only the Jaina philosophy darefully advocates the limitless power and energy of human soul and its independency; and bestows full responsibility upon the man and man himself to attain the highest goal of his life—the infinite bliss, without the help of any God or supreme being.

The non-violence (ahimsa) is the back-bone of Jaina Philosophy. Non-violence is the base of Jaina religion and philosophy. It is all and all of Jainism. Complete thinking and conduct of Jainas are spread on the vast canvas of non-violence. So the Jainas presented deep and vivid study of non-violence.

For this purpose, the exhaustive study of non-violence, Jaina thinkers pierced sufficiently deep into the material sciences like—Physics, Chemistry, and specially Zoology, Botany and Biology. By the deep study of these sciences, the minutest details which were presented by the Jaina thinkers, proved true to such a high degree, that even the greatest scientists of to-day are astonished. They highly esteem those consequences, by saying that it is wonderful how such consequences obtained milleniums ago while there were no laboratories, etc.

These results proved very much beneficial to Jainas. On the one side, they could follow the path of non-violence, in their thought and behaviour; and on the other Jainism is standing upright in the modern science-effected world. While other orthodox religions and isms are either in clash or they slink away and hesitate to face the new researches of the modern science; the Jaina metaphy-

sics, philosophy and religion are proved true. The scientificity of Jainism is coming into light as the scientific researches are enhancing. This is the open proof of highest thinking of Jainas.

Though there are many books to get through the Jaina religion and philosophy. An inquisitive can understand the subject with the help of those books, yet the necessity of such a single volume, by which the authoritative knowledge can be got, is keenly felt by the scholars and general inquisitives alike. The present volume will fulfil the need. On the one hand, it will prove an authentic book regarding Jaina philosophy and on the other it will be a reference book to the scholars.

This book came out from the pen of *Sri Devendra Muniji Shastri*. Munisri is a great scholar of Jaina religion, philosophy and agam literature. He is a learned man. Many ancient and modern languages, like—Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit, Gujrati, Marathi, Hindi etc. are at hand to him. He has been devoting his precious time since thirty years in the comparative study of the different currents of Indian culture and literature, like—religions, philosophies, yoga etc. He had gone through thousands of works of reputed authors—ancient and modern and himself have written hundreds of books. Because of his extra-ordinary genius Munisri now gained the fame as the 'Vizard of comparative study' of different philosophies, religions and literature.

The present volume is the result of Munisri's three years' continuous study. In this volume Munisri has impartially presented the exhaustive study of Jaina philosophy.

This volume (Hindi) was published at the auspicious occasion of 25th centenary of Vir Nirvana. It got appraisal from every corner. Everyone liked it and gave warm welcome.

The year 1977 proved lucky to Madras citizens. His Holiness, Reverend Gurudeva, Rajasthan Kesari, Upadhyaya *Sri Pushkar Muniji* Maharaj stayed there for four rainy months. At that time the intelligentia, mainly the Gujrati speaking inquisitives earnestly requested to the Maharaj Sahib, for the English version of the book. Those people pleaded that the English version would be more beneficial for the English speaking people and also those persons whose mother tongue is not Hindi. Non-Hindi areas would also be able to know about Jaina religion and philosophy.

The members of Gujrati Swetambara Sthanakvasi Jaina Association of Madras, were so enthusiastic to see the book in English, that they became pre-publication customers and gave financial co-operation in this way.

This enthusiasm instigated *Dr. Kalghatgi* and he accepted happily the burden of English translation. *Dr. Kalghatgi* is a renowned scholar of Indian philosophy and specially Jainology. He has translated the book in English with full zeal and great effort.

Dr. T. S. Devodoss, Professor, Deptt. of Philosophy, The University of Madras, took great pains to edit the English translation. Honourable *Dr. G. R. Damodaran*, Vice Chancellor, The University of Madras, has encouraged us by giving 'Foreword' to the book.

Our affectionate companion and renowned literary man *Sriyut Srichand Surana* 'Saras' took the responsibility of printing of the book with due intimacy.

Dr. Brij Mohan Jain, has very keenly and carefully carried out the tough work of Mss. & proof-revision exerting his full zeal.

We are grateful to all our aforesaid companions for the heartiest co-operation which they have rendered us.

We planned to give the book, three years before, in the hands of the readers; but due to unavoidable circumstances—the difficulty of press, the printing of book become undesirably late. Consequently, our inquisitive readers and financial co-operators have to wait long. We apologise for the inconvenience. But, lastly, we have a satisfaction, that we could give this long awaited precious work in the hands of our readers.

—Secretary

Sri Tarak Guru Granthalaya, Udaipur.

FOREWORD

The cultural heritage of India is pre-eminently represented by the Brahmanic and Sramanic traditions. Jainism and Buddhism are the chief representatives of the latter tradition. Lord Mahavira is the greatest exponent of Jaina thought.

Among the path-finders to the Supreme Reality, Bhagavan Mahavira stands pre-eminent. Vardhamana, universally known as Mahavira, the last of the twentyfour *Tirthankaras* of the Jainas, represents the ancient Jaina tradition of India, that of *ahimsa*, renunciation, sacrifice and asceticism. Though Mahavira's teachings are primarily followed by the Jainas, they are in fact applicable *mutatis mutandis* to the followers of other religious faiths. In essence, Lord Mahavira is a *Jagadguru*—a World Teacher whose teachings are meant for the entire mankind. Far from being a recluse concerned only with an inner spiritual experience, Lord Mahavira also associated himself closely in uplifting the social life of the people. He was instrumental for codifying all unsystematic mass of beliefs into a set of rigid rules of conduct for *munis*, i. e., monks and *shravakas* i. e., house-holders. The essence of Lord's teaching is embodied in the three-fold code known as *ratna-traya*. By following the three-fold path of Right Belief, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, as ordained by the Jainas, the soul is released from the cycles of birth and rebirth and attains the pure and blissful abode of the liberated souls.

Jainism is unique in the history of religious philosophy. Jainism, although usually referred to as a religion, is basically a way of life. The Jainas have always stood for the dignity of man and equality of all, and have preached the elevated ideal of *ahimsa* which is considered central to the Jaina ethical thought. As rightly observed by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, 'The Jainas were first to make *ahimsa*, non-violence, into a rule of life.

The present book is a classical work on Jaina Philosophy, rendered into English by Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi from the original

text—*Jaina Darshana : Swaroop aur Visleshana* written by the venerated monk *Devendra Muni* who belongs to the Svetambara Sthankawasi order. The author of the book is a renowned scholar and outstanding exponent of Jaina Philosophical thought. Devendra Muni's scholarship is astounding and deeply penetrating as is evident in his numerous writings and books written in Hindi, Gujarati and Rajasthani languages. As the author of more than hundred books, Devendra Muni ranks among the world's greatest exponents of Jaina thought.

The present work shows great mastery of the author over not only the doctrine he is expounding but also the realm of Indian thought. The book though primarily concerned with *Jaina Darshana*, Logic and Metaphysics, allude in the course of explaining its distinctive features to nearly all the other systems of Indian Philosophy. The book contains frequent references to Contemporary Western Philosophical thought. Devendra Muni's exposition is throughout admirable.

The book is divided into six parts dealing with discussions of *Prameya*, *Pramana* and a synoptic study of *Jaina Darshana*. The Introductory chapter will serve as an excellent aid to the study of the book.

Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, Professor and Head of the Department of Jainology and Prakrits in the University of Mysore has done a great job by translating into English, Devendra Muni's classical book—*Jaina Darshana : Swaroop aur Visleshana* written in Hindi, thereby drawing the attention of scholars over the globe to the fascinating domain of Jaina thought.

It is a high standard of editorial competence that is set here in this book by Dr. T. S. Devodoss, Reader in Philosophy at University of Madras.

Devendra Muni's admiration for Lord Mahavira and his teachings and for the civilization which embodied it makes this not only a learned but also a stimulating book. The world of scholars owe a debt of gratitude to Devendra Muni's monumental contribution to Jaina philosophical thought.

25th January, 1979

G. R. DAMODARAN
Vice-Chancellor
The University of Madras

P R E F A C E

Philosophy is the 'Divine Eye' of man. What man cannot see by his physical eyes, can see by the eye of philosophy. So, the philosophy is the vision of insight. In other words, philosophy is the medium to get into the inner core of reality.

The aim of philosophy is to discuss the nature of life and world. It also reconciles the problems, like—what are living and non-living realities, the elements constituting the world and how many are they, what are the effects of living and non-living substances on the different activities of the universe.

As these and such other questions are eternal and had disturbed the human brain since his invent, and the human mind remain always active to solve these problems, so it would be apt to say that the current of philosophy is as old as man itself or prehistoric.

When we come to historic period, we find that the systematic knowledge of philosophy came into existence. The first such country is India and the second is Greece. All the Eastern philosophies are effected by Indian philosophy and the Western by Greek philosophy.

All the Indian philosophies aim at the quest of soul and its nature. Indian philosophers are found crazy to know the nature of soul and God, in detail. Such tendency we do not find in Greek philosophers. Though they also have tried to know about the soul but could not go so deep as Indian philosophers. Though their style is charming, yet the outlook was mainly material. And because the European and American, i. e., all the Western philosophers are influenced by Greek philosophy so the western philosophy became material in outlook. But the trend of Indian thinkers always remained towards the soul, so Indian philosophy became spiritualistic by nature. Though Indian thinkers also discussed the nature and material reality, but to the extent it was pertaining to

soul. The complete treatise of matter was to understand the nature of soul more clearly. Being the main aim the quest of the soul Indian philosophers never neglected the life and activities of the physical world. In true sense, Indian philosophers have posited their faith in life and enhanced their continued steady foot-steps toward the attainment of ultimate truth.

Philosophy has logic and cogitation as its bases. It tries to understand the nature of reality and ultimate reality by reason and then induces to believe the accuracy and legitimacy of them. In this way, the faith and reason are in harmony in Indian philosophy.

Western philosophy is based on free thinking. It is theoretical in nature and its main characteristic is intelligence. It avoids authoritative valid knowledge.

The demarcation line between the Eastern and Western philosophy is the conception of salvation. All the main currents of Indian thinking merge in the ocean of salvation while western philosophy neglects this subject.

The various happenings and changes in nature leave man in astonishment. He desires to search and know the causes of these happenings ; and so is the aim of western philosophy to investigate and understand the real nature of this visible physical world. Hence it can be said that the western philosophy is the mental exercise. It does not do much to remove the miseries of mankind. It suggests no pathway to the ultimate good of man.

But according to Indian philosophers, misery is responsible for the origination of philosophy and they posit its aim the removal of misery. The prominency of Indian philosophy resides in the fact that it is helpful to us to attain the highest goal, i.e., salvation. The nature of elements is considered only due to the cause that such knowledge helps to remove misery.

Indian philosophy is not only a method of thinking but also a method of life. It has a specific view-point regarding the life and visible world. It is not only the science of reasoning, but an art of life. Indian philosophy does not satisfy itself by the search and

knowledge of Truth ; but it induces everyone to lead truthful life. Because of this, the philosophy and religion remained hand-in-hand in India. There is neither variance nor separation between the two.

Philosophy thoroughly examines the reality and then accepts it by logic and reasoning so that soul can get salvation ; and the religion is the practical way to obtain the spiritual truth. Thus philosophy ascertains our highest goal and religion is the way to attain it. Philosophy purifies the method of thinking while religion is the purification of living-method. Philosophy demonstrates the fundamental principles and religion brings them into action. It gives up the forbidable and follows the beneficial. Hence philosophy and religion are complement to one-another. In Indian philosophy conduct also found its valuable position along with cogitation. Thinking and reasoning find its culmination in conduct—right conduct.

Jaina philosophy bears in itself some salient features which place it at the foremost position among the world philosophies. On the one hand, Jaina philosophy dipped in the fathomless depth of ocean of spiritual science and solved the unriddle problems of spiritualism by the medium of different view-points and deep piercing reasoning; and on the other hand it demonstrates some specially astonishing maxims and principles in the science of matter long before modern scientific world. It had very minutely considered the conscious powers and energies ; and also a thorough analysis of the sciences, like—Zoology, Botany, Biology etc. It gave the unique theory of many-sided approach to understand from all directions the reality and the fundamental principles. Its style of truth-demonstration by the theory of relativity (syadvad) is a greatest acquisition. The maxims ascertained by Jaina philosophy about 'atom', 'sound' fulcrum of motion etc., are proved true by the modern science.

Really Jaina philosophy is unique and holds an out-topping place in the philosophic sphere of the world. In present volume light have been thrown on the special characteristics of this philosophy.

Vast literature has been published in Sanskrit, Prakrit and other languages pertaining to Jainology. This literature is of both types—simple and complex. It is a matter of happiness that the

different branches of Jaina literature are being published in National language—Hindi as well. Many important volumes also have been published dealing with Jainology. The present volume is also an attempt in the same direction. The vigilant readers would be the true judge of this work and they will estimate that how much I am successful in my this attempt. But I have no hesitation to say that religion, philosophy, literature, culture, agam, purana are my favourite subjects. While I wrote on these subjects, I get the indescribable joy, therefore, I am confident that readers will also obtain the same joy at the occasion of perusal of the book.

I got the commandment of reverend Gurudeva, an spiritual ascetic of highest order, Rajasthan Kasari, Upadhyaya *Pushkar Muniji* Maharaja that at the great auspicious occasion of 25th Nirvana centenary of Bhagavana Mahavira, such type of unique and original literature should be prepared which must be of ever-lasting value and by the perusal of that literature the vigilant readers should get instigation towards their spiritual upliftment beside increasing their knowledge. According to the desire of reverend gurudeva, I determined to prepare two books : one—comparative study of life of Bhagvana Mahavira. I devoted ten precious years in the perusal of pertaining literature and consequently a volume came into light entitled '*Bhagavana Mahavira : Ek Anushilana*'. In this voluminous research work the critical study of the life history of Bhagavana Mahavira has been described in the light of literature from the period of agamas i. e., 6th century B. C. to the modern times. The other volume I prepared pertaining to philosophy. For this I studied more than hundred books and invested many years. The book was published in 1975.

In the year 1975 we stayed for four rainy months in Poona (Maharashtra). At the inauguration occasion of the book entitled '*Jaina Darshana : Svarooṇa aur Vishleshana*' (Hindi) the dignitaries, like—Dr. S. Barlingay (Head of the Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Poona), Dr. Anand Prasad Dixit (Head of the Deptt. of Hindi), Dr. A. D. Batra etc. etc., were present and they appraised the book with full zeal.

Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi (Head of the department of Philosophy and Jainology, University of Mysore, Mysore) expressed his earnest feelings that this book should be translated into English so that the

readers and scholars of Eastern and Western philosophies by English medium may also be benefitted and English speaking world would become aware of Jaina Philosophy. *Dr. Kalghatgi* expressed his desire to translate the book in English to the renowned citizen of Mysore *Rikhaba Chand Ji Chhallani* and *Sri Chhallani* informed me accordingly I consented joyfully.

Dr. Kalghatgi is regarded as an authority in Jaina philosophy. He has good command on English language. Many merit works came out of his pen. He had fulfilled the job with due labour and vigilance. *Dr. T. S. Devodoss* (Professor, Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Madras) has edited the manuscript (English translation) taking full pains. I am grateful to both the learned persons. Words cannot express the pains they took.

Manuscript was given in the press for printing in 1978. It was estimated that two to three months would be sufficient time for printing the whole book ; but since then a chain of difficulties enveloped the fate of book. Unavoidable and ultra wire circumstances regarding the printing press continually hindered the publication of the book, even to say that due to the negligence and hostility of press management some pages of the manuscript were missed. A tedious problem aroused to face.

Dr. Brij Mohan Jain (Agra) solved this problem. He also took the burden of tedious work of proof-correction. In spite of hillarious efforts of *Dr. Kalghatgi* and *Dr. Devodoss* to give the manuscript quite correct, the description at some places could not be clear, due to the ignorance and negligence of typist, as the typist was unaware of philosophy and philosophic words and technical terms, so mistakes have been created. This was a hard nut to crack. *Dr. Brij Mohan Jain* also did this work with ability and to my satisfaction.

The cordial co-operation of *Srichand Surana 'Saras'* to get the book printed eye soothing and beautiful, will also be remembered.

The tremendous efforts of *Sri Surendrabhai* President of Sthanakvasi Jaina Gujrati Association, Madras, and *Sri Balwanibhai*, ease the path of publication of this book, as due to their attempts some of the main members of the association became the pre-publica-

tion customers of this volume and so created financial co-operation. Renowned social worker *C.L. Mehta, Indrachandji Mehta, Madhukar-bhai Mehta* etc., also rendered valuable co-operation.

Whatever good is in this volume, it is due to the kind mercy of my Gurudeva Upadhyaya Sri *Pushkar Muniji Maharaj*, who is always like a light house to me. Words cannot express his mercy.

Respected mother Mahasati *Prabhavati Maharaj* is the greatest energy to me. Alas ! she has gone to the father's abode on 27th January, 1982. It would be a matter of more joy if she could see this book printed by her own eyes ; but nothing can be done. Which cannot be cured must be endured. It is my solemn wish that in the remembrance of Holy mother I may enrich the treasure of literature.

It would not be proper at this occasion to forget my elder sister Mahasati *Pushpavati Maharaj* ; because she is a perennial source of instigation to me to step forward in the field of knowledge.

The serviceful co-operation of my *sramana* companions—*Ramesh Muni, Rajendra Muni, Naresh Muni* is of great importance in my writing work. It would be negligence on my part, if I donot remember their polite behaviour and co-operation.

Lastly, I am grateful to all the writers, whose books are referred in preparing the present volume.

Rishabh Janma Jayanti
5th April, 1983
Harakhachanda Kothari Bhavan
2 Chopasni Road
Jodhpur.

Devendra Muni Shastri



A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

Part I

Nature of Darsana and H-1

Darsanika Literature

1. *DARŚANA : A SYNOPTIC STUDY* H-2
 2. *JAINA CANONICAL LITERATURE* ,
AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
-

11.2

Darsana : A Synoptic Study

Darśana is an expression of man's inherent capacity for intellectual discrimination. The word *darśana* is derived from the root term *dr̥ś*, to see. *Dr̥śyate anena iti darśanarth*, signifies the meaning that it is perception. Perception may be of different types like sense-perception, logical enquiry or insight of the nature of soul. However, *darśana* in its true sense would refer to the intuitive experience aided by intellectual discrimination. *Darśana* would mean the perception of *Ātman* and not merely knowledge of the physical world. It enables one to gain the inner meaning of life and the world. *Darśana* means 'direct knowledge', 'intuitive experience'. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan holds the view that "*darśana* is not an intuition, however much it may be allied to it. Perhaps the word is advisedly used, to indicate a thought system acquired by intuitive experience and sustained by logical argument."¹ The seer who has *darśana* gains a wider perspective of the view of the life and the world than the scientist and the poet. The scientist looks at reality from a particular aspect and from analytical point of view, although he draws certain conclusions guided by flashes of intuitive knowledge. The poet has, as his subject, infinite beauty of the whole world in all its manifestations. But the seer, who is a philosopher, looks at life and the world from the synoptic point of view. His outlook is much wider in its scope and includes diverse points of view. He is not bound by the

1 *Indian Philosophy*, (London : George Allen & Unwin Limited, 1966), Vol. I, p. 43.

limitations of particular aspects of the subject as the scientist is. He views life steadily and sees it in all its comprehensiveness. As Plato observes, a philosopher (*dārṣanika*) is "the spectator of all time and existence". *Darṣana* is the whole-view as revealed to the soul-sense. Man is a rational animal and rationality is the chief differentia which distinguishes him from others. He thinks about the nature of the different things of the world. *Darṣana* originated from the moment when man began to think and cogitate. The antiquity of *darṣana* could be traced to man himself. There have been divergent approaches to the understanding of the origin of *darṣana*, based on the prevailing circumstances. Some have laid emphasis upon the intellectual exercise, while others have given primary importance to the aspect of wisdom. *Darṣana* stands for a philosophical perspective, a *Weltanschauung*. It means the view of the world. There are some thinkers who contend that *darṣana* is the perception of the self. Thus, the varied viewpoints may be traced to the circumstances which prevailed during particular periods of time.

ORIGIN OF DARŚANA H 3

Faith 11 19

Some thinkers say that the origin of *darṣana* lies in intellectual enquiry. It is believed that *darṣana* begins from the exact moment, one asks the question : 'Why?'. Before the commencement of the age of *darṣana*, there was the age of faith (*śraddhā*). Statements of an authority, like a prophet, were implicitly accepted as true in nature. For instance, we find in recorded history, utterances of great prophets like The Buddha and Mahāvira and the statements of Manu were accepted implicitly as *ipso facto* Truths. It may be noted in the context, that faith marks the starting-point of one's journey towards the ultimate goal. It also indicates the first vision of truth. It is considered as a great moral virtue and absolutely essential for a spiritual aspirant for his realisation of the Supreme, according to the Indian tradition. For instance, the *Rgveda* praises faith.¹ The *Gītā* proclaims that only the faithful gains knowledge.²

1 *Rgveda*, 10.151, 1-5.

2 *Gītā*, 4.39.

H 4 Logic

This gave way to the place of reason. In the process of intellectual enquiry, man began to get hold on the understanding of the phenomena of nature. The cardinal dictum in this age was the question : "What is the nature of Reality ?". The criterion of the origin of philosophy lies in the inquiry into the nature of reality.

H 4 Wonder

Some philosophers contend that philosophy had its origin in curiosity to understand Nature's phenomena which was baffling to the finite mind. The World of Nature thwarted the imaginations of the poet and the seer. The sublimity of nature's beauty, the grandeur and the fragrance of blooming flowers, the fierce wind blowing, the sunshine, the rapturous scenes of the flowing of rivers and the roaring of seas, the dazzling-twinkling stars in the sky amidst the encircling beauty of moon's light—all the aspects of nature's delight were the subjects of philosophical enquiry into the nature of its origin and creation. The Greek philosophers hold the view that the origin of philosophy lies in 'wonder'. To think and to wonder by looking at the vicissitudes of life is philosophy.

H 4 Doubt

The origin of modern philosophy is to be traced to this early tendency of doubting spirit and also to the questioning attitude. Francis Bacon, for instance, began to doubt the teachings of the Church. He aimed at bringing about a synthesis between science and philosophy on the basis of integration, and he ended with founding philosophy on the solid foundation of intuitive experience. It may be noted here that science gives us knowledge, but only philosophy alone gives us wisdom. Science is analytical description while philosophy is synthetic interpretation. "Men are not animals erect," said Francis Bacon, "but immortal gods." He contended that man must war only on the obstacles that nature offers to the triumph of man.

Descartes too stressed the need of 'methodic doubt' as the cobweb-clearing prerequisite of honest thought. He built his super-structure of mathematical philosophy based on the notion of 'doubt'. Immanuel Kant based his philosophy on the critique of

knowledge and gave a formalistic philosophy of the 'Noumenon'. Similarly, the rationalistic pluralism was based on the methods used by Descartes. Thus, we find that Western philosophers adopted the method of 'doubt' in analysing the verities of life. Indian philosophers have based their development of philosophical thought on the aspect of the 'innate curiosity' of man to comprehend the nature of Reality.

DARŚANA AND PHILOSOPHY H.3

Darśana and philosophy are often referred to as synonyms. However, there is a primary distinction in the connotation of the terms. *Darśana* leads to the knowledge of the self. The ultimate end of *darśana* is to know oneself. The starting-point of Indian thought is its emphasis on man himself. If we take the utterances of the important philosophers of each tradition into consideration, 'Man know thyself' may be said to be the chief advice of all the four traditions. Socrates said it in so many words. The *Upaniṣada* did the same when they exhorted man : *atmānam viddhi* (know thyself). Philosophy is the intellectual pursuit of the understanding of the ultimate reality. It is, as a philosopher puts it, an unusually rigorous effort to think consistently. It is an intellectual gymnastic, a luxury of the mind. But *darśana* has a practical purpose—in one's efforts to free oneself from the bondage of worldly existence. It aims at seeking solace in the eternal bliss free from the empirical adjuncts of this life. In this sense, *darśana* expresses the lofty grandeur of intuition. *Darśana*, according to the Indian tradition, has not remained restricted to the academic pursuits of understanding the nature of the ultimate reality to be sought in philosophy. It has transcended the narrow empirical barriers and seeks to realise the highest truth. In the West, philosophy is considered merely as an academic pursuit of knowledge for knowledge sake. In India, the seers have gained the vision of reality. Hence, the term '*darśana*' as applied to Indian thought becomes significant.

DARŚANA AND SCIENCE H.3

In this scientific and materialistic age, we find that men are generally drawn towards gaining materialistic pleasures in life and seem to neglect the spiritual values of life. Perhaps the reason lies in this that men are caught in the web of *samsāra* and fail to realize the deeper significance of life beyond this mundane world. *Darśana*

enables one to seek Truth through meditation while science tries to understand the mysteries of the world through experimental investigation. Science is analytic, while philosophy and *darśana* are synthetic in approach. The conclusions of science are only intellectual shorthands and are provisional. Scientific hypothesis are liable to be rejected. In fact, science proceeds to develop on the basis of the rejection of earlier hypothesis in favour of more acceptable forms. The Newton's law is no longer accepted today. Einstein's Theory of Relativity may also be overshadowed by a more cogent hypothesis at a later date.

Darśana is centred round the understanding and realisation of the self, while the main task of science is to comprehend the mysteries of nature. *Darśana* meditates on the *Ātman* and *Parātman*. Science analyses the intricacies of nature and discovers the uniformities of the laws of nature. *Darśana* looks at the universe as a integrated whole. Science attempts to comprehend the diverse aspects of the universe. Science looks at reality piecemeal. *Darśana* gives prominence to reason, meditation and intuition. On the contrary, science lays emphasis on analytical experience, experimental observation and deductive analysis. The conclusions of science are tentative in nature because they are subject to further investigations. *Darśana* gives a synoptic picture of reality and, therefore, it discloses the aspects of truth and not mere probabilities. Yet modern thinkers in their enthusiasm for understanding the nature have given exclusive importance to scientific investigations and analyses.

Darśana can be said to be the vision. It is the higher intuition by which realisation of the supreme reality becomes true. A scientist looks at reality through the external eye, although he uses reason and intuition to understand the nature of reality. A seer (*dārśanika*) transcends the ordinary perceptions of the outer eye and sees the highest reality through the inner eye. *Darśana* really enables one to understand the world and life in its entirety. As Matthew Arnold said : "*Darśana* looks at life steadily and looks at it as a whole." Thus, we find, *Darśana* embraces in its fold the manifold aspects of scientific knowledge and investigations and philosophical pursuits as well. Bertrand Russell observes : "the utility of science is twofold—one is that it understands everything that falls within the field of its experimentation ; the other is that whatever is under-

stood should be brought within the scope of rules." Russell's analysis shows that science can be understood from two angles—one is with reference to its methodology, and the other with reference to the subject-matter.

The methodological approaches of science and *Darśana* stand on different footings. While science uses empirical tools of observation and experimentation, *darśana* adopts the transcendental modes of meditation and vision.

Science studies the universe in its various aspects. It is therefore analytic. Each science studies a particular aspect of life. For instance, Biology studies life, Physics studies matter, while Psychology studies the mind. Each science has its own limited field of experience as its subject-matter. The physical sciences study the physical matter and its modifications. Biological Sciences study life and its expressions. Behavioural Sciences like Psychology study mind and its states. The fundamental approach of all these sciences is empirical in nature. But *darśana* uses the synthetic method in which reason and intuition are synthesised and harmonised, in order to present a comprehensive picture of reality.

4.3 DARŚANA AND RELIGION

We have earlier noted that *Darśana* is one of the most characteristic and fundamental thoughts of Indian philosophy—the meditative and mystical attitude of mind towards an idealistic conception of the universe. Manu, the famous Hindu Law-giver, gives a clear perception of the notion of *darśana* thus :

"He who is possessed of true insight
(*darśanasampanna*) is not bound by deeds,
But the man destitute of insight (*darśanavihīna*) is
involved in the cycle of existence."¹

F. H. Bradley observes ; "Religion is rather the attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being." It is also contended by philosophers that religion is 'natural' because the ultimate realities must be a 'natural' part of the universe of which man becomes conscious. Religion enables every man what he is, and helps him to say, 'Here is reality': As Stanley Cook

¹ *Manusmṛti*, VI. 74.

observes : "Religion primarily involves some immediate consciousness of transcendent realities of supreme personal worth, vitally influencing life and thought, expressing themselves in forms which are conditioned by the entire stage of development reached by the individual and his environment, and tending to become more explicit and static in mythologies, theologies, philosophies, and scientific doctrines."¹

Against this background, let us now compare and contrast the roles of *darśana* and religion in all spheres of human activity.

Darśana and religion are both essential for man to gain self-realisation or God-realisation. Divergent views have been stated by scholars in regard to their mutual relationships. There are some who hold the view that they are identical. Some others say that they are entirely different, two poles set asunder. Whatever may be the opposing viewpoints, we cannot deny the fact that both are fundamentally essential for man to reach higher heights of spiritual progress. Considered thus, they are supplementary to each other. Reason, as we know, is the differentia of man. It is the prerogative of man. When reason looks within itself, when man introspects, *darśana* is born ; but when reason projects into the external world and translates thoughts into action, then religion arises. When religion and *darśana* have in common is the they are fundamental to the way of life of an individual or of a society, and it is not surprising that they should be closely connected. It is generally said that "religion is morality tinged with emotion." Indeed, it has often been held that morality is wholly dependent on religion, that a man who has no religion cannot have any morality. Whatever may be the theories of the origin of religion, religion is born when the Truth arrived at by reason is translated into action in the form of moral codes. For instance, mere knowledge that 'it is good to tell the Truth' is not sufficient unless it is translated into action. Truth-speaking, would then have mere academic interest. Unless we practice speaking Truth, it will not have any meaning. However, philosophers like Socrates said, "Virtue is knowledge" and "to know virtue is to be virtuous." According to Socrates, "Knowledge is not mere collection of informations nor academic facts, it is realisation. To know is to

1 *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* edited by James Hastings, (New York : T & T Clark, 1956) Vol. 10, p. 693.

realise." In this sense again, *darśana* and religion are two main aspects of the experience. Without religion, *darśana* would be merely delusive. *Darśana* becomes divine when it is strongly backed by religion. In other words, *darśana* and religion are two inseparable entities of life. Besides, they are complementary to each other. Religion without *darśana* is blind and *darśana* without religion is heretic. Bereft of *darśana* which gives the rational and intuitional basis for its belief and practice, religion would degenerate into mere blind belief and become only a collection of superstitious practices without any rational and intuitional basis. The early primitive forms of religion are blind and have no rational or intuitional basis. On the other hand, *darśana* without the fervour of religion would be empty as it would not flow with emotion and noble sentiments. The two are necessary for the realisation of the divine nature of man. Human life would be meaningless and devoid of the higher values of life, without the harmonious blending of *darśana* and religion in man's life and activity. A synthesis of the two would bring about a harmonious development in man's personality and endow him with a balanced view of life.

†. > DARŚANA AND LIFE

It may be asked : What is the relation of *darśana* with life as such ? The answer to it, is suggestive of the fact that man is given to thinking. Man continues to think and thinks constantly. As Aristotle said, "Man is a rational animal." Rationality is his chief characteristic. Reasoning is his prerogative and through it combined with his intuitive power, man seeks to build a structure of philosophy and *darśana*. Śaṅkara sums up the unique nature of man thus : "*Karma-jñānādhikārāt*." He is one who is capable of both knowledge and moral freedom. When man ceases to think and to intuit, he falls down to the status of an animal. In short, it is impossible for a human being to live without *darśana* or faith. Man's life is a saga of constant and coherent thinking. First, the knowledge of the 'self' dawns on him and then of the 'other' as related to him. The knowledge, in fact, the realisation of the relation of the self with the other, is necessary for the realisation of one's highest goal of perfection. To meditate on the fundamental facts and values of life, to put them to the test of reason and to act up to the ideals and values of life, is the expression of the relation of *darśana* to life.

Life compels man to live in society. He is gregarious, selfish and yet a rational and moral animal. Self-development is possible only through his active social participation which implies the observance of ethical codes of life. Man's true destiny is not the conquest of his external nature but the conquest of his own self because *ātmanigraha* or the suppression of the lower self alone indicates the greatness of the human spirit. Man is not a 'lost' creature. He is ever capable of self development. Self-development is possible only through gaining philosophical truths. This is made possible only through *darśana*. Thus, we find the inseparability of *darśana* to life.

DARŚANA AND THE WORLD +1.3

Having analysed the relation between *darśana* and life, let us now attempt to understand the significance of the relation of *darśana* to the external world. Knowledge of the relation between life and the external world would give us the idea of the extent to which *darśana* values the relation and the extent to which man understands his relation to the values of life as such.

The world is as much the subject-matter of *darśana* as life is. It studies life and the world alike. In the analysis of philosophical thought, there are two fundamental streams—the idealistic and the realistic. The two are opposed to each other in their thought-structure. The realist affirms the reality of the external world, independent of cognitive consciousness. The idealist affirms the priority of cognitive consciousness and the reality of idea independent of the external world. In other words, the realist posits the existence and reality of the external object independent of our knowledge of it. The idealist posits the reality of an idea because we know the external object and we considered it to be real. The different trends of idealistic thought are—Subjective Idealism, Objective Idealism and Absolute Idealism. Similarly, there are different types of realism, such as Naive Realism and Critical Realism. Materialism would claim its relation to realism. Some contend that realism leads to philosophy of matter and idealism leads to the philosophy of spirit. In Indian thought, Advaita of Śaṅkara, *Vijñānavāda* of Vasubandhu and *Śūnyavāda* of Nāgārjuna are forms of idealism. Advaita affirms the identity of *Ātman* and *Brahman*, and the external world as an appearance. Vasubandhu states that the world and its modifications are the forms of *vijñāna* and the real can be described as the *ālayavijñāna*

(store-house of consciousness). Nāgārjuna goes further than the *Vijñānavādins* and *Advaitvādins* by affirming that everything including the external world, the self and God, is unreal. Even *dharma* and *buddhi* are unreal. The real is the *śūnya*. The philosophy of Nāgārjuna is intricate in nature and poses problems to understand it. It is difficult to understand the philosophy of Nāgārjuna. Some have interpreted the *śūnya* in the absolutist sense of the term. Some others have interpreted the *śūnya* in the nihilist sense as the 'void'.

Like the idealist tendencies, we have the realist schools of thought expressed in the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* schools of thought. *Śāṅkhya* thought may be considered to be realistic in a sense, because it posits the reality of two fundamental principles—*Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. In these philosophies, the empirical as well as the transcendental spiritual reality have been accepted. The Jaina gives the *anekānta* point of view. It is realistic and empirical in approach to the understanding of reality.

A study of Western philosophy shows that in the Fifth century B. C., Parmenides affirmed that real is the Being and not becoming. Being is. In this sense, knowledge and the known are identical. This is the beginning of idealist thought in the West. Socrates was primarily a moral philosopher. His main object was to make man good. Plato emphasised the primacy of the spirit. But, he built a structure of philosophy which may be more realistic than idealistic. Plato raised the ideas of Socrates to the metaphysical level and placed them in the world of ideas. Ideas are real, objective, eternal and perfect. They live in the world of ideas. Aristotle was more earthly than Plato. He affirmed that 'Form' and 'Matter' are the two ultimate principles and ultimate realities. Pure Form and pure Matter do not exist in the world, but they are real. The world consists of form and matter. In European philosophy, Descartes is considered to be the father of modern philosophy. He started with the method of doubt and built a philosophy on the solid foundation of mathematics. With him commenced the Rationalist School of Thought in modern philosophy.

SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY (DARŚANA)

It has been alleged by Western thinkers that Indian philosophy

is pessimistic and because of its emphasis on renunciation and self-denial, it has lost the status of an academic pursuit and cannot be aptly called philosophy. The primary object of philosophy in India is practical. It aims at freeing man from the bondage of this world which is full of misery. In this, it may be argued that Indian thought is pessimistic. But pessimism in Indian thought is only used as a means and never as an end in itself. In this sense again, all philosophy is pessimistic. If we consider the ultimate end of Indian philosophy, we can say that it is not pessimistic at all, because the aim of Indian thought is to free one from the misery of this life and to lead him to transcend the misery and to attain the highest bliss. Misery is a fact of life. But the highest bliss is also the fact of experience which can be attained by every one who transcends the misery of this world. This can be achieved by *jñāna-mārga* (the path of knowledge), *bhakti-mārga* (the path of devotion), and *Karma mārga* (the path of action). The Jainas affirm that the way to self-realisation is the synthesis of right intuition (*samyag-darśana*), right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) and right conduct (*samyag-cāritra*). In this sense, Indian thought is not pessimistic but on the contrary, highly optimistic. It is melioristic.

Indian philosophers aimed at divination of man. Their main object was to impress upon the people that enjoyment of the pleasures of life should not be the primary end of life. They exhorted the people to give up indulgence in worldly or sensual pleasure and adopt an attitude of renunciation. Whether it was the *Advaitavāda* of Śaṅkarācārya, *Vīṣiṣṭādvaita* of Rāmānujācārya, *Śūnyavāda* of Nāgārjuna, *Vijñānavāda* of Vasubandhu or *Ahimsā* and *Anekāntavāda* of Mahāvīra, all of them inspired the people of their age to give up enjoyment of pleasures and to adopt the spirit of renunciation and penance. The ultimate object of philosophy, as we have seen earlier, is the attainment of bliss. Bliss is not to be confused with sense-pleasure, nor with happiness of this world. It is pure bliss, which the soul in its pure state can enjoy without any obstruction from the empirical adjuncts of this world because the enjoyment of bliss is the pure state or characteristic of the soul. Pleasures of the world are fleeting and ephemeral; they lead to misery. The ultimate state of bliss is the pure state which the Indian philosophers stressed. Freedom from misery was considered by some, like the Buddha, as the state of *nirvāṇa*. Some others, like the Vedāntins and also the Jainas, gave a positive

import to the state of perfection expressing pure bliss. They called this *mokṣa*. Indian philosophers gave importance to the path of self-denial and rejection of the pleasures of this world not out of the sense of frustration but with the supreme object of the attainment of the highest state of peace and bliss.

The outlook of the ancient Indian thought was, therefore, practical and pragmatic. Its aim, as we have said earlier, is to lead men to the highest end of perfection, not of the worldly existence but of the pure nature of the soul. The Indian '*Weltanschauung*' was, therefore, primarily spiritual and the translation of the spiritual attitude to the worldly activity. Thus, the stress in Indian thought is on 'inwardness' which has often been wrongly understood as an emphasis on 'other worldliness'. But it is unjust to regard the Indian attitude towards this world and its people as one of indifference or hatred. Some critics of Indian thought believe that the Indian pursuit of spirituality is a selfish quest and that the saint and the sage are concerned with their own salvation. "This criticism," observes Dr T.M P. Mahādevan, "is the result of a gross misunderstanding of the Indian ideal of spirituality..... God-realisation or self-realisation is a state of perfection where there can be no room for even the least trace of selfishness. For the man of wisdom there is not the distinction of 'mine' and 'not-mine'. He regards the whole world as his household."¹

Thus, in India, philosophy is to be lived and it is not merely an academic pursuit. In the West, philosophy was primarily an academic pursuit to be studied in class-room. Indian seers did not merely get to know the reality, but they experienced the reality and they lived the spirit of reality. Siddhasena Divākara, Dharmakīrti, etc., did not toy with the idea of knowing the nature of Truth in the academic sense, but the realisation of the Truth permeated every fibre of their being. Theirs was the realisation of Truth. The Westerner remained in his ivory tower without any conscious effort to translate the truth in everyday life. It remained far from the madding crowd. But the supreme aim of Indian philosophical tradition was the kindly light that led men from untruth to truth, from darkness to

1 *Ayam nijaḥ parovetī gaṇanā laghucetsām.
Udāraçaritānām tu vasudhaiva kuṣumbakam.*

light and from death to immortality.¹ It has led us from indulgence in worldly pleasures to renunciation of pleasures. It is not merely a piece of antiquarian investigation that Indian thought deserves study. It is of immense value to the student of philosophy and the study of Indian philosophy alone can give a right perspective about the past of India. A study of Indian philosophy will enable us to adopt a balanced view of life and healthy perspective of the situations in life. It is the synthetic vision of India that has made philosophy comprehend several sciences which have become differentiated in modern time.²

Swāmī Vivekānanda describes India as "the blessed *puṇya-bhūmi* and as the land from where came the founders of religions from the ancient times, deluging the earth again and again with the pure and perennial waters of spiritual truth."³ Spiritual life is the true genius of India. She has stood like a 'Rock of Ages', and has survived the ravages of time because her civilization, which is inspired by the spiritual insight of holy men, is marked by a certain moral integrity, a fundamental loyalty, a fine balance of individual desires and social demands. It is the emphasis on spiritual freedom as the *summum bonum* that makes the message of Indian culture supremely significant to the modern man who is afflicted with the malady of excessive outwardness.⁴ The men of God have felt that the salvation of India did not lie in imitating the West but in holding fast to Indian ideas and institutions and in purifying and elevating them. Their world-view had an undeniable influence as a practical guide to life, individual and collective national and transcendental.⁵ It should be noted that India did make the first attempt to solve the most vital problem, the problem of harmony between life and spirit, of which the vision came to her seers almost at the very dawn of her spiritual history. Besides, the application of moral truths to the facts of social life is the essence of Indian philosophical tradition. □

1 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.

2 S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, (Allen & Unwin : London, 1961), Vol. I, p. 31.

3 Swāmī Vivekānanda, *The Complete Works of Swāmī Vivekānanda*, Part III, 1922, p. 105.

4 T.S. Devadoss, *Sarvodaya and the Problem of Political Sovereignty*, (University of Madras, 1974) p. 9.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 30.

Jaina Canonical Literature And Its Development

The Jaina philosophical literature is classified into five broad divisions, and it is possible on the basis of this division to understand the nature of Jaina philosophical literature from the time of Bhagavān Mahāvīra—the twenty-fourth *Tīrthaṅkara* to the present day. The five divisions are as follows :

1. The Age of *Āgamas*.
2. The Age of the *Anekānta* view.
3. The Age of the establishment of *Pramāṇaśāstra*.
4. The Age of the Neo *Nyāya*.
5. The Modern Age of collection and editing.

THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS

The period of the *Āgamas* may be considered to begin with the time of *parinirvāṇa* of *tīrthaṅkara* Mahāvīra (Vikrama-pūrva 470) and extended for thousand years. The teachings of Mahāvīra were collated by the *Gaṇadharas*. Mahāvīra gave the conceptual content of the *Jain-śāstras* (in the form of *artharūpa*) and the same has been presented in the form of literature expressed in language by Gaṇadharas. These works are called '*Sūtrāgama*'. The *Āgama* literature is, therefore, of two forms : 1. *Arthāgama*, and 2. *Sūtrāgama*. The *Āgama* literature has been presented for the sake of the study by *Ācāryas*, and therefore, it has also been called, '*Gaṇipīṭakas*'. The collection of the teachings of Bhagavān Mahāvīra has been made into 12 works and has been called *Dvādaśāṅgi*. They are : (1)

Ācārāṅga, (2) *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, (3) *Sthānāṅga*, (4) *Samavāyāṅga*, (5) *Bhagavati*, (6) *Jñātādharma-kathā*, (7) *Upāsakadaśā*, (8) *Antakṛtdaśā*, (9) *Anuttarapāpātikadaśā*, (10) *Praśnavyākaraṇa*, (11) *Vipāka*, and (12) *Drṣṭivāda*.

From the point of view of structure, the *Āgama* literature has been divided into two types: (1) *Aṅga-praviṣṭa* and (2) *Anaṅga-praviṣṭa*. The collection and systematic arrangements of the original teachings of Bhagvān Mahāvīra by the *Gaṇadharas* are considered as *Aṅga-praviṣṭa*. The writings of the later elder *munis* are called *Anaṅga-praviṣṭa*. The entire canonical literature, except the twelve *aṅgas* (*Dvādaśāṅga*), has been called *Anaṅga-praviṣṭa*. It has also been suggested that literature which comprised the dialogues between Tirthaṅkara Mahāvīra and his disciples concerning the fundamental questions relating to the triple function of 'generation or origination,' 'destruction' and 'permanence' of a thing is called '*Aṅga-praviṣṭa*'. It was on the basis of the teachings of Bhagvān Mahāvīra that the elder *munis* wrote works explaining his teachings. These works constitute '*Anaṅga-praviṣṭa*'. The former is the *Aṅga* literature and the latter can be considered as sacred literature constituting the fringe of the *Aṅga* literature.

The twelvefold *Dvādaśāṅga* occupies the most prominent place in the Jain canonical literature. *Dvādaśāṅgī* is valid by its own inherent nature. It is self-valid. The validity of other canonical writings forming the *Anaṅga-praviṣṭa* is determined to the extent of its consistency with the contents of the *Dvādaśāṅga*. *Anaṅga-praviṣṭa* is also valid because its statements are consistent with the truths formulated in the *Aṅga* literature.

Anaṅga-praviṣṭa Āgama literature can again be divided into two types: (a) the writings of the *Sthaviras* (Elders) and (b) the writings which have come down from the original teachings and from tradition. It is called '*Niryūdhā*'. *Niryūdhā Āgamas* are extracts from *Dvādaśāṅgī* or *Pūrvas*. They are classified as follows:

(1) *Daśavaikālika* (2) the Second *Śrutaskandha* of *Ācārāṅga* (3) *Nisītha* (4) *Vyavahāra* (5) *Bṛhatkalpa*, and (6) *Daśāśruta-skandha*. *Daśavaikālika* was preached by Ārya Śāyambhava to his son Maṇaka.¹ The other *Āgamas* were taught by Kevali Bhadrabāhu.

1 *Sāhitya Aur Saṃskṛti*, pp. 29-30.

Śyāmārya was the author of *Prajñāpanā*. *Anuyogadvāra* was of Āryarakṣita and *Nandī* was written by Devavāchak.

From the point of view of language, the canonical literature can be classified into two eras : the first era is from 400 B.C. to 100 A.D. The *Āgamas* written during this period have been written in *Ardhamāgadhī*. The second era can be stated to be from 100 A.D. to 500 A.D. and the writings in this period are in Jaina *Mahārāṣṭrī Prākṛt*.

In *Sthānāṅga* and *Nandīsūtra* we get two types of division : 1. *Aṅga-praviṣṭa* and 2. *Aṅga-bāhya*. We get similar distinctions in the *Digambara* literature also. *Āgama* literature has been described on the basis of the analogy of *puruṣa*, the human personality having different organs. *Āgama* literature has, therefore, been referred to as '*Āgama puruṣa*'. *Aṅga-praviṣṭa* literature was considered as *Aṅga-sthānīya* and the twelve *sūtras* were given the status of *Upāṅga* (*Upāṅga-sthānīya*). As the human body has organs like, two legs, shoulders, neck and the head, similarly the *Āgama puruṣa* can be considered on that analogy as having organs of this type. The twelve *aṅgas* are considered to be the organs of the *Śruta-puruṣa* and therefore they have been called '*Aṅgapraviṣṭa*'. The ears and eyes etc., have been considered as *upāṅgas*. Similarly, the twelve *upāṅgas* are mentioned as '*Upāṅgas*'.

ANGA	UPAṅGA
<i>Ācārāṅga</i>	<i>Aupapātika</i>
<i>Sūtrakṛtāṅga</i>	<i>Rājaprasānīya</i>
<i>Sthānāṅga</i>	<i>Jīvābhigama</i>
<i>Samavāyāṅga</i>	<i>Prajñāpanā</i>
<i>Bhagavātī</i>	<i>Jambūdvīpaprajñapti</i>
<i>Jñātādharmakathā</i>	<i>Sūryaprajñapti</i>
<i>Upāsakadaśā</i>	<i>Candraprajñapti</i>
<i>Antakṛtdaśā</i>	<i>Kalpikā</i>
<i>Anuttaraupapātikadaśā</i>	<i>Kalpāvataṁsika</i>
<i>Prasnavyākaraṇa</i>	<i>Puṣpikā</i>
<i>Vipāka</i>	<i>Puṣpa-cūlika</i>
<i>Dṛṣṭivāda</i>	<i>Vṛṣṇidaśā</i>

The term '*Upāṅga*' was first used by Ācārya Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya*.¹

The term '*Chedasūtra*' was first used in the *Āvaśyakaniryukti*² and later in the commentaries (*Bhāṣyas*). There are four *Cheda-sūtras* : (i) *Vyavahāra*, (ii) *Bṛhatkalpa*, (iii) *Nisītha* and (iv) *Daśāśruta-skandha*.

The use of the term '*Mūla*' is of very later date. *Daśavaikālīka* and *Uttarādhyayana* have been considered to be the '*Mūlasūtras*'. *Nandī* and *Anuyogadvāra* are the *Cūlikā-sūtras*.

In this way, the *Aṅgabāhya-śrūta* literature has been classified in different ways from time to time. An elaborate discussion on this question has been given in the work entitled *Sāhitya aur Saṁskṛti* which may be referred to for a detailed study.

The canonical literature available today has been scribed by Devardhigaṇī Kṣamāśramaṇa. *Āgama* literature was not in the written form before this time. In the second century after the *Parinirvāṇa* of Bhagavān Mahāvīra, a severe famine struck for over twelve years. Soon after the famine, a Council was organised in which the *Āgamas* were for the first time recited. The second attempt at crystallising the *Āgamas* was made during the period between *Vira Nirvāṇa Samvat* 827 to 840. Two recitations were held during this period—one at Mathura and the other at Vallabhi. The Council at Mathura was presided over by Ārya Skandila and the second Council at Vallabhi was presided over by Ācārya Nāgārjuna. These recitations have been referred to as Māthuri and Vallabhi recitations. But during all these three recitations the *Āgamas* were not put in writing. The work of writing the *Āgamas* was done in Vallabhi after *Vira Nirvāṇa* 980 under the guidance of Devardhigaṇī Kṣamāśramaṇa. The period upto this were full of obstacles due to effects of many severe famines. Much of the *Śrūta* which had been handed down by oral tradition was forgotten ; but whatever was possible to be revived by memory was recited and written down. The *Āgamas* were collected in fragments. Whatever was available, was systematically organised and presented in the form of *Āgamic* works.

1 *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya*, *Ṭikā*, p. 23.

2 *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*, 777.

The present form of *Āgamas* is to be, therefore, traced to the work done by Devardhigaṇī. He collected the *Aṅga* and the *Aṅga-bāhya* literature and edited them. He is, therefore, considered as the editor of the *Āgama* literature in the present form.¹

Philosophical Discussions in the *Āgamas* 4.4

There is a good deal of philosophical discussion in the *Āgamas* :

(i) *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*. (ii) *Prajñāpanā*, (iii) *Bhagavati*, (iv) *Nandī*, (v) *Sthānāṅga*, (vi) *Samavāyāṅga* and (vii) *Anuyogadvāra*.

Sūtrakṛtāṅga refutes the prevailing philosophical schools of thought. In this work, Naturalistic Monism (*Bhūtādvaitavāda*) has been refuted, and the doctrine of separate and independent soul is established. The God and Soul Monism (*Brahmādvaitavāda*) is also refuted. In its place, the doctrine of the plurality of souls is established. The doctrine of *karma* and its effects have been proved. The theistic concept of God has been rejected. It is established that the world (*samsāra*) is beginningless (*anādī*) and endless (*ananta*). Several other theories of philosophy prevailing at that time, like *Akriyāvāda*, *Vinayavāda*, *Ajñānavāda* were refuted and the validity of *Kriyāvāda* (activism) was propounded.

In the *Prajñāpanā* we get a detailed discussion about the nature of the soul (*jīva*) from various points of view.

In the *Rājaprasaṇīya*, after an elaborate refutation of the atheistic thought, there is an exposition of the *Āīman* and the other world with copious illustrations and expositions of different concepts.

In the *Bhagavati* we get a beautiful study of the topics like, *Naya*, *Pramāṇa*, *Saptabhaṅgī*, and *Anekāntavāda*.

Nandīsūtra discusses the nature and types of knowledge.

1 Śrī Devardhigaṇī Kṣamāśramaṇena śrīvīrād aśītyadhikanavaśata (980) varṣe jātena dvādaśavarṣīya durbhikṣavaśād bahutarasādhuvyāpattau bahuśrutavicchittau ca jātayā.....bhavyalokopakārāya śrutavyaktaye ca śrīsaṅghāgrahāt mṛtāvaśīṣtatadākālīna sarvasādhūn Vallabhyāmākārya tanmukhād vicchinnāvaśīṣtān nyūnādhikān truṭitāātruṭitān āgamālapakān anukrameṇa svamatyā saṃkalayya pustakārūdhah kṛtāḥ. Tato mūlato Gaṇadharabhāṣitānāmapi tatsaṃkalānāntaram sarveṣāmapi Āgamānām kartā Śrī Devardhigaṇī Kṣamāśramaṇa eva jātaḥ —*Sāmācārī śataka*.

In the *Sthānāṅga*, there is discussion of the important topics like, *Ātman*, *Pudgala* (matter), *Jñāna* and other topics. In the philosophical doctrines of Mahāvīra, there are references to *Nihnavavāda* which refers to the single point of approach or view of *ekānta*.

Samavāyāṅga contains discussions on topics like, *Jñāna*, *Naya* and *Pramāṇa* etc., etc.

The *Anuyogadvāra* has a discussion of the connotation of the term and incidental references to *pramāṇa* and *naya* and other principles.

In the commentaries (*Tīkāś*) of these *Āgamas* we find vivid discussions on philosophical topics.

Among the commentators the names of Saṅghadāsagaṇī and Jinabhadragaṇī are frequently mentioned. They lived in the 7th century of vikrama era. Jinabhadragaṇī has written an important commentary called *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*. Saṅghadāsagaṇī's *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya* is a classical work, which contains an exposition of the codes of conduct of *Śramaṇa* from the philosophical as well as argumentative points of view.

We cannot easily forget the name of Ācārya Haribhadra, a renowned Saṅskṛt commentator. He has written his commentary in Saṅskṛt on the basis of the ancient *cūrṇis*. In these commentaries he has made special use of philosophical discussions. We find the same feature in Malayagiri's commentary ; philosophical discourses have been employed in the work.

In the *āgama* literature, prominence has been accorded to epistemological and scientific discussions ; however the philosophical aspects has not received much attention as in religious literature other than the *āgamas*. The primary reason for this is that the *āgama* literature is mainly meant for *sādhakas* (seekers of truth). For the edification of the *sādhakas*, there are frequent repetitions at many places. These *āgamic* works make special mention of the injunctions regarding the codes of conduct for the *sādhakas*. But in the later literature, importance has been given to discussion of philosophical topics.

Tattvārthasūtra is the most important work of Ācārya Umāsvāti. It is a comprehensive philosophical work which discusses various

subjects including philosophy and science. Here, we find most enlightened discussions of subjects like Philosophy, Ethics, Geography, Cosmology, Natural Philosophy and the *karma* theory. Ācārya Umāsvāti has also written a commentary (*Bhāṣya*) on his *Tattvārthasūtra*. In the 6th century A. D. Ācārya Pūjyapāda has written a commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra*. It is called *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Akaṣaṅka and Vidyānandi have also written commentaries on this work. Akaṣaṅka's *Rājavārttika* and Vidyānandi's *Śloka-vārttika* are important works. These *ācāryas* belonged to the Digambara tradition. In these works, we get very thought-provoking discussions of the philosophical topics. In the Śvetāmbara tradition, Ācārya Siddhasena and Haribhadra have also written commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra*. This was in the 8th or 9th century A. D. We find in these works evidence of a distinct development of Jaina logic and philosophy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that just as Dharmakīrti's commentary *Pramāṇavārttikā* on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* became the centre of the development of Buddhist logic, so also the commentaries on *Tattvārthasūtra* became the central base for the development of Jaina logic. We get important commentaries on *Tattvārthasūtra* in the later period, as for instance, Malayagiri's commentary in the 12th century A. D., Cirantanamuni's in the 14th century A. D. and the commentary of the great logician Yaśovijaya in the 18th century A. D. In addition to these, there are several other writers of the Digambara tradition who have written commentaries on *Tattvārthasūtra*. We have commentaries of Śrutasāgara and Vibudhasena, Yogīndradeva, Yogadeva, Lakṣmīdeva and Abhayāṅki. In the 20th century also we have several commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra* in Hindi and Gujarati languages.

The *Tattvārthasūtra* nearly marks the end of *āgamayuga* (age of *āgamas*).

ANEKĀNTA YUGA—AGE OF ANEKĀNTA

43

In the Buddhist literature in India, the great scholar Nāgārjuna, by his intellectual discussions and writings, created a stir in the philosophical climate of his time and he gave impetus to the development of philosophical thought. Nāgārjuna's writings are to be found in all fields of Buddhist thought. But his special field was logic and metaphysics. He gave a new turn to the development of logic and metaphysics. Prior to him, philosophy was primarily based on faith

and its elucidation. But with Nāgārjuna we find a new turn to philosophical development which gave emphasis on rational and critical studies. The *Śūnyavāda* of Nāgārjuna was the turning point for philosophy ; and philosophy was brought to a systematic level. This type of intellectual development was not merely restricted to the development of Buddhist thought, but it influenced the development of other systems of Indian philosophy. As a result of this, Jainism was also influenced to some extent with the Nāgārjuna's philosophical wave. The great logicians Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara and Samantabhadra gave a systematic turn to the development of Jaina Philosophy. This was during the 5th and 6th centuries A. D. These Ācāryas brought about a systematic development of the Anekāntavāda, whose roots could be found in the teachings of Bhagavān Mahāvira. On the basis of this study, we can call this age as the age of the establishment of Anekānta doctrine—*Anekānta Sthāpanā Yuga*. In this age, we find great scholars like Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra, Mallavādi, Ācārya Singhaganī and Ācārya Pātrakeśari who built up Jaina philosophy on rational and logical foundations. During this period of hectic intellectual activity, these Ācāryas had triple duties to perform—(1) They had to present Jaina thought in a systematic way on sound logical basis ; (2) To answer effectively the objections and difficulties raised by the Buddhist scholars ; (3) To present the Jaina thought effectively and vigorously by answering the objections of the philosophers of the Vedic school of thought. This period is regarded as the golden age (*Svarṇima yuga*) in the Jaina philosophical literature.

In this age, Indian philosophical thought had three prominent theories which were being frequently discussed. They are (i) *Śūnyavāda* of Nāgārjuna, (ii) *Vijñānavāda* of Vasubandhu and (iii) *Advaitavāda* of Vedānta. Jaina ācāryas thought that exposition of *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda*, in the face of the three theories prevailing in Indian thought at that time, would give both validity and strength to Jaina philosophy and that Jaina thought could be ably defended with the help of *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda*. On this account, this age is considered to be the *Anekānta Sthāpanā yuga* or *Anekāntavādī yuga*.

५.३ PRAMĀṆA ŚĀSTRA-VYAVASTHĀ YUGA

According to logic, knowledge of a thing could be established by means of valid sources of knowledge. In Saṅskṛt literature the

Pramāṇasāstra became an important subject. In this age Jaina ācāryas turned their attention from discussion of *anekānta* to the *pramāṇasāstra*. In Indian philosophy we find the influence of rigorous logical discussions of Dignāga on the *pramāṇasāstra* and *Nyāyasāstra*. Dignāga provided inspiration to the development of Indian logic. He was the interpreter of a very strong and systematic theory of logic and *pramāṇasāstra*. Dignāga was the father of the *pramāṇasāstra* and Dharmakīrti is to be considered as the promoter of Indian logic. The intense and rapid development of logical thought due to the inspiration of Dignāga had its influence on the development of logic in other *Darśanas* also. In the Vedic tradition, eminent logicians like Vyomaśiva, Jayanta, Udyotakara and Kumārila helped the development of logic in a systematic way. During this period (i.e., 8th and 9th centuries A. D.) there were many Jaina ācāryas who were great logicians. Among them may be mentioned, the names of Haribhadra and Akaṣaṅka. Haribhadra did not write any independent work on *Pramāṇasāstra*. However his works, *Anekānta Jayapatākā*, *Śāstravārtasamuccaya* and *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* influenced the development of Jaina logic to a great extent. Akaṣaṅka has given an elaborate and critical discussion of Jaina logic and metaphysics in his works *Pramāṇasaṅgraha*, *Nyāya-viniścaya* and *Laghīyastraya*. Vidyānandi wrote a commentary entitled *Aṣṭasahasrī*, on the work *Aṣṭasatī* of Akaṣaṅka which was a commentary on *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. By this work Vidyānandi gave a firm status to the Jaina *pramāṇasāstra*. During this period Prabhācandra wrote *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa* and *Nyāya-kumudacandra*. These works give an elaborate and critical discussion of the Jaina *pramāṇasāstra*. Vēdidevasūri wrote a commentary on his own work *Pramāṇatattvanayāloka*. This commentary is called *Syādvādaratnākara* and it is really a crest jewel (*ratnākara*) of Jaina logic. It gives a comprehensive view of Jaina logic. Ratnaprabhasūri, disciple of Vēdidevasūri, has written *Ratnākara-vatārikā* and in this work he has given the salient features of the problems discussed in *Syādvādaratnākara*. Ācārya Hemacandra has made a unique contribution by his book *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*. Similarly, Malliṣeṇa's *Syādvādamanjari* is a significant contribution to Jaina logic of this age. All these ācāryas have given an able and logical refutation of the Dignāga's position concerning Jaina logic. The special feature of the writers of this age is to be found in their two-fold object—(i) refutation of the rival schools of thought ; and

(ii) presentation of own school of thought in a systematic way. This dual function of refutation and presentation (*Khaṇḍana-maṇḍana*) of the logical discussion is the most important contribution of this age of *pramāṇasāstra*.

AGE OF THE NEO-NYĀYA (NAVYA-NYĀYA) 卞. 3

In the development of the Indian logic, the appearance of the book *Tattvacintāmaṇi* gave a new turn to the development of logic which may be called Neo-logic. The credit for this revolutionary change from logic to Neo-logic goes to a brilliant writer of the 13th century, a Naiyāyika, named Gaṅgeśa. In *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, the author has used new terminology of logic and written in a new style. This work is the most prominent work in the Indian logic and meta physics of this age. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* discusses the naiyāyika theory of *pramāṇas* mentioning four *pramāṇas* beginning with *pratyakṣa*. The language and the style used for discussing logical problems in this work by Gaṅgeśa are entirely new. He has discussed the problems which are very terse and purely academic in a language which attracts and appeals even to the common man. Many scholars have written commentaries on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* brought about a new turn in the development of Indian logic. The Buddhist scholars were influenced by this new wave. The Jaina scholars also could not escape from the powerful trend of this thought. The style of *navya-nyāya* made a profound influence on the Jaina ācāryas. The books on Jaina logic were, however, being written in the earlier style and tradition up to the end of the 17th century A. D. It was only in the beginning of the 18th century that Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya wrote his work on Nyāya in the *navya-nyāya* style. His work *anekānta vyavasthā* written in the *Neo-nyāya* style helped the re-establishment of the *Anekāntavāda*. Similarly, *Jainatarkabhāṣya* and *Jñānabindu* were two important contributions to the *Jaina pramāṇasāstra*. *Nayapradīpa*, *Nayarahasya* and *Nayopadiṣṭa* were important works on *nayavāda*. A commentary on *Nayopadeśa* called *Nayāmṛtataraṅgiṇī* is an important work. An explanatory work on *Aṣṭasahasrī* was also written. Similarly, a commentary on *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* of Haribhadra was written. It is called *Syādvādakalpalatā*. Several other books like *Bhāṣārahasya*, *Vādarahasya* helped the dual function of refuting the *naiyāyika* logic and presenting the Neo-logic of the Jains. Apart from Yaśovijayī, we find that Yaśasvatasāgara

and Vimaladāsa wrote works on logic in the new style of *navya nyāya*.

MODERN AGE—THE AGE OF ECLECTICISM १३

The trend of thought and writing which was started by Yaśovijayjī continued to influence for over a century. Some scholars did write commentaries and notes on the classical texts on logic ; but there was no substantial change in the trend of thought. There was also no substantial contribution to the development of logic. During the British period, however, a fundamental change took place in the outlook in dealing with the problems of logic and philosophy. But the scientific outlook and the empirical approach towards looking at the philosophical problems became prominent. Very few works in Sanskrit and Prakṛt were written during this period. The study of western thought created a profound influence on looking at the problems of Indian philosophy. The ancient Indian literature began to be studied in a new perspective under the influence of western thought. Three important characteristics of the change can be mentioned :—(1) Comparative study of the Indian thought in the light of the western thought ; (2) Collection of and editing ancient classics in the new perspective ; and (3) Critical notings on the problems of ancient Indian thought. There was another trend that developed during this period, and that was, to give copious references while editing the works.

In the Jaina tradition of writing, the credit of giving new interpretation while editing the ancient texts goes to Paṇḍit Sukhalālji Saṅghavī. In his edited works, we find critical notes of these books, a new outlook and profound scholarship. Two more great scholars Paṇḍit Mahendrakumārjī Jain and Paṇḍit Dalsukha Mālvaṇiyā continued the tradition of Sukhalālji Saṅghavī. Professors A. N. Upādhye, Chakravartī and Hirālāl Jain have also contributed immensely to the development of Jaina thought by editing many ancient texts with critical notes.

At present, many scholars have been writing research articles on the problems of Jaina logic and philosophy. Everyday the work of editing the ancient texts and writing critical papers is fast progressing and it would be difficult to give an exhaustive assessment of the enormous work being turned out in the recent past. Editing and

interpretation are the special features of this age. In this way, we can classify Jaina literature into five divisions, and it is clear that the Jaina literature is most comprehensive in all its aspects—philosophical or otherwise.

Every age has something special to contribute to scholarship and literature. The school which absorbs the contributions of the age enhances itself regularly and without pause ; but which does not absorb these contributions becomes static and less prominent. The fundamental value of writing remains constant in all ages. It is only looked from new angles of thought every time. The inner core is the same, but the outer expressions may differ.¹

JAINISM IN THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS ॥ ३

The question how the Jaina philosophy was presented in the *Āgamas* cannot be easily answered unless we develop a catholic outlook and a historical sense. As the *Upaniṣadic* philosophy developed in greater breadth and depth and more so through the *Bhagavadgītā*, we can say that the development of Jaina philosophy was from the *Āgamic* age to the later stages of logical and critical development. The *Āgamic* thought became broader and richer in depth during the age of Commentaries while the philosophic development became rich and varied at the time of *Tattvārthasūtra*. We have now to see what were the characteristics of Jaina philosophy at the *Āgama* stage of thought.

Philosophical problems of the *Āgamas* can be studied under two heads :—(1) *Prameya* or *Jñeya* (object of knowledge), and (2) *Pramāṇa* or *Jñāna* (valid sources of knowledge). The former is the ontological and the latter is epistemological in nature. The Jaina *Āgama* literature gives prominence to the discussion of the following problems :

- (i) *Anekānta* attitude, (ii) *Saptabhaṅgī*, (iii) *Naya*, (iv) *Nikṣepa*, (v) *Dravya*, (vi) *Guṇa*, (vii) *Paryāya*, (viii) *Padārtha*, (ix) *Kṣetra*, (x)

1 *Jaina Darśana*

- (a) *Jaina Dārśanika Sāhitya Kā Siṃhāvalokana*—Sri Dalsukha Bhāi Mālavaniyā.
 (b) *Viśva Darśana Kī Rūparekha*—Paṇḍit Vijaya Muni
 (c) *Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha*.

Kāla and *Bhāva*, (xi) *Niścaya* and *Vyavahāra*, (xii) *Nimitta* and *Upādāna*, (xiii) *Niyati* and *Puruṣārtha*, (xiv) *Karma* and its effects, (xv) *Ācāra* and *Yoga* and other subjects. The problems of *Jñāna* and *pramāṇa* were discussed with reference to the nature and various forms of knowledge exhaustively. Similarly, in the *Āgama* literature, we get a discussion of the various forms of *pramāṇas* and their characteristics. *Pramāṇa* has been classified into : *pratyakṣa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect). Similarly, we find that there is a discussion of other *pramāṇas* like *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison) and *śabda pramāṇa* (testimony). In the early *Āgamas* we get the interpretation of the term *naya* as point of view (*Ādeśa*) and outlook or attitude (*dṛṣṭi*). Similarly, we find the distinction between *dravyārthika* (substance point of view) and *paryāyārthika naya* (point of view of modifications). The word *Pradeśārthika naya* has also been used for *Paryāyārthika naya*. Discussions from the complete (*sakalādeśa*) and partial (*vikalādeśa*) points of view about the problems of *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* (sevenfold approach to the valid sources of knowledge) and *naya saptabhaṅgī* (sevenfold points of view) are to be found in the early *Āgamas*. There are also descriptions of the four types of *nikṣepa*. We find a beautiful description of the doctrines of *Syādvāda* and *Anekāntvāda* by the dream of a cuckoo. The eternal and the non-eternal nature of *Jīva* (soul) has been discussed. The problems of logic like, *vitandā* and *jalpa* found their way in the discussion in the *Āgama* literature. In this way, by the exhaustive discussion of epistemological and ontological problems the nature and the problems of validity of *pramāṇa* was presented in the *Āgama* literature in a lucid way. Besides, we get a critical study of the nature of six substances (*ṣaṭdravya*) and nine *padārthas* (categories). It is clear from this that the Jaina philosophical practices was more developed and mature than the philosophical thought of the Vedic seers.

THE PROBLEM OF PRAMEYA (OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE OR ONTOLOGY)

The terms *prameya* and *jñeya* have been used as synonyms in sense in the *Darśana* literature. That which is the object of knowledge is called *prameya*. '*Samyagjñāna*' (right knowledge) is knowledge and it has for its object the highest reality. That which can be comprehended by knowledge is called *jñeya*. The object of knowledge (*Jñeya* or *prameya*) whatever it may be, can be known accord-

ing to Jainism from different points of view. Jainism affirms that we have to consider the nature of an object from the point of view of *anekānta* (many-sided approach to understanding of a thing).

According to the Jaina history, Bhagavān Mahāvīra carried on the tradition of Jaina thought from the earlier *Tīrthaṅkaras* without making any material modifications. In epistemological subjects Bhagavān Mahāvīra taught the distinction between five kinds of knowledge as was taught by the earlier *Tīrthaṅkaras*. Similarly, the doctrines of four *nikṣepas*, seven *tattvas*, nine *padārthas*, five *astikāyas*, *karma*, *Guṇasthāna*, *leśyā* and *dhyāna* were taught by Mahāvīra in the same way in which the previous *Tīrthaṅkaras* like Pārśvanātha and all the *Tīrthaṅkaras* have taught. He did not deviate from the earlier path in these respects. But in the case of moral codes Bhagavān Mahāvīra did introduce some modification in the tradition of *Tīrthaṅkara* Pārśvanātha, that he preached the vow of *Brahmacarya* separately to the four vows preached by Pārśvanātha. Though the vow of *Brahmacarya*, in the tradition of Bhagvān Pārśvanātha, was amalgamated in the fourth vow of *Aparigraha*. We get references about this in the dialogue between Keśi, a follower of Pārśvanātha, and Gautama, a disciple of Mahāvīra.

During the *Chadmastha* stage and soon after the harassment given to him by Śūlapāṇi, Bhagvān Mahāvīra had a dream in which he saw a male cuckoo with variegated wings. This dream was interpreted to mean that Bhagavān Mahāvīra would preach the multi-valued theory through the *Dvādaśāṅga*. Later on his disciples went about preaching the doctrine of *Anekānta* to the followers of Buddha and *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. Mahāvīra preached the doctrine of *anekānta* and he eschewed dogmatic approach to the problems under discussions. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* we get a reference to Bhagavān Mahāvīra being asked in what terms the monks should talk to the people and to his telling them that they should teach *Vibhajjavāda*. The concept of *Vibhajjavāda* could be better understood, if we study the Jaina as well as the Buddhist literatures.

In the *Majjhimanikāya* we find a reference to Tathāgata Buddha answering the question of Śubha-Māṇavaka thus : 'Oh ! Māṇavaka, I am *vaibhajjavādī* and not *ekāmsavādī*'. From this, it appears that the Buddha accepted the Jaina concept of *Anekāntavāda* which may also be referred to as *Vibhajjavāda*. In fact, *Vibhajjavāda* expresses

the spirit of *anekānta* in the discussion of the problems of things of the world. It would now be necessary to understand the implications of the doctrine of *Syādvāda*.

Syādvāda is the logical expression of the *anekānta* spirit in propositional forms. It expresses the possibility of predicating other aspects of the Truth. When one aspect is predicated, a full and comprehensive picture of reality would not be possible. And, therefore, the *Syād* is prefixed to all the seven predications. *Anekānta* and *Syādvāda* are the unique and significant contributions of Jainism to the Indian logic.

We get descriptions of the concept of *dravya* (substance) in the *Āgama* literature. We often find three terms : *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality) and *pariyāya* (modification) in these works. *Dravya* (substance) has qualities (*guṇas*) and the expression of quality is *pariyāya* (modification). The three are inherent, yet different. There is primarily a dichotomous division of *dravya* (substance) into : *Jīva* (living) and *ajīva* (non-living) substance or the same can be classified as conscious substance and unconscious substance. There is the six-fold classification of *dravya* : (i) *Jīva* (living), (ii) *Pudgala* (matter), (iii) *Dharma* (fulcrum of motion), (iv) *Adharma* (fulcrum of rest), (v) *Ākāśa* (space) and (vi) *Kāla* (time). Excepting *Kāla* (time), the other five *dravyas* are multi-dimensional. Therefore, they are called '*astikāya*', a technical word used by the Jainas for describing the substance with multi-dimensions. *Kāla* (time) is uni-dimensional and, therefore, it is not '*astikāya*.' Every substance (*dravya*) has infinite qualities and every quality (*guṇa*) expresses itself in infinite modes.

We get the description of *nikṣepa* in *Āgama* literature. There is detailed analysis of the concept of *nikṣepa* in *Anuyogadvāra*. It is not however the work of a Gaṇadhara. We find a reference in the *Sthānāṅgasūtra* regarding this concept (*Sthānāṅga* 4 : 299) and by the discussion of '*Sarva*' in that work, it is clear that Bhagavān Mahāvīra himself taught the doctrine of *nikṣepa*. This term *nikṣepa* has been very often used but, if the exact connotation of the term is not understood, there would be confusion of thought. *Nikṣepa* denotes the method of explaining the exact meaning of a term. Bhagavān Mahāvīra said that a term can be used in four contexts : (i) *nāma* (its name), (ii) *sthāpanā* (its context), (iii) *dravya* (the object connoting the name) and (iv) *bhāva* (its conceptual meaning). This

concept of *nikṣepa* signifying the methodology of use of the term has been discussed in the earliest canonical literature as also in the modern works on logic. In the literature other than the *Āgamic*, there is a new approach to the understanding of this doctrine from the point of view of Neo-logic. Yaśovijayajī has given all elaborate discussion of the problem of *nikṣepa* along with the other problems of *pramāṇa* and *naya*.

Āgama literature gives an exhaustive study of the concepts of *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva*. They have been studied from the points of view of intrinsic four-fold distinctions (*svacatuṣṭaya*) and the extrinsic four-fold distinctions (*paracatuṣṭaya*). A thing in its inherent nature (*svadravya*), in its own place (*sva-kṣetra*), in its own time (*svakāla*) and in its own inherent connotation (*svabhāva*) can be said to have been considered in its fourfold aspects (*svacatuṣṭaya*). A thing can also be considered from the extrinsic points of view which would be described as from the points of view of *para-dravya* (extrinsic substance), *parakṣetra* (extrinsic place), *parakāla* (extrinsic time) and *parabhāva* (accidental characteristics). We find that the same object can be looked at from different points of view. Consequently, we get different presentations of the nature of the same object. This is due to the differences arising out of the attitude of the person which may consider as subjective, the ability of the person, sources of knowledge of the object, the existing state of the object at a particular place and time. According to the extent of the influences of these factors, the cognition of the object differs. In fact, every moment there are fleeting changes in the subjective and objective factors influencing and determining the nature of the cognition of the object. It would be difficult to present exhaustively the entire canvas of the various factors operating at the time of the cognition of an object. That is the reason why we find enormous diversity in the presentation of the view of different individuals and schools of thought. Keeping this point in view, Bhagavān Mahāvīra presented the concept of *nikṣepa* and emphasised that it is possible to view an object from different fourfold angles : *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva*.

3 CONCEPT OF PRAMĀṆA

There is abundant discussion about the nature of *pramāṇa* and *jñāna* as epistemological problems. *Pramāṇa* and *jñāna* have been

considered as the sources of cognising objects. In the *Āgama* literature, we find that there is greater emphasis on the discussion of the topic of *jñāna* than on *pramāṇa*. We come to know from the *Rāja-praśniya* that the discussion about five-fold division of *jñāna* (knowledge) was there to be found much earlier than of Mahāvīra's time. In the *Āgama* literature we get discussion of the divisions and sub-divisions of knowledge. In the analysis of the doctrine of *karma* we find a critical study of the distinctions in the *Jñānāvaraṇiya karma* (karma which obscures knowledge). Similarly, we also find description of the five-fold distinction in knowledge as also the distinctions of *Jīva Mārgaṇās* (distinctions in the varying character of selves) in the *Pūrva* literature. Similarly, we have a separate part of the *Pūrva* literature called *Jñāna-pravāda* which gives an exhaustive discussion about the nature and the five-fold division of knowledge. It is clear from these evidences that the five-fold division of knowledge with their nature and sub-divisions was known to Jaina long before Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the last of the *Tīrthaṅkaras*. On the basis of the study of *Āgama* literature, we can say that there were three basic divisions in the analysis of the nature of *jñāna* (knowledge)—(i) in the first division, knowledge has been divided into five types, (ii) the second division makes a distinction in knowledge into (a) separate direct (*pratyakṣa*) and (b) indirect (*parokṣa*). *Mati* and *Śruta jñāna* are considered as *parokṣa* because the self gets the knowledge indirectly through the sense-organs. The sense-organs do not give us direct knowledge as they are impediments to the realisation of cognition by the pure nature of self. *Avadhi* (clairvoyance), *Manahparyava* (telepathy) and *kevala* (omniscient knowledge) are considered as *pratyakṣa jñāna*, as the self gets direct knowledge. (iii) In the third division, the sense-knowledge is considered both as *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*.

Discussion of the nature and types of knowledge in the *Āgama* literature has been so important and extensive that references to the *pramāṇaśāstra* and comparative study of the theory of knowledge in the light of the epistemological problems in other systems of Indian philosophy have been neglected. Writers of *Āgamas* have made a distinction between the *samyaktva* (right or valid) and *mithyātva* (wrong or invalid knowledge) on the lines of the distinction between the *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) and *apramāṇa* (invalid knowledge) in other schools of Indian thought. The first three types of knowledge—*mati* (sense knowledge) *śruta* (indirect and knowledge through other

sources) and *avadhi* (clairvoyant knowledge) have their valid and their invalid aspects (*kumati*, *kuṣruta* and *kuḍvadhi*). But in the case of the next two types of knowledge, *manahpariyaya* (telepathic) and *kevala* (omniscient knowledge) there is no possibility of invalid form of knowledge. In this way, in describing the various types of knowledge, distinctions have been suggested without using the term invalid knowledge (*apramāṇa*).

There is not much discussion on the concept of *pramāṇa* in the *Āgamas*, as we get abundant description of the nature and types of *jñāna* (knowledge). The *Anuyogadvāra* and *Nandīsūtra* have used the term *pramāṇa* in a wider sense and have made distinction between (i) *indriya-pratyakṣa* (direct cognition through the sense-organs) and (ii) *no-indriya-pratyakṣa* (direct cognition by other sources than the sense-organs). *Indriya-pratyakṣa* has been distinguished into five types based on the five sense-organs. *No-indriya-pratyakṣa* includes *avadhi* (clairvoyance), *manahpariyaya* (telepathy) and *kevala* (omniscience). In this place the prefix 'no' denotes absence of 'sense-organs.' The three types of knowledge coming under the category of 'no-indriya' are cognitions without the help of the sense-organs as directly obtained by the self. Jaina theory makes sense-knowledge as indirect (*parokṣa*). But here it has been considered as *pratyakṣa* in order to correlate the discussion about this problem in the other schools of Indian thought. *Anumāna* (inference) has been distinguished into : (i) *pūrvavat*, (ii) *śeṣavat* and (iii) *dṛṣṭasādharmyavat*, but the distinction of inference as *svārtha* (for one's sake) and *parārtha* (for the sake of others) has not been mentioned. In the *Āgama* and its commentaries we find description of *anumāna* (inference) and its divisions and sub-divisions. There is also a discussion of the constituent proposition of inference as expressed in the form of syllogism.

CONCEPT OF NAYA 43

In the *Āgama* literature we find that there is discussion about *naya* also which is an aspect of *pramāṇa*. We get a description of the general nature of *naya* in *Sihānāṅga*, *Bhagavati* and *Anuyogadvāra*. The terms like *dṛṣṭi* and *ādeṣa* have been used as synonyms of *naya*. The cognition of a particular aspect of an object out of the varied aspects may be called *naya*. Many schools of thought present their view-points from a specific point of view. They refuse the view-points of others.

This means of refutation of other points of view is likely to lead to dogmatic and one-sided approach to the understanding of the nature of reality. Bhagavān Mahāvīra said that such one-sided approach to problems is *ekānta* (one-sided) and perverse. He presented a synoptic approach to the understanding of the problem of reality and that is a many-sided view, *anekānta*. It is *nayavāda*. *Nayavāda* has also been considered as a *drṣṭivāda*, *ādeśavāda* and *apekṣāvāda*. The essence of these concepts is one and the same. We have already discussed about the implications of the *naya* and its sub-divisions in the last chapter. *Naya* is a specific point of view, it is a specific method of approaching reality and it is the expression of *anekānta* view.

In the *Āgama sāhitya* we get a description of the problems of logic according to the contexts. Basic problems of logic and epistemology have been discussed in the *Āgama* literature.



POST-ĀGAMIC JAINISM

The Jaina philosophy that developed after the *Āgama* literature and before the systematic period may be called post-*Āgamic* Jainism. This presents a systematic development of the philosophical problems of Jainism including epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. We get here the doctrine of *karma*, the ethics of Jainas, metaphysical problems, the concept of *dravyas* and the theory of *yoga* systematically formulated and discussed. Enormous literature has been written on these topics. *Karma*-doctrine has been discussed in a brilliant and systematic way in *Gommaṣasāra-Karmakāṇḍa* of Nemicandra and *Karmagrantha* of Devendrasūri. A systematic study of ethical problems is to be found in *Mūlācāra*, *Bhagavati Ārādhana*, *Ānagāra Dharmāmṛta*, *Dharmabindu Prakaraṇa*, *Yogaśāstra*, *Ratnakaraṇḍa Śrāvakācāra*, *Śrāvakācāra* of Vasunandī, and *Śāgāra-dharmāmṛta* of Paṇḍit Āśādharma. The philosophical concepts of Jainism have been ably and critically presented in *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti and the commentary thereon, as also in *Dravyasaṅgraha* of Nemicandra. Kundakundācārya has presented philosophical problems in his famous works like *Pravacanasāra*, *Samayasāra*, *Niyamsāra* and *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*. *Yogavimśika*, *Yogaśataka*, *Yagadṛṣṭisamuccaya* and *Yogabindu Prakaraṇa* of Haribhadra are representative works of this age. The Ācāryas of this age concentrated on the study and discussion of the conceptual aspects of Jainism.

Part II

Discussion of Prameya

1. *LOKAVĀDA*—COSMOLOGY
 2. *TATTVAVĀDA* (METAPHYSICS)—
BACKBONE OF JAINA PHILO-
SOPHY
 3. *ĀTMAVĀDA*—AN ANALYSIS (CON-
CEPT OF *ĀTMAN*)
 4. *AJĪVATATTVA*—A SURVEY OF
NON-LIVING SUBSTANCE
 5. *PUDGALA* (MATTER): A STUDY
 6. *PUṆYA* AND *PĀPA*—MERIT AND
DEMERIT—A STUDY
 7. *ĀŚRAVATATTVA*—PRINCIPLE OF
INFLUX OF *KARMA*—A STUDY
 8. *SAMVARA* AND *NIRJARA*—PRIN-
CIPLES OF STOPPAGE AND DES-
TRUCTION OF *KARMAS*—A STUDY
 9. *BANDHA* AND *MOKṢA*—BOND-
AGE AND LIBERATION—A DIS-
CUSSION.
-

Lokavāda (Cosmology)

We see the vast universe before us. Naturally some fundamental questions regarding the origin and the nature of the universe arise. We ask ourselves the questions : When did the universe originate ? Would there be the end of the universe ? What are its ultimate principles ? Many similar questions may be asked ; and answers to these questions have varied according to the philosophical predilections of different schools of thought. It would be necessary to study these questions in the light of modern researches in philosophy and science.

There were discussions on these questions during Mahāvira's period. Gautama, the Buddha, considered these questions un-answerable, (*avyākṛta*)¹ but Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvira has attempted to answer these questions satisfactorily.

Bhagavān Mahāvira had a disciple called Ārya Roha. He asked Mahāvira, "Bhagavān ! Of the *Loka* and *Aloka*, is *Aloka* first and then came *Loka* ?" Mahāvira said to Ārya Roha thus : *Loka* and *Aloka* were both there and will continue to be there. They are beginningless (*anādi*) and endless (*ananta*). Both of them are eternal (*jātvata*) and none of them is later or earlier.²

1 Tathāgata Buddha said that the following ten questions are un-answerable—(1) Is the world eternal ? (2) Is it non-eternal ? (3) Has it an end ? (4) Is it endless ? (5) Are the soul and body one ? (6) Are they different ? (7) Does the Tathāgata exist after death ? (8) Does he not exist after death ? (9) Does he exist and not exist after death ? (10) Does he neither exist nor not-exist after death ?—*Majjhimanikāya, cūlamāluṅkya sutta*—63;

2 *Bhagavatī* 1, 6.

THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE

4.3

We live in this world. The entire cosmos including our world is *Loka*. It is the stellar universe. Beyond this, is the vast un-limited. This is *Aloka*. It is beyond and infinite. Therefore, we have the Universe and the beyond, the limited and unlimited, the *Loka* and *Aloka*. In the vast unlimited beyond, in the *Aloka*, the fundamental substances like *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Kāla*, *Pudgala* and *Jīva* have no relevance. They have their relevance and they exist in the *Loka*, the limited universe. It is also said that the *Loka* is a cosmos which gives subsistence for the five *Astikāyas* (multi-dimensional substances).¹ In the *Uttarādhyayana*, the *Loka* is described as that which sustains *jīva* and *ajīva*.²

The distinction between *Loka* and *Aloka*, the limited and the unlimited is an eternal distinction and it was not made at any particular time ; because it is not possible to divide the eternal and the non-eternal on some one principle. Substances (*śaśḍravya*) are also eternal. Space can be divided but the division is only artificial and is meant for practical purposes. There is no fundamental division in space. Time is the basis of change and this can be considered from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view, time is the basis of the modifications of *jīva* and *ajīva* (living and the non-living substances). Time is the fundamental principle which is present in *Loka* and *Aloka*. From the phenomenal point of view, time is measured for practical purposes on the basis of the revolutions of the sun and the moon, and this measurement has relevance only to the human world. *Jīva* and *Pudgala* (living substance and matter) are characterised by activity and have their *madhyama-pariṇāma* (phenomenal activity). The distinction between *Loka* and *Aloka* and their limits are to be determined by the *Dharma* and the *Adharma astikāyas*. They divide the space into two parts—the limited and the limitless. The limited sustains the universe ; the limitless is the beyond. It is *Aloka*. In the limitless *Alokākāśa*, the principles of *Dharma* and *Adharma* (motion and rest) do not operate. Therefore, *Jīva* and *Pudgala* are located in the limited universe (*Lokākāśa*).

1 *Bhagavatī* : 13, 4.

2 *Uttarādhyayana* : 36, 2.

LOKA AND ALOKA (UNIVERSE AND THE BEYOND) ५. ३

The Universe (*Loka*) is bounded and limited, while *Aloka*, the limitless *ākāśa*, is unbounded. It has no boundaries. *Lokākāśa* (bounded space) has innumerable *pradeśas* (*asaṅkhyeya pradeśa*) while the boundless space has infinite *pradeśas*. The universe consists of 14 *rajjus*, but *Aloka* (limitless space) cannot be measured at all. In the *Bhagavatī* we get a dialogue between Bhagavān Mahāvīra and Ārya Skandaka. Bhagavān Mahāvīra said, "The universe is limited with reference to the aspect of matter and also with reference to the measurable space, because the universe occupies a limited portion of space. From the point of view of time, *Kāla*, the universe is endless and eternal because there is no point of time in which the universe does not exist. From the point of view of essence (*bhāva*) and modes (*paryāya*) the universe is endless, because the modes of substance are endless.¹

The great scientist Albert Einstein has given a picture of the four dimensional reality of space and time which comes nearer to the Jaina description of space and time. He says that the universe is limited while the limitless space is unbounded. The universe is limited because matter and energy do not exist beyond the universe. They have no relevance beyond the universe.

THE LOCATION OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE BEYOND (LOKA AND ALOKA) १ ३

The universe is flat at the bottom (*visṭīta*), narrow in the middle and globular on the top like the form of musical instrument '*mṛdaṅga*'. Of the three parts one is curved, the second is straight and the third is placed on the top so as to give a shape of a '*mṛdaṅga*'. It is said to be of the shape of '*triśarāva samputa*'. In other words, the shape of the universe is well defined. It is difficult to give the shape of the *Aloka* although it is sometimes suggested that it is globular in shape. *Aloka* has no parts. It is one. *Lokākāśa* has been divided into three parts—(1) the Lower Universe (*Adholoka*), (2) the Middle Universe (*madhyaloka*) and (3) the Upper Universe (*Urdhvaloka*).² The universe in all the three parts measures 14 *rajjūs* in length i. e., from the lowest point to the uppermost point. The

1 *Bhagavatī* : 2. 1, 90.

2 *Bhagavatī* : 11, 10.

upper universe measures little less than seven *rajjus*, the middle part of the universe measures 1800 *yojanas* and the lower part of the universe measures a little more than seven *rajjus*.

Ākāśa is one and indivisible. Still, we make a distinction between the *Lokākāśa* and *Alokākāśa* on the basis of the operation of the cosmic principles of *Dharma* and *Adharma* (motion and rest). On the basis of the operation of these principles, a division is further made between the lower, middle and the upper part of the universe.¹ In some parts, the two principles are extended and in some others their extension is limited. In the upper part of the universe the two principles of motion and rest are extended and for this reason, the shape of the upper part of the universe is of the shape of the musical instrument '*mṛdaṅga*'. The shape of the middle part of the universe is narrow. Its shape is like a curtain without the borders. The lower part of the universe is again extended. Its shape is like the bow attuned. The limitless space (*alokākāśa*) has no substance subsisting in it. Therefore, it has no form and is limitless. The thickness of the limited universe is of seven *rajjus*.

The vastness of the universe is so great that it cannot be easily measured. In order to explain the vastness of the universe, Bhagavān Mahāvīra made use of an analogical parable. Suppose a god (*Deva*) is standing on the top of the mount *Meru*, which is one lakh *yojanas* in height. Suppose again, that at the foot of the Mount *Meru* six goddesses of directions (*dik-kumūrikās* of East, West, North, South, Up and Down directions) are standing facing the opposite direction of the Mount. Granting that they throw balls of rice of oblation (*balipīṇḍa*). At this point of time, the god starts running, and he catches hold of the balls of rice in the mid air before they touch the ground. This is called fast running (*Śīghra-gati*). The analogy is extended in order to explain the extent of the vastness of the Universe. Suppose again, at the same time a child is born in a merchant's house. His span of life is one thousand years. He completes one thousand years of his age. And after him, a son is born with one thousand years of age as his span of life. In this way, the cycle continues for seven generations; and memory of their family and the status etc., are obliterated from the minds. Still the god continues to run and he

1 *Bhagavati* 11, 9.

does not reach the end of the universe. It may be that he has covered the major portion of the distance of the universe, still the remaining part might measure 'innumerable' parts (*asaṅkhyeya bhāga*).

Dr. Einstein says that the diameter of the universe can be measured as consisting of one crore and eighty lakhs of light-years. The distance of light year is measurable in terms of the movement of a light-ray in terms of time. A ray of light of the sun travels at a speed of 1,86,000 miles per second.

URDHVALOKA (THE UPPER UNIVERSE) ॥ ३

That part of the universe which is 900 *yojanas* above the world that we live in, is called the upper universe (*Ūrdhvaloka*). The gods live in this part of the world. It is therefore called '*Brahmaloka*', '*Devaloka*', '*Yakṣaloka*', and '*Svargaloka*'.¹ The uppermost part of this world is called '*Sarvārtha-siddhi*'. *Siddha-śila* is situated twelve *yojanas* above '*Sarvārtha-siddhi*'. It measures 45 lakh *yojanas* in length and breadth. The circumference of '*Siddhaśila*' measures a little more than the breadth by three times. In the centre it measures 8 *yojanas*.² It gets narrowed down from all the four sides. It appears like an open umbrella. It is white and pure, like the conch, the pearl and, therefore it is called '*Śītā*'. Another name for it is '*Ṭṣaṭprāgbhārā*'. One *yojana* above this is end of the universe. In the uppermost one-sixth portion of this one *yojana* space, the liberated souls reside.³ '*Lokānta*' has been called '*Lokāgra*' in the *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*.⁴

The gods are not born of wombs. They are born in a special form and a divine bed called *upapāt śaiyyā*. They do not suffer premature death. They are extremely brave. They could be classified into four categories on the basis of their residence : (i) '*Bhavanavāsī*', (ii) '*Vyantara*', (iii) '*Jyotiṣka*' and (iv) '*Vaimānika*'. The *svargas* having the status of Indra etc., are considered to be named as *Kalpa* and the gods taking birth there are referred to as '*kalpoṣpanna*'. Those who are above the *Kalpa* are called '*Kalpātīta*'. In this part of the

1 *Uttarādhyayana* : 19, 8; 18, 29; 5, 24; 14, 41.

2 *Uttarādhyayana śikṣā* : Ācārya Ātmārān, p: 1668.

3 *Uttarādhyayana* : 36, 57-62.

4 *Uttarādhyayana* : 36, 56.

heaven there are no distinctions between individual gods in status. They are all equal. They are called 'ahamindra' as they have the same status as Indra. If gods have to descend to the earth where human beings reside, it is only the gods born in the *Kalpa* who can come down to the earth. The gods residing above the *Kalpa* does not come to the earth. The '*Bhavanavāsi*' and the gods residing upto the heaven '*Etāna Kalpa*' experience erotic pleasures as human beings does. The gods of the '*Sanatkumāra*' and '*Māhendrakaḷpa*' enjoy sex-pleasures merely by the touch of the bodies of the goddesses. The gods of the *Brahma* and *Lāntaka Kalpa* get sense-pleasures by the sight of the beautiful bodies of the goddesses. The gods of '*Mahā śukra*' and '*Sahasrārakaḷpa*' experience the erotic pleasures by listening to the melodious music of the goddesses. And the gods residing in the '*Ānata*', '*Prānata*', '*Āraṇa*' and '*Acyuta Kalpa*' get sensual satisfaction by the mere memory of their beloved goddesses. The other gods are free from sex-impulses. *Lokāntika* gods are also free from the bonds of sex-instinct. Therefore, they are called '*deva-ṛṣi*' (the god-saints).

MADHYALOKA (THE MIDDLE UNIVERSE) ४.३

The *Madhyaloka* (the middle universe) measures 1800 *yojanas*. In the *Uttarādhyayana* it is referred to as '*Tiryak loka*'.¹ In this part of the universe, there are innumerable islands and seas surrounding each other. In the vast expanse of this part of the universe, it is only two and half islands (*dvīpa*) where there is habitation of human beings.² It is called '*samaya kṣetra*'.³ The structure of each of these two and half islands is similar in form with only this difference that each gets extended by double. There is the Mount '*Mānuṣottara*' in the centre of the island called '*Puṣkaradvīpa*', and therefore only half the portion of '*Puṣkaradvīpa*', is inhabited by human beings. There are seven important divisions in the island called '*Jambu-dvīpa*': (1) *Bharata*, (2) *Haimavata*, (3) *Hari*, (4) *Videha*, (5) *Ramyaka*, (6) *Hairanyavata* and (7) *Airāvata*.⁴ *Videha kṣetra* is further divided into two parts : (i) *Devakuru* and (ii) *Uttarakuru* i.e.,

1 *Uttarādhyayana* : 36, 50 ; 36, 54.

2 *Tattvārthasūtra* : 3, 35. : *Prāṇg Mānuṣottarānmanuṣyāḥ*.

3 *Uttarādhyayana* : 36, 7.

4 *Tattvārthasūtra* 3, 10 : *Bharata-Haimavata-Hari-Videha-Ramyaka-Hairanyavata-Airāvata kṣetrāṇi*.

Pūrvavideha and *Uttaravideha* respectively. In the *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa dvīpa* and in *Puṣkarārdhadvīpa* there are double than that of *Jambūdvīpa*. All these islands have been divided into three parts on the basis of the functional importance as : (i) *Karmabhūmi*, (ii) *Akarmabhūmi*, and (iii) *Antaradvīpa*.¹

'*Karmabhūmi*' is that part of the '*Madhyaloka*' in which human beings are engaged in activities like agriculture, commerce, art, architecture etc. In this part, human beings are capable of earning the highest merit (*puṇya*) and the most intense demerit (*pāpa*). *Bharata*, *Airāvata* and *Mahāvīdeha* are *karmabhūmis*. It has been suggested that there is one each of *Bharata*, *Airāvata* and *Mahāvīdeha* and two each of the same in *Jambūdvīpa* and *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa* respectively. Similarly, in *Puṣkarārdha Dvīpa*, there are two *Bharata*, two *Airāvata* and two *Mahāvīdeha* countries. In this way there are fifteen *Karma-bhūmis* in the two and a half *dvīpas* (islands).² All the continents that we have today are covered by a small portion of the *Bharata-kṣetra* in the *Jambūdvīpa*. From this, we can just imagine the vastness of the *Madhyaloka* and specially the three worlds of the universe.

That part of the universe in which there is no need to work for maintenance by following any occupation like agriculture etc., is called '*Akarmabhūmi*'. In this part, the enjoyment of life is possible without any work. It is also called '*Bhoga-bhūmi*' as there is predominance of enjoyment only. There is constant pleasure in that part, as the gods enjoy life without effort. There are six places of *Bhogabhūmi* (places of enjoyment) in the *Jambūdvīpa*—(i) *Haimavata*, (ii) *Hari*, (iii) *Ramyaka*, (iv) *Hairanyavata*, (v) *Devakuru* and (vi) *Uttarakuru*. In this way, we find that there are double countries in *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa dvīpa* and *Puṣkarārdha dvīpa*. There are twelve countries in each of the two *dvīpās* i.e., in the *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa dvīpa* and *Puṣkarārdha-dvīpa*. So, in all, there are thirty *Akarmabhūmis* (lands of pleasure).

Apart from the *Karma* and *Akarma bhūmis*, there are islands among the seas. They are called '*Antaradvīpa*'. There are twenty-eight islands in the '*Lavaṇa samudra*', the sea that encircles the *Jambū-dvīpa* alround, and at the fringe of the *Himavāna* Mountain. The islands in the sea are spread over in seven quadrangles (*Catuṣka*).

1 *Uttarādhyayana* : 36, 195-196.

2 *Uttarādhyayana* : 36, 196.

They can be mentioned in the following order :—First Quadrangle : *Ekoruk*, *Ābhāṣika*, *Lāṅgūlika* and *Vaibhāṇika*. Second : *Hayakārṇa*, *Gajakārṇa*, *Gokārṇa* and *Śaṅkulīkārṇa*. Third : *Ādarśamukha*, *Meṣamukha*, *Hayamukha*, and *Gajamukha*. Fourth : *Asvamukha*, *Hastimukha*, *Siṃhamukha* and *Vyāghramukha*. Fifth : *Asvakārṇa*, *Siṃhakārṇa*, *Gajakārṇa* and *Karṇaprāvaraṇa*. Sixth : *Ulkāmukha*, *Vidyūnmukha*, *Jivhāmukha* and *Meghamukha*. Seventh : *Ghanadanta*, *Gūḍhadanta*, *Śreṣṭhadanta* and *Śuddhadanta*.

In this way, there are twenty eight 'Antaradvīpas' in relation to the 'Sikhari' mountains, and the total of fifty six 'Antaradvīpas' (islands) can be mentioned. These are considered to be the places of habitation of human beings. Thus we find the Mid-universe (*Madhyaloka*) is vast and extensive. Still, compared with the vastness and extensiveness of the Upper Universe, and of the lower, the extension of the Mid-universe amounts to a negligible portions of the two, almost amounting to zero.

4.3 ADHOLOKA (THE LOWER PART OF THE UNIVERSE)

The part of the universe which is below the mid-universe is called 'Adho-loka' (the lower Universe). There are seven worlds, one below the other. They are known as seven 'Narakas' (hells). Mostly, the hell-beings reside in these worlds. The measurements of these seven worlds are not uniform. The lower ones are more extensive than the immediately preceding upper world in order of succession. But they are not very close to each other. They are separated by the thick coating of liquid, air, and space.¹ Each world has below it the quantity of thick liquid, dense air, thin air and space.²

The seven worlds of the nether region universe have been named as : 1. *Ratnaprabhā*, 2. *Śarkarāprabhā*, 3. *Bālukāprabhā*, 4. *Paṅkaprabhā*, 5. *Dhūmaprabhā*, 6. *Tamaḥprabhā* and 7. *Mahātamaḥprabhā*. The suffix 'prabhās' to each of the name connotes the characteristic colour of the place. *Ratnaprabhā* has three parts and the upper part has the colour of *ratna* (diamond). It measures 16,000 *yojanas*. Just below, is the second part. It is covered by mud, and measures 48,000 *yojanas*. The third part below, is covered by water, and it measures 80,000 *yojanas*. Thus the total measurement of the

1 *Tattvārthasūtra* : 3, 1-2.

2 *Sarvārthasiddhi* : 3, 1.

extension of *Ratnaprabhā* comes to about 1,80,000 *yojanas*. From the second to the seventh worlds in the nether universe, there are no parts as we get in the *Ratnaprabhā*. All the matter they have is of the same kind. The second nether world measures 1,32,000 *yojanas*. The third measures 1,28,000 *yojanas*. The fourth world extends for 1,20,000 *yojanas*. The fifth world measures 1,18,000 *yojanas*. The sixth and the seventh measures 1,16,000 and 1,08,000 *yojanas* respectively. The thick layer of liquid below the seven nether worlds also varies in quantity and measurements.¹

The beings in hell reside in the different nether worlds just in the middle of each part leaving one thousand *yojanas* on the upper and the lower parts. For instance, in the *Ratnaprabhā* measuring 1,80,000 *yojanas* in dimension, the hellish beings reside in the central part leaving aside 1,000 *yojanas* on the upper and 1,000 *yojanas* on the lower portions of the world. Similarly, in the other six nether worlds there is habitation of the hellish beings in the central parts leaving aside one thousand *yojanas* each on the upper and the lower parts of each world.

Beings living in these nether worlds are considered to be hellish beings (*Nāraki Jiva*). The lower we go in the stages of the nether worlds, we find beings suffering and infected with ugliness, they are frightful in appearance and nature, and they suffer from various disabilities in increasing degrees. In these places, there are extremes of heat and cold. The residents of these hellish worlds suffer untold misery, though they seek to get some pleasure. Their lot is one of never-ending misery. They see others with extreme anger and with bloodshot eyes. They fight with each other like cats and dogs remembering their animosity in the previous lives. They cut each other mercilessly with their weapons and even with hands, feet and teeth. Their bodies become deformed and cut asunder into pieces. But like mercury, the parts of the body join again and form a whole. The hellish beings suffer indescribable pain when they are subjected to drink hot boiling lead. The devilish gods make them embrace the red-hot iron-bars and force them to climb the trees brimming with sharpest thorns. The devil-gods torturing them are most cruel. They are found to be going upto the first three nether worlds. They

1 *Sarvārthasiddhi* 13, 1.

are technically named as *Paramādhārmika* and are also called as 'asuras' (demons). They are very cruel and they get sadistic pleasure in torturing other inmates of hell. The hellish beings are constantly in the grip of suffering and they have no possibility of escape till the expiry the course of their allotted life in the nether world, as they have no possibility of premature death.¹

There is the limitless space (*Ākāśa*) beyond the boundaries of the universe. The expanse of this universe is so vast that it would not be possible to gauge even the smallest portion of the extensive vastness of this universe by the modern techniques of the modern science.²

4-3 LOKASTHITI (THE POSITION OF THE UNIVERSE)

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad has a dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Gārgeyī regarding the position the universe. Gārgeyī wanted to know the fundamental principle of the universe. She asked : What is the ultimate substance of the universe ?

Yājñavalkya : It comes from air.

Gārgeyī : And where does the air come from ?

Yājñavalkya : It is from space. And space is from *Gandharvaloka* ; *Gandharvaloka* from *Ādityaloka* (the sun) ; *Ādityaloka* from *Candraloka* (the moon) ; *Candraloka* from *Nakṣatraloka* (the stars) ; *Nakṣatraloka* from *devaloka* (the heavens) ; *Devaloka* from *Indraloka* (abode of Indra) ; *Indraloka* from *Prajāpati-loka* (abode of *Prajāpati*) and *Prajāpatiloka* from *Brahmaloka*.

Gārgeyī : And where does the *Brahma-loka* come from ?

Yājñavalkya : Gārgī ! Do not ask such question, otherwise your head will fall down.³

In the Jaina philosophy, we do not reach such a situation where one reaches the dead end of intellectual curiosity. Bhagavān Mahāvīra never flinched from answering any question. He answered all questions and gave full intellectual satisfaction to his disciples. In the

1 *Tattvārthasūtra* : 2, 52 ; 3, 3-5.

2 *Uttarādhyaṇasūtra—ēka Pariśīlana* : p. 61.

3 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* : 3, 6, 1.

Bhagavatisūtra, Mahāvīra has explained the problem of the nature and the ultimate substance of the universe¹. He said that the basis of the universe could be presented in eight forms :

1. Air is in *Ākāśa*.
2. The sea has its basis in the air.
3. The earth is in the sea.
4. The moving and the non-moving beings are on the earth.
5. *Ājiva* is based on *Jīva*.
6. *Jīva* encrusted with *karman* is dependent on *karman*.
7. *Ajīva* is comprehended with the help of *Jīva*.
8. *Jīva* comprehends the nature of *karman* and is covered by *kārmic* particles.

The primary elements of the universe are earth, water, air and space. On the basis of these elements, the constitution of the universe is found. The fundamental substances of matter (*ajīva*) and life (*jīva*) are inter-related and inter-dependent on each other. *Jīva* is the support of *ajīva*, in a sense, and *ajīva* is dependent on *jīva*. *Karman* is the matrix of mundane souls (*samsārī jīva*) and *jīva* gets involved in the wheel of *samsāra* due to the influx of *karman*. Similarly, body is the abode of the soul. The soul when bound by *kārmic* matter gets embodied and becomes involved in the wheel of life and death. *Karman* is responsible for the embodiment of the soul and thereby all the physical activities arise.

✱ 2. THE THEORY OF CREATION (SRŚṬIVĀDA)

Considered from the point of view of the end, we can say that the universe is beginningless and endless from the point of view of substance ; it has a beginning and an end from the point of view of its modes (*Paryāya*). There are two fundamental substances in the universe : the *jīva* (living substance) and *ajīva* (non-living substance). This is the dichotomous division of the substances. Both the substances are beginningless and eternal. There is no relation between them as to the prior and posterior. From the point of view of modifications, the universe is constantly changing. The changes are of

1 *Bhagavati* : 1, 6.

two types : natural and artificial. There are constant changes taking place in the substances by their very nature. But the modification of a mundane being (*samsāri jīva*) is due to the encrustations of *karman* to the soul ; and this is not the natural condition of the soul.

In the Vedic philosophy, there are two prominent views of thought : *Advaitavāda* (Non-dualism or Monism) and *Dvaitavāda* (dualism).

Regarding the nature of the Universe, *Advaita* philosophy presents three views : (i) *Jaḍādvaitavāda* (Naturalistic Monism), (ii) *Caitanyādvaitavāda* (Idealistic Monism) and (iii) *Jaḍa-caitanyādvaitavāda* (Naturalistic and Spiritualistic Monism). The *Jaḍādvaitavāda* (Naturalistic Monism) maintains that consciousness is a product of matter. It is the by-product of the chemical changes in the body of an individual. It is an epiphenomenon. The *Cārvāka*-Materialism and the Materialism of the modern science hold this view.

According to *Caitanyādvaitavāda*, the Brahman is the ultimate reality and the fundamental principle of the universe. The *Brahman* is transcendent of the three worlds. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, it has been said that the *Brahman* is beyond the three worlds. He thought : 'how can I express myself in the three worlds ?' Then He showed himself in the forms of *nāma* and *rūpa* (name and form).¹

Jaḍa-caitanyādvaitavāda maintains that the universe is a product of the synthesis of spirit and matter (*cetana* and *acetana*). But, the Naturalistic Monists (*Jaḍādvaitavādin*) and the Absolute Idealism (*Caitanyādvaitavāda*) do not accept the view presented by the *Jaḍa-caitanyavādin* because the effect cannot proceed from the cause which is dissimilar. The Naturalistic Monism maintains that the mind arises out of matter, and the Ideal Monistic Idealism maintains that matter is the expression of the spirit. Thus, the Monist does not accept the independent reality of matter and spirit. The priority of cognitive consciousness is the cardinal principle of the Idealist and reality of the objective world independent of consciousness is the assertion of the Realist. Matter is primary for the Materialist and spirit is primary for the Idealist.

1 *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1, 1, 2, 3.

Tad dvābhyāmeva pratyavāida rūpeṇa caiva nāmnā ca.

But the Dualist (*dvaitavādin*) posits the reality of spirit and matter independent of each other. One does not come from the other nor are they subordinate as reality to each other. The universe is the effect of the union of matter and spirit.

The *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Mīmāṃsā* systems of thought contend that God brings together the atoms, and the universe is formed. The universe is the creation of such combination of the atoms. This is the union of the spirit and the matter. As the creation of the universe is based on the combination of atoms, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory is called *Ārambhavāda*.

Sāṅkhya and *Yoga* philosophies give importance to the concept of *Prakṛti* with three *guṇas*. According to the *Sāṅkhya*, the evolution of the universe begins when *Prakṛti* comes in contact with *Puruṣa* and there is disturbance in the balance of the *guṇas* in the *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* is unconscious, *Puruṣa* is conscious. *Prakṛti* is unconscious but active while *Puruṣa* is inactive. In the presence of the *Puruṣa*, disturbance in the three *guṇas* is created and the evolution starts. The need for a Creator God is not felt for explaining the evolution of the universe. The consequent modifications and effect exhibited in the universe are due to the activities of the *Prakṛti*. In the *Yoga* philosophy, the concept of God is brought, although indirectly, for explaining the process of reality. Therefore, the *Yoga* system is called theistic *Sāṅkhya*. The causal theory accepted by the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and the *Vedāntin* is the identity theory of cause and effect. Effect is potentially present in the cause and when the cause expresses itself in the modifications, the effects show themselves. This causal theory of potentiality and actuality, as Aristotle mentions, can be considered in two parts : (i) *Guṇapariṇāmayāda* (expression of the modifications of *guṇas*) and (ii) *Brahmapariṇāmayāda* (expression of the modifications of the *Brahman*). *Sāṅkhya* philosophy and *Mādhvācārya* accepts the theory of *Guṇapariṇāmayāda* while *Viśiṣṭādvaita* of *Rāmānuja* advocates the theory of *Brahmapariṇāmayāda* for explaining the evolution of the universe. They maintain that *Prakṛti*, *Jīva* and *Īśvara* are the three principles which are real and they are all the expressions of the *Brahman*. *Brahman* expresses itself in the aspect of *Prakṛti* and that results in the evolution of the universe.

Jainism and Buddhism do not accept the theory of creation. They believe in the theory of modifications (*parivartanavāda*).

The Buddhist theory of the world and its evolution depends on the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*. The Buddhists advocate the theory of aggregate and continuity and not permanence. In Jaina philosophy, whatever modifications are to be found in the universe, they are to be explained in terms of the combined co-operation of the *jīva* (living substance) and *pudgala*. These modifications can be considered into two parts : (i) natural (*svābhāvika*) and (ii) practical (*prāyogika*) or phenomenal. The natural modifications are very subtle. They are not visible to the eyes. But the phenomenal changes are gross (*sthūla*) and they are visible to the eyes. The universe is, therefore, the result of the combined operation of matter and spirit.

The Vedic seers were perplexed about the origin of the creation of the universe. In the *Nāsadiya sūkta* of the *Rgveda*, the fundamental question of creation and origin of Creation has been raised. A series of questions have been asked. They are : What is the first principle of the universe ? Who can describe it ? How did it originate and what is the cause of varieties in the universe ? Were gods created after the creation of the universe ? Who can explain the origin of this universe ? What is the cause of the creation ? Finally, who created the Creation and who did not ? One who knows this, is beyond us, and it is possible that he also does not know.¹

The Jaina philosophy is clear about the problem of the universe and its reality. Jainism maintains that matter does not arise from spirit nor does spirit arise from matter. Both are beginningless and real.

BHEDĀBHEDAVĀDA (THE DOCTRINE OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE)

The problem of identity and difference in explaining the reality has given rise to four schools of thought. One school of thought gives primacy to difference (*bheda*), and the second gives to non-difference

1 *Rgveda* : 10, 129 *Nāsadiya sūkta*.

Nāsadāsīnnosadāsītadānīm nāsīdrajo no vyomā paro yat.

'Ko addhā veda ka iha pravocati kuta ājātā kuta iyam visṛṣṭiḥ.

Arvāg deva asya visarjñernāthā ko veda mata ābabhūva.

'Iyam visṛṣṭiryata ābabhūva yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na.

Yo asyādhyakṣaḥ parame vyomantoṣaṅga veda yadi vā na veda'.

or identity (*abheda*). The third school of thought gives importance to both as of equal reality and the fourth school maintains that there is the qualified distinction of *bheda* and *abheda* (*bhedaviśiṣṭa-abheda*).

The school emphasising difference (*bhedavāda*) maintains that nothing is permanent. Everything is changing. Difference is the only reality while oneness or identity is an appearance. Where there is *bheda* (difference), there is reality. *Sautrāntika* and *Vaiśāṅghika* schools of Buddhism advocate this theory. Everything is momentary (*kṣaṇika*). Every moment there is the origination and destruction. Nothing is permanent. Where there is no permanence, there is no non-difference. *Jñāna* and *padārtha* both are momentary. What we call the *Ātman* is merely an aggregate of five *skandhas* (physical and mental states) : *viññāna*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra* and *rūpa*. These are the aggregate of the *skandhas* and what we call the self.¹ This theory is called *sahghātavāda* (the theory of aggregates). This is also the theory of *anātmavāda* and it is also called *pudgalanairātmavāda*. From the point of time, the theory of self and the world does not express the reality of permanence but only of the stream or a continuity (*santāna*) without anything permanent to continue. We find that all our empirical thinking implies the process of thought leading to the theory of impermanence. The identity and oneness are the expressions of the aggregate or collection, and it is merely with reference to time and space. In fact, things and cognition are different and there is only a stream or continuity of the things and cognitions which are discrete. Change is the fundamental principle of the universe and permanence is only the appearance. The wheel of the chariot moves on one point of axle and also stops with that point. Similarly, every *jīva* lives in moment as a thought is fleeting, so also the *jīva* is temporary and fleeting.²

The Greek philosopher Heraclitus said that everything is changing and nothing is permanent. Permanence is only appearance. We cannot step into the same river-water twice. Every moment there is change, and change is the very essence of thing. One moment, it is and the next moment, it is not. It does not, however, mean that there is modification of a thing because modification requires a substance to modify but there is no permanent substance. One who

1 *Śaṅkaraśāstra samuccaya*.

2 *Visuddhimagga*,

trusts his reasons and not the essence knows that everything flies and nothing is. Considered from the rational point of view we can say, impermanence is the essence of reality.¹ David Hume also maintained that permanence is an appearance and change is reality.² The illusion of permanence is due to the senses but reason knows that nothing is permanent. Whenever I try to catch 'myself', I stumble upon this or that perception. I do not find myself as permanent substance. Williams James propounded a theory of the stream of consciousness. Every passing thought is itself a thinker.³ Bergson enunciated the doctrine of *Elān vital* as the very essence of life and the universe. The *Elān* is the very source of the world and everything is the manifestation of the *Elān*.⁴

The *abhedavādin* affirms that reality is one, and difference is an illusion. The diversity and difference in life are due to our ignorance. The fundamental principle of the universe is one. *It is*; and the diversifications of the One are only an appearance. This view-point has been presented in the *Upaniṣads* and by the thinkers of the *Advaita Vedānta*. The Absolutists, as they are called, posit the One as the ultimate reality because that is the consummation and the limit of the gradual process of the synthetic approach. The one is the perfection and duality is imperfection. This is the cardinal principle of the *Advaita Vedānta*. *Vijñānavāda* and *Śūnyavāda* have presented similar points of view.

In the Western thought, we get traces of the development of monistic philosophy from the time of Greek thinkers like Permenides. Permenides said that reality *is* and *it does not become*. That which becomes, that which changes, is not real. There must be something that changes. It is the eternal principle. It is the one principle which remains the central point of the changes. It is the *sat* in the language of Indian philosophy and change is the *asat*. He said, '*Ex nihilo nihil fit*.' From the *sat*, you cannot get another *sat*, because it is the reality. That which becomes, must come out of that which it was not. If it were, it would not become and there is no problem of

1 "The illusion of permanence is ascribed to the senses. It is by reason that we arise to the knowledge of the law of becoming."

2 David Hume, *Ibid*.

3 William James : *Principles of Psychology*.

4 Bergson, Henry : *Creative Evolution*.

diversification of being. Therefore, *being is*, and all difference, multiplicity and change are mere illusion. As Permenides tried to establish the theory of being, Heraclites attempted to advance the theory of change on similar grounds. Jaina philosophers refuted the argument of those who tried to establish the reality as a change and flux, and established the theory of the reality of the Identity and Difference.

The third view presents a theory of identity and difference. According to this theory, identity or oneness is as real as difference and multiplicity. In the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory, we find that there is equal emphasis on the universal and the particular (*sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*). The substance and its modifications are based on the universality and the differentia of a thing. The universal and the particular are both important, for instance, the concept of cow as a universal, is as much derived from the generality of particulars, as particulars derive their identity from the universality of the universal. Therefore, the universal and particular are both independent and real. This is clear from the example mentioned above regarding the relation of the particular cow to the universal 'cow in general'. This view tries to reconcile the two theories which apparently contradict each other and affirm the reality of the universal or the particular as the case may be. The *Syādvādamoṅjārī* mentions that the universal and the particular are equally real and complementary to each other and yet different from each other.¹

Next, we come to the theory of qualified monistic theory (*viśiṣṭādvaita*). There are two forms of this theory. One gives prominence to the unity for the oneness making multiplicity only as an expression of the unity. Rāmānuja presented a Qualified Monism in which the one expresses itself into the many. The *Brahman* and the world are real. The soul merges itself into the *Brahman* as the waters of the river merge into the waters of the sea. The triple principle of *cit*, *acit* and *Īśvara* are real. The Reality is one and the self and the world are the expressions of the reality. The world is considered to be the body of *Īśvara* and *Īśvara* is the soul of the world. *Īśvara* is, therefore, considered to be the one with the *cit* and *acit* as its

1 *Syādvādamoṅjārī*—7.

Ayuta siddhānāmādhāryādhārabhutānām iha pratyayahetuḥ sambandhaḥ sa samavāyaḥ.

qualified expression. *Cit* and *acit* are derived from *Īśvara* as they are the body of *Īśvara*.¹ His philosophy has, therefore, been called *Viśiṣṭādvaita* (Qualified Monism). The primacy of unity is recognised and multiplicity is explained as emanating from the unity.

The Jainas have made a specific and significant contribution to this problem of the relation between the one and the many. According to the Jainas, the one and the many are equally real and ontological realities. As the multiplicity and difference are the facts of life, so is the unity. However, the two are not separate and independent realities. One implies the other : One cannot be expressed without the other. Where there is difference, there is identity, and where there is identity there is difference. Jaina philosophy co-ordinates both identity and difference. Every object is characterised by the very nature of its generality and particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*), identity and difference (*bhedābheda*) and permanence and change (*nityānityatva*). Every object expresses the generality of its class and particularity of the individual object. It would not be proper to say that an object expresses the substantiality and the unity only, because it also expresses as the inherent characteristic, the particularity and diversity as the form of modification (*pariyāya*). Similarly it would not be correct to consider the unity and oneness an appearance and not real, because modifications are not possible without a permanent object which changes. Similarly, the identity and difference cannot be considered as independent entities because they do not express themselves independently of each other, and there is no third substance which unites them. Therefore, identity and difference should be considered as complementary and as simplifying each other, though both are real. A thing can be described as similar, and dis-similar according to the point of view of and the context. Identity and difference are both applicable to a thing. It is identical, as well as, different from the different points of view. For instance, a thing is identical when considered from the point of view of similarity and genus, while it is different, looked at from the context of differentia and other species and individuals belonging to other species. Therefore, to say that identity and unity are real, and difference and change are unreal would be a logical and metaphysical fallacy. Further, identity and

1 *Śrī Bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja 3, 1, 9:

“*Sarvaṁ paramapuruṣeṇa sarvātmanā,*”

differences cannot also be considered as separate and independent realities. They imply each other. Therefore, it would be apter to say, a thing is characterised by the performance and change, identity and difference. These are categories of judgement. It has, therefore, been said that reality is similar in a particular context *kathāñcit*, is dis-similar from another point of view, it is describable from a still different context and indescribable from another point of view. It is real and also not-real considered from different contexts.¹ A thing has all these characteristics inherent in it. A thing is permanent and changing, general and particular, similar and different, one and the many and eternal and non-eternal. Aristotle expressed a similar view. A thing is characterised both by generality and particularity. It cannot be comprehended without the categories of generality and particularity, and nothing can exist without the categories of generality and particularity.²

Jaina thought has tried to comprehend the essence of a thing in its complex and comprehensive form. This view is, in a way, the expression of the *anekānta* point of view. It is possible to predicate contradictory attributes to a thing at the same time on the basis of the point of view (*naya*) and the contextual reference (*nikṣepa*). This is the approach of the *Bhedābheda-vāda*, (the theory of identity and difference). The predication of the attribute of identity and difference at the same time does not nullify the comprehension of the nature of a thing, but it gives a clearer and synthetic picture of the object. Substance is characterised by permanence and the modes by mutations and change. Substance and modifications are not different. It is the substance that undergoes modifications. They imply each other.³

✧ ३ DRAVYA (SUBSTANCE)

Jainism has presented the six-fold substances. They are : (1) *Jīva* (living substance or soul), (2) *Pudgala* (non-living matter), (3) *Dharma* (principle responsible for the motion in the world), (4) *Adharma* (principle of rest), (5) *Ākāśa* (space) and (6) *Kāla* (time).

1 *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā*—25.

“*Syānnāṣi nityaṃ sadṛśaṃ virūpaṃ
Vācyaṃ na vācyaṃ sadasattadeva*”.

2 *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*—W. T. Stace.

3 Dr. Mohanlal Mehta : *Jainadharma aur Darśana*.

Excepting *Kāla* (time), all other substances are called '*astikāyas*'; because they have multi-dimensional forms : while *Kāla* is not considered as '*astikāya*', as it has linear dimension only. Time moves in linear dimension. It never looks back. Nor can we measure time in the three dimensional categories. *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa* and *Kāla* are indivisible substances. They cannot be divided into parts although *Ākāśa* and *Kāla* in their empirical contexts are practically measurable. But they are considered as '*avayavi*' in the sense, conceptually they have innumerable points comparable to atoms (*paramāṇus*). The *Pudgala* (matter) alone is divisible. The ultimate indivisible point of *Pudgala* is an atom (*paramāṇu*). It cannot be further divided. When atoms combine they form an aggregate called '*skandha*'. The '*skandha*' has as many spacial points as it has atoms. The aggregate of two atoms would be called '*Dvi-aṇuka skandha*' (two-atomed molecule). The molecule (*skandha*) consisting of infinite atoms (*anantāṇu*) would be characterised by the infinite points of space. Division of the molecule brings back the atoms to their original single atoms. Molecule is not permanent. In this sense, the matter (*Pudgala*) is divisible. From the point of view of number, *jīvas* are infinite. Looked at from the angle of spacial positions, we could say that *jīva* is characterised as occupying innumerable *pradeśas* (points of space). *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Lokākāśa* (empirical space) have innumerable *pradeśas*. *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Lokākāśa* and *Jīva* occupy equal *pradeśas* (points of space). *Kāla* (time) has no spacial point nor is it considered an atomic substance. As it has not the multi-dimensional spacial characteristic, it cannot be considered an *astikāya*. It is included in the category of substance (*dravya*) because it functions as substance and change, in the empirical existence which is always in time. Ācāryas have made a distinction in time as : (a) real time and (b) phenomenal time (*vyavahāra kāla*). *Puṇḍarīkāsāra* mentions that the constant change expresses the real time, while time measured by astronomical phenomena would be considered as phenomenal time (*vyavahāra kāla*). It can be considered from another point of view : a point of time in the present is the real time, and the time measuring the past and the future points of time are the phenomenal time. A point of time which has passed cannot come back, and the point of time yet to come is not present at all. Therefore, past and present do not exist; they are only empirical and conventional measurements of time. The division of time into *samaya*, *muhūrta*, day and night etc., are only

practical and conventional measurements of time. Similarly, the conventional and practical distinction and division in *Ākāśa* is considered as measurable space called '*Dik*' (direction) and it is not an independent substance.

The present synthesises the past and the future. The past and the future have their importance on account of the present. Whenever we accept the existence of a thing, we have to admit that it existed in the past and will continue to exist in future. It is not possible to say that the object would exist in original state for all time. It undergoes modifications ; still modifications do not affect the real and substantial nature of the object. In the *Tattvārthasūtra*, *dravya* (substance) has been defined as that which has undergone modifications, which undergoes and which will continue to do so in future also.¹ The real nature of the object remains unchanged in and through all modifications. If it were not so, the substantial nature of the object would not remain and the past and the future changes would not have relation whatever. The object does express the identity in modifications. The substance does imply the reality. Ācārya Umāsvāti says that *dravya* expresses the attributes of origination, permanence and destruction. He also says that substance is that which has modifications.² He has in this connection, used the word *paryāya* (modification) in the place of *utpāda* (origination) and *vyaya* (destruction) and the *dhrauvya* in place of *guṇa*. *Utpāda* (origination) and *vyaya* (destruction) imply the concept of change. Every object has two aspects : identity and difference, permanence and change. Similarly, it exhibits the qualities of similarity and dis-similarity. The core is the permanent nature of the object and that which changes and undergoes modification. We find that the qualities are expressed in modifications. In the substantiality of the object, there is permanence, and in modifications we get change. Permanence and change, therefore, are equally real. The origination and destruction express modifications of the substances, but the substance remains permanent, it is not destroyed. For purposes of explaining this, Umāsvāti calls it '*Tadbhāvavyaya*'.³ This is the characteristic of permanence. Ācārya Kundkunda defines *dravya* (substance) as that

1 *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5, 29.

2 *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5, 37.

3 *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5, 30.

'it is itself'. *Aparityakta* has the characteristics of origin, continuity and has qualities (*utpāda*, *dhrauvya* and *vyayayukta*) and has modifications (*paryāya*).¹ In this, we get the real definition of *dravya*. *Pañcāstikāyasāra* describes the reality in similar way.² In this sense, the Jaina thought does not consider reality from one point of view only (*ekānta*) eternal or non-eternal. It is both eternal in one sense and non-eternal in another sense. It is eternal from the point of view of its essential nature, but non-eternal from the point of view of the modifications (*paryāyas*). By presenting the nature of reality either as eternal in the language of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and Vedic thought, or as flux and non-eternal in the language of the Buddhist thought, we would not be giving a comprehensive and synoptic view of reality. It would be one-sided view (*ekānta*). Therefore, it is necessary to give a synoptic picture of the nature of reality in the many-sided approach as the Jainas do. The Reality has to be considered as both eternal and non-eternal; eternal from the point of view of substance and non-eternal from the point of view of modes. An object is, it gets modifications and it is also destroyed. It does not lose its identity in the changes. Change is not mere discrete flow of independent points. It is the thing that changes. Change and permanence are, therefore, equally real. We experience a thing as permanent only when there is substantiality in the changing modes. This theory of the Jainas of identity and change has been compared to the chemical change.

In 1789, Lawosier, an eminent scientist, propounded a theory of conservation of matter. According to this theory, matter is constant. Its modifications are only expressions. The modifications do not destroy matter nor do they add to the quantity of matter. Just as the coal when burnt becomes ash, the matter is not altogether destroyed. It is only converted into ash. Similarly, in the universe, oxygen and carbon-dioxide are being continuously combined and dis-integrated without ever affecting quantity of the gas. Nothing

1 *Pravacanasāra* : 2, 3.

Apariccattasahāveṇuppadavvayadhuvattasamjuttam.

Guṇavaṃ ca sapajjāyaṃ, jaṃ taṃ davvaṃ ti buccanti.

2 *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, gāthā 8.

Sattā savvapaṇṇatthā, savissarūvā aṇantapajjāyā.

Bhaṇḍuppadadhuvattā, sappadivakkhā havadi ekkā.

new comes out, it is only transformation or the modification of matter. For instance, if we keep a metal pot unused for a long time, it gets rusted. But the rust is not a new substance. It is only a chemical action on the matter due to its contact, and it forms as oxy-hydrate. The qualitative aspects of matter gets transformed into its different modifications due to certain physical and chemical actions. The mass of matter remains constant and there is no change in the essential function and the nature of matter. Similarly, light-energy may be transformed into heat-energy. Magnetic attraction will not anyway fundamentally alter the quantity of matter or energy. They are only *pariyāyas*, modifications, without affecting the quantum of matter. The Jainas have affirmed the same point when they say that in the modifications of *dravya* the quantum of *dravya* does not change. It expresses itself in different forms. *Dravya* is eternal, modifications express change without affecting the quantum of *dravya*. Therefore, *dravya* is constant in all its modifications.

The *Sāṅkhya* philosophers have propounded a theory of permanence and change (*nityānityavāda*). *Puruṣa* is eternal, *Prakṛti* is also eternal, but it expresses itself in the form of its evolutes. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* says that atoms and souls are eternal and the objects of the world like a pot and a piece of cloth (*Ghaṭa-paṭa*) are non-eternal. The aggregates of the atoms are eternal. But unlike the Jainas, they do not accept the eternity involved in the *pariyāyas* also. Patañjali, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathi and others do not accept the functional theory of eternity *pariṇāmīnityatvavāda*; but they accept the concept of the ultimate reality.¹

1 (a) *Pātañjala Yogadarśana* :

"*Dravyam nityamākṣīranityā. Suvarṇam kadācidākṣītyā yuktaḥ piṇḍo bhavati, piṇḍākṣītimupamādyā rucakāḥ kriyante, rucakākṣītimupamādyā kaṭakāḥ kriyante, kaṭakākṣītimupamādyā svastikāḥ kriyante. Punarāvṛtaḥ suvarṇa piṇḍah.....Ākṣītranya cānyā ca bhavati, dravyam punastadeva. Ākṣītyupabhedenu dravyamevāvaśiṣyate.*

(b) *Mīmāṃsā Ślokaṛtika* : 1-3 p. 619.

Vardhamānakabhaṅge, ca rucakāḥ kriyate yadā Tadāpūrvārthinaḥ śokahprāptiścāpyuttarārthinaḥ. Hemārthinaḥ tasmādvastu trayātmakam. (Conid.)

DRAVYA AND PARYĀYA (SUBSTANCE AND MODES)

The term *Dravya* has many meanings. In its substantial sense it is eternal (*Nitya*). It is also used in the sense of a principle. Very often *Dravya* refers to the universal and *paryāya* refers to its modes.

The concept of the universal has been considered by the Jainas in two respects : First, the universal in the sense of referring to the *jīvas*. For instance, *jīvas*, whether empirical individuals or the liberated souls, all are considered as *jīvas*. Empirical individuals have their distinctions on the basis of various principles like the place of residence, the number of sense-organs, etc. Liberated souls are the *siddhas*. They are also *jīvas*. This reference of the universal (*sāmānya*) to the *jīvas* is called *tīryak sāmānya*.

The second distinction in the meaning of the concept of the universal refers to the vertical distinction of generality. This is called *ūrdhvatāsāmānya*. For instance, an object may undergo modifications, all its modifications are its particulars and the object in its generality is constant. It refers to the universal. The *Jīva*, from the point of view of substance is the universal referring to the substantiality *ūrdhvatāsāmānya*.¹ Again, if we describe the different stages of *jīva* in its various forms of existence, It would also be called *ūrdhvatāsāmānya*.²

Bhagavān Mahāvīra was once asked by a disciple : How many *jīva paryāyas* (modifications of *jīva*) are there ? Mahāvīra said : There are endless forms of *jīva paryāya*. "How is it ?" asked the disciple. Mahāvīra said : There are innumerable denizens of hell. There are numberless *Asurakumāras* and *Stanitakumāras*. There are innumerable earth-bodies and air-bodies (*pṛthvikāya* and *vāyukāya*). There are numberless vegetable-bodies (*vanaspatikāyas*). Similarly, there are innumerable two-sense organism and in this order there are innumerable men. There are *Vyantara* beings. There are innumerable *siddha jīvas* (liberated souls). Therefore, the substance of *jīva* is infinite in

Notpādasthītibhaṅgānāmabhāve syānmatītrayam.

Na nāṣena vinā śoko, notpādena vinā sukham.

Sthītyā vinā na mādhyasthyam, tena sāmānyanītyatā.

1 *Bhagavati sūtra* : 7-2-273.

2 *Bhagavati sūtra* : 7-3-279.

its variety of modifications.¹ In this dialogue, we find the expression of a specific form of distinction based on certain criteria. The modifications of the substances of *jīva* are to be found in infinite forms in this universe. Among the *jīvas* are also included the perfected souls. Therefore, this concept of generality or universality as applied to the *jīva* may be considered as *tiryaksāmānya paryāya*.

So far, we have considered the modifications of *jīva* at a particular point of time. But there would be infinite varieties of modifications within a span of many points of time. In this sense, a *jīva* has its infinite variations in point of time and space considered from the point of view of its modifications. While thinking about the various modes of a particular *jīva* we are looking at it from the point of view *ūrdhvatāviśeṣa* (verticular particularity). The description of the different modifications of *jīva* has reference to generality in the sense that *jīvas* assume various forms. Similarly, denizens of hell can also be described in terms of the various states of existence in hell that they undergo. This type of the infinite variety of existence of the denizens of hell who are of the same nature has been ably described in *Prajñāpanā*.

One resident of hell is similar in its substantiality with another resident. But considered from the point of view of status, nature, place and time we can make distinction between the different types of hellish beings. From the point of view of the residence, colour, smell, etc., for instance, there are innumerable variations in the complexity of the hellish beings. The distinctions are numerous and various. Therefore, as has been described in the *Prajñāpanā*, we can classify the hellish beings into different varieties on the basis of the distinctions in their capacity of understanding and possession of various forms of knowledge like, *matijñāna*, *brutajñāna* and also on the basis of their colour and smell, etc. In this sense, we have numerous types of denizens of hell.² Even considered from their bodily forms, there are innumerable types of the beings. Some are tall, some are very short, measurements beings judged from one 'aṅgula' to five hundred *dhanuṣya*. In between there are innumerable varieties. Similar distinctions could be made on the basis of their

1 *Bhagavatī sūtra* 25, 5.

2 *Prajñāpanā*, 5, 148.

span of life. Therefore, the *jīvas* can be considered from various points of view and can be classified on the basis of different criteria. These distinctions are referred to as *ardhvatāsāmānyārūpa viśeṣa* (particularity from the cross-sectional point of view).

Bhagavatī sūtra and *Prañāpanī sūtra* have given detailed study of *jīva* from the point of view of substance and also from the point of view of its modes. The changes and modifications imply the distinction of time and the modes and particularity imply the distinction in space. In this sense, words *pariyāya*, *viśeṣa*, *pariṇāma*, *utpāda* and *vyaya* have similar meanings. In the analysis of *dravya*, these words have been used in various contexts.

A question has been asked whether substance and mode are different or identical.

The *Āgama* literature has considered the modes as different from substance. It has also been considered in some respects as identical. *Bhagavatī sūtra* points out that modes are changing and not eternal and even after the destruction of the mode, the substance remains. Therefore, mode has to be considered different from substance. Otherwise, when modes are destroyed substance also will be destroyed. It implies that substance is not to be considered as mode and mode is not identical with the substance. The attributes of a substance cannot be destroyed, but its variations and modifications may change.

The disciples of Bhagavān Pārśvanātha had, presumably, some doubts about the question whether the disciples of Mahāvīra understood the concepts of *sāmāyika*. Bhagavān Mahāvīra said : The soul is *sāmāyika*, and *sāmāyika* is the essence of the soul. Here the soul is the substance and the universality and the equality are its essential features. They are expressed in the form of modes. In this sense, the modes are not different from the substance. The soul is identical with its attributes of universality, equality and omniscience.

*Bhagavatī sūtra*¹ and *Sthānāṅga*² have mentioned eight types of the *jīva* or *Ātman* : (1) *dravyātmā* (soul as substance), (2) *kaṣāyātmā* (soul in the affective state), (3) *yogātmā* (the soul as active), (4) *upa-*

1 *Bhagavatī sūtra* 12, 10, 466.

2 *Sthānāṅga* 8,

yogātmā (hermic energy of the soul), (5) *jñānātmā* (soul as knowledge) (6) *darśanātmā* (intuitive experience of the soul) (7) *cāritrātmā* (soul as an ethical being) and (8) *vīryātmā* (the inherent energy of the soul). These distinctions have been made from the points of view of substance and modifications. The description of soul as a substance has been made from the point of view of substance, and the remaining descriptions of the seven states have been made from the point of view of modifications. The substance (*dravya*) and modifications (*paryāya*) are both mutually complementary to each other. One cannot exist without the other. Substance without modifications and similarly modifications without substance, are not possible. Where there is substance, there must be modes (*paryāyas*).¹



1 Dr. Mohanlal Mehta : *Jainaḍharma aur Darṣana* (Hindi) pp. 123-129.

Jaina Metaphysics

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES

The Indian philosophical literature has made an exhaustive study of the concepts of *Tattva* (the first principle). *Tattva* comes from the word *tat*, and *tat* is a Saṅskṛt pronoun. By the suffix of the word *tva* it connotes the meaning of this (*tasya bhāvaḥ tattvam*). *Tattva*, therefore, refers to the first principle. In philosophical literature, there has been a very elaborate and deep study of the concept of the *tattva*.

From the practical point of view, *tattva* refers to the existing status (*vāstavika sthiti*), the essence (*sāravastu*) and the summary (*sārāṁśa*) of a thing. In the philosophical thought the common sense point of view of *tattva* is accepted but transcended and given a richer content from the ultimate point of view. It means the nature of the substance, pure principle or the ultimate principle.¹ In the Vedic literature, *Brahman* and *Paramātma* have been referred to as *tattva*. In the *Sāṅkhya* thought the first principle of the universe is described as *tattva*.

Different schools of philosophy have given the description of the *tattva* from different points of view. But all of them emphasise that the *tattva* is very important in life. The life and thought are intimately connected with each other, and they cannot be separated.

1 *Bṛhatnayaçakra* 4—

*Tattam̐ taha paramat̐ham̐ davyasahāvam̐ taheva paramuparam̐.
Dheyam̐ suddham̐ paramam̐ eyat̐hā hunti abhihāṇā.*

—*Tattva, paramārtha, dravya svabhāva, par-apara, dhyeya, buddha parama* —all these are synonyms.

They also emphasise that without the first principles or *tattva*, the life cannot be dynamic, it would be still. So to isolate the contemplation of the first principles from the process of life could be to deny the reality of the *ātman*.

The entire Indian philosophy is based on the study of the first principles. The orthodox systems of Indian philosophy have discussed the concept of ultimate principles according to their philosophical predilections. The *Cārvāka* philosophy has also accepted the first principles. It says that earth (*pṛthvī*), water (*jala*), air (*vāyu*) and fire (*agni*) are the four ultimate principles of the universe.¹ *Ākāśa* is not the ultimate principle because it cannot be apprehended by sense-experience, but it can only be known through inference. *Vaiśeṣika* philosophers first gave six principles : (1) *Dravya* (substance), (2) *Guṇa* (quality), (3) *Karma* (activity), (4) *Sāmānya* (generality), (5) *Vīśeṣa* (particularity) and (6) *Samavāya* (inherence). Later, the principle of *abhāva* (non-existence) was added. Thus, there are seven fundamental principles of the universe. The *Naiyāyikas* have given 16 principles (*padārthas*) of the universe. They are : (1) *pramāṇa*, (2) *prameya*, (3) *saṃśaya*, (4) *prayojana*, (5) *dṛṣṭānta*, (6) *siddhānta*, (7) *avayava*, (8) *tarka*, (9) *nirṇaya*, (10) *vāda*, (11) *jalpa*, (12) *vitandā*, (13) *hetvābhāva*, (14) *chala*, (15) *jāti* and (16) *nigrahasthāna*. They are primarily logical categories. *Sāṃkhya darśana* has enunciated 25 principles in the evolution of the universe. They are : *prakṛti*, *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra*, *pañca jñānendriyas* (5 sense-organs), *pañca karmendriyas* (5 motor organs), *pañca tanmātrās* (5 elements) and *pañca mahābhūtas* (5 basic substances) and *puruṣa*, the self. *Yoga* philosophers have accepted the *Sāṃkhya* enunciation of the 25 principles. *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* has advocated that the injunctions of the *Vedas* are primary and they are the first principles. The *Advaitavedānta* is monistic philosophy and has postulated the first principle of the universe *Brahman*—all else is its appearance. The Buddha has formulated the 4 noble truths : (1) *duḥkha* (misery), (2) *duḥkhasamudaya* (cause of misery), (3) *duḥkhanirodha* (cessation of misery), (4) *duḥkha-nirodha-mārga* (way to the cessation of the misery). In Jaina thought the concept of *tattva* has been considered from two aspects : (1) *śaḍdravya* aspect (the six substances) and (2) seven *tattvas* or nine *padārthas*. The terms *Dravya*, *Tattva* and *Padārtha* are sometime considered as equivalent.

1 Bṛhaspati : *Pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni*.

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TERMINOLOGY OF TATTVA

In Jaina metaphysics the terms *sat*, *sattva*, *tattva*, *tattvārtha*, *artha*, *padārtha* and *dravya* have been used in various contexts as equivalent terms. However, these terms have their variations of uses. Ācārya Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthasūtra* has used the word *tattvārtha*, *sat* and *dravya* in a similar way, in the context to reference to substance. These concepts have only linguistic variations, but there is no difference between the uses of the words conceptually. Ācārya Nemicaandra has mentioned a dichotomous division of the *tattva* into *jīva* and *ajīva* (living and the non-living) as *dravyas*. The universe is constituted of these two fundamental substances. The Buddhist philosophers have propounded a theory of the impermanence of things. Everything is transitory, everything is a flux. Therefore, reality is only fleeting and transitory. But Vedāntins, on the other hand, have formulated a theory of the absolute as the ultimate truth which is permanent and unchanging. The changing universe is an appearance. In this way, the Buddhists and the Vedāntins have approached the theory of reality from their different points of view : one from the synthetic point of view and the other from the momentary point of view. The Jainas say that these two points of view are one-sided, partial and *ekānta*. To assert their point of view is to commit the fallacy of exclusive affirmation (*ekānta*). According to Jainism the reality is comprehensive and complex. Both the synthetic and momentary points of view are partial approaches to the understanding of the real. Both these approaches are partial truths. Because permanence and change are both real and without permanence there is no change. It is the permanent which changes. Therefore, the Jainas believe that they are equally real. We cannot assert exclusive truth in any one of them. Everything in the universe would be permanent if it is looked at from the point of view of substance and it will be a change and impermanent if it is looked at from the point of view of modes. Let us consider, now, the Jaina analysis of the theory of the reality.

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THE NUMBER OF TATTVAS

The question regarding the number of the *tattvas* has been answered by the Jaina philosophers in different ways in different contextual references. There are three fundamental approaches to this problem. From the point of view of the cosmic order, it can be said that the universe consists of two fundamental principles :

jīva (living substance) and *ajīva* (non-living substance). From ontological point of view, with the element of the spiritual considerations, we can say that there are 7 *tattvas* : *Jīva*, *Ajīva*, *Āśrava*, *Bandha*, *Saṃvara*, *Nirjarā* and *Mokṣa*. If we include the ethical and religious overtones to these considerations, we have nine principles which includes the seven principles mentioned above and two more are added i.e., *Pāpa* and *Puṇya*. In the philosophical literature there appears to be a general agreement on the usage of the second tradition of the looking at reality from metaphysical and spiritual points of view and they give seven principles. In the *Āgama* literature, the third tradition is used. The *Bhagavati*¹, *Prañhāpanā*², *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*³ have mentioned nine principles. The *Sthānāṅga*⁴ mentioned two-fold classification : *Jīva* and *Ajīva*. Ācārya Nemicaṇḍra has stated in the *Dravyasaṅgraha* that there are two-fold distinctions in the *Tattvas* : *Jīva* and *Ajīva* on the basis of the *Āgamas*, mentioned above. Ācārya Umāsvāti has included, in the *Tattvārthasūtra*, the principles of *Puṇya* (merit) and *Pāpa* (demerit) in the principles of *Āśrava* or *Bandha* and mentioned the seven distinctions of the *tattvas* (principles).⁵ Ācārya Malayagiri has followed the enunciation the principles as given by Ācārya Umāsvāti, in his commentary on the *Prañhāpanā*.⁶

THE ORDER OF THE TATTVAS 4.3

A relevant question has been asked as to why the *Jīva dravya* has been given the first place and other *dravyas* are mentioned later. The answer to that would be that *Jīva dravya* is fundamental for the following reasons although other principles are equally important.

The essence of *Jīva* is consciousness. As such, *jīva* knows, it experiences the modes of *Pudgala*. It experiences the fruits of good and bad *karmas*. Each *jīva* is aware of the tendency of experiencing the pleasure of the world and also it has a craving for the realisation of the self. The principle of *ajīva* is useful for the soul to realise the highest end of *Mokṣa*. It is like the ladder with the help of

1 *Bhagavati* : *Abhigama jīvājīvā uvaladdha puṇṇapāvā āsava saṃvara nījjara kiriyāhigaraṇa bandha mokkha kusalā*.

2 *Prañhāpanā*.

3 *Uttarādhyāyana*, 28, 14.

4 *Sthānāṅga*, 2.

5 *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1, 4.

6 *Prañhāpanāvyūtti*.

which, we can ascend to the other floor. It is like the boat by means of which we can cross the ocean of life. Similarly, the external world (*ajīva*) is a canvas on which the activities of the *jīva* are to be developed. In this sense, *Ajīva* is the next category in importance of the seven *tattvas*. Similarly, *jīva* in contact with *ajīva* will bring about the influx of *karma* (*āśrava*) and *bandha* (the bondage). The empirical individual (*saṃsārī jīva*) experiences merit (*puṇya*) and *pāpa* (demerit) due to the influx of *karma* (*āśrava*) and bondage (*bandha*). Therefore, in some *Āgamic* books, *puṇya* and *pāpa* have been mentioned before the categories of *āśrava* and *bandha*; and in some books they have been included after the categories of *āśrava* and *bandha*. The separation of *jīva* and *pudgala* leads to *mokṣa*. *Samvara* and *nirjarā* are the means for the attainment of *mokṣa*. When the *kārmic* particles are entirely removed from the *jīva*, *mokṣa* is possible. The order of the principles in many works has been *Samvara*, *nirjarā*, *bandha* and *mokṣa*.

❧ PRESENTATION AND ELABORATION

The *Ācāryas* present the philosophical problems to the disciples keeping in view the degree of their capability of understanding the intricacies of the problems. If the disciple is sharp-witted, the presentation becomes brief and sometimes even suggestive. Elaboration in simple language should be necessary to persons who are rather slow-witted. If the seven-fold principles are crystallised in a brief presentation, then the principles are to be expressed in the two-fold distinction of *jīva* and *ajīva*, because these two principles incorporate the other five principles in the form of expressions of 'the *jīva* and *ajīva*'. The ways of the forms of *tattvas* are different. *Āśrava*, *bandha*, *puṇya* and *pāpa* are principles mainly concerned with ethical and empirical considerations. They are called '*saṃyogi*'. But *samvara*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa* do not have their eyes towards the worldly attainments. One is based on the secular activity and the other turns towards spiritual salvation. The latter is therefore called '*viyogi*'. *Āśrava* is the influx of *karma* into the soul. The soul gets *kārmic* particles encrusted and it is vitiated by the influx of *karma*. This causes the bondage (*bandha*). Where there is *āśrava*, there is *bandha*. The soul gets entangled in the wheel of life and death due to the influx of the *kārmic* particles and vitiating the psychic states of the soul, through passions (*kaṣāyas*). Auspicious *bandha* is *puṇya* and inauspicious bondage is *pāpa*. In this way, the four principles of *āśrava*, *bandha*,

saṁvara and *nirjarā* are closely associated with the principles of *jīva* and *ajīva*. *Samvara* is to prevent the influx of *karma*, and that is possible by stoppage of the inlet of *karma*, just as we close the inlets of water in a tank for the sake of obstructing the flow of water inside. The function of *nirjarā* is to remove the *karma*, which is there associated with the soul, just as we remove the accumulated water from the tank for cleaning the tank. When all the *karmas* is removed, the soul becomes pure and free from *kārmic* tinge. It reaches the state of perfection. The function of the three principles is to remove the *kārmic* particles which are foreign to the soul.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES (TATTVAS) FROM THE SPIRITUAL POINT OF VIEW

43

The *tattvas* can be classified into three forms from the spiritual point of view of the *tattvas* which will be known (*jñeya*), those that should be discarded and those that should be grasped and accepted. *Jīva* and *ajīva* are principles which need to be understood in the proper way (*samyagjñāna*). One who wants to realise himself would have the right knowledge of the principles of *jīva* and *ajīva*, otherwise, he would not be able to develop self-control. For the sake of salvation, one should avoid *bandha* and *saṁsāra*. *Mokṣa* is to be realised. *Samvara* and *nirjarā* are the means for the realisation of *mokṣa*. *Āsrava*, *puṇyā* and *pāpa* will bring the bondage (*bandha*) and they have to be discarded. If the merit (*puṇya*) is related to the good activity that leads to self-realisation, it has its functions for the path of realisation. In the *chadmastha* stage of *guṇasthāna* the self is associated with *puṇya* along with the realisation of the triple jewels (*samyagdarśana*, *jñāna* and *cāritra*). In the lower stages there are emotional upsets. Those who are seeking to realise the self, but because they rely on the noble words of the *munis* and *arhantas* (*virīhamkaras*), would attain the state of righteousness. In short, *puṇya* considered from a particular point of view (*ekānta dṛṣṭi*) may be worthy of being discarded, but from other points of view, it has the characteristics of *jñeya*, *heya* (to be discarded) and *upādeya* (to be accepted). In the fourteenth *guṇasthāna*, which is the highest stage, *puṇya* has also been discarded, because *puṇya* (merit) as well as *pāpa* (demerit) have no relevance in that stage. From the 11th to 13th stages of *guṇasthānas*, it is only knowable (*jñeya*) and in other *guṇasthanas*, the seeker after truth has need of the *puṇya* (merit)

because with the help of the *puṇya* he will have tread his way to self-realisation. In this sense, *jīva* and *ajīva* are *jñeya* (worthy to be known); *āśrava* (influx of *karma*), *bandha* (bondage) and *pāpa* (demerit) are to be discarded and *nirjarā* and *mokṣa* are worthy to be pursued. *Puṇya* can be considered from various points of view. It is worthy of knowledge (*jñeya*), it is *heya* (to be discarded) from another view and *puṇya* needs to be accepted in the earlier stages of self-realisation. It has all the three characteristics.

43 RŪPI AND ARŪPI (WITH FORM AND THE FORMLESS)

Jīva is formless. *Mokṣa* is also formless. There are 5 types of *ajīva* category : *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa*, *Kāla* and *Pudgala*. *Dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla* are formless (*arūpi*). *Pudgala* (matter) has form. The modes of *pudgala* can be found in the forms of *karma*, *āśrava*, *bandha*, *puṇya* and *pāpa*. Those which have form are characterised by the qualities of *varṇa* (colour), *gandha* (smell), *rasa* (taste) and *sparśa* (touch). That which is characterised by the absence of these qualities is formless (*arūpi*).

43 JIVA AND AJIVA

The questions arise out of the nine principles, how many are *jīvas* (living substances) and how many are *ajīvas* (non-living substances). This question has been considered with reference to principle of *samvara*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa*. These are expressions of function of *jīva*. So these are also called *jīvas*. *Āśrava*, *bandha*, *puṇya* and *pāpa* are expressions of non-living substances. Hence, these are also called *ajīvas*. *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa*, *Kāla* and *Pudgala* are non-living substances.

43 CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES WITH REFERENCE TO DRAVYA

Jainism makes a two-fold distinction in the study of *tattvas* as follows : (1) from the point of view of the ontological categories and (2) from the point of view of substances. We have already seen the classification of the substances from the ontological point of view. From the point of view of substance (*dravya*), *tattvas* have been classified into two : *jīva* and *ajīva*. On the one hand, there is the *jīva* category and on the others the *ajīva*. *Ajīva* has been further classified into different types as : (1) *Dharma* (principle of motion), (2) *Adharma* (principle of rest), (3) *Ākāśa* (space), (4) *Kāla* (time), and (5) *Pudgala*

(matter). *Jīva*, *Pudgala*, *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* are called *Astikāyas* because they have three dimensional extensions. *Astikāya* connotes the characteristic of multi-dimensional extension, but *Kāla* (time) is not considered as *astikāya*, because it is not multi-dimensional. It has only linear dimension.

DRAVYA AND BHĀVA (SUBSTANCE AND MODES) * 3

If we want to understand the nature of a thing, we have to consider the nature of the object from the point of view of its substance and its characteristic. *Dravya* refers to the original matter and *bhāva* has reference to its modes. *Dravya* and *bhāva* can be considered from another point of view, i. e., *dravya* has reference to the material aspect and *bhāva* refers to the psychic state. The seven *tattvas* can be analysed from the point of view of substance and the modes.

The *jīva* as a substance is eternal, beginningless and endless. This is considered from the point of view of substance. But from the point of view of psychic state, *jīva* can be considered a substance expressing itself in various psychic ways like desires and other mental activities. Similarly, *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa* are non-living substances. The modifications are also non-living (*ajīva*) substances. *Punya* can be considered from both *dravya* and *bhāva* points of view and *punya* affects the soul in its activity and the encrustations of *karma*. Similarly, *pāpa* also has two aspects : the material aspect and the psychic aspect. Jainism considered the various principles from the two fundamental aspects, i. e., from the point of view of material aspect and the psychic point of view. In this way, we get the *dravyāśrava*; and *dravyāśrava* expresses itself in *mithyātva* (perversity), *avrata* (violation of vows), *pramāda* (negligence), *kaṣāya* (passions) and *yoga* (activity). In the same way, we have *bhāvāśrava* with reference to the same forms of expression like *mithyātva*, *avrata* etc. These are psychic states of the self. *Saṁvara* can also be considered from the material and psychic points of view. *Saṁvara* expresses itself in activities which are wholesome and which are meant to arrest the influx of *karma*. These activities may be expressed in the forms of practice of *vratas*, *saṁiti* and in three forms of *gupti*. By means of these activities, the influx of *karma* can be arrested and the *kārmic* particles are held in abeyance. There is the psychic aspects of *saṁvara* which expresses itself in the psychic states of the self which are helpful for

enabling us to stop the influx of the *karmas*. *Nirjarā* has two aspects : *dravyanirjarā* which expresses itself in *tapa* (austerities) and *bhāvanirjarā* which is the psychic foundation for the practice of austerities. The *bandha* (bondage) has also been considered from two points of view i.e., *dravyabandha* which is the *kārmic* bondage and *bhāvabandha* which is expressed in the psychic expressions like emotions etc. The highest state of *dravyamokṣa* is a state where all the *karmas* are removed and *bhāvamokṣa* is a state of perfect bliss and perfect peace of *ātman*. □

Ātmavāda : An Analysis

(Concept of Ātman)

VARIOUS THEORIES OF SOUL H. 3

Sūtrakṛtāṅga discusses different theories of soul.¹ Some philosophical theories postulate the ultimate elements as the highest reality of the universe. The earth, water, air, fire and space have been considered to be the ultimate elements of the universe, and soul is a product of the combination of these elements.² In the Buddhist literature, we find references to these theories of the soul and there is mention of a theory that the soul as a thing consisted of the four elements excepting space.³ The *Rigvedic* seers speculated over the nature of the soul and they were perplexed to discover the real and the ultimate nature of the soul. They asked the question : "Who am I ?" "I do not know."⁴ In the philosophic discussions about the nature of the soul, several views have been presented which mention the nature of the soul in the materialistic and the idealistic strain. Some have said that the soul is composition of matter, some identify it with an aspect of *prakṛti*, some make the soul the essence of life (*prāṇa*) and still others give an idealistic picture of the soul as a person (*puruṣa*).

THE MATERIALISTIC CONCEPTION OF SOUL H. 3

Considered from the historical point of view, the materialistic view of reality is very ancient. We find mention of this view as a

1 *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1, 1, 1, 7-8.

2 *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1, 1, 1, 7.

Santi pañca mahbbhūyā ihamegesimāhiyā.

Pudhavī āu teū va vāū āgāsa pañcayā.

3 *Brahmajālasutta*.

4 *Rigveda*—1, 164, 37.—*Na vā jānāmi yadiva idava idamasmī.*

polimic in the *Upaniṣads*, the Buddhist and the Jaina literature. In the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, the problem of the ultimate source of the universe has been discussed; and mention has been made the matter is the ultimate source of the universe.¹ In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, there is discussion about the ultimate source of the universe. It has been suggested that matter is the ultimate source of the material things, and consciousness in this universe. There is no consciousness in the dead body (*na pretyasaṃjñā astī*).² Jayanta, the *Naiyāyika* philosopher, has suggested that the materialistic theory is to be found in ancient Indian thought in the *Cārvāka* philosophy.³ In the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* we get references to the materialistic theory of the soul.⁴ *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* makes mention of the *Cārvāka* theory of soul as the combination of the five physical elements.⁵ In the *Dīgghanikāya*, there is a discussion of the view of Ajitakeśakambalin, who said that the soul is a product of the combination of the four elements except space.⁶ It is clear from the discussion of the materialistic theories, that they maintain the view of the soul as a product of the combination of the basic elements and consciousness is also a by-product of the metabolic changes in the body. This view is called '*Lokāyatamata*'. This has been criticised by other systems of philosophy in India.

In the ancient philosophical literature, we also get references to the theory called *tajjīvatatccharīravāda* as we get the materialistic conception of the soul. In the *Upaniṣads*, the theory has not been mentioned in this terminology, but in other philosophical works like *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*,⁷ *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*⁸ and *Majjhimanikāya*⁹ we get references of this view.

1 *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 1, 2.

2 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2, 4, 12.

3 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, gāthā 1553.

4 *Nyāyamañjarī*—Vijayanagaram series, p. 472.

5 *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1, 1, 17—18.

6 *Dīgghanikāya*—*Sāmaññaphalasutta*.

7 *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 2, 9-10

(a) *iti padhame purisaajāye tajjīvatatccharīrae tti āhie*

(b) *docce purisaajāye pañcamahabbhūie tti āhie*

(c) *Sūtrakṛtāṅga-niryukti*, gāthā 30

8 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*—doubts of *Vāyubhūti*

9 *Majjhimanikāya*—*cūlamālunkya sutta*

Paṇḍit Sukhalāl Saṅghvi etc., has suggested that “*Bhūtacaitanyavāda*” and “*tajjivatacchariravāda*” are two different theories. If they were identical theories, there would not have been separate mention and separate discussion of these theories.¹ *Tajjivatacchariravāda* maintains that body and soul are one. Tathāgata Buddha has mentioned this problem as one of the unanswerable questions (*avyākṛta praśna*). In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, we get discussion about this theory. “The soul and the body are one and identical. If they are different, they could have been shown as separate entities as we can show the sword from its case, a nut from the bag and as we can get the butter from the curds, but we cannot show the soul as different from the body.”²

These two schools of thought can be found discussed in the ancient Indian philosophical literature. It has been described that the fundamental substance of the universe is constituted of the fundamental elements like the earth, water, air and fire (*pṛthvī, āpaḥ, teja* and *vāyu*).³ According to this thought, the consciousness has been described as a product of the combination of the elements.⁴ Just described. There is no other source except this. Just as we get alcohol from the combination of jaggery and *ghāṭakī* flowers, so also we get consciousness from the metabolic changes in the body. This type of materialistic theory or epiphenomical theory of consciousness and also the materialistic theory of reality could be found in the *Cārvāka* philosophers in India and in the Greek philosophers like Thales, Aneximander and Aneximanes. They were monistic materialists. Democratus was a Pluralistic materialist. He propounded the theory of atoms. Similarly, in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* we get the mention of a theory of *Kambalāśvatara* which mentions that consciousness is only body (*kāyādeva caitanyaṃ*). According to the *Tattvasaṅgraha* *tajjivataccharīra* is a theory of *Kambalāśvatara*. *Dīgghanikāya* mentions the name of Ajitakeśakambalin as a propounder of this theory. It is possible that Ajitakeśakambalin and *Kambalāśvatara* are the same persons.

In the Buddhistic literature there is a part in the *Dīgghanikāya* called *pāyāsīsutta*. In the Jaina literature we have *Rājapraśnīyasūtra*.

1 *Bhāratīya Tattvavidyā*, p. 77.

2 *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, *Puṇḍarīka adhyayana*.

3 *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, p.1.

4 *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, p. 205

In both these works there is a similar discussion about the questions of the king Pāyāsī or Pradeśi regarding the nature of the soul. The king Pāyāsī did not consider the body and the soul as separate. In order to prove this theory he demonstrated that there is nothing that remains after the destruction of the body after death. He carried some observations in this respect and made some experiments. Perhaps, these were the first primitive forms of experiments. He had asked some persons that they should come and report as to where they were after death, but none came to report to him. He locked a man in a box and sealed it in order to show that after the death of the man, there would be nothing in the box except the body. He cut asunder the limb of the body of the person in order to locate the soul but he could not locate the soul. A youth, for instance, can discharge many arrows with his strength, but a young child cannot do so. This is because the strength is in the body, and if the body is destroyed the energy is also destroyed.

Rājā Pradeśi carried these investigations and was sure that the soul is nothing but the product of the body. Apart from the body there would be no soul. His father was also of the same view. This materialistic conception of the soul as belonging to the organism was discussed in the *Upaniṣads* and in some cases it has been supported for the sake of presenting theories to the people of different abilities.¹

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, there is a story of Virocana and Indra going to Prajāpati for getting a clarification regarding the nature of the *ātman*. Prajāpati asked them to look into the pond of water and he said "you are that" i.e., the body i.e., the *ātman*. Virocana was satisfied with this view and he went on preaching the materialistic conception of the soul as identical with the body.

ĀTMAN AS PRĀṆA (PRĀṆMAYA ĀTMĀ)

But Indra had his doubts. He could not let be convinced of the view that the soul is the body. Then a different view possibly came to his mind that *ātman* is *prāṇa* (the vital or life force). This view was held by many philosophers. They argued that without this life force, sense-experience would not be possible and sense-organs would not function. Take away the life-force and the sense-organs would be dead. The life force has sometimes been associated with breath because after death, breath would not function. Therefore,

1 *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2, 1, 2.

2 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 9, 9.

ātman is the *prāṇa* and all functions of the life are possible because of *ātman*.¹ In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* it has been said that *prāṇa* is life force in the universe.² *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* describe that *prāṇa* is the god of gods.³ But Nāgasena has refuted the theory of *prāṇa* as the soul in the *Milindapaṇḥa*.

The sense-organs have an important function in the body. Some identify the *ātman* with the sense-organs, but philosophers have criticised this theory of identifying the *ātman* with sense-organs. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* also there is a criticism of the theory as the story of Indra and Prajāpati continues.⁴ In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, it has been said that at death, the sense-organs cease to function, but *prāṇa* which is the source of the energy of the sense-organs is not destroyed. Therefore, *indriyas* function because of the *prāṇas* and *indriyas* have been described as *prāṇas*.⁵

In the Jaina literature, there is the mention of ten *prāṇas* (life forces), in which the sense-organs are also included.

Vācaspati, while discussing the *vaikṛtika bandha*, as accepted by the *Sāṃkhya*, has suggested that there are views which mention that *indriyas* are the *puruṣa*. These are the views which identify *puruṣa* with *indriya*. They are *Indriyātmavādins*.⁶

In this way, there have been several views which may be considered as materialistic in nature as they identify the *ātman* either with the body or the sense-organs. This is one of the views which is equally important in Indian thought. The materialistic view of the *ātman* as presented by the *Cārvāka* has been recognised as a separate *darśana* in the current of Indian philosophy.

3. ĀTMAN AS MIND (MANOMAYA ĀTMĀ)

It has been observed that the sense-organs do not function in the absence of the mind. The body may remain in a place resting for sometime, but the mind moves about. Therefore, the mind is more important than the sense-organs and some have suggested the theory that mind is the *ātman*. Paṇḍit Dalsukha Mālavaṇiā says that

1 *Tattirīya Upaniṣad*, 2, 2, 3; *Kauṣītaki*, 3, 2.

2 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 3, 15, 4.

3 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 1, 5, 21.

4 *Ātmanīmānsā*, ed. Dalsukh Mālavaṇiā, p. 13.

5 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 1, 5, 21.

6 *Śāṅkhya-kārikā*, 44

there was first the view of *ātman* as *prāṇa* and later came the theory of *ātman* as the mind.¹ Mind is subtler than the sense-organs and the *prāṇa*. The philosophers do not uniformly agree as to the nature of the mind, whether it is material or immaterial. Some have suggested that the mind is immaterial, but the *Naiyāyikas*² and *Vaiśeṣikas*³ have considered mind as atomic in nature. It is different from the material substances like earth, water, etc. *Sāṃkhya darśana* maintains that the mind evolved out of *ahaṃkāra* before the evolution of the *pañcabhūtas* and therefore the mind is subtler than the *bhūtas* (elements). *Vaiśāṅghika* school of Buddhism maintains that mind is of the nature of *viññāna* and it is an expression of *viññāna*.⁴

Nyāya philosophers have sometimes considered mind as *ātman*⁵ because mind is different from the body as we make a distinction between the body and soul. Mind is all-pervasive. Mind comprehends all that the sense-organs grasp. Therefore, mind is considered to be *ātman* and it is not necessary to make a distinction between the *ātman* and mind.⁶

Taittirīya Upaniṣad also says that mind is the *ātman* (*anyoṅantar-ātmā manomayaḥ*).⁷

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* discusses the nature of the mind from different aspects. Mind is considered to be the highest truth (*paramabrahma samrāt*).⁸ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* makes mind the *Brahman*.⁹ *Tejobindu Upaniṣad* describes mind in various ways and gives supreme importance to mind. Mind is the whole universe. Mind is the greatest enemy and due to mind we suffer untold misery. Mind is *Kāla* (time). Mind is *saṃkalpa* (will). Mind is *jīva* (soul). Mind is *citta* (consciousness). Mind is *ahaṃkāra* (indivi-

1 *Ātmanīmāṃsā*, p. 15.

2 *Nyāyasūtra*, 3, 2, 61.

3 *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 7, 1, 23.

4 *Abhidharma Kośa*—*Ṣaṇṇāmanantarātūtaṃ viññānaṃ yaddhi tan-manāḥ*.

5 (a) *Nyāyasūtra*, 3, 1, 16.

(b) *Nyāyavārtika*, p. 336.

6 *Taittirīya, Up.*, 2, 3.

7 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Up.*, 1, 5, 3.

8 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Up.*, 4, 1, 6.

9 *Chāndogya, Up.*, 7, 3, 1.

duality). Mind is *antaḥkaraṇa* (inner sense). Mind is *pṛthvī* (the earth). Mind is *jala* (water). Mind is *agni* (fire). Mind is *pavana* (wind). Mind is *ākāśa* (space). Mind is *śabda* (sound). Mind is *sparga* (touch). *Rūpa* (form), *rasa* (taste), *gandha* (smell) and *pañcakośa* (five sheaths) arise out of mind. The states of waking ((*jāgrti*), dream (*svapna*), and sleep (*sūṣupti*) are all expressions of the function of the mind. Similarly, the deities of direction¹(*dikpāla*), *vasu*, *rudra*, *āditya* and others are all forms of mind.² In this way, mind is the very source of universe. It is the very essence of the universe.

PRAJÑĀTMA-PRAJÑANĀTMA-VIJÑĀNĀTMA ॥ ३ (ĀTMAN AS PRAJÑĀ AND VIJÑĀNA)

The philosopher transcending the speculations of *ātman* as mind, reaches a stage when he finds *ātman* as identical with *prajñā* (psyche). This is the later stage of development of the theory of *ātman*, in the hierarchy of thought. The mind and the sense-organs cannot function in the absence of the psyche (*prajñā*). *Prajñā* is much more important than the sense-organs and the mind.³ In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, *prajñā* has been described as *antarātmā* and *viññānātmā* as *manomaya*.⁴ In the *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, *prajñā* is considered as ultimate truth and it is an aspect of *Brahman* and mind is one of the aspect of the *prajñā*⁵. *Prajñā* and *prajñāna* are considered as identical.⁶ The word *viññāna* is considered a mode of *prajñā*.⁶

Viññāna, *Prajñā* and *prajñāna* have the same meaning. In this sense *ātman* is described as *viññānātmā*, *prajñātmā* and *prajñānātmā*. We have already discussed about the views which have considered mind as material and those views which say that mind is immaterial. Transcending these views we come to a realm of views where *ātman* is considered as psyche and the higher aspect of function of psyche. This is expressed in the self as a cogniser. Cognition by mind is

1 *Tejobindu Up.*, 5, 98, 104.

2 *Kauṣītaki Up.*, 3, 6, 7.

3 *Taittirīya Up.*, 2, 4.

4 *Aitareya Up.*, 3, 2.

5 *Aitareya Up.*, 3, 3.

6 *Aitareya Up.*, 3, 2.

possible only if there is a cogniser and that is considered to be, according to this theory, the *prajñā*. *Indriyas* are to be the means of cognising an object by the *prajñā*.¹ We should bear in mind that in *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad*, the sense-organs and mind have been included in the psyche as the man in the sleeping or in an unconscious state does not cognise anything even if the sense-organs are there because the *prajñā* does not function. Therefore, the functions of these asceceries like the sense-organs and the mind are dependent on the *prajñā* or the psyche. The man gets up from sleep and he get awake and begins to recognise things. Similarly, if a man is reborn, his experience starts. In these cases, the sense-organs begin to operate and get experiences as fire is born from the spark.² Man begins to get knowledge. The sense-organs, therefore, are an aspect and function of the *prajñā*.³ Without the association with *prajñā*, sense-organs and the mind cannot function.⁴ Therefore, it is necessary to understand that the psyche is distinct from the sense-organs and mind. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*,⁵ we have a description of the grades of reality, one higher than the other. The intellect (*buddhi*) is higher than mind (*manas*), *mahat* (the great) is greater than *buddhi*, *avyakta prakṛti* (undifferentiated *prakṛti*) is higher than *mahat* and *puruṣa* is the highest of all; because according to *Sāṃkhya*, the mere presence of *puruṣa* is sufficient to create disturbance in the equilibrium of the three *guṇas* in the *prakṛti* and then the evolution starts. From this, it is clear that the intellect (*Vijñāna*) is not the characteristic of the attribute of consciousness but it is the attribute of *prakṛti*. From this we can say that in the search for *vijñānātma* (i.e., *ātman* is identical with the *jñāna*) we arrive at the truth that the *ātman* is consciousness (*cetanāmaya*). The consummation of the hierarchy in experience will be the bliss (*ānanda*) which is the highest point of experience. It is very often suggested that *ātman* is *ānanda*. It is *ānandamaya*.

1 *Kauṣītakī*, 3, 8.

2 *Ibid.*, 3, 2.

3 *Ibid.*, 3, 5.

4 *Ibid.*, 3, 7.

5 *Kaṭha Up.*, 1, 3, 10-11.

CIDĀTMĀ (ĀTMAN AS CIT) 4.2,

The Indian philosophers have described the different levels of the self in its experiences starting from *annamaya* to *ānandmaya*. These may be considered as the sheaths of *ātman*. In all these discussions, the outer encrustations of the *ātman* have been described, but the real nature of the *ātman* has not been mentioned. The contemplations and the nature of these aspects of *ātman* have led the philosophers to the conclusion that these different sheaths of *ātman* are also to be considered as the stages or the states of the self; for instance *annamaya ātma* is the bodily self. It is the instrument of experience. It is like the chariot. The charioteer who drives the chariot is that *ātman*.¹ Without the *ātman*, the bodily functions cannot exist. The body and the self are two different principles. According to the *Praśna Upaniṣad*, the *prāṇa* is an expression of the *ātman*. It arises out of the *ātman*, as the shadow of the man is due to the man, because he is a physical being, so also *prāṇa* depends on the *ātman*.² Therefore, *ātman* and the *prāṇa* have to be considered as two different entities although *prāṇa* is an expression of the *ātman*.

*Kenopaniṣad*³ makes it clear that *ātman* is distinct from the sense-organs (*indriyas*) and the mind (*manas*). In the absence of the *ātman* they cannot function. As the essence of *vijñānātmā* (intellect) is to be found in the *ānandātmā* (the bliss). The essence of *ānandātmā* (bliss) is in the *antarātmā*, and that is the *Brahman*. In this sense, the *Brahman* is the highest reality distinct from the *vijñāna* and *ānanda*.⁴

Brahman and the *ātman* are not different, they are identical.⁵ The names are only different. The *Brahman* is sometimes described as the highest reality and the *Puruṣa*, and it is the ultimate essence (*Gūḍhatma*) of all that is in the universe.⁶ The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* considers *Buddhi-vijñāna* (intellect) as a product of *prakṛti* and there-

1 (a) *Maitreyi Up.*, 2, 3, 4.

(b) *Kaṭha Up.*, 1, 3, 3.

2 *Praśnopaniṣad*, 3, 3.

3 *Kena Upaniṣad*, 1, 4, 6.

4 *Taittiriya Up.*, 2, 6.

5 *Māṇḍūkya Up.*, — *Sarvaṃ hi etadbrahma ayamātmā brahma*.

6 *Kaṭha Up.*, 1, 3, 10-12.

fore, *jaḍa* (unconscious). It is possible that the seers of the *Upaniṣads* were not satisfied with this aspect of *viññāna*, unconscious principle as an aspect of *prakṛti* and proceeded further to find out the ultimate reality. They realised that the highest reality is the *Brahman* and *Brahman* is pure conscious. It is *ātman* and the identity of the *Brahman* and *ātman* is the consummation of the monistic theory of thought.

We have also seen that *viññānātman* is not self-luminating (*svataḥprakāśita*). It is a product of *prakṛti*, but it gets illumined in the presence of the *puruṣa* and *puruṣa* is self-illumined.¹ It cognises even intellect also.² The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, describes *ātman* as the higher reality and says that *ātman* is the cogniser. It is *aparokṣa* i.e., it gets direct experience. It grasps the *prāṇa*. It experiences through the sense-organs like the eyes and ears. It reflects with the mind. It cognises the knowledge.³ The self is the seer (*draṣṭā*), the hearer, the thinker and the knower.⁴ It is *cimātra* (pure conscious). It is illuminating (*sarva prakāśarūpa*) and and it is all-shining (*jyotisvarūpa*).⁵

The first seekers after the knowledge of the *ātman* were concerned with understanding the nature of the *ātman* in materialistic terms. Later the meditation of the *ātman* lead to the conception that the *ātman* is the immaterial and spiritual substance. The *ātman* cannot be grasped by senses. It is possible to know the *ātman*, if we transcend sense-experience and reach the state of the knowledge of the *ātman* through the direct experience of intuition. Deep contemplation on *ātman* is necessary and that is why we find Naciketā went to Yama and sought to know the nature of the self. Yama offered him the pleasures of the world, but Naciketā was not tempted by the worldly pleasures because his aim was to know the self.⁶ Maitreyī gave up all wealth that her husband offered for the sake of

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 4, 3, 6-9. *Viññānātma* and *prajñānaghana* (4, 5, 13) are distinct. The former is *prakṛti* and later is *Puruṣa-cetana*.

2 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 3, 7, 22.

3 *Ibid*, 3, 4, 1-2.

4 *Ibid*, 3, 7, 23 ; 3, 8, 11.

5 *Maitreyī Up.*, 3, 16, 21.

6 *Kaṭha Up.*, 1, 1, 23-29.

knowledge of the self.¹ Yājñavalkya said that all things of this world, all the animals, all the wealth, the son, the wife and the husband are all because of the *ātman*. It is therefore, necessary to know the *ātman*. We should meditate on the *ātman*.²

PRE-VEDIC TRADITION : ŚRAMAṆA CURRENT OF THOUGHT H. 3

In this way, the discussion about the nature of the *ātman* has been copious and all the theories regarding the nature of the *ātman* have been discussed in the *Upaniṣads*. However, before the composition of the *Upaniṣads*, there was, in India the *Śramaṇa* current of thought which was prevailing much before the Āryans came to India. The *Śramaṇa* current of thought was full developed and had its own philosophy and it was primarily spiritual and secondarily worldly in outlook. This was the pre-vedic and non-vedic current of the thought. But we find that sufficient attention has not been given to the study of the pre-vedic *Śramaṇa* current of thought, although the prominent conceptions of this current of thought like *nirvāṇa* and *karma* and ascetic life have been assimilated in the general stream of Indian thought.

JANMĀNTARAVĀDA (THEORY OF RE-BIRTH) H. 3

There are many schools of philosophy which advocated the reality of infinite number of individual souls. Each of them presented its thought from a specific point of view.

All our activities have their after-effects. These after-effects constitute the *karma*. The *karma* has to be exhausted or experienced and there is no escape from it. If it is not possible to exhaust the *karma* in order to be pure-self in this life, we have to postulate the existence of life after death and a series of life as a consequence of the necessity of explaining the bondage and the destruction of the continuing *karma* that affects the soul. This has given rise to the theory of re-birth and of the other world. The question was very often asked : 'What would be the nature of the self after the destruction of the body and where would the self go ?' On this difficult problem, there

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, 2, 4, 3.

2 *Ibid*, 4, 5, 6.

have been different theories of philosophy explaining the needs for the postulate of rebirth and the nature of the self in the cycle of birth and death.

3. NATURE OF SOUL ACCORDING TO JAINISM

Paṇḍit Sukhalālji says that among those who believe that there are infinite number of independent souls which are all pure and perfect in their original nature the Jaina tradition is first and foremost. Jaina theory of soul is prominent and it has a special contribution to make to the theories of souls propounded in Indian thought. The reasons for this are twofold : (1) Jaina view is based on rationalistic ground and is very much amenable to reason, and (2) The Jaina theory of self has already established itself by the time of the 23rd Tirthaukara Pārsvanātha in the 8th century B. C. The theory crystallised during that period has largely remained the same in its core. But the Buddhist and Vedic theories were of non-self and have undergone major changes in the centuries that went by.

According to Śramaṇa tradition the nature of soul may be described as follows :

1. *Jīva* is beginningless and endless. It has no beginning nor end. It is indestructible. It is eternal. From the point of view of substance the nature of *jīva* is pure and perfect and the same in all three phases of time—past, present and future. Therefore, it is eternal (*nitya*). From the point of view of modification *jīva* is *anitya* (temporary) because it undergoes various forms of empirical modifications. Therefore *jīva* is eternal but *jīva* as an empirical individual is not eternal.

2. Regarding the description of the empirical self (the *saṃsārī jīva*), we can say though milk and water, sesamum and the oil, and flower and its fragrance are related, as it seems the relation between the soul and body, but really the position of the soul is like a bird in the cage, like the sword in the sheath and like the sugar in a pitcher. The soul can become independent of the body.

3. One of the characteristic of *jīva* is contraction and expansion, that it pervades the body that it occupies whether big or small. In the body of the elephant, the soul pervades entire body of the elephant and if it is in the body of ant, it pervades the body of the

entire ant. However, this characteristic of pervasion in a body, big or small, does not affect the fundamental nature and the number of *pradeśas* of the soul.

4. As space is formless and as it can be comprehended by its space-giving function, so also *jīva* is formless, yet we can comprehend the nature of the soul by means of intellect (*viññāna*).

5. As time is beginningless and indestructible so is *jīva* which is beginningless and indestructible.

6. As the earth is the very basis of all things, so is *jīva* which is the basis of knowledge and experience.

7. As space is undiminishing and constant in all the three times, so is *jīva* which is indestructible, endless and beyond measure.

8. As the gold can get the form of garland, head-dress (crown) ear-rings, ring etc., but still as the substance of the gold is the same so also the *jīva* is the same although it wanders about in the wheel of *saṃsāra*, in the four forms of existence—the heavenly, the human, lower animal and the hellish stage.

9. As the sun spreads its rays and objects illumined and as the sun moves elsewhere at night and the light is not seen so also the soul that exists with a particular body experiences the life in this existence, and as it leaves this body, and enter another, this experience is no more.

10. As the fragrance of saffron and the lotus flower can be experienced by smell and not by sight so also *jīva* cannot be seen by the eyes yet we can know the existence of the self through the attribute of knowledge.

11. The music of the instrument can be heard but cannot be seen. In the same way, the *jīva* in its form cannot be seen. We can also understand the nature of the *jīva* by means of its characteristics and effects.

12. The ghost and the devils can enter the bodies but they cannot be seen. We can only infer the presence of these by the bodily activities. Similarly, we can know that there is self by observing the psycho-physical activities like laughter, pleasure and pain and bodily activities like dances etc.

13. The food we take is transformed into seven basic elements through chemical composition. Similarly, the particles of matter

which are fit to be *kārmic* particle are transformed into *kārmic* particles (*karmavargaṇā*) which obscure the free function of the soul.

14. *Jīva* is a source of different forms of energy like knowledge energy (*jñānaśakti*), the energy of the basic power (*vīryaśakti*) and will-power (*saṃkalpaśakti*).¹

15. *Jīva*, through its activity in the empirical world, accumulates *saṃskāra* (mnemic traces) and through the *saṃskāra* a *sūkṣmaśarīra* (subtle body) constituted of material particles. This is called *paudgalikaśarīra*. When the soul gives up one body and enters another in the next life the *sūkṣmaśarīra* will be there with it, with the load of mnemic traces of the previous life.²

16. *Jīva* is formless, but by its accumulated *karmas* it has acquired a body and through this body it also becomes with form.

17. All *jīvas* have the same qualities and capacity of development. Yet each *jīva* develops in different ways owing to several factors like the *puruṣārtha* and other causes.

18. There is nowhere in the world, a place where subtle-bodied and gross-bodied souls are not present.

19. Just as the particles of gold are mixed up with the earth in the form of ore, this mixed form of ore has been beginningless. It gets purified and pure gold is extracted with the help of fire. So also the *jīva* gets purified and reaches the state of perfection through *saṃvara* and *tapasyā* etc.

20. Just as it is not possible to decide whether the egg is prior or the hen, so also it is not possible to determine the priority or otherwise of *jīva* and *karma*. Both of them co-exist from beginningless time.

COMPARISON OF JAINA VIEW WITH THE SĀMKNHYA-YOGA VIEW

We have so far discussed the characteristics of *jīva* from the point of view of Jaina philosophy. We shall now consider the comparative picture of Jaina view with the *Sāmkhya-Yoga* view.³

1 *Uttarādhyaṇasūtra*, 28, 11.

2 *Tattvārthasūtra*, 2, 26.

3 *Bhāratiya Tattvavidyā*, p. 81.

1. *Jīva* from the Jaina point of view is beginningless and endless and it is characterised by consciousness (*cetana rūpa*). *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* also presents a similar view.

2. According to Jainism, *jīva* pervades the body that it occupies. It had a characteristic of expansion and contraction according to the size of the body. Therefore, it expresses itself in modes. But according to the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, *jīva* is all-pervading and in its characteristic of consciousness, there is no possibility of *pariṇāmitva* of expressing in the form of modes.

3. According to Jainism there are infinite number of souls and each occupies a particular body. The *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* tradition also accepts this view.²

4. The Jaina conception of the soul accepts the characteristics of activity and enjoyment (*kārṣṭva* and *bhokṣṭva*) as belonging to the soul. It also says that the pure and the impure forms of attributes are possible due to activity, but the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* tradition does not accept the inherent activity of the soul. According to the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, the *puruṣa* is passive, but it is conscious. Similarly, experiences and enjoyments and substantiality and attributes are not acceptable to the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*.³

5. The Jainas have advocated a theory that *jīva* acquires in its empirical existence the mnemonic traces (*saṃskāras*), which form the subtle body in terms of material particles. This subtle body moves along with the *jīva* into the next life. In the same way, in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* tradition, *puruṣa* itself has no attachments nor the consequential attributes of *cetana*. It is pure, unattached and it is not directly involved in the activity and the enjoyment. For the sake of explaining the continuity in the future life, the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* also posits a subtle body (*Sūkṣmaśarīra*) which moves with the soul and which has the characteristic of pervading the body and experiencing the fruits of the *karmas*. This is *pratīpuruṣa*. In short, as the Jainas maintain the variety of expression of *cetana* in the empirical form so also the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* accepts the subtle modes embodied in the principle of *buddhi* or *lingā śarīra* which is a product of *prakṛti*.⁴

1 *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 10, 1, 17.

2 *Ibid.*, 18

3 *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 19, 20.

4 (a) *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 40.

(b) *Bhāratīya Tattvavidyā*, p. 83.

6. The Jaina view of the soul is that the soul is formless. But it appears to have form due to *kārmic* encrustations and the subtle body. But the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* thinks that the soul is formless and the forms of the individual soul are due to the subtle and the gross bodies which are products of *prakṛti*. The illusion of a form arises due to the fact that the impressions received through the sense-organs are reflected in the soul and the soul therefore reflects it back. Just as space has no form, yet we, through our reflection, imagine the form of space. Similarly, the soul expresses the reflection that give rise to forms.¹

7. According to Jainism, the soul is the source of infinite energy, and the energy of knowledge, of will and of power, but in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* we find these forces are attributed not to consciousness which is the essence of the soul, but to the subtle body which is the form of *buddhi* and *buddhi* is the product of *prakṛti*.²

8. According to Jainism all the *jīvas* have the same capacity and the same energy, but personality distinctions are due to the differences in the *puruṣārtha* and other causes. In the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* also the difference in the personality development are traced to the *Sūkṣma śarīra* which is the form of *buddhi* and the *buddhi* is the product of *prakṛti*. In its real nature each soul is equal.

COMPARISON OF JAINA VIEW WITH NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW

The Jains and the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* tradition have presented a theory of the soul in which we find the nature of the soul as independent and consciousness. Consciousness is the essence of the soul. Similarly *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory has given an independent view of the soul. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, like the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, accept the reality of the soul and its independence from the body. Souls are infinite in number and they are beginningless.³ They are eternal. They are spiritual substances. However, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* does not accept the Jaina characteristic of the soul as pervading the body, but it maintains that soul is all-pervasive like the views of the *Sāṃkhya*.⁴ The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* does not accept the characteristic of the expansion and contraction according to the needs of the body that the

1 *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 62.

2 *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 40.

3 *Vaiśeṣika Darśana* 3, 2, 20 ; 3, 2, 21.

4 *Vaiśeṣika Darśana* 7, 1, 22—*Vibhāvanmahānākāśastathā cātmā*.

soul possesses, but like the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* it says that from the substance point of view, the soul is *kūṭastha nitya*¹. However, in some points regarding the characteristic of the soul like the substance, attributes and characteristics, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* comes nearer to the Jaina view. The *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* says that soul is consciousness and has no attributes. But the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* like the Jainas accepts the possibility in the empirical sense. The soul is receptacle of many attributes and modes.² In the Jaina point of view the soul is considered to be a source of many powers but in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, we do not find this view. However, the psychic states like knowledge, pleasure, pain, will, desire, hatred, *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit) are all considered to be the attributes of the soul. These attributes are operative and they exist as long as the body exists. They arise and they are destroyed. However, these qualities are inherent in the psychic states of the *jīva* as expressed in the *jñāna* and *darśana*. According to the Jainas the predominant theory is that in the state of perfection *jīva* is consciousness, and has the characteristic of bliss (*ānanda*) and power (*vīrya*) and knowledge (*jñāna*), but in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* the consciousness is only an attribute of the soul and as such in the highest state of perfection consciousness cannot exist with the soul. It is analogous to unconscious states. Nor has the soul any other characteristic in the perfect state.³ The fundamental reason is that the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* does not accept consciousness as the essence of the soul. It is only a quality, but the view of Jainas and of the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* maintain that consciousness is the essence of the soul and according to them the soul is characterised by consciousness. The soul is consciousness. But according to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, consciousness is the quality of the soul. Soul has consciousness; and hence in the highest state of perfection, the soul is unconsciousness.

1 *Prāśastapādabhāṣya*, *Dravyasādharmya Prakaraṇa*—

“*Anāśritattvānityattve cānyatrāyayavidravyebhyaḥ.*”

2 (a) *Vaiśeṣika darśana* 3, 2, 4 ; 5, 3, 5; 9, 3, 6.

(b) *Prāśastapādabhāṣyagata Ātmanirūpaṇa*.

3 (a) *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1, 22.

(b) *Introduction to Gaṇadharavāda* p. 105, *Dalsukha Mālavāṇī*.

(c) *Bhāratīya Tattvavidyā*—*Paṇḍit Sukhalālji*, p. 86.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika darśana has certain differences in the consideration about the nature of consciousness with the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, as there are some similarities also. *Sāṃkhya* maintains that self is consciousness, pure and simple, it is self-illuminating. It is free from the modifications like the modes of consciousness which do not really affect the true nature of consciousness. The modes of mental states are due to the reflection of the states in consciousness and in the self. In the highest state of perfection consciousness is free from the states like knowledge and feeling etc., which are mere modes without affecting the consciousness. Similarly, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* considers consciousness and modes as qualities of the self and self as only a substratum of the qualities. In the highest state, self is free from consciousness. Therefore, in the state of liberation (*Mukti*), the self is free from any attributes or modes. The same interpretation could be given in the case of *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, although the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* believes that consciousness is the essence of the soul. In this sense, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* conception of self in the state of liberation could be considered free from any qualities like space (*ākāśa*) with this difference that *ākāśa* is formless but it belongs to the empirical world. While soul is *amūrta* (formless) but not belonging to the empirical existence (*bhautika*). There appears to be no difference between the liberated soul and *ākāśa*, as there is absence of any quality or mode of consciousness in both. However, *ākāśa* is a substance (*dravya*) and *mukta jīva* (liberated soul) is endless (*ananta*). There is only the denominational difference. There is no other difference between *ākāśa* and *jīva*.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought has similarities and differences with the Jaina and *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* systems of thought. The Jainas maintain that *jīva* has the inherent characteristics of enjoyment (*bhokṛtva*) and activity (*karṇtva*). According to the Jaina view, these characteristics are very much present even in the liberated state. But the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* does not accept the presence of the characteristics of enjoyment (*Bhokṛtva*) and activity (*Karṇtva*) in the state of liberation, although they do admit the presence of these characteristics in the empirical state of the *jīva*. According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, the states of consciousness like knowledge, will, etc., take their origin and are destroyed when in contact with the body (*śarīra*) and the *jīva*

expresses the characteristics of enjoyment (*bhokṛtva*) and activity (*kartṛtva*) only in relation to the body.¹ In the liberated state these characteristics are absent. In this respect, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* comes nearer to the *Sāṃkhya* conception of self as consciousness.

According to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, the characteristics of enjoyment (*bhokṛtva*) and activity (*kartṛtva*) of the soul are different in content. The *jīva* is eternal but is characterised in its very nature by the attributes of enjoyment and activity. The attributes of enjoyment and activity have association with the phenomena of origin and destruction. The *jīva* expresses modes of knowledge (*jñāna*), will (*icchā*) and activity (*prayatna*), and with the presence of these modes the *jīva* is considered as possessing the characteristics of enjoyment and activity. But in the liberated state, there is the total absence of the modes of knowledge, will and activity and, therefore, the *jīva* is not characterised by the characteristics of enjoyment and activity. These are totally absent in the liberated state. In this sense, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* makes a distinction between the *jīva* as substance and *jīva* in the empirical state as expressing the mental modes. From the point of view of ultimate existence *jīva* is *nitya* (eternal) but from the empirical point of view, *jīva* is active and is the enjoyer of the experiences. In this sense, they differ from the Jaina conception of *jīva* as having the inherent characteristics of enjoyment and activity. The fundamental principle involved would be the consideration of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view that the substance is different from the attributes. The *Sāṃkhya-Yoga darśana* does not accept the presence of attributes in the *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* is consciousness, but consciousness is not a quality of *jīva* as the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* considers it to be. Consciousness is the essence of *puruṣa* and does possess the attributes. However, in both the systems of thought, the eternity of the soul is established from different stand-points. The *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* takes the stand that the soul is eternal because it is pure consciousness and the mental states are only modes not connected as essential characteristics of the soul. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* considers the soul to be eternal because it is the substance and in this eternal sense as the substratum of qualities. Consciousness and its modes are only qualities of the soul and hence different from the soul.

1 *Nyāyavārtika*, 3, 1, 6.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, like the Jainas accept the view that *jīva* is affected by the auspicious and inauspicious effects of activity through *saṃskāra* (the mnemonic mass). The Jainas maintain that the after-effects are absorbed by the subtle body (the *sūkṣma śarīra*) which is empirical in existence. But the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* considers the *manas* as atomic in nature. The *jīva* being all-pervasive is not able to grasp the knowledge. It is the mind, which is atomic in nature, functions as the instrument of knowledge. The *jīva* has this atomic mind (*paramāṇu manas*) when the *jīva* gives up one body and takes into another in the succeeding life, takes the other body also. According to the Jainas, it is the *sūkṣma śarīra* (the subtle body) which goes with soul and enters into the body in the next life.

Sāṃkhya-Yoga darśana postulates a *sūkṣma-linga-śarīra* (subtle body) which is the repository of the good and evil and their effects. It has the capacity of pervading the body it occupies. It is this *Sūkṣma-linga-śarīra* which goes along with the pure soul from one body into another in the next life.¹ The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* presents its theory of after-life (*punarjanma*) in terms of its conception of the atomic view mind (*paramāṇu manas*). The Jainas say that *jīva* moves into the next life with the *sūkṣmaśarīra* with its characteristics of enjoyment and activity. According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, as also *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, there is no possibility of activity in the pure soul, these are accidental qualities and modes. But in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, we find that there is the conception of the effect of the good and evil on the rise and fall of the states of *jīva*. It does not accept the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* conception of the impact of the good and evil on the *Sūkṣma-linga-śarīra* and is only, as the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* says that we attribute the direct effect of these characteristics on soul.

3 THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF NATURE OF THE SOUL

In order to understand the views of the Buddha about the nature of soul, we should analyse the Buddhist view of the concept of non-self in the historical perspective.

Prior to the Buddha and during his time, there were two views regarding the nature of the soul : (i) The *Ātman* is eternal and is not

1 (a) *Nyāyavārtika* 3, 2, 68.

(b) *Gaṇadharavāda*, p. 121 (Introduction)

(c) *Bhāratīya Tatvavidyā*, p. 89 (footnote) Paṇḍit Sukhalālji.

affected by any modes of time and empirical adjuncts; (ii) The second view was that the *Ātman* although permanent is affected by the empirical adjuncts. According to first view, the *Ātman* remains pure and perfect, unaffected by any psycho-physical modes in time—past, future and present. The second view, while accepting the *Ātman* as the eternal principle, does accept the possible influences on the nature of the *Ātman* by the empirical modes. Both these views, have one common factor of accepting the conception of *Ātman* as the permanent substance. The Buddha was against the views of the eternity of the *Ātman*. What you call self is merely an aggregate of physical and mental states. It is the *sanghāta* (aggregate) of the *nāma* (mental) and the *rūpa* (the physical states). It is *nāma-rūpa*. We have seen that the physical and mental states forming the ego (*nāma-rūpa*) are constituted of *rūpa* (physical states), *saṃskāra* (mnemic mass), *saṃjñā* (cognition), *vedanā* (affective states) and *viññāna* (psychic energy). There is nothing permanent in the world. Everything is fleeting. Every moment, there is change. What I am this moment, next moment I am not. This kind of description of the Buddha's view of the soul was considered *Anātmavāda*. It is difficult to say whether he denied the existence of a permanent self as the eternal or whether he refused to accept the empirical personality as a permanent entity. There has been a controversy over this problem. However, it is necessary to note that the basic attitude of the Buddha was '*sarvaṃ pṛahak'*'—everything is fleeting. The Buddha was considered as the '*Nairātmavādin*' one who denied the existence of a permanent soul. The Buddha did not however accept the materialistic conception of the soul, as constituted if the material elements as presented by the '*lokāyata*' view. He followed the middle path (*madhyama mārga*). He accepted the concepts of rebirth, (*punarjanma*), *karma*, *puruṣārtha* (fundamental values) and *mokṣa* (liberation). In this sense, the Buddha did recognise that the concepts of *Ātman*, *jīva* and consciousness (*cetanā*) have important place in the system of thought, that he preached.

However, it would be a truism to say the schools of philosophy like, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* and Jainism presented a definite view-point on the concept of the *Ātman*. But Buddhism did not give a definite view of the self. Careful study of the development of Buddhist thought shows that there were five different streams of thought in the Buddhist view of the nature of soul—

1. *Pudgala-nairātmyavāda* (materialistic conception of non-soul)
2. *Pudgalāstivāda* (the materialistic view of the soul)
3. *Traikālika dharmavāda* (theory of elements) and *Vārtamānika dharmavāda* (the theory of momentary elements).
4. *Dharmanairāt nya-niḥsvabhāvatā* or *Śūnyavāda* (theory of Śunya).
5. *Vijñaptimātratāvāda* (theory of consciousness as soul.)¹

All these theories have been fundamentally based on the important tenets that the Buddha preached in his conceptions of the four Noble Truths and the eight-fold path. They draw their inspiration from the Buddha's primary concern for freedom, misery and the spiritual values.

PUDGALA NAIRĀTMYAVĀDA

In the *Tripiṭakas* there is the mention of the clear view that *ātman* is merely an aggregate of the *skandha* of physical and mental states. The mental states are constituted of *vedanā* (feeling), *saṁjñā* (cognition), *saṁskāra* (mnemic mass) and *viññāna* (the psychic energy). These undergo modifications and the chain of modification is called *sanghāta*. It is the flow of the modes of mental phenomena. All these are called *nāma*.² *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*³ mentions the term *nāma-rūpa* and there, it is suggested that the very nature of the principle expresses its nature and its modes. According to Buddha, however, there is no basic principle like *nāma-rūpa* and *rūpa-nāma* are the expressions of physical and psychic states. The Buddha says that there is a constant flow of the mental states like the *vedanā*, *saṁjñā*, and *viññāna*. For this flow, there is neither the beginning nor the end. This is based upon and centred round the conception of the *pudgala* and therefore it is called *nairātmyavāda*.

- 1 Refer for the three views of Buddhistic Metaphysics—*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. 1, pp. 3-14, also *Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 26.
- 2 *Visuddhimaggo*—*khandhaniddesa*, 14.
- 3 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, 1, 4, 7.—*tadvedam tarhya vyākṛtamāsīt tannāmarūpābhyāmeva vyākriyata*.

4-3 PUDGALĀSTIVĀDA

The Buddhist *sangha* was against the conception of the permanence of the soul and the philosopher refuted the argument for the conception of the permanence of the soul, but after sometime those who believed in the permanence of the soul coming from the *Brahmanic* tradition joined the Buddhist *sangha*. They gave a new orientation to the Buddhist conception of *nairātmyavāda* in the light of their original predilections of the *sāsvata ātmavāda*. They based their conception on the materialistic theory of the self. *Kathāvatthu* and *Tattvasaṅgraha* have mentioned this kind of a theory of the permanence of the soul as a polemic against the Buddhist view of *ātmavāda*.¹ These *pudgalvādins* maintain that the *jīva* is of a material nature. When they were asked whether the *jīva* has form like the material objects they were not able to accept this view. The *Pudgalāstivāda* entered the Buddhist *sangha* but as it was not consistent with the main concept of the Buddhist view as expressed in the *ātmavāda*, this theory lost its importance and remained only in name.

1-3 TRAIKĀLIKA DHARMAVĀDA & VARTMĀNIKA DHARMAVĀDA

The *Pudgalanirātmyavādins* had to perform a two-fold function : (i) It had to defend itself against the *ātmavādins* and to show that there is no permanent self. (ii) Yet this theory had to accommodate the conception of the rebirth, *bandha* (bondage) and *moṣka* (liberation). This gave rise to the theory of *sarvāstivāda*. According to this theory, the mental states designed as *nāma* were referred to as '*citta*' and it expresses itself in *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra* and *viññāna*. These constitute the aggregate and the aggregate is in flux. These are included as *dharma* (elements). This theory had to defend on the basic stand of *kṣaṇikavāda*. Accordingly, the *sarvāstivādins* presented the modes of '*citta*' as flowing in three durations of time and presented the *traikālikatā*.² But there appeared to be

1 *Abhidharmadīpa* & notes, p. 254 ff.

(a) *kaḥ punaratra saṃyujyate ?* (p. 254)...*pudgalisyaṃpi avyākṛtavastuvādināḥ pudgaloṃpi dravyatoḥstīti* (p. 258)...*nagnāṭapakṣe prakṣeptavyāḥ* (p. 259).

(b) *Tattvasaṅgraha*, *kārikā* 336.

2 (a) *Tattvasaṅgraha me Traikālika Parikṣā*, *kārikā* 1786, p. 503.

(b) *Abhidharmadīpa-ṭippaṇa sahita kārikā* 299, p. 250.

inconsistency with the original Buddhist conception of reality as impermanent and fleeting and is consigned to present only (*vārtamānika*). By introducing the conception of *vārtmānika* to the moments of the present. The efforts to reconcile these views gave rise to the theory of *sautrāntikavāda*. The *sautrāntikavāda* accepted the *sarvāstivāda* conception of 'citta' (mental) and *caitasika* (mental states). But they made them referring to the present moments only (*vārtamānika*). In this way, they tried to make the reality a flux, yet accepting the mental states of *sarvāstikavādin* as elements.

DHARMANAIRĀTMAYA-

NIHŠVABHĀVATĀ OR ŚŪNYAVĀDA

4.3

This was the age of vigorous philosophical discussions. Philosophical disputations were very prominent in this age. Some philosophers propounded the theory of being (*sat*); others refuted the arguments of this theory and enunciated the theory of non-being (*asat*). Still others presented the theory of the being and the non-being. In this way the permanent, the impermanent, the one and the many and similar problems were discussed vigorously by the philosophers in this age. Nāgārjuna came to realise that the Buddha's *catuskoṭi* (four-fold predications) was not very useful for providing the philosophical basis for *nairātmavāda*. Therefore, he presented a theory of *Śūnyavāda*. The interpretation of the 'śūnya' has been various. Some have suggested that *śūnya* is the void. But some others have suggested that Nāgārjuna could not have considered the reality as the void because he was originally trained in the *dvaitic* conception of reality, as he was brought up in the *upaniṣadic* tradition. Therefore, they say that Nāgārjuna's *śūnya* is not the void, it is the ultimate reality which is unspeakable and inexpressible. However, as Nāgārjuna was converted to Buddhism and as he became the vigorous exponent of the *nairātmavāda* and the theory of reality as momentary, it cannot be said that Nāgārjuna presented the absolutist view-point. Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyavāda* did not in anyway refute the rationalistic and a spiritualistic conception of reality and the theory of evolution.

VIJÑĀPTIMĀTRATĀVĀDA

4.4

After *Śūnyavāda*, comes *Yogācāra*. According to the *Yogācāra* school, *Śūnyavāda* does not systematically consider any of the *Buddhistic* theory, but the Buddha's conception of *nāma* was primarily concerned with mental states. It is centred round *viññāna*. There-

fore, according to the *Yogācāra*, reality is mostly mental in nature. It is *viññāna*, and *āīman* is the expression of *viññāna*, although there is no permanent *Āīma*. *Viññānavādins* are generally considered to be a subjective idealists who give prominence to mental states and to the external works. The mental states are real and external world is only an expression of mental states. *Viññānavādins* had to posit an objective conception of the storehouse of consciousness. It is *āīaya-viññāna*.

In this way, we find discussion of the conception of self from different stages and gradually it has reached the idealistic position of the conception of the self as we find in the *viññānavāda*. In this, the self is primarily mental and expressing mental states. Eminent philosophers like Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla tried to present this idealistic conception of the self in terms of *viññāna*, yet not deviating from the original stand of *Kṣaṇikavāda*.¹

In the Buddhist tradition, all the schools of thought have presented their own views concerning the soul as *cittasantāna* (the stream of consciousness). The *viññāna-advaitavādins* maintain that there is nothing except *viññāna* and the self is considered as a stream of mental states and self that is real. The physical states are subsumed under the general conception of *viññāna*.²

In the Buddhist philosophy there is no discussion about the specific relation of *citta viññānasantati* or *Jīva*. We cannot, therefore, say whether self have any reference to the states of bodily existence, however in some of the works like *Visuddhimagga*³ there are reference to the bodily states and it is possible that the mental states like the pleasure and pain have relation to bodily states.

We have already said that in the *Sāmkhya-Yoga*, Jaina thought and others there is a view that in the rebirth the *Sūkṣmaśarīra* moves from one body to the other. Similar description we find in the *Dīgghaknikāya* about the *gandharva*. The description goes that one who wants to go from one life to the other after death, has to wait for seven days with *gandharva*. In the *kathāvatthu* there is a discus-

1 (a) *Pramāṇavārtika* 2, 327.

(b) *Tattvasaṅgraha kī bahirarthaparīkṣā*, pp. 550-82.

2 *Santānāntara Siddhi* Dharmakīrti has discussed it in this book,

3 *Visuddhimagga*—14, 60 ; 17, 163,

ssion about the inner life in relation to the conception of *gandharva*. Similarly, in some other works and in the writings of Vasūbandhu and other *Vaibhāṣikas* there is mention of transmigration from one body to the other¹. It is like the subtle body. In *Theravādi* Buddha-ghoṣa there is no mention of the subtle body (*antarābhavaśarīra*). He has given certain examples of the movement of consciousness from one body to the other.²

UPANIṢADIC THOUGHT

In the *Upaniṣadic* tradition we do not get a uniformity of views regarding the nature of the self. Sometimes even in one *Upaniṣad*, we find the mention of different views, regarding the conception of the self. For this reason, those who have speculated on the nature of the self have presented various views. Bādarāyaṇa wrote the *Brahmasūtra* and in the *Brahmasūtra*, we find the mention of various views of the self as presented by the ancient seers. *Brahmasūtra* became a very important work like the *Upaniṣads* and several commentaries on that were written. But unfortunately all the commentaries are not available today. Śaṅkarācārya wrote a commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* and presented *Māyāvāda* (theory of Appearance). But those who did not accept *Māyāvāda* wrote commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra* and presented their own interpretations of the *Brahmasūtra* refuting the *Māyāvāda*. Among them may be mentioned the Ācāryas like Bhāṣkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. These Ācāryas presented different views in their commentaries but the basic uniformity of their presentation was that they all refuted the argument of *māyāvāda* and said that *jīva* is real as the *Brahman* is real. *Jīva* is different from the body. It is eternal and is imperishable. Śaṅkarācārya while presenting his *māyāvāda* based his argument on the *Upaniṣadic* teachings. Paṇḍit Sukhalālji has analysed the *Upaniṣadic* streams of thought as presented by these writers into three states, as 1. Śaṅkara's *Advaita*, 2. Madhvācāryās *Dvaita* and 3. the Vedic interpretations of other Ācāryas.³

Śaṅkara said *Brahman* is real. It is the ultimate reality and all other things are appearances. The differentiations of *Jīvas* in the

1 *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 142 with notes.

2 (a) *Visuddhimaggo*, 17—163

(b) *Bhāratīya Tatvavidyā*, p. 99.

3 *Bhāratīya Tatvavidyā*, p. 100.

empirical existence are not real but are only appearance caused due to *avidyā*. Everything is *Brahman*, and *jīva* and the distinctions between the *jīvas* are not real distinctions. The *Brahman* and the *ātman* are identical, '*Aham brahmāsmi*'.¹ Madhvācārya's conception of reality was different from that of Śaṅkarācārya. His was dualistic conception of reality. *Brahman* is real, *jīva* is also real. *Jīva* is not merely an appearance. *Brahman* and *Ātman* are both equally real. There are innumerable *jīvas*. They are all eternal.

Bhāṅkara and other Ācāryas have maintained that *jīvas* are real. They are the consequential expressions of the *Brahman*. It may be said that they are the products of the *Brahman*. They are expressions of the *Brahman*, therefore, they cannot become an appearance.

In the *Mahābhārata*, there are three views of the conception of the *jīvas* based on the Sāṅkhya philosophy : (1) There are of 24 principles (24 *tattvavādī*) (2) those who maintain an independent eternal *Puruṣa* still belonging to the 24 principles theory, i.e., 25 *tattvavādī*, and (3) those who maintain that *puruṣa* is different from *Brahman* and belonging to the '*chavvisatattvavāda*' i. e. 26 *Tattvavādī*.

It appears that ancient philosophers discussed these three streams of thought and the discussions were mainly based on the *Upaniṣadic* thought. In brief, the philosophical discussions concerning the nature of the self based on the *Upaniṣadic* tradition can be summarised into some forms of philosophy as (1) *kevalādvaita* (2) *satyopādhiadvaita* (3) *viśiṣṭādvaita* (4) *dvaitādvaita* (5) *avibhāgādvaita* (6) *suddhādvaita* (7) *Acintya bhedaḥbheda* and such other various forms. In general, we have exponents of the *Advaita* and *Dvaitavada* including Rāmānuja's *Viśiṣṭādvaita*.

Śaṅkara presented *kevalādvaita*. According to him, *Brahman* is the only reality. All else is appearance. The world is an appearance. *Brahman* is the ultimate reality and phenomenal world is only an appearance. According to him, the empirical individual soul is not an independent reality. It is only the phenomenal state of the *ātman*. *Ātman* and the *Brahman* are identical and the phenomenal reality of the *ātman* is due to *avidyā* and *ābhāsa*. Śaṅkara takes recourse to the conceptions of *māyā*, *avidyā* and *ābhāsa* for explaining the pheno-

1 (a) *Brahma Siddhī*, p. 9—'*Jivobrahmaiva nāparaḥ*.'

(b) Dr. C.D. Sharma : *Bauddhadarśana and Vedānta*, p. 234.

menal world. He makes a distinction between the different levels of thought like the dream state, the waking state, the dreamless sleep and the *turiya*. These views are based on the *upaniṣadic* concept.

Appaya Dikṣita has written a commentary called *Siddhānta Leṣa-Sangraha* on *Vedānta Siddhānta Sūktimañjarī*. In this, he has given a commentary of the various views regarding the relation of the *Brahman* and *ātman* according to the *kevalādvaita* (pure *advaita*) strain of thought. Some of the views may be mentioned as follows :

PRATIBIMBAVĀDA ५३

Swāmī Vidyāranya and the commentators have given explanations about the relation between the *Brahman* and the *jīva* according to their stand-points. One of the prominent views is that the *jīva* is the reflection of the *Brahman* (the image of the *Brahman*). This reflection is considered by some as un-understandable (*avidyāgata*), as the inner sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*) by others and as based upon ignorance (*ājñānagata*) by still others.¹

AVACCHEDAVĀDA ५३

Some commentators have used the term *avaccheda* in place of *pralibimba* and they maintain that the *Brahman* is not reflected in the *antaḥkaraṇa* (inner sense), but *jīva* is an expression of the *antaḥkaraṇa*.²

BRAHMA-JIVAVĀDA ५३

According to this view, *Jīva* is neither the reflection of the *Brahman* nor its 'avaccheda', but the reality of the *Jīva* is due to *avidyā* and the *Brahman* is due to *vidyā*.³

In this way, there are important conceptions regarding the relation of the *Jīva* to the *Brahman* in the *kevalādvaita* as : (1) *prati-bimbavāda* (2) *Avacchedavāda* and (3) *Brahmābhedavāda*.⁴

Regarding the number of *jīvas*, there is no unanimity among

1 *Vedāntasūktimañjarī*, I paricheda, kārikā, 28-40.

2 *Ibid.* 41.

3 *Ibid.* 42.

4 *Bhāratiya Tattvavidyā*, p. 104.

the *kevalādvaitins*. According to some *jīva* is considered to be one and the body with the *jīva* is living-body and others are non-living. Some others maintain that *jīva* is one, still other bodies are equally living and still other thinkers say that there are many *jīvas*.¹ These views have been briefly mentioned by Sadānanda in the *Vedāntasāra* and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the *Siddhāntabindu*.

According to Bhāṣkara, *Brahman* due to infinite variety of energy, expresses itself in the form of *jīvas* as also in the form of the world. *Jīva* is the effect of the *Brahman* and as such it has functional truth. The *Brahman* is one, but its effects are many. There is no inconsistency between the concepts of unity and diversity. Just as the one ocean manifests itself into infinite number of waves, so also one *Brahman* manifests himself into the infinite soul *jīvas*. With removal of ignorance one realises that *Brahman* is one and the *jīvas* which appear to be atomic in nature are the same as *Brahman*.

Rāmānuja has presented the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* theory. He said that the *Brahman* is real and the *jīvas* are equally real. *Jīvas* are like the world which is the manifested *Brahman*, are also manifested in form. The unmanifested *Brahman* is manifested as the world and as the *jīvas*. The unmanifested psychic energy (*citśakti*) expresses itself in the form of manifested *jīvas* and the source is the unmanifested *Brahman* which is *Brahmanārāyaṇa*.

Ācārya Nimbārka said that the *Brahman* is one and undivided, simple and perfect, yet the *jīvas* are the effects of the *Brahman*. Nimbārka has presented the theory of *Bhedābheda* (identity and difference). It is therefore called *Dvaitādvaita*, (the one and the dual). The one wind expresses itself in many forms, similarly, the one *Brahman* manifests itself into many *jīvas*. These *jīvas* are equally real.

Vijñānabhikṣu says that *puruṣa* is independent and beginningless like *prakṛiti* but not different from the *Brahman*. This view is called "*avibhāgādvaita*" (undifferentiated *advaita*).

Ācārya Vallabha presents the pure *Śuddhādvaita*. According to him, the world and the *jīva* are the phenomenal effects of the *Brahman*. These effects are due to *līla* (magic or play). And the *Brahman* is pure and simple. It is a reality.

1 *Vedānta sakti mañjarī*, kārīkā, 43-44

Caitanya accepts the "*acintyabhedābheda*". The *Brahman* manifests in different *jīvas* due to the inherent *jīva śakti* (the inherent energy of the soul). *Jīvas* are both identical to and also different from the *Brahman*. This relation is beyond the speculation (*acintanīya*).

Philosophers from Bhāṣkara to Caitanya have considered *jīva* as atomic in nature. When the *jīva* removes ignorance by means of *jñāna* (knowledge) and *bhakti* (devotion), then the *jīva* attains liberation. All these *ācāryas* are believers in the atomic nature of the soul (*apūjivavādi*.) They maintain that rebirth is possible by means of the subtle bodies (*Sūkṣmaśarīra*).

Madhya is *Vedāntin*, but he does not believe in the theory of non-dualism (*advaita*) and non-difference (*abheda*). He maintains, on the authority of *upaniṣad*ic tradition, that *jīva* is atomic in nature. There are infinite number of *jīvas*. They are eternal and real. They are not the effects of the *Parabrahman*, nor are they part of *Brahman*. When the *jīva* removes the ignorance, it realises the authority (*svāmīva*) of the *Brahman* or *Viṣṇu*.

The *Śaiva*'s do not accept the authority of the *Veda* or the *Ve-dānta*. They accept the *pratyabhijñā darśana*. They base their arguments on the *pratyabhijñā*. According to them, *parabrahma* is *Śiva*. Nothing else is greater than *Śiva*. The *parabrahma* or *Śiva* is the highest reality and by his will, he creates infinite number of *jīvas* and the world. From the point of view *tattva* (principles) *jīva* and *śiva* are not different.

According to the *upaniṣads* and *Bhagavadgītā*, *ātman* is different from the body¹ different from the *manas*.² It pervades entire universe.³ It is not the effect of anything (*avikārya*)⁴ and it is indescribable in words⁵ The things (*avikāryas*) and the description of the

1 *Kaṭhapaniṣad* 2, 15, 18—"na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre"

2 (a) *Kaṭhapaniṣad*, 2, 3, 7, 80—The mind is superior to the sense-organs, *buddhi* superior to the *manas*, *mahat* greater than *buddhi*, *avyakta* greater than *mahat* and *puruṣa* greater than *avyakta*. *Puruṣa* is pervasive (*vyāpaka*) and *alinga* (without sex).

(b) *Kaṭhapaniṣad* 1, 3, 10, 11—There is nothing greater than *puruṣa*.

3 *Iṣa Upaniṣad*—*Īśāvāsyamidam sarvaṃ yatkinca jagatyām jagat*.

4 *Bhagavadgītā*, 2-25.

5 *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2, 4

Brahman can only be in the negative as 'neti-neti'.¹ The *Brahman* is neither gross nor atomic, neither small nor large, neither water nor any liquid, neither shadow nor darkness, neither wind nor *ākāśa*, neither the aggregate nor having qualities like taste, smell, neither eye nor speech nor mind. It is neither light nor *prāṇa* (life force). It is not mouth. It is neither in or out.²

3 SIZE OF THE SOUL (PARIMĀṆA)

In the *Upaniṣads* we get different views regarding the size of the soul. It has been said that the *ātman* which is *manomaya* is within the heart and is of the size of grain of rice.³

There is a view which says that the size of *ātman* is equal to the distance of the top of thumb to the tip of fore-finger.⁴

The *ātman* is considered to be pervading the body.⁵

There is another view which says that *ātman* is all pervading.⁶

There is another view which says that the *ātman* as residing in the heart and which is greater than the earth, than the space, than the world and in fact greater than all the universe.⁷

According to the Jainas, the *jīva* is eternal and has no end. Every *jīva* pervades infinite points of space. It has the capacity of pervasion. At the time of *Kevalī samudghāta* the *ātman* pervades the entire universe for some time⁸ and at the time of the death of mundane soul pervades partially⁹ and has infinite *pradeśas*.

The *dharma*, *adharma*, *lokākāśa* and *jīva* occupy equal number of space, points but from the point of view of measurement they do not occupy the equal number of space-points. *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Lokākāśa*, are receptive and they do not express any qualities of action and reaction and there is no effect of any type. *Saṃsārī jīvas*

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4, 5, 15—*Sa Esa Neti-Neti*.

2 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3, 9, 8.

3 *Ibid*, 5 6.

4 *Chandogya Up.* 5, 18, 1—*Pradeśa mātram*.

5 *Kauṣītaki Up.* 35, 4, 20 *Eṣa prajñātmā idaṃ-śarīramanupraviṣṭaḥ*.

6 *Muṇḍaka Up.* 1, 1, 6.—*Sarvagataḥ*

7 *Chandogya Up.* 3, 14, 3.

8 *Bhagavatī* 2, 10—*Jivātthikāye*—*loye*, *loyamette*, *loyappamāṇe*.

9 *Bhagavatī* 6, 6, 17.

receive *pudgala*, they show activity and their effects are not uniform. Due to the accrusion of material particles like the *kārmic* particles, *jīvas* express expansion and contraction. Yet they are atomic in nature also and except in the case of the state of *kevalin samudghāta*, they do not become all-pervasive. Therefore, the *jīvas* are called as of *madhyama-parimāṇa* in the sense they have intermediate size.

It should be noted that the attributes of expansion and contraction do not really belong to the nature of the soul. The attributes are ascribed to the *kārmic* bodies. Due to the accretion of *kārmic* particles *jīvas* occupy a particular size of the body. And the effects of this type of pervasion of the body in a particular size is due to the *kārmic* body. The largeness or smallness of the *kārmic* body is due to the four directions (*gati*). In the liberated state these characteristics are absent.

The capacity of the *jīva* of pervading the entire body that it occupies is likened to the capacity of the light of the lamp which pervades the entire room big or small. As the light of the lamp illumines the room which is big or small, so the *jīva* pervades the entire body big or small. This pervasion is possible due to the *kārmic* body.

The *jīva* which occupies the body of a small child, occupies the body of a youth, and also the body of an old man. The soul which pervades a huge body can also contain itself in smallest of the bodies, the body of an insect.



CHARACTERISTIC OF JĪVA

From the noumenal point of view, *jīva* has the characteristic of *cetanā* (the light of consciousness). All *jīvas* have this characteristic of *cetana* (the light of consciousness), and it is the inherent characteristic of the *jīva*. But the development of the *jīva* differ in each individual case according to its capacity and on the basis of the intensity of the *kārmic* encrustations. Similarly, the development of *jīva* depends on the extent of knowledge based on the removal of knowledge-obscuring *karma*. In describing the distinction between *jīva* and *ajīva* it has been said that all the *jīvas*, however in the lowest possible stage of development, possess an infinite part of *kevalajñāna*

(omniscient knowledge).¹ If that part of omniscience is also covered by the *kārmic* particles, it would become *ajīva*, but such a contingency never arise.

From the phenomenal point of view, *jīva* has the characteristic of growth, of intelligence and a state of existence like animal state etc. A machine can be made to eat food but it cannot make use of the digested food for its own development. There may be some machines which are self-controlled; for instance, a torpedo has the capacity of moving on its own energy, but these machines cannot be produced by other machines nor do they produce such machines. They can be used. There is not a single machine which is self-skilled and self-producing. A railway train, for instance, can take tonnes of luggage and move, but it cannot fly like a bird. A bird has psychic energy which train or the machine does not possess. Therefore, the psychic energy is the criterion of distinguishing a living soul from non-living object.

MUKTA AND SAṂSĀRI JĪVA

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Jīvas have been classified into two types as (1) *mukta* (liberated) and (2) *saṁsāri* (empirical *jīvas*). Both the types of *jīvas* are infinite in number. The *saṁsāri jīvas* are to be classified into six types on the basis of the nature of the body they possess, as (1) *Pṛthvikāya* (earth-bodied), (2) *apḥkāya* (water-bodied), (3) *Tejaskāya* (fire-bodied), (4) *vāyukāya* (air-bodied), (5) *vanaspatikāya* (vegetable kingdom) and (6) *trasakāya* (beings can move).

Except the *trasakāya jīvas* the other 5 types of *jīvas* can be distinguished into (1) gross (*bādara*) and (2) subtle (*sūkṣma*). The universe is filled with subtle *jīvas*. The gross-bodied beings cannot live without any support like the body and they reside in some parts of the universe. The number of the living beings which are earth-bodied has been described with an analogy. If the living beings, contained in a lump of earth of the size of a fruit (*āvalā*), and if each living being were to get the body of the size of the dove, then the population of all the living beings in the lump will overflow the one lakh *yojana* of the *jambūdvīpa*.²

1 *Nandīsūtra*.

2 *Addāmalagapamāṇe puḥavikāe havanti je jīva. Te pārevayamittā jambūdvīpe na mānti.*

If the living beings contained in a drop of water were each to get a body of the size of a grain of sesamum, then they will overflow the *jambūdvīpa*.¹

The living beings contained in a spark (*cingārī*) were each to get the body of the size of a small egg of louse (*likha*) then the *jambūdvīpa* will be over-populated.²

The living beings contained in a fraction of air which moves a leaf of a margosa tree were to get the body of a tiny grain of *khasa-khasa* then *jambūdvīpa* will be over-populated.³

✓ 2 BODY AND SELF (ŚARIRA AND ĀTMAN)

The problem of the relation of the body and soul has been an important problem in philosophy. Three theories explaining the relation between the two have been presented :

1. Materialistic view which may be described as 'Epiphenomenalism' used in describing the relation between body and mind.
2. Parallelism, and
3. Interactionalism.

Epiphenomenalism tried to dispense with mind and soul as an independent reality and make them a by-product of the metabolic changes in the body. Consciousness (*Cetanā*) is the product of the metabolic changes in the brain cells. As the function of intestines is digestion, the function of the lungs is breathing so is the function of cerebrum is consciousness. It is also considered as function a by-product of the chemical changes in the cerebrum. There is nothing like *Ātman* or the consciousness as a separate reality.

The *Ātmavādins*, i.e., those who advocate the reality of the *Ātman* as different from the body or the mind refute the arguments of the epiphenomenalists by showing that the use of the term action (*kriyā*) is ambiguous. It is one thing to say that the action or function of the intestines is to digest food and the lungs to breathe, yet another

- 1 *Egammi dagabindummi je jīṇavarehiṃ, paṇṇattā.
Te jaṭ sarisavamittā jambūdiva na mānti.*
- 2 *Varaṭṭitandulamittā teṭṭā, jīvā jīṇehiṃ paṇṇattā.
Matthapalikkha pamāṇā; jambūdiva na mānti.*
- 3 *Je limvapatta pharisā vāu jīva jīṇehiṃ paṇṇattā.
Te jaṭ khasakhasamittā, jambūdiva na mānti.*

thing to say that the function of the brain cells is to get consciousness. The consciousness and the cerebrum belongs to two different realms, qualitatively different. When we think of consciousness, we do not normally think of cerebrum, though we may associate the two. Different organs of the body have by themselves no active or creative function. Intestines do not digest the food, lungs do not breathe, but we digest and we breathe through the intestines and lungs. Similarly, it is the self that thinks and that is conscious, although the function may be operated through the cerebrum. Consciousness cannot be produced out of the un-conscious matter. The organs of the body are lifeless and without conscious energy, it is the self that gives consciousness. Without the self the body has no life, it is a dead-matter. The bodily organs by themselves do not function. Father Butler wrote "that the brain is formed of the dead hydrogen atoms, oxygen atoms, nitrogen atoms and phosphorous atoms. Imagine them separate and senseless. Observe them running together and forming all imaginable combinations. This is purely a mechanical process which can be seen by the mind. But can you see or dream or in any way imagine how out of that mechanical act and from these individually dead atoms, sensation, thought and emotion are to arise? We cannot create Homer out of the rattling of dice or 'differential calculus' out of the clash of billiard ball... You cannot satisfy the human understanding in its demand for logical continuity between molecular process and the phenomena of consciousness."

It would be futile to compare the functions of digestion and respiration with the consciousness, because, the functions of digestion and respiration are unconscious. It is indubitable fact that consciousness and psychic energy are an independent force not produced out of the bodily functions. Those who consider consciousness as the effect of the bodily functions have to face a different question: 'Am I acting on my self-will or am I influenced by the bodily functions?'

Psycho-physical parallelism is another theory which has been propounded to explain the relation between body and mind or in a sense the soul. Psychical and physical forces run parallel to each other without ever affecting each other. A physical state is correlated to a mental state, point by point, without affecting the other. Parallel occurrence is the point common to both the states.

The third theory of the relation between the body and mind

is the theory of interactionism. According to this view, the bodily and the mental states affect each other. There is interaction between each other. For instance, physical ailments like the stomach ache and other ailments do affect the mental states like the cognitive ability the emotional upset and the conative urge. -Ill health does affect the mental energy adversely, while health will bring wholesome effect on mental life. For instance, particular type of food and drink would bring about mental states due to the toxic effects. Memory capacity can be improved by certain types of food. Injury to a particular part of the brain-cells would impair the power of memory. Similarly, if the certain parts of the brain-cells are adversely affected, there would be impairment to the mental energy.

f) 3

EFFECT OF THINKING ON THE MIND

Body and mind are intimately related to each other. They interact on each other. Cognitive, affective and conative activity do affect the bodily condition. Vigorous process of thinking brings about bodily fatigue. Emotions do create certain metabolic changes in the body like, secretion of glucose in the blood, coagulation of the blood and other chemical effects. The bodily and mental energy affect each other. The body and the mind are two qualitatively different substances. Still they influence each other. How this interaction is possible has been a difficult problem to solve.

3 THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ĀTMAN AND THE BODY

The *Ātman* and the body are different substances. One is a spiritual substance, while the body belongs to the material realm. *Ātman* is the psychic energy (*Cetanā*), it is formless. Body is material, it is unconscious. It has form. Then problem is how the two different principles interact on each other. Jainism tried to solve this problem of interaction between two qualitatively different principles by means of the concept of the gross (*būdara*) and subtle (*sūkṣma*) body (*śarīra*). Every soul in this *samsāra* is encased in the gross and subtle bodies. At the time of death, gross body is left here and the subtle body continues to be encrusted with the soul. When the soul enters the next birth it carries the subtle body with it. It enters another gross body with the subtle body. The subtle body is constantly being formed, like the snow-ball which adds particles of snow on its downward journey. The relation between the soul and the subtle body could be considered to be beginningless. It is always with the

soul as long as soul remains in the *samsāra*. In this sense, it is possible to say that the soul from the point of view of phenomenal existence has a certain form. It is in its pure state formless. And in this sense the *samśārī jīva* takes the form of the gross body by means of '*sūkṣma śarīra*'. In this way, the body and soul are intimately associated with each other; and form and the formless can have associations with contradictions. When the soul attains its purity, it would have no connection with the body which has form. The relation between the body which has form and the soul which has no form is beginningless, but it has an end, as the soul, by its own efforts can free itself from the association with the body.

SOUL AND MODERN SCIENCE ७.३

Some scientists do not distinguish between mind and soul. Mind is considered as expression of the modes of the brain. Pavlov regarded the memory as merely the expressions of the metabolic changes in the numerous cerebral cells. Even Bergson, who established the reality of the self by rational arguments, did consider the memory is due to the physiological changes in the cerebral cells. As the photo-plate receives the negative of photograph, so also the cerebral cells do receive and preserve the impressions of the past. This could be described as the physical memory. The memory traces are revived due to appropriate stimulations. Therefore, the mind is not something separate qualitatively from the cerebrum. It is physical. Pavlov's theory has been described as muscle twitch psychology. In this way, some scientists have tried to prove that there is nothing which is immaterial and spiritual. Everything can be explained, including mind and thought, through the operation of the bodily processes. However, mind is both material and immaterial, the physiological basis is material and psychic functions are immaterial. Otherwise, we cannot explain the higher values of life. It cannot be said that Shakespeare wrote the *Hamlet* by mere movements of the muscles and nerves, by hands and with the brain.

In the *vr̥tti* of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, it has been described that the cognitive, affective and conative mental functions like thinking, memory, emotions and will are due to the function of the mind which is immaterial.¹ The means of getting the mental states is

1 *Sūtrakṛtāṅgavr̥tti*, 1, 8.

primarily physiological based on the function of the brain cells. But the mental states are not physical. They are immaterial. Brain is physiological and the brain cells are often called knowledge cells. (*Jñāna tantu*). It is true to say that body affects the mental states; but the mental states are not the bodily states. Some modern scientists have emphasised this point of view of the distinction of the mental and bodily states. It would not be possible to explain the qualitative distinction of the mental state from the body by merely asserting that the mental states are nothing but bodily. We find prominent qualitative difference in the mental states and the bodily states. Yet in a sense, we can say that they are also similar in some respects, because the mental states are based on the physiological states in the brain.

It is clear from this discussion, that modern science is not clear about the nature of mind and body, whether there are prominent distinctions between the two. Even supposing that the cerebrum is the repository of the mental states, cognition and memory, it does not disprove the possibility of the presence of psyche (*cetanā*) as the prime-mover of the psychic states. Like the photo-plate, the cerebrum revives the impressions, preserves them and facilitates their revival on appropriate occasions. It is difficult to explain the 'why' of such processes and how the co-relation takes place. It is possible to explain the insoluble problem by positing the presence of psyche (*cetanā*) which is not physical in nature, but which is inscrutably associated with the bodily functions.

The phenomenal progress of science in the modern age is possible only because of the function of the psyche which is different from the brain rather bodily, although they are necessary as instrument or media.

Modern science says that there are 102 elements. They are material in nature and have form. All the experiments in science so far carried are on the empirical and the material aspects of things. The immaterial is beyond sense observation and is not amenable to experimental investigation. In the mental states we find characteristic which are not to be found in the physical states. Therefore, it can be said that the mental and physical states are qualitatively different, although they are not discreet as not to interact on each other.

Modern science has not been able to find a satisfactory solution

to the problem of relation of body and mind. Even if we consider that cerebrum is the seat of memory and is an instrument for the revival of memory, it cannot be said that psyche (*cetanā*) is not there at all. Like the negative of the photo-plate, the cerebral cells do function as repositories of past events in the form of memory. But the cerebral part cannot function as a guarantee of the future events. The problems regarding the 'how' and the 'why' of the cognitive function can only be understood if we posit independent of the cerebrum. In the case of the mechanical retention of the negative in the photoplate there is no variation nor novelty. It is a necessary mechanical and routine process, which can be explained by means of the rules of mechanical science. But in the case of human mind, we find there is variation and unrepresentability based upon the relation of the past impression. There would be individual variation in the expression of mental states and the revival of past impressions on the basis of the retention of the past impressions. However, this can be explained only with the help of the function of a psychic energy which is distinct from the physical function.

There has been rapid and phenomenal progress in the field of empirical sciences. This has been possible due to the enormous amount of systematic thinking and imagination which are expressions of the psychic energy (*cetanā śakti*). This proves the presence of the independent psychic energy.

The Russian Scientist Pavlov carried extensive experiments concerning the study of the physiological problems of conditioned reflexes. He carried experiments on the dogs and the experiments are called 'the dog and the saliva experiments'. In these experiments, he first rang the bell and then presented food to the animals. After some time he rang the bell but did not give food. He showed, by the quantity of saliva collected after ringing the bell, that the animals were conditioned by stimulus response to the bell and the food. There is no question of any mental states like expecting food. It is merely a physiological response without any element of independent psychic states.

However, it is also true that experiments shown that by operating on the animal and removing particular parts of the brain certain mental functions became inoperative. But the psychic was not lost. The animal behaved mechanical, ate food and other physiological processes like blood circulation and the respiration were also normal.

These functions are not purely physiological. But they have the psyche as a spring cord. Experience is a criterion of the psychic energy and experience is neither to be identified with the physiological processes nor to be associated with them, although physiological processes are the basis of psychic activity. Even when certain physiological functions do not operate, it cannot be said that the person does not experience the pleasures or pains, although he is not able to communicate his experiences to others. In the *Āgama* literature it has been mentioned that a *jīva* does experience various experiences pleasant or unpleasant in the series of affix lives. One is blind, one is dumb, one is deaf and similarly one may be suffering from incurable diseases. If such a being is tortured by sharp instrument, he may not be able to communicate to others because of his dumbness and blindness etc., but he does suffer immeasurable feelings of pain. Such feeling of immeasurable pain is also experienced by *Sihāvarakāya Jīvas*, but having no sense-organ to express, they cannot express their misery.

ORIGINAL FORM OF CETANĀ

Regarding the nature of *cetanā* the philosophers have expressed two different views. According to one view, it is said that life cannot be produced from object. Life-force is equally real, independent and beginningless. Louis Pasteur has shown by experimental investigation that life is a force by itself.

Louis Pasteur carried experiment in this connection. He took a bowl of glass, and kept some inanimate objects in it. He saw to it that no animate object, not even an egg is kept in the glass. Then he gradually removed the air inside the glass, and made it into a vacuum. In this state no minute organism accumulated there even after a very long time. But when same objects were kept in the open for some days and it was found that some animate infinite small organisms were deposited on the surface of the object. From this, it was clear that the atmosphere contains infinite number of minute organisms fleeting in the air and they are deposited on the objects.

According to another view, it is maintained that life can be generated from inanimate objects. Some scientists like Freud, Russian lady scientist Lapesinskeya and the atomic scientist like Deraldure and his assistant Stanley Millar have suggested that life can be generated from the inanimate objects.

Marxist theory maintains that the psyche is the qualitative transformation of the physical objects. As water heated to a particular degree becomes vapour and cooled to the zero degree, it solidifies into ice, so is psyche produced from the changes in the physical objects.

But the question is, at what stage the changes in the physical things does consciousness arise? The cerebrum contains various forms of material particles and the gases like oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon and phosphorus. Is it possible to determine which of these gases or physical particles become the origin of consciousness? Is it due to one of them separately, or due to the combination of all of them or some of them? So far empirical sciences have not been able to give any solution to the problem of the origin of psyche out of the physical changes. They have not been able to determine the original nature of *cetanā*.

It has sometimes been suggested that the *ātman* can be identified with the sense-organs and the brain. This view is not correct because even when the sense-organs cease to function due to some defect, memory traces of previous experiences continue to be experienced without the functioning of the sense-organs. Similarly, it can be shown that *ātman* cannot be identified with the brain. When the same function of the cerebral cell cease to work, even then memory may continue to be experienced. Therefore, it is not appropriate to identify the cerebrum with the *ātman* although it is the source of knowledge. The sense-organs and the brain are only the instruments for getting experiences. As the sense-organs are the instruments of receiving external stimulations, so is the brain the instrument of retaining the sense-impressions. It has been pointed out that if the brain cells are injured, memory may be impaired. Yet we can say that in the mentally defective beings, consciousness does work, even though it may not function normally. But all other physiological and mental functions in some respects do work without impairing the normal physiological routine of the mentally defective. From this, can be shown that the psychic energy is different from the brain and its functionings, although brain cells are the repositories of the psychic functions. *Tandula Veyūliya* gives a description of the physiological functioning of the body. There are 160 '*ūrdhvagāminī*' and '*rasavāhini*' veins in the human body. They start from the navel

and terminate in the head. The sense-organs function normally as long as these veins are working in perfect harmony.¹

According to Caraka, the cerebrum is the centre of the sense-organs and the vital life forces (*prāṇa*).² It is a truism that if a particular chord in the brain is cut, a particular psychic function is paralysed, but this does not mean that the brain cells are the psyche.



ĀTMAN AND INFINITE PRADEŚAS

We have already seen that *ātman* has infinite number of *pradeśas*. Finite number of *pradeśas* cannot form the *jīva*. From the point of view of biological science, infinite number of cells form the individual life and the body (psycho-physical organism). Body is composed of infinite material particles, but life is formed of the protoplasmic units. From the noumenal point of view, it is said that the *ātman* is a spiritual substance. It is simple and pure. It is eternal and perfect. And the description of *ātman* as constituting of infinite *pradeśas* is only to be looked at from the practical point of view. It is only an attempt, an imperfect attempt to find out the measurement of the *ātman*, if it is possible to say so. A piece of cloth is woven with threads. Threads are the part of the cloth. But threads by themselves do not constitute the cloth, although threads are necessary for the cloth. Nor can we say that the aggregate of threads could be called cloth. It is the pattern that is important. Similarly, the *ātman* has infinite number of *pradeśas*. They constitute the pattern of the *ātman*.

Consciousness is the characteristic of the *ātman*. This characteristic of consciousness is psychic energy and it is a differential of the *ātman*. The non-living substances do not possess this characteristic. Therefore, *ātman* is considered to be a pure substance, independent of other substances. The *jīva* expresses the characteristics of *sat* (existence) and *kriyākāritva* (activity). Due to its characteris-

1 *Tandula Veyāliya*.

"*Imammi sariraye saṭhisirāsayam nābhippabhavāṇam uḍḍhagāmināṇam siram upagayāṇam jāu rasaharṇiotti ccaī. Vujāsim ṇam niruvaghāṇam cakkhūsoyaghāṇajihabalam bhavaī.*"

2 *Caraka Saṁhitā*—

*Prāṇāḥ prāṇabhṛtām yarta, tathā sarvendriyāṇi ca.
Yadutāmāṅgamāṅgānāṁ śīrastadabdhīhīyate.*

tic of *sat* it is a *padārtha* (substance). Due to its characteristic of activity the *jīva* expresses modifications. But, in all these modifications it retains its essential nature and identity. The stream of consciousness is the attribute of the *ātman*, and the *ātman* remains the same through the modifications constituted of origin and decay.

THE VIEWS OF THE SCIENTISTS 1. 2

Prof. Albert Einstein says, "I believe that intelligence is manifested throughout all nature."¹ Sir A. S. Eddington said, "Something unknown is doing, we do not know what it is.....I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness.....The old Atheism is gone. Religion belongs to the realm of the spirit and mind, and cannot be shaken."² Herbert Spencer maintains that the teachers and founders of the religion have all taught, and many philosophers ancient and modern, Western and Eastern have perceived that this unknown and unknowable is our very life.³ J. B. S. Haldane expresses his view on the nature of the self as, "The truth is that, not matter, not forces, not any physical thing, but mind and personality is the central fact of the universe."⁴ Arthur H. Compton has written to say, "A conclusion which suggests.....the possibility of consciousness after death.....the flame is distinct from the log of wood which serves it temporarily as a fuel."

In the book entitled 'The Great Design' there is a description of the views of many scientists regarding the nature of the self, and the design of the universe. According to their views, the universe is not merely a mechanical and unthinking process which rolls its way with inexorable necessity, but there is a design and a plan. This postulates an intelligence which works behind the process of the universe and the designer, we may call this intelligence by any name we want.

Rene Descartes has said, by giving a very simple example, that 'I think, therefore I am'. He based his arguments regarding the reality

1 *The Modern Review* of Calcutta, July 1936.

2 *Ibid.*

3 *First Principles* 1900

4 *The Modern Review* of Calcutta, July 1936

of the self on the indubitable fact of the process of thinking and reasoning. He doubted everything but he could not doubt the doubter. The doubter is a substance.

Spinoza said that substance has infinite number of attributes, and among them consciousness and extension are prominent. Consciousness is a form of the attribute of thought. That is the Self. Similarly, extension has its infinite modes, they constitute the physical universe.

John Locke said that Self is the object of direct experience. "I think, I argue, I experience pleasures and pains." The 'I' is the substance, it is the substratum of experiences. Self is an object of knowledge.

George Berkely has shown that the universe is constituted of three principles : (1) The self, (2) God (Ultimate self) and (3) The external world. The consciousness is the essential characteristic of the soul. Without consciousness soul cannot exist.

The philosophers that we have just mentioned, Descartes, Locke and Berkely have shown that the reality of the self is self evident. No proofs are necessary, no arguments are necessary. But, David Hume denied the reality of the Self and said that it is only a fleeting collection of impressions. His view is nearer to the Buddhist concept of *ātman* as not a real substance but merely an aggregate of physical and mental states.

The scientists right from the beginning have been discussing the problem of the nature of the self but they have not come to any definite conclusion. The problem of the Self has still remained a mystery.

THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE ĀTMAN

Attempts have been made to give positive proofs for the existence of the *ātman*. On the contrary, there have been attempts to argue against the existence of the *ātman*. But on the whole, it can be said that arguments against the existence of the *ātman* do not hold ground. Therefore, there is a possibility of maintaining that the *ātman* is real. It is an independent substance. It is a spiritual substance. We cannot get the knowledge of the *ātman* through the senses. Still, this would not be a counter-argument against the exis-

tence of the *ātman*. We see with our eyes and we see objects which are within the range of the sense-organ of sight. Similarly, there should also be a favourable circumstance of the presence of the light. Therefore, the function of sense-organ is limited by its physical capacity and environmental factors. But the experience of sight will be possible if there is a Self which perceive.

Those who question and those who doubt the reality of the Self have no valid arguments to give. The Self is expressed through the experiences of the senses. The Self cannot directly be seen through the senses. It can be inferred through its effects. Consciousness cannot belong to the material and non-living object. Therefore, the Self is different from the non-living object. We have seen that those who argued that consciousness is the product of the physiological and chemical changes in the brain cells, have not been able to prove that the brain cells or the chemical effect is the soul. They have not been able to show that the physiological processes produce mental states, although some Naturalist Psychologist like Pavlov have tried to demonstrate that all activities of an organism are physiological. It is of the nature of stimulus response and conditioned reflex. Moreover, evolution of anything has to be from within its nature. Nothing can evolve from something which is not of its nature. Therefore, the development of life has to be from life only. It cannot be from non-living to life. That would mean arising of something out a thing of a different nature, as the *Asatkāryavādin* would assert. Therefore, it would be proper to consider that the immaterial soul and the material body are qualitatively different.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF JIVAS

Jivas have been classified into different types on the basis of the different principles. The foremost classifications of *jivas* is (1) *Mukta jivas* (liberated souls) and (2) *Saṁsārī jivas* (soul involved in this world). This classification is based on the principle of the attainment of perfection.

Of the *Saṁsārī jivas*, there are different classifications again on the basis of different principles. For instance, on the basis of the principle of the capacity of movement *jivas* have been classified into :

(i) *Sthāvara jīvas* (beings which cannot move e. g. trees) (ii) *Trasa jīvas* (beings which have the capacity of movement).¹

Sthāvara jīvas are of three types : (1) *Pṛthvī jīvas* (Earth-bodied) (2) *Jala jīvas* (Water-bodied) and (3) *Vanaspatis* (Vegetable kingdom).² Sometimes, the *Sthāvara jīvas* have been classified into five different types : (i) *Pṛthvikāya* (earth-bodied), (ii) *jalakāya* (water-bodied), (iii) *tejaskāya* (fire-bodied), (iv) *vāyukāya* (air-bodied) and (v) *vanaspatikāya* (vegetable-kingdom). The *jīvas* of the air and fire-body have movement as their nature and they are called *gati-trasa* (moving). They have been distinguished into : gross (*bādara*) and subtle (*sūkṣma*). The subtle-bodied beings are pervading the entire universe, while the gross-bodied beings live in specific places of the universe.³

Gross earth-bodied beings are of two types : (1) *mṛdu* (soft) and (2) *kaṭhina* (hard). The soft earth-bodied beings are again classified into seven types on the basis of the colour of their bodies : *kr̥ṣṇa* (black), *nīla* (blue), *lohita* (red), *harita* (yellow), *śukla* (white) *pāṇḍu* (orange) and *panakamṛtika*. This distinction may be considered to be more scientific.⁴ Similar distinction has been made in the *Prajñāpanā*.

The hard portion of the earth has been divided into *bhūtala-vinyāsa* (terrain) and *karambapalo*. These too have parts and have been further classified into 36 parts :—

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Śuddha-pṛthvī</i> (earth) | 9. <i>Upala</i> (some type of rock) |
| 2. <i>Śarkarā</i> (sand) | 10. <i>Trapu</i> (zinc) |
| 3. <i>Bālukā</i> | 11. <i>Sīsaka</i> (lead) |
| 4. <i>Śīla</i> (granite, rocks) | 12. <i>Rūpya</i> (silver) |
| 5. <i>Lavaṇa</i> (salt) | 13. <i>Suvarṇa</i> (gold) |
| 6. <i>Ūsa</i> (soft earth) | 14. <i>Vajra</i> (diamond) |
| 7. <i>Ayasa</i> (iron) | 15. <i>Haritāla</i> (emerald) |
| 8. <i>Tāmra</i> (copper) | 16. <i>Hinguluka</i> |

1 *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, 36, 69.

2 *Ibid*, 36, 70.

*Pudhavi ājīva ya taheva ya vaṇassaī
Icceye thāvarā tivihā tesim̐ bheye suṇeha me.*

3 *Ibid*, 36, 78, 86, 100.

4 *Ibid*, 36, 72.

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|---|--------------------------|
| 17. <i>Manaḥṣīlā</i> | 27. <i>Markata</i> |
| 18. <i>Sasyaka</i> (a variety of emerald) | 28. <i>Bhujamocaka</i> |
| 19. <i>Anjana</i> | 29. <i>Indranīla</i> |
| 20. <i>Pravāḷaka</i> ¹ | 30. <i>Chandana</i> |
| 21. <i>Abhraka Bālukā</i> | 31. <i>Pulaka</i> |
| 22. <i>Abhrapaṭala</i> | 32. <i>Saugandhika</i> |
| 23. <i>Gomedaka</i> | 33. <i>Chandraprabha</i> |
| 24. <i>Rucaka</i> | 34. <i>Vaiḍūrya</i> |
| 25. <i>Anka</i> | 35. <i>Jalakānta</i> |
| 26. <i>Sphaṭika</i> | 36. <i>Sūryakānta</i> |

According to the *Bṛhadvṛtti* commentary on the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra* *Lohitākṣa* and *Masāragalla* are species of *sphaṭika* and *Marakata* respectively.²

The gross water-bodied beings (*sthūla jala*) can be divided into 5 types, as : (1) *Śuddha udaka* (pure water), (2) *Osa udaka* (dew), (3) *Haratanu* (green bodied) (4) *Koharā* (fog) and (5) *Hima* (ice).³

The gross vegetable kingdom is of two types, as : (1) *pratyeka śarīrī* (having separate bodies) and (2) *sādhāraṇa śarīrī* (having one body). The being having one *jīva* in one body is called *pratyeka śarīrī*, but, if one body contains innumerable *jīvas* (living cells) it is called *sādhāraṇa śarīrī*.

Pratyekaśarīrī being in the vegetable kingdom are of twelve types as :

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|--|---|
| 1. <i>Vṛkṣa</i> (tree) | 8. <i>Parvaga</i> |
| 2. <i>Guccha</i> | 9. <i>Kuṇḍa</i> |
| 3. <i>Gulma</i> | 10. <i>Jalaja</i> |
| 4. <i>Laiā</i> (creeper) | 11. <i>Auṣadhitraṇa</i> (medicinal grass) |
| 5. <i>Vallī</i> (plant) | 12. <i>Haritakāya</i> (green bodied plant) ⁴ |
| 6. <i>Traṇa</i> (blade of grass) | |
| 7. <i>Latāvalaya</i> (encircling creepers) | |

The beings of *sādhāraṇa śarīra* have innumerable types like

- 1 *Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra*, 11, 36.
- 2 *Uttarādhyāyana bṛhadvṛtti*, patra 689.
- 3 *Uttarādhyāyana*, 36, 86.
- 4 *Uttarādhyāyana*, 36, 95-96.

kanda and *māla* etc.¹ So far we have considered the *sthāvara jīvas* i. e., the living beings who have not got the capacity of movement.

Now we consider the *trasa jīvas* (living beings who can move about) i. e. self-moving beings. The *trasa jīvas* are of six types :

1. *Agni* (fire-bodied) } *Gati trasa*
2. *Vāyu* (air-bodied) }
3. *Dvīndriya* (two-sensed organisms)
4. *Trīndriya* (three-sensed organisms)
5. *Caturīndriya* (four-sensed organisms)
6. *Pañcīndriya* (five-sensed organisms)²

The fire-bodied and the air-bodied beings do not possess self-willed movements. Therefore, they are called *gati trasa*. They move about randomly. The other *jīvas* from two sense-organisms onwards have self-willed movements.

The fire-bodied and air-bodied animals are gross and subtle. The subtle-bodied beings pervade the entire universe, while the gross-bodied beings have a habitation in a particular place.³ The gross-bodied fire beings have various forms like *angāra*, *murmura*, *śuddha agni*, *archi*, *jwālā*, *ulkā*, *vidyut*, etc.⁴

The gross air-bodied beings have the following types :—

- (1) *Utkalikā*, (2) *Maṇḍalikā*, (3) *Ghanavāta*, (4) *Guñjāvāta*, (5) *Śuddhavāta* and (6) *Sarivartakavāta*.⁵

Those beings who have the capacity of movement on their own account and being aware of the movement and those who can move forward and backward, expand and contract, create sound, express the feeling of fear and run about, all these are *trasa jīvas*.⁶

According to the terminology of the *trasa jīvas*, we can classify *trasa jīvas* on the basis of the criterion of the number of sense-organs they possess. There are four types or *trasa jīvas* :

1. *Uttarādhyanasūtra*, 36, 97-100.
2. *Ibid*, 36, 108-127.
3. *Ibid*, 36, 112-121.
4. *Ibid*, 36, 101-109.
5. *Ibid*, 36, 119-120.
6. *Daśavaikālika*, *adhyayana* 4, *sūtra* 9.

1. *Dvīndriya* (two-sensed organisms)
2. *Trīndriya* (three-sensed organisms)
3. *Caturīndriya* (four-sensed organisms)
4. *Pañcendriya* (five-sensed organisms).¹

They are all gross-bodied and there is no distinctions of subtle- and gross-bodied organism in this case. Two-sensed, three-sensed, and four-sensed organisms are *sammūrechanaja* i.e., they did not take their birth in a womb. They are self-born. The five-sensed organisms are of two types : (1) *sammūrechanaja* (self-born) (2) *Garbhaja* (born of womb).

From the point of view of the states of existence, the five sensed-organisms are of four types : (1) *Nairayika* (hellish), (2) *Tiryāṇca* (lower animals), (3) *Manuṣya* (human) and (4) *Deva* (heavenly beings). Among the five-sensed lower animals, there are three types, namely, (1) *jalacara* (moving in water) (2) *sthalacara* (moving on the earth) (3) *Khecara* (moving in the air).²

The *jalacara* animals are of various types. Prominent among them are : (1) *Matsya* (fish), *Kacchapa* (tortoise), *grāha*, *magara* (crocodile) and *śuṃṣumāra* etc.³

The *sthalacara* animals are mainly of two types as : (1) *catuṣpāda* (four footed) (2) *parīsarpa* (crawling).⁴

Catuṣpāda animals are of four types as :

1. animals with one hoof—horses etc.
2. with two hoofs—oxen etc.
3. with round legs, like elephants.
4. with feet having claws and nails, like lions etc.⁵

Parīsarpa animals are mainly of two types as :

1. *Bhujaparīsarpa* (moving with shoulders)
2. *Uraḥparīsarpa* (crawling with the stomach) reptiles, like snake etc.⁶

1. *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra*, 36, 127.

2. *Ibid*, 36, 172.

3. *Ibid*, 36, 173.

4. *Ibid*, 36, 180.

5. *Ibid*, 36, 181.

6. *Ibid*, 36, 182.

Khecara animals are of four types as :

1. *Carmapakṣī*
2. *romapakṣī*
3. *samudgapakṣī*
4. *vitatapakṣī*¹



SAMŚĀRI AND MUKTA JIVAS

According to Jainism, from the point of view of substance and energy all *jīvas* are equal. There is no distinction between a *jīva* and *Īswara* as a higher *jīva*. But from the point of view of modes, a distinction has been made among the *jīvas* as those who are liberated (*siddha jīvas*) and those who are in *saṁsāra* (*saṁsārī jīvas*). They are considered to be the freed souls and those who in bondage in this wheel of *saṁsāra*. When the soul is freed from the *kārmic* matter, it becomes pure and is freed from the wheel of life and death. *Uttarādhyayana* and other *āgama* books give various synonymous words for *mukti* which have been used in their books : *mokṣa*,² *nirvāṇa*,³ *bahiṣvihāra*,⁴ *siddhaloka*,⁵ *ātmavasati*,⁶ *anuttaragati*,⁷ *pradhānagati*,⁸ *varagati*,⁹ *sugati*,¹⁰ *apunarāvṛtta*,¹¹ *avyābādha*¹² and *lokottamottama*¹³ etc. The state of the soul in *mukti* condition is characterised by freedom from disease, without body, without experiences of misery, the enjoyment of the perfect bliss and peace, perfect purity and perfect holyness, without destruction and possessed

1. *Uttarādhyayana sūtra*, 36, 188.
2. *Ibid*, 6, 10.
3. *Ibid*, 36, 269; 28, 30.
4. *Ibid*, 14, 4.
5. *Ibid*, 23, 83; 10, 35.
6. *Ibid*, 14, 48; 7, 25.
7. *Ibid*, 18, 38; 18, 39-40, 42, 43, 48.
8. *Ibid*, 19, 68.
9. *Ibid*, 36, 67.
10. *Ibid*, 28, 3
11. *Ibid*, 29, 44, 21, 24.
12. *Ibid*, 29, 3.
13. *Ibid*, 29, 58.

of perfect knowledge and intuition. It is free from rebirth and is in the highest state of perfection.¹

The *ātman* in the highest stage of perfection is the *paramātman* and there is really speaking no distinction between the *ātman* and the *paramātman* in the highest stage. In the highest stage of perfection, each *ātman* retains its individuality, unlike the *Vedāntic* conception of the identity or the merger of the *ātman* with the *Brahman*. The *jīva* has perfect knowledge and intuition (*samyagjñāna* and *darśana*) and its inherent characteristics. When the *kārmic* particles are completely destroyed *ātman* becomes free from all the modes of the body like oldage, disease and death and is free from the rebirth. It has no empirical body attached to it. Therefore, it is considered to be *ghanarūpa*. *Mokṣa* is not to be mistaken as a negative state of void. It is positive state of bliss. The size of the *mukta jīva* (freed soul) is of the dimension of the subtle body that it have been, last life minus one third of its form.² This is because, during the *śukladhyāna* state (deep peaceful meditation) vibrations of the *sūkṣma śarīra* are reduced to this form. Therefore, one-third portion of the earlier *sūkṣma śarīra* is eliminated.

A question arises, when the *ātman* is free from the body either it should be atomic in form or all-pervasive. Similarly, how can we explain the reduction of the *sūkṣma śarīra* to one-third *śarīra* in the highest stage.

The answer that has been suggested is that the *jīva* has been shown to be pervading the body that it occupies in a particular empirical life. The form of the soul was neither atomic nor all-pervasive. In the freed state the soul is without body. Therefore, there is no question of pervading or expansion or contraction of the soul. It has no form and whatever description is given about the nature of the soul in the liberated state, it is only with reference to

1. *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra* 36, 66.

(a) *Arūṇo jivaghaṇā nānadaḥsaṇasanniyā.*

Āḷaṇ suhamsampattā uvamā jassa natthi ū.

(b) *Uttarādhyāyana* 29, 28; 9, 4; 29, 41.

2. *Uttarādhyāyana sūtra* 36, 64—

Usseho jassa jo hoī bhavammi carimammi ū.

Tibhāgaḥiṇo taito ya siddhāṇogāhaṇā bhavē.

the space points and not extensions. It is formless and therefore many *siddhas* can live together in the same space.

The soul in its liberated state is freed from the bodily activities like birth and death. It is in its own nature. It is *saccidānanda* (perfect reality, perfect consciousness and perfect bliss). *Ūrdhvagatī* (tendency to go up) is the very characteristic of the *ātman* and when the *kārmic* encrustations are removed, it goes up freed from all *karmas* to the *siddhaśilā*. As long as the *karma* vitiated the soul, it is held down in the wheel of life and when the *karma* is destroyed, the *ghanaṭva* of the world i. e. the downward force of the world like the gravity does not affect the soul. It is freed from all the *karmas*.

The freed soul is free from the body. The movement is the attribute of the body and therefore, in the state of freedom, the soul has no movement at all. It has no other types of vibrations. It is free from material and bodily modes of movement and variations.¹ Therefore, the soul moves towards the upward path to the *siddhaśilā*. The *Bhagavatī sūtra* mentions the four causes for such state of *ūrdhvagatī*, as (1) *prayoga*, (2) *asangatā* (3) *bandhaviccheda*, (4) *tathāvidha svabhāva*.² Due to the absence of the principle of motion (*dharma*) the soul does not go to *aloka*. The freed soul enjoy perfect bliss of itself.

Next distinction of the *jīva* is the *saṃsārī jīva*, i. e., the souls involved into the wheel of *saṃsāra*. The *saṃsārī jīvas* are being eternally moving from one state to the other experiencing the *kārmic* effects and in turn accruing more and more *karma*. It is full of *karma* and therefore, it is embodied and not freed from bodily modes. But the freed souls are free from *karma*. They are omniscient and perfect. The liberated souls are not bound by any other state. They enjoy their own state without being affected by any other external or internal forces. There are no distinctions between the different individual souls in the free state although they retain their individuality.

The liberated soul is completely free from the empirical adjuncts like the modes of body and the mind. Therefore, there are no repetitions, revivals or reoccurrence of the physical and psychic states, because the *karma* is removed and the *karma* is the cause of all these modes.

154 *Bhagavatī* 3, 3.

155 *Bhagavatī*, 7, 1, 265—

Nissangayāe nirangaṇāe gatipariṇāmeṇam bandhaṇa cheyaṇāe.
Nirindhaṇāye puvvappaogeṇam akammssa gaṭī paṇṇāyati.

Ajīvatattva : A Study

(A SURVEY OF NON-LIVING SUBSTANCE)

Jīvatattva is opposite of *ājīvatattva*.¹ *Cetenā* is the characteristic of *jīva* and it has the attributes of *upayoga* i. e., *jñāna* and *darśana*. The substance which is in a body and which sees, knows and experiences pleasure and pain is called *jīva*.² The body in which there is no cognising substance experiencing pleasure and pain is the *ajīva* (non-living substance).³

Ajīva is of two kinds : (1) *rūpī ajīva* (with form) and (2) *arūpī ajīva* (formless).⁴ *Pudgala* has form. The other four substances (*dravya*) *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa*, and *Kāla* are *arūpī* (formless).

In the *āgama* literature the substances having form have been called "*mūrta*" while those substances which have no form are called "*amūrta*."

DHARMĀSTIKĀYA

Of the six *dravyas*, *jīva* and *pudgala* have the capacity of movement. They have the capacity to move from one place to the other, but it does not mean that they are constantly moving every instant. It only means that they have motion as a capacity and possibility and are not absolutely stationary (*sthitiśīla*). The other four *dravyas* are having no motion. In Jainism, *jīva* and *pudgala* have been considered to be both *gatiśīla* (having movement) and *sthitiśīla* (being stationary)—and for this kind of movement they have

1. *Sthānāṅga*, 2, 1, 57.

2. *Pañcāstikāya*, 2, 122.

3. *Pañcāstikāya* 2, 124-125.

4. (a) *Uttarādhyayana sūtra*, 36.

(b) *Samavāyāṅga*, 149,

a medium of motion and that is the principle of *Dharma*; and *Adharma* is the principle of rest. These two are the functional principles.¹

In the Jaina literature the words *dharma* and *adharma* have also been used in the ethical sense as *śubha* (auspicious) and *aśubha* (inauspicious). In the use of these words the *Dharmadravya* connoted assistance of movement, while *Adharmadravya* has a connotation of stagnation. Other *Darśanas* in Indian philosophy have not given thought to the conception of *Dharma* and *Adharma* in the sense of connoting the principle of motion and principle of rest. In modern science, Newton for the first time discovered the principle of motion. Albert Eienstein while advocating the principle of motion said that the universe is limited, similarly the space beyond the universe (*aloka*) is also limited. The universe is limited because the substance or energy is limited to the sphere of universe. Beyond this universe, there is neither substance nor energy which is responsible for the motion. What the scientists call Ether as the principle of motion, Jaina literature gives it the name of *Dharmadravya* (principle of motion).²

1. (a) *Bhagavatī*, 18, 7; 7, 10.

(b) *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* 36, 6.

2. Hollywood, R. and T : *Instruction Lesson No. 2, What is Ether ?*

I am quite sure that you have heard of *Ether* before now, but please do not confuse it with the Liquid Ether used by surgeons, to render a patient unconscious for an operation. If you should ask me just what the Ether is, that is, the Ether that conveys electromagnetic-waves. I would answer that I cannot accurately describe it. Neither can any one else. The best that anyone could do would be to say that Ether is invisible body and that through it electromagnetic waves can be propagated.

But let us see from a practical standpoint the nature of the thing called 'Ether.' We are all quite familiar with the existence of solids, liquids and gases. Now suppose, that inside a glass vessel there are no solids, liquids or gases : that all of these things have been removed including the air as well.

If I were to ask you to describe the condition that now exists within the glass-vessel, you would promptly reply that nothing exists within it, that a vacuum has been created. But I shall have to correct you, and explain that within this vessel there does exist 'Ether' nothing else.

Bhagavāna Mahāvīra said that the *Dharmadravya* is one. It pervades the entire universe. It is eternal. It has no colour, smell, nor touch and taste. It is the principle of motion by which matter moves. All the activities and movement of the *jīva* in both physiological and psychological sense like physical movement and mental states, are due to principle of motion. It has infinite number of *pradeśas* (space points). It does not move although it is the principle of motion. It is indestructible. It is the principle by which the movement is possible although it does not contribute directly either in the material substance or as the energy which makes objects move. It is formless and therefore it has neither the attributes of the physical objects nor the attributes of mental states. *Dharma-dravya* is one and whole and does not appear as parts. It pervades the entire universe and there is no place in the universe in which *Dharmadravya* is absent.

Movement (*gati*) is the characteristic which refers to the move-

So we may say that 'Ether' is a something that is not a solid, nor liquid, nor gaseous, nor anything else which can be observed by us physically. Therefore, we may say that an absolute vacuum cannot be created, for Ether cannot be removed.

We get our knowledge of Ether from experiments : by observing results and deducing facts. For example, if within the glass-vessel, mentioned above, we place a bell and cause it to ring, no sound of any kind reaches our ears. Therefore, we deduce that in the absence of air, sound does not exist, and thus, that sound must be due to vibration in the air.

Now let us place a radio transmitter inside the enclosure that is void of air. We find that radio signals are sent out exactly the same as when the transmitter was exposed to the air. So we are right in deducing that electro-magnetic waves or Radio-waves do not depend on air for their propagation that they are propagated through or by means of 'something' which remained inside the glass enclosure after the air had been exhausted. This something has been named 'Ether.'

We believe that Ether exists throughout all space of the universe ; in the most remote region of the stars, and at the same time within the earth, and in the seemingly impossible small space which exists between the atoms of all matter. That is to say, Ether is everywhere ; and that electromagnetic wave can be propagated everywhere.

ment from one place to the another, and *Dharma* assists movement. Just as the movement of the fish is possible in water although the water does not or may not make it to move. Similarly, the principle of motion (*Dharma*) is the principle by which the movement is possible. Without this principle, motion is not possible, just as the fish cannot move outside the water. Likewise, the movement of *pudgala* (matter) is possible due to *Dharmadravya*. To give an example of modern life, we can say just as the movement of the train would be possible because of the rails, similarly *Dharmadravya* assists movement. Similarly *jīva* and *pudgala* have movement because of principle of motion (*Dharmadravya*).

Motion and rest are the two states which are the characteristics of *pudgala* and *jīva* (matter and soul). They do not have mere motion nor mere rest, some time they move and some time they rest. In this world there are four states of movement and rest of a thing, as, (1) from rest to motion, (2) from motion to rest, (3) always at rest and (4) always in motion. Therefore, the movement and the rest are natural to the objects. And they have principles assisting them. They are the principles of *Dharma* and *Adharma*.

It is necessary to postulate the *Dharma* and *Adharma* as principles of motion and rest, because we cannot explain the movement and the state of rest in the universe nor can we divide the cosmos into *Loka* and *Aloka*. We have already said that *Jīva* and *Ajīva* have primarily the state of movement as a characteristic. The immediate causes of movement and rest in *Jīva* and *Pudgala* are in the very nature of these substances, however the efficient causes are *Dharma* and *Adhārma*, which are remote, and are causes for the movement and rest of the two.

The states of motion and rest are to be found in the universe and these two are possible by the *Dharma* and *Adharma dravyas* which do not themselves possess, motion or rest, but which assists the motion and rest.¹ It is therefore possible to understand, how

1. *Prajñāpanā, Pada 1, Vṛtti—*

Dharmādharmavibhūttāvat sarvatra ca jīva pudgalavicārāt.

Nālokaḥ kaśचित् syānna ca sammatametadarthānām.

Tasmāddharmādharmau, avagādham vyāpta lokakham sarvam.

Evam hi paricchinnaḥ siddhyati lokastad vibhūtvāt.

important are the substances of *Dharma* and *Adharma* in this universe. Ācārya Malayagiri said that the order in the *Loka* and the *Aloka* (universe and the beyond) is not possible without these substances.¹

This world is a fact, because it is experienced through the senses. But the beyond i. e., the *Aloka* is not subject to sense-experience. Therefore, the existence and the non-existence of the *aloka* has been a problem. But when we accept the existence of *Loka*, we have also to postulate the existence of the beyond, because the limited does imply the unlimited. The logic of our arguments would certainly show that if there is a beyond, there must be a limited as if there is the limited which implied the unlimited. These are relative terms.²

The universe has all the six substances like the *Jīva*, *Pudgala*, *Dharma* and *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* and *Kāla*. But where there is only *Ākāśa*, it is the beyond; the unlimited and it is called *Aloka*. In the *Aloka*, *jīva* and *ajīva* cannot exist because *Dharma* and *Adharma* are the criteria of the distinctions between the two spheres of *Loka* and *Aloka*, where *Dharma* and *Adharma* operate that is *Loka*, and where these principles are not operative it is *Aloka*.

Gautama Gaṇadhara asked Bhagavāna Mahāvīra "What is the use of *Dharmāstikāya* for the *jīvas*?"

Mahāvīra said: "O Gautama, if the principle of motion were not to operate, where would be the motion? Who would come and who would go? How could the waves of the sound travel? How could eye-lids open? Who would talk and who could move about? The whole world would have remained stationary. *Dharmāstikāya* is the means to all the moving things."³

Gautama asked, "Bhagavan! What is the use of the *Adharmāstikāya* for the *Jīvas*?"

Mahāvīra said, "O, Gautama, if the *Adharmāstikāya* were not

1. *Prajñāpanā*, pada 1, vṛtti—*Lokālokavyavasthānupapatteḥ*.
2. *Nyāyāvatāra*—*Yo yo vyutapati macchuddhapodābhidheyah sa sa savipakṣah. Yathā ghaṭo'āghaṭa vipakṣakah Yaśca lokasya vipakṣah so'lokaḥ*.
3. *Bhagavatī*, 13, 4.

to operate as principle of rest who would stand and who would sit ? Who would sleep ? Who could concentrate ? Who could remain silent ? Who can remain inactive ? Who could keep the eyelids steady ? The world would have constant movement without break. All that is steady and at rest is due to the principle of rest, *i. e.*, *Adharma*.”¹

COMPARISON WITH ETHER

Many Indian and Western philosophers have recognised the reality of motion in the universe, but they have not found it necessary to postulate a principle by which the movement is possible. In the modern science Ether has been suggested to be the medium of movement. It is analogous to the Jaina conception of *Dharma*. The Ether is one of the outstanding discoveries of the modern science. The eminent scientist Dr. A. S. Edington writes “This does not mean that the Ether is abolished. We need an Ether...in the last century it was widely believed that Ether was a thing of matter having properties such as mass, rigidity, motion like ordinary matter. It would be difficult to say when this view died out...Now a days, it is agreed that Ether is not a kind of matter, being, non-material—its properties are signaries (quite unique) characters such as mass and rigidity which we meet within matter will naturally be absent in Ether but the Ether will have new and definite characters of its own...non-material ocean of Ether.”²

Albert Einstein has propounded the Theory of Relativity and he has shown that Ether is non-material, continuous, non-discrete and co-extensive with space. While discussing the comparative study of the *Dharmadravya* with Ether, Prof. G. R. Jain says “that it has been established that the Jaina philosophers and modern scientists agree regarding the principle of Ether and the *Dharmadravya* as synonymous because both of them are non-material, non-discrete, continuous whole and all-pervading like *Ākāśa*. They have no form, nor have they movement although they are the medium of movement.”

1. *Bhagavatī*, 13, 4.

2. *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 31.

ADHARMĀSTIKĀYA

As the *Dharmadravya* is necessary for movement in the world so is the *Adharmadravya* necessary for explaining rest and a static state of the objects. As in the absence of the *Dharmāstikāya* we cannot explain the existence of motion, so also we cannot explain the state of rest without *Adharmāstikāya*. Like the *Dharma*, *Adharma* also pervades the entire universe. It is whole, and non-discrete. As the sesame oil pervades the entire grain of sesame, so also the principle of *Adharma* pervades the entire *Lokākāśa* (the universe). Just as the shade of the tree provides coolness and possibility of rest for a traveller, similarly the *Adharmāstikāya* enables the *jīva* and *pudgala* substance to experience the state of rest. The question, if the state of rest which is due to *Adharmāstikāya* in what way does it help? For this, we can say, if the state of rest were not possible, then there would be continuous motion and there would not be any possibility of steadiness... This stage of steadiness and static existence is possible through *Adharmāstikāya*.

It has again been asked that if *Dharma* as a principle of motion and *Adharma* as the principle of rest, they are contrary, how can they co-exist? Both of them are continuous, both of them are formless. They are *ajīva* and they are inferable.

For this, it can be said that their functions are different. One helps motion and the other helps the static existence. Both these functions are different; they cannot be attributed to the same principle.

The third question has been asked: *Dharma* and *Adharma* are formless. How can they assist motion and rest? The answer is, that the capacity to help not necessarily remains in those substances which have form, even the formless substances have this capacity. Just as *Ākāśa* (space) is formless, but still it accommodates infinite number of things so also *Dharma* and *Adharma* are formless, they are the basic principles of motion and rest. *Ākāśa* has the capacity of accommodating things, so also the *Dharma* and *Adharma* has the capacity to help the motion and rest.

The next question is: if *Dharma* and *Adharma* are all-pervading, then they must inter-penetrate each other. And there will be no distinction between them.

For this, it can be said that as substances they are all pervading but as to their functions they are different. Each does its own functions although they do co-exist. Just as numerous lights illumine the room and the light of each lamp pervades the entire room. It does not mean that the function of one is not distinct from the other and it is lost and has no existence. Similarly, *Dharma* and *Adharma* are all-pervading, yet their functions are different and there is no contradictions in their functional distinctions.

Some thinkers have compared *Adharma* with the principle of gravitation and field. But Dr. Mohanlāl Mehtā is of view that the *Dharmāstikāya* is quite different from the gravitational force and field and it is an independent principle.

Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara does not find it necessary that *Dharma* and *Adharma* be considered as independent substances (*dravyas*). He considers that both of them are not substances but they are modes of substances.¹

ĀKĀŚĀSTIKĀYA

That substance which accommodates *Jīva*, *Pudgala*, *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Kāla* is called *Ākāśadravya*.² It is the basis of all *dravyas* and therefore it has a special function.³

Gautama Gaṇadhara asked to Mahāvīra : “Bhagavan ! What is the use of substance of *Ākāśa* for the *Jīvas* and the *Ajīvas* ?”

Bhagavāna Mahāvīra said : O Gautama, if *Ākāśa* were not to be there, where would the *jīvas* be ? Where would the *Dharma* and *Adharma astikāyas* pervade ? Where would the *Kāla* extend ? Where would the dance of *Pudgala* be possible ? The whole world would be without foundation ?⁴

Ākāśa is not a solid thing, but it is empty space which accommodates all things. It is all-pervading (*sarva-vyāpī*), formless (*amūrta*) and it has infinite points of space (*ananta pradeśi*). *Ākāśa* is divided

1 *Niścayadvātriṃśikā*, 24

Prayogavisrasākarma *tadabhāvasthistathā.*

Lokānubhāvavṛttāntaḥ kim dharmādharmayo falaṃ.

2 *Tatvārthasūtra* 5, 18—*Ākāśasyāvagāhaḥ.*

3 *Uttarādhyayana* 28, 9—*Bhāyaṇaṃ savvadavvāṇaṃ nahaṃ ogāhala-kkhaṇaṃ.*

4 *Bhagavatī* 13, 4.

into two parts : (1) *Lokākāśa* (the limited universe i.e. the world) and (2) *Alokākāśa* (the limitless beyond).¹ As a lake gives space to the water, similarly *Ākāśa* is a resting place for all the *dravyas*. A question has been asked that if *Ākāśa* were to be one and continuous, how could there be distinction between the *Lokākāśa* and the *Alokākāśa*? How can *Ākāśa* be divided into these two? But the answer is, this division is not on the basis of substance, it is with reference to the functions of the *Dharma* and *Adharma dravyas*. *Ākāśa* is really one and continuous without parts, but we make a distinction between *Lokākāśa* and *Alokākāśa* because we have to explain the distinction with reference to the accommodation to the other *dravyas*. That part of *Ākāśa* where substances like *Jīva*, *Pudgala*, *Adharma*, *Dharma* and *Kāla* exists, is called *Lokākāśa* and the beyond is called *Alokākāśa*. *Ākāśa* is one and formless, it is all-pervading and even in the *Lokākāśa* and *Alokākāśa*, there is no distinction in substance.

A question has been asked that it may be true that which accommodates things is the *Ākāśa*. *Lokākāśa* accommodates the substances. We may call it *Ākāśa*. But the limitless and the beyond which is called *Alokākāśa* does not accommodate anything, hence void. Still why is it called *Ākāśa*? The answer is that the very nature of *Ākāśa* is to accommodate things and *Lokākāśa* accommodates *dravyas*, but in *Alokākāśa* there is nothing. So, there is no question of accommodating. In the *Alokākāśa* there are no substances at all. Substances are limited to the *Loka*, so *Alokākāśa* does not accommodate but it does not mean that it loses its function of accommodation. The fact is this that due to the absence of *Dharma* and *Adharma* as the principles of motion and rest in the *Alokākāśa*, it is completely free from any other substance. Therefore it is empty. It is the limitless. Therefore, it is called *ananta* (endless). It is the limitless beyond. In modern philosophy *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* have been considered as the forces in *Ākāśa*.

A question is asked : How does *Ākāśa* accommodate a thing? That which has no place prior it can be given a place or the thing which was not there could be kept there?

1 *Uttarādhyayana*, 36, 2.

The answer is, every object is in one place or the other. It moves from one place to the other. As *Ākāśa* is beginningless, so are other substances.

A question is again asked : If all substances exist simultaneously and if *Ākāśa* accommodates all substances on the basis of *Dharma* and *Adharma*, how can these substances be considered as those which get accommodation (*ādheya*).

The answer is *Ākāśa* is more extensive than the other substances. It gives accommodation to all substances and so it is called base (*ādhāra*) and as the other substances take accommodation in it so they have been called *ādheya*. Just as the hands and the body can be related as the part and the whole, or the organs and the body. The entire canvas of the objects depend on each other. According to Jainism, water is the support of the earth. *Vāyu* is the support of water, and *Ākāśa* is the support of *Vāyu*. But *Ākāśa* has no support outside itself. It is self-existent and it does not need the support of any other substance.

Lokākāśa has infinite number of *pradeśas* (space points), while *Alokākāśa* has limitless space. The whole *Ākāśa* is limitless and endless. It is limitless because, infinite *pradeśas* are taken out from the limitless *Ākāśa*, still infinite *pradeśas* remain. Therefore, from the point of view of extension, *Ākāśa* has been considered to be of different as *ananta* (endless), *parītānanta* (endless more) and *yuktānanta* (still more endless) and *anantānanta* (endlessly endless).¹ All these are the forms of the endless.

According to the Buddhists, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṃkhya* and *Vedāntins*, *Ākāśa* is the substance. But we do not get an elaborate discussion of *Ākāśa* in these schools of thought as we get in the Jaina philosophy. In the Buddhist philosophy, *Ākāśa* is considered to have a characteristic of *āvaraṇābhāva* (absence of pervasion) and it is considered to be simple element (*asaṃskṛta dharma*).² But in the Jaina philosophy, *Ākāśa* is not considered in a negative connotation, in terms of *abhāva* (non-existence), and also it is not considered as *asaṃskṛta dharma*

1 *Tattvārtharājavārtika*, 5, 10, 2.

2 Baldeva Upādhyāya : *Bauddha Darśana*, p. 239 (Hindi)

because it has the characteristic in it of the origin, permanence and destruction (*utpāda*, *sthiti* and *vināśa*).

Vaiśeṣikas have made *Ākāśa* as independent substance and it has a characteristic of producing *śabda* (sound). They have considered the directions different from *Ākāśa*.¹ That which has the attribute of *śabda* is *Ākāśa*, and that which limits the external world by direction is called *dik*.² *Nyāya-kārikāvalī* makes *dik* as that which has the attributes of the farness and nearness (*dūratva* and *sāmpīya*) and which makes distinction between the one place and the other. *Dik* is one and *nitya* (eternal). By the phenomenal distinctions for practical purposes it is called the east and west and other directions.³ In the Jaina philosophy *dik* is not considered to be distinct from *Ākāśa*. Because in the variable measurable distinctions of *Ākāśa*, we find the *dik* i. e., the direction. These are conventional measures. *Ākāśa* is not one which produces sound because *śabda* is produced by matter which has form and *Ākāśa* is formless. It is not possible to say that the formless *Ākāśa* produced substances with form. Similarly, we cannot say that *Ākāśa* is a product of *prakṛti* nor is it an appearance of *Brahman*⁴ because *Ākāśa* is an independent substance.

According to Jainism, *Ākāśa* as a substance has infinite number of *pradeśas*. From the point of view of extension, it is endless and limitless extending from *Loka* to *Aloka*. From the point of time, *Ākāśa* is beginningless and endless and considered from the point of view of nature, *Ākāśa* is formless.

Dik (direction) is a form of empirical measurement of *Ākāśa* with reference to the existence and location of the things. It is the measurable extent of *Ākāśa*, with reference to different locations. From the slanting *loka* (*tiryak loka*), we have the "*diśa* and a *anudiśa*."

1 *Tarkasangraha* p. 2, 9.

Tatra dravyāṇi pṛthivyaptejovāyvakāśakāladigatmamanānsi navaiva ...śabdaguṇakamākāśaṃ. tatryaikam vibhūnityam ca...prācyādi vyavahāraheturdik.

2 *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, 2, 2, 13.

3 *Nyāyakārikāvalī* 46, 47. *Dūrāntikādiheturikā nityādigucyate. Upādhibhedādekāpi prācyādi vyapadeśabhāk.*

4 (a) *Sadānānda : Vedāntasāra*, p. 32.

(b) *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, 3.

Diśā commences with two points of space of *Ākāśa*, and increasing itself by two-two *pradeśas*, it covers infinite number of *pradeśas*. *Anu-diśā* is a part of *Diśā*. *Ūrdhva diśā* (upward direction) and *adhodiśā* (downward direction) begin with four *pradeśas* and in these, there are four *pradeśas* till the end. There is no increase in the *pradeśas*.¹

The East is a direction which a man, where he is, considers as the direction from which sun rises. The direction in which the sun sets is for him the West. If a man faces the East and expands his both the hands, the direction to the right hand is South and the direction to the left is the North. These directions are conventional measurements based on the sunrise and sun's movement. These are also called *tāpadisās*.²

In *Ācārāṅganiryukti* we get another description of directions. It is for astrological purpose. The East would be in front of astrologer (*prajñāpaka*) the West behind him, the North to his left hand and South to his right hand. This distinction is called *Prajñāpaka Diśā*.³

We should remember that *Diśā* (direction) is not an independent substance. *Diśā* has been conventionally formed for the sake of measuring space and determining directions. *Ākāśa* has infinite *pradeśas* (points of space). Just as every point in a piece of cloth is necessary for giving pattern, similarly all the *pradeśas* give a pattern for the empirical measurement of *Ākāśa*. *Pradeśa* can be considered to be a point of space in which one *parmanu* exists. This is the primary limits of measurement. When we measure and determine the directions like East and West, they are only for practical purposes. They are not to be considered as separate entities and we cannot consider the countries, the districts and the other sub-divisions as independent space. It is all one, but it is measured for practical purposes.⁴

1 *Ācārāṅganiryukti*, 42, 44.

2 *Ibid*, 47, 48.

3 *Ibid*, 51.

4 Dr. Mahendrakumār Jain : *Jaina Darśana*, p. 174.

In modern science *Ākāśa* (space) is not to be considered to possess the characteristic of producing sound. Matter has attributes of producing sound. Sound is experienced by the sense-organs which are material in nature. Therefore, material particles come into contact with the other material particles and due to the resistance of the material particles, sound is produced. The stimulation of the sound is received by the sense-organ—the ear. Due to this contact, the sound is experienced. We cannot consider *Ākāśa* as the substance having the attribute of sound. *Ākāśa* is not a product nor a mode of a material substance, nor is it extensible nor extendable due to the material substance. According to *Sāṃkhya*, *prakṛti* is the primordial substance and *Pṛthvī* and *Ākāśa* are the products of the *prakṛti*. But it is a question worth considering. The products of *prakṛti* like *pṛthvī*, water and air and *agni* etc. have form and how can the product of *Ākāśa* which is also a product of *prakṛti* cannot have form. The *prakṛti* evolve into a variety of complex of modes to form the universe. The evolution of the *prakṛti* is based on the disturbance in the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. But the evolutes of *prakṛti* will have different qualitative distinctions as some having form and some formless, if we accept *Ākāśa* as a product of *prakṛti*.

It cannot be said that *prakṛti* gives rise to *Ākāśa* and we cannot make *Ākāśa*, the product of *prakṛti*. Because *Ākāśa* is inactive, formless, endless, and all pervasive. The products of a *prakṛti* arises out of the disturbances in the three *guṇas* and due to the presence of the *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* is inactive and pure consciousness. *Puruṣa* is an independent reality and *prakṛti* is to explain the evolution of the entire universe including *Ākāśa*. This appears to be difficult to understand.

Water, earth and other substances have *Ākāśa* as the matrix. In the case of water, the particles are little apart and they are bound to be in-between. Therefore, *Ākāśa* accommodates all substances.

BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF ĀKĀŚA

The Buddhist philosophers have considered *Ākāśa* to be a simple element (*asaṃsakṛta dharma*). They have described it as

having the characteristic of *anāvṛtti* (non-covering) and *āvaraṇābhāva* (non-pervasion).¹ It does not pervade anything nor is it covered by any object, those elements which have the attributes of origin and destruction are called *saṃskṛta dharma* (composite elements). But the *Sarvaśaṅkavādi* Buddhists maintain that *Ākāśa* is a simple substance and not composite. But it is free from the characteristic of origin and destruction. *Vaibhāṣikas* describe the nature of *Ākāśa* as a non-pervasive element, but have its own characteristic.² But the question is, is it possible to have an object with empirical characteristic and at the same time not produced? It is possible that we cannot describe the products of *Ākāśa* in the language of origin and destruction. However, *Ākāśa* is eternal and not produced unlike the other four elements like *pṛthvī*, *ap*, *teja*, and *vāyu*. So, *abhidhammasaṅgraha* has described *Ākāśa* in terms of *pariccheda* (analysis), but *Ākāśa* cannot be purely described in terms of *pariccheda*, because it is one and continuous and also because in empirical characteristic like origin and destruction are applicable to composite objects (*saṃskṛta dharma*).

WESTERN CONCEPTION OF SPACE (ĀKĀŚA)

The western philosophers have given an elaborate discussion about the reality and nature of space. There are different views. There is the rationalistic approach presented by Descartes and Leibnitz and that is the idealistic view presented by Plato, Aristotle and even upto Kant.

Descartes, Leibnitz and other philosophers have considered space as a form of experience. Kant said that space is a form of perception. While Plato, Aristotle and others have said that space is an independent substance. The Jainas have given an independent reality to *Ākāśa* and have considered it as an *astikāya* because it has the dual characteristic of *astitva* (existence) and *kāyatva* (extension).

Regarding the nature of *Ākāśa* as *śūnya* (empty) or otherwise, philosophers are not agreed. The idealistic philosophers like Kant and others have considered the empty space as possible. Descartes,

1 *Abhidharma kośa* 1, 5.—*Tatrākāśamanāvṛttiḥ*.

2 *Ibid.*, 1, 28—*Chidramākāśadhātāvākhyam ālokatamasī kila*.

Leibnitz and Plato and Aristotle have said that empty space without the content of objects is not possible. The Jainas have advocated the possibility of empty space in their concept of *Ālokākāśa*. But from the phenomenal point of view, *Ākāśa* is always filled.

Regarding the nature of *Ākāśa*, there are different views. Kant and others, as we mentioned earlier, believe that space is a form of perception. It is the matrix on which perception is possible. All experience is possible because of the matrix and space and time. However, *Ākāśa* is not an independent substance. It is an intellectual construct. If it is considered to be an independent reality there would be no distinction between *Īśwara* and *Ākāśa*.¹ *Ākāśa* is *jyñātāsāpekṣa* (a product of intellect). It is a priori principle and it is cognitively priori which is a postulate.

Observation : The idealist philosophers have considered space as only a product of understanding and that has no independent reality. It is made to be based on cognitive consciousness, it is not in-reality. Even the support of the things that is attributed to *Ākāśa* is a product of intellect. However, the things of the world requires some support and without the concept of *Ākāśa*, we cannot construct the order of the universe, yet it cannot be said to be a mere product of imagination. Because the facts of the world contradict it.

The idealist contention that the all-pervasive nature of *Ākāśa* would lead to the identity of the *Īśwara* and *Ākāśa* is not also correct. Thirdly, Kant said that space is a form of perception and it is intuitive perception. This view, appears to be inadequate, because space is a fact of experience and the things of the world do require a substance which give support to them.² Euclidian Physio-metry and the later mathematical development have proved contrary to the Kantian conception of space as a form of perception.³ Jainas and Kant agree in one point. In that, they accept the possibility of the empty space.

1 *Cosmology*, p. 101.

2 *Cosmology*, p. 97.

3 Refer to (a) *Physics and Philosophy*—Varanar Haisanavarg, p. 81.

(b) *From Euclid to Edington*, p. 16-17.

(c) *The Philosophy of Space and Time*, Introduction, p. 60.

According to Plato and Aristotle, space is considered as a substance. Plato has said that space is the blank principle. Aristotle would only accept the reality of space in the presence of physical objects. Descartes says that space cannot be considered as an attribute of the object.

Observations : If *Ākāśa* has a reality of its own, it must be different from the physical objects, because physical objects are destructive while *Ākāśa* is endless. To occupy certain space and to obstruct of certain space are the characteristics of the physical objects, but to give space to these objects is a different thing. Many objects can exist together and the same object may exist in different objects at different times. This makes it clear that the object occupying the space, and space accommodating the objects are different subjects. According to Jainas, the substance of *Ākāśa* can accommodate many objects in one space. *Ākāśa* is formless, but if it considered in relation to the objects occupying space, it can be described as having form. However, *Ākāśa* cannot inherit the qualities of the objects it accommodates.

Leibnitz and other philosophers have considered space, a form of visible objects. Eienstein has considered space as a reality ; infact it is space-time reality.

According to Gasendi, space is a reality independent of matter and the Self. This view is nearer to the Jaina conception of giving independent reality to *Ākāśa*. This has relevance to the scientific conception of space. Newton, like the Jainas, have accepted the reality of space with objects *i.e.*, filled-space as having form.

Space is considered to be without movement (*agatiṣīla*), one and continuous. It is like the void. However, there is a difference between Newtonian and the Jaina conception of space. According to the Newtonian conception, space is indelibly connoted with ether and matter. This is meant to explain the principle of motion. But according to the Jainas the principles of motion and that of rest (*Dharma-Adharma dravyas*) are independent substances and they are the basis of motion and rest in the universe. These two principles and the *Ākāśa* are not inherent. In this sense, ether as a substance cannot be explained without the conception of *Ākāśa*. Bertrand

Russell also comes to a similar view. He would like to distinguish the filled space, and empty space on the basis of rigours of logic ?

KĀLA (TIME)

Jaina philosophers have presented two prominent views regarding the nature of *Kāla* (time). According to one view, *Kāla* is considered to be the mode of substances of *Jīva* and *Ajīva*. *Kāla* is considered to be an independent *tattva*.

According to the other view, *Kāla* is an independent substance, just like *Jīva* and *Ajīva*. In the same sense *Kāla* cannot become the expression of change in the objects although it is the medium of change, and *Kāla* is an independent substance. It is a *dravya* although it is not an *astikāya*, because it is not multi-dimensional but it is only uni-dimensional.

In the *Śvetāmbara Āgama* literature, there is the mention of both the views in *Bhagavatī*,¹ *Uttarādhyayana*,² *Jivābhigama*³ and *Prajñāpanā*.⁴ Later Ācārya Umāsvāti,⁵ Siddhasena Divākara,⁶ Jinabhadraṇī,⁷ Haribhadrāsūri,⁸ Ācārya Hemachandra,⁹ Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya,¹⁰ Vinayavijaya,¹¹ Devacandra,¹² and other *Śvetāmbara ācāryas* have mentioned both the views. *Digambara ācāryas* like Kundakunda,¹³ Pūjyapāda,¹⁴ Bhattāraka Akalaṅkadeva¹⁵ and Vidyānandasvāmī¹⁶ have mentioned that *Kāla* is an independent substance.

1 *Bhagavatī* 25, 4, 734.

2 *Uttarādhyayana*, 28, 7-8,

3 *Jivābhigama*.

4 *Prajñāpanā*, pada 1, Sūtra 3.

5 *Tattvārthasūtra* 5, 38-39 and see its *bhāṣya* by Siddhasena.

6 *Dvātriṃśikā*.

7 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya* 926 and 2068.

8 *Dharmasaṅgrahaṇī*, Gāthā 32 ṭīkā by Malayagiri.

9 *Yogaśāstra*.

10 *Dravyaguṇaparyāya rāsa*, see *Prakaraṇa Ratnākara*, pt. I, Gāthā 10.

11 *Lokaparakāṣa*.

12 *Nayacakrasāra and Āgamasāra*.

13 *Pravacanasāra*, 2, gāthā 46-47.

14 *Tattvārthasārvarthasiddhi* 5, 38-39.

15 *Tattvārtharājavārtika*, 5, 38-39.

16 *Tattvārthaslokavārtika*, 5, 38-39.

According to the first view of *Kāla*, the measurable distance like *samaya*, *muhūrta*, day and night are the modes of *Kāla* from the practical point of view. The modes are special features of the substances *jīva* and *ajīva*. In the constitution of the world, *Jīva* and *Ajīva* are the constituent principles and both of them are expressed in the form of modification. These modifications and their clusters are considered as *Kāla*. *Kāla* by itself is not an independent substance.¹

According to the second view, *Kāla* is an independent substance. Just as *Dharma* and *Adharma* as principles of motion and rest are independent substances *Jīva* and *Ajīva* have their functions of movement and rest. But the movement and rest is possible in the medium of the principle of movement i. e. *Dharma* and the principle of rest. The two are independent substances. Similarly, time is a substance and change is possible in time.²

However, the two views mentioned above are not contrary to each other, but they are complement to each other. From noumenal point of view, *Kāla* is abode of the *Jīva* and the *Ajīva* and not an independent substance. But from phenomenal point of view *Kāla* is a substance. It is considered a substance because of its functions. The functions of *Kāla* can be mentioned as change, effect, activity, the one and the other etc. For this reason, *Kāla* is considered as *dravya*. The changes in the various objects are possible in time. The conventional measurements of time like *samaya* and *āvalika* are not different from *jīva* and *ajīva*. They are the modes of these substances.

From the noumenal point of view, *Kāla* need not be considered as an independent substance. By making *Kāla* the mode of the substances of *Jīva* and *Ajīva*, the phenomenal existence can be explained.³ But from practical point of view, *Kāla* has been considered as an independent substance just as *Jīva-Ajīva* and their modes are considered.⁴

1 Paṇḍit Sukhalālji : *Darśana aur Cintana*, p. 331.

2 Paṇḍit Sukhalālji : *Darśan aur Cintana*, p. 332.

3 (a) *Bhagavatī* 2, 10, 120 ; 11, 11, 424 ; 13, 4, 482-483 ; 25, 4 etc.

(b) *Prajñāpanā*, pada 1.

(c) *Uttarādhyayana* 28, 10.

4 *Sthānāṅgasūtra* 95.

If we survey the Jaina literature regarding the constitution of the *Loka* i. e., the universe, we find that there are two views mentioned. The first view maintains that the universe is constituted of six substances (*ṣaḍdravyas*)¹ and the other view advocates the constitution of the universe as made up of five principles, *pañcāstikāya*.² However, according to Dalsukhabhāi Malavaṇīā, the view of six *dravyas* mentioned in the *Uttarādhyayana* may be considered as an exception.³ In the *Śvetāmbara* literature like *Śthānāṅga*,⁴ *Jīvābhigama*,⁵ *Bhagavatī*,⁶ and *Pañcāstikāya*,⁷ in *Digambara* literature, it is suggested that the universe is constituted of 5 principles (*pañcāstikāya*).

*Uttarādhyayana*⁸ and *Dharmasaṅgrahaṇī* have described *Kāla* as of the measure of two and a half *dvīpa* (islands). In fact *Kāla* has relevance in the world of men and also in the astronomical and astrological calculations. The rotations and evolutions of planets are possible in time. In this sense, *Kāla* has relevance with reference to human intellect.

In the *Digambara* literature *Kāla* is not merely considered as an aspect of or an expression of human intellect with reference to human activity, but it is also pervading the entire universe.

It may be noted that although *Kāla* is a substance, it is not a substance like the other five substances having extensional dimensions. It is not a substance having the characteristics of *skandha*

1 *Uttarādhyayana*, 28, 7—

Dhammo adhammo āgāsam kālo puggala-jantavo.

Esa logo tti pannatto jīṇehim varadamsihi.

2 *Bhagavatī* 13, 4, 481.

(a) *kimīyam bhante ! loyetti pavuccaī ? Goyamā, pañcatthikāyā.*

(b) *Pañcāstikāya*, gāthā 3.

3 *Āgama yug kā Jaina-darśana*, p. 214.

4 *Śthānāṅga*, 5, 3, 441.

5 *Jīvābhigama*, 4.

6 *Bhagavatī* 13, 4, 481.

7 *Pañcāstikāya*, Gāthā 3.

8 *Uttarādhyayana*, 36, 7,

Dammāddhamme ya do_ ceva logamitta viyāhie.

Logāloge ya āgāse, samaye samaya-khettie.

(aggregate of atoms), but it is of the nature of the *aṇu*. It has no magnitude, therefore it has no *kāyatva*. It is not an *astikāya*. It is non-dimensional. The time series are always in forward direction (*ūrdhva pracaya*). It is a linear series.¹ The span of *Kāla* is considered to be uni-dimensional. *Dharma* and *Adharma* and the *pañca dravyas* except *Kāla* have three dimensional forms. In these, there are aggregates of many points that *Kāla* always moves in one direction, it is forward-looking. Every point of time is discrete and at a particular moment of time the present alone exists and the past has gone and the future has to come. Therefore, here is only one *samaya* every time. Therefore, there is no possibility of aggregate of time (*skandha*). As it is mono-dimensional, it cannot present a reverse direction i. e., *tiryak pracaya*. Therefore *kāla* is not considered an *astikāya*.

FORMS OF TIME (KĀLA)

*Sthānāṅga*² mentions four types of *Kāla* : 1. *pramāṇa kāla*, (measurable time), 2. *Yathāyuniṛvṛttikāla* (life span time of a *jīva*) 3. *Marāṇakāla* (moment of death) and 4. *Addhākāla* (time relative to the movement of sun and moon).

Conventional measurement of *Kāla* is impossible and is possible through the changes in the objects. The life and death are two relative spans of time. The duration of life is considered as *yathāyuniṛvṛtti kāla* and the cessation of the duration of life is death and is called the *marāṇakāla*.

The measurement of time based on the revolutions of the sun and the moon is called the *addhākāla*. It is a primary distinction of measurement of time. The other distinctions are forms of this distinction. This is the phenomenal measurement of time with a practical purpose of determining the span of time. Therefore, this is restricted to the human world and it is meant to measure the various distinctions of time for human activities. We have already said that the real time i. e., *nīścaya kāla*, is the mode of *jīva* and *ajīva*. And it is all pervading both in the *Loka* and *Aloka*. There are no divisions in real time. All the divisions from *samaya* to

1 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 22.

2 *Sthānāṅga* 4,

pudgala-parāvartana are made of the *addhākāla*.¹ The minutest division of *kāla* is *samaya*. It is indivisible. It can be described on the analogy of a hole in the *kamalapatra* or a hole in a piece of cloth.

If the 100 petals of lotus are kept one over another and if one is to pierce a needle so as to penetrate all the petals, it may appear that all of them have been penetrated simultaneously. But this does not happen. Every petal is pierced successively within the minutest fraction of time and that *samaya* which takes to pierce one petal is the unit.

As a strong man, you may tear a piece of cloth at once. It may appear that the piercing was done simultaneously, but this was not so. Every thread is torn at every fraction of time and that is the smallest unit of time.

In short, a piece of cloth is woven into large number of threads and each thread is constituted as the infinite points of cotton. When the piece of cloth is torn, every point of cotton and every thread needs to be torned separately and each requires an indivisible and minutest fraction of time and this is called *samaya*.

We may now mention the conventional measurements of time for the purpose of human activities from *samaya*, the smallest unit, to the largest unit of *anantakālacakra*.

The indivisible minutest fraction of time	—one <i>samaya</i>
Infinite number of <i>samayas</i>	—one <i>āvallkā</i>
256 <i>āvalikās</i>	—one <i>kṣullaka bhava</i> (the shortest life span)
2223 $\frac{1229}{3773}$ <i>āvalikās</i>	—one breath (inhaling and exhaling)
4446 $\frac{2458}{3773}$ <i>āvalikās</i>	—one <i>prāṇa</i>
<i>Sādhika</i> 17 <i>kṣullaka bhava</i> or	—one breath
7 <i>prāṇas</i>	—one <i>stoka</i>
7 <i>stoka</i>	—one <i>lava</i>
38½ <i>lava</i> .	—one <i>ghaṭī</i> (24 minutes)

1 *Bhagavatī*, 11, 11.

77 lavas

—2 ghaṭī or

—65536 kṣullaka bhava or

—16777216 āvalikā or

—3773 prāna or

—one muhūrta (48 minutes)

30 muhūrta

—one day and a night

15 days

—one pakṣa (fortnight)

2 pakṣas

—one māsa (month)

2 māsa

—one ṛtu (season)

3 ṛtu

—one ayana

2 ayana

—one year

5 years

—one yuga

70 crore-crores, 56 lakhs crore years

—one pūrva

Innumerable years

—one palyopama

10 Crore-crore palyopama

—one sāgara

20 Crore-crore sāgara

—one kālacakra

Anantakālacakra

—one pudgala parāvartana

THE NATURE OF KĀLA IN THE VEDIC TRADITION

The term *Kāla* has been used at many places in the *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads*.¹ But we do not get a clear picture of the exact meaning of the *Kāla* in all these references.

Kaṇāda in the *Vaiśeṣika darśana* has presented four *sūtras* for describing the principle of *Kāla*. He says that *Kāla* is substance, it is eternal and it is the ground of all activities.² In the *Nyāya* philosophy Gautama has not given an independent interpretation about the nature of *Kāla*. Incidentally, he has described the nature of *Kāla* as the ground of all activities. Just as *Vaiśeṣikas* have done, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* have a similar view of *Kāla*.

In the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* there is not much discussion about the nature of the *Kāla*. Jaimini has not given specific references regarding

1 See—*Upaniṣad vākya koṣa*.

2 *Vaiśeṣikadarśana* 2, 2, 6-9.

*Aparasminnaparam ugapacciram kṣipramiti kālalingāni.
Dravyatva nityatve vāyunā vyākhyātam. Tattvaṃ bhāvāna Nūyeṣ-
vabhāvādanityeṣu bhāvātkāraṇe kālākhyeti.*

3 *Pañcādhyāyī* 2, 1, 23.

Digdeṣakālākāṣeṣavyapevaṃ prasāṅgaḥ.

the nature of the *Kāla*. However, the commentator like Pārthasārathi and Paṇḍit Rāmakriṣṇa,¹ have discussed this problem of time and have largely accepted the *Vaiśeṣika* concept of time, with certain modifications in that, *Vaiśeṣikas* consider *kāla* to be indirect in cognition, while *mīmāṃsakas* make direct cognition. In this sense, we can say that *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and *pūrva-mīmāṃsa* maintain the time as an independent substance.

According to *Sāṃkhya*, *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are the two fundamental principles. *Ākāśa*, *diśā* (direction), mind etc. are nothing but the products of *prakṛti*.² There is no independent substance like time, but it is only an expression of *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* is eternal, yet it has its changing aspects. The gross and subtle matter are expressions of *prakṛti*.

In the *Yoga* philosophy, Pātañjali has not discussed prominently the nature of time. But the commentator Vyāsa, in his commentary, has made specific mention of the time. He says that measurable units of time like *muhūrta*, *prahara*, day etc. are phenomenal measurements of time and for practical purposes they are products of intellectual discrimination. We make distinctions in the different spans of time on the basis of minutest units of a *kṣaṇa* (moment). *Kṣaṇa* is real but it is not the fundamental substance. It is the ground of change, and the minutest unit on which change is measured is *kṣaṇa*. He shows that *kṣaṇa* can be measured by the time-span taken by an atom to reverse form from one point to the other. In the *Yoga* philosophy, also like the *Sāṃkhya*, *prakṛti* is considered to be unconscious, but active. Activity is the inherent characteristic of *prakṛti* and therefore it does not need any other force to bring activity in *prakṛti*. But the ground of activity and not the cause can be considered to be the principle of time. It is only an efficient cause, it is to be understood as a principle on account of which change can be

1 *Yuktisnehapraparaṇi siddhāntacandrikā*, 1, 1, 5, 5.

Nāsmākam vaiśeṣika devadapratyakṣaḥ kālaḥ, kintu pratyakṣa evau, asminkṣane mayopalabdha ityanubhavāt. arūpasyaāpyākāśavat pratyakṣatvam bhaviṣyati.

2 *Sāṃkhya pravacana* 2, 12—*Dikālāvākāśādibhyaḥ*.

measured. However, unlike *Vaiśeṣikas*, *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga darśanas*, do not make *Kāla* as an independent substance.¹

Vedānta darśana is also called *Uttaramīmāṃsā* or *aupaniṣadika darsana*. The propounder of this school of thought was Bādarāyaṇa. Bādarāyaṇa has not discussed the nature of time but Śaṅkarācārya has presented his theory of absolutism. According to him, *Brahman* is the only reality. *Ātman* is the *Brahman*, all else is appearance. According to this theory, substances like *ākāśa*, atoms, etc. are not independent reality.² However, as we have seen earlier other *Vedāntins* like the *Vīṣiṣṭādvaitins*, of Rāmānuja school of thought and other forms of *Vedāntins* like Nimbārka, Madhva, Vallabha, etc. have given their interpretation of the relation of the *Brahman* and the *Ātman* although the foundational principle of the *Brahman* as the sole reality continues to determine their interpretations of the *Brahman*. They have not considered *Kāla* as an independent substance. All the *Vedāntins* along with the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga* are agreed that the *Kāla* is a form of perception and is not an independent substance. Thus we have two views regarding the substance *Kāla* in the Jaina philosophy. Similarly in the *Vedic* tradition, we have also two views, the one advocating the time as an independent substance and the other denying the independent substantially to *Kāla* (time).

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF KĀLA (TIME)

The Buddhists consider time as a mental construct for the sake of the practical purpose. Time is not an independent substance. It is an only experience. It is a cognition.³ The past, the present, the future are all phenomenal distinctions of time made for practical purposes and they are not real time.



1 *Darśana ane Cintana*, part 2, p. 1028—*Bhāṣya of Yogadarśana*, pāda 3, sūtra 52.

2 *Aṭṭhāśālī* 1, 3, 16.

Pudgala (Matter) : A Study

WHAT IS MATTER

What the scientists call matter and what *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* call the physical universe (*jaḍa*), the Jainas call it *Pudgala*. In the Buddhist philosophy, the word *pudgala* has been used to connote *ālaya*, *viññāna*, *cetanāsantati* etc. In the Jaina *āgamas*, *ātman* embodied and associated with matter is also sometimes called *Pudgala*, but primarily the word *pudgala* refers to the substance with form. Of the six substances, five of them, except *Kāla*, are called *Astikāya*, because they have extension and *astitva*. *Jīva*, *Dharma*, *Adharma*, and *Ākāśa* do not possess characteristics of integration (*saṁyoga*) and disintegration (*vibhāga*). Its distinctions are denoted by means of atoms. If we imagine the extension, if possible of the four substances, we can find that *Jīva*, *Dharma* and *Adharma* have innumerable parts, while *Ākāśa* is indivisible and endless, *Pudgala* is not indivisible. The minutest part of *Pudgala* is *paramānu* i. e. atom, and the biggest part of the *Pudgala* is the entire cosmos. Atom can be considered as micro-cosm and cosmos can be looked at as macro-cosmic. It is mentioned as *mahāskandha*¹ and as pervading the entire universe. For this reason also, *Pudgala* is considered to have the characteristics of integration and disintegration (*pūraṇa-galana*).

TERMINOLOGY OF PUDGALA

The term *Pudgala* has two parts— *pud* and *gala*. *Pud* refers to

1 *Bhagavati* 8, 10, 361—

Jīveṇam ! poggali, poggale ? Jīve poggali, poggalevi.

2 *Śabdakalpadruma koṣa*—In the fifth temporal stage (*samaya*) of *kevalinasamudghāta* the matter that is separated from the *ātman* pervades the entire universe and it is called “*acūtamahāskandha*.”

completing or joining. 'gala' refers to dropping or finishing. The substance which has the characteristic of constantly integrating and disintegrating i.e., joining and separating, forming and separating is called *pudgala*,¹ *Tattvārtharājavārtika*², *Tattvārthavṛtti* of Siddhasena,³ *Dhavalā*⁴ and the *Harivaṃśapurāṇa*⁵ have stated that due to the characteristic of integration and disintegration, the substance *Pudgala* is considered to be matter. *Pudgala* is that substance which can be divided and also combined. *Pudgala* has the attributes such as *sparśa* (touch), *rasa* (taste), *gandha* (smell) and *varṇa* (colour).⁶

PUDGALA IS RŪPI

In this sense, *Pudgala* is an object of sense-experience. As it has the attributes of *rasa*, *gandha*, etc. it is called *rūpī* or *rūpavān* (having form). The objects with form can be experienced and cognised through the sense-organs. Objects without form cannot be experienced through the sense-organs. For instance, substances like *Jīva*, *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa* and *Kāla* are formless and we cannot get the experience of these through the sense-organs.

A question arises, namely, that as the *Pudgala* has the attributes of *rasa*, *gandha* etc. can we say that these attributes are inherent attributes of the substance *Pudgala* or are they products of experience and imposed by the mind on substance?

The answer is, *Pudgala* has the attributes of *rasa*, *gandha*, etc. The sense-organs do not impose these attributes on matter. Matter has the inherent characteristics of these *varṇa*, *rasa*, etc. Without

1 *Śabdakalpaderumkoṣa*—*Pūraṇāt pud galayatīti gālāḥ*.

2 *Tattvārtharājavārtika* 5, 1, 24—

Pūraṇagalanānyarthasamjñatvāt pudgalāḥ.

3 (a) *Tattvārthavṛtti* 5, 1—*Pūraṇād galanācca pudgalāḥ*.

(a) *Nyāyakośa*, p. 502—*Pūraṇād galanād iti pudgalāḥ*.

4 *Dhavalā*—*Chavihasanṭhānaṃ bahuvihi dehehi pūradīti galadīti poggalā*.

5 *Harivaṃśapurāṇa* 7, 36—

Varna-gandha-rasa-sparśaḥ-pūranam galanam ca yat.

Kurvanti skandhavat tasmāt pudgalāḥ paramānavaḥ.

6 (a) *Tattvārthasūtra* 5, 23—*Sparśarasagandhavarṇavantaḥ pudgalāḥ*.

(b) *Bhagavatī*, 2, 10.

these attributes, matter has no existence at all. It is true that experience of these qualities is due to the contact of matter with the sense-organs. But it does not mean that these attributes are not in the matter. The relation is between the sense-organs and *varṇa-rasa* is not between the cause and effect, but between the knowledge and the object of knowledge. Similarly, sense-organs are not the products of *varṇa* and *rasa*. Both of them have independent existence. They, however, interact on each other.

There is another question regarding the experience of illusions. If colour and taste are inherent attributes of substance, how is it that experiences of these attributes with different individuals differ and how is it that there are illusions, concerning the colour, taste, etc? How is it that there are differences in the experience of taste and colour according to the differences in individual capacities, place and time etc?

The answer is, it is true that these experiences of colour, taste, etc., may be different with different individuals and also in different circumstances. The causes are twofold (1) internal and (2) external. The internal cause refers to the differences in the sense-organs, and the external causes are concerned with external stimulations. Due to these two types of causes, we experience differences in the experience of *rasa*, *gandha*, etc. For instance, a person suffering from jaundice sees everything yellow. A colour-blind man will see everything grey. Similarly, our experiences of the melody and the music depend upon our mental set up. If we are in a bad mood, the music drags on. Such differences of experiences are also possible due to the differences in the intensity and the extent of the stimulations that the sense-organs receive from the external world. For instance, bright light may give different stimulations and discordant music may also give different stimulations for the harmonious music. Due to these differences in the external stimulations, we experience objects differently. These differences in experience are therefore due to the internal and external causes. However, the attributes of *rasa*, *gandha* etc. are inherently present in the substance. Without these attributes, substance cannot exist. Substance is the substratum of the attributes and the attributes are equally real and independent. The Jains maintain the distinct relationship between the substance and the attributes.

THE FOUR TYPES OF PUDGALA (MATTER)

Matter (*Pudgala*) is a substance and it is of four divisions (*bheda*) : (1) aggregate (*skandha*), (2) *skandha deśa* (aggregate occupying space), (3) *skandha pradeśa* (aggregate occupying limited space), (4) *paramāṇu* (atoms).¹

SKANDHA : ↘ ↙

The unit of formed matter (*mūrta dravya*) is *skandha*. It is the aggregate of atoms, i.e., from two atoms to infinite number of atoms arise. In the *skandha*, we find the integration and disintegration of *paramāṇus*. Similarly, the aggregates also may join with atoms, and that would be one *skandha*. If two atoms combine, the aggregate is called *dvi-pradeśī*. And if the *dvi-pradeśī skandha* is divided, we get two atoms.

If three atoms are combined we get three-*pradeśī skandha*. If they are separated, we get either three *paramāṇus* or one *paramāṇu* and *dvi-pradeśī skandha*.

If four atoms are combined, it is called *Catuḥpradeśī skandha*. If they are separated we get the following forms :

1. One atom and one three-atomed aggregate (three *pradeśī skandha*).

2. Two *dvi-pradeśī skandhas* (aggregates of two atoms each).

3. Two atoms each separate and one *dvi-pradeśī skandha*.

4. Four atoms separate each.

Sometimes, infinite number of atoms combine and they form the cosmos.

The aggregates of atoms are called *skandha*. *Skandha* formation is of three types : (1) *bhedapūrvaka* (having distinctions) (2) *saṅghāta pūrvaka* (collection), (3) *Bheda and saṅghāta pūrvaka* (with distinctions and collection).²

The distinctions are possible due to internal and external causes.³ The internal causes, for the distinction between the one *skandha* and the other do not depend on any external factors. The

1 (a) *Bhagavatī*, 2, 10, 66.

(b) *Uttarādhyaṇa*, 36, 10.

2 *Tattvārthasūtra* 5, 26—*Bhedasāṅghātebhya utpadyante*.

3 *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 5, 26.

causes are inherent in the *skandhas* themselves. The external causes are due to some external factors, and these are called *skandhas* formed due to external causes.

Formation of unity of different elements is called *sanghāta*. This is due to the external causes or the internal causes. Two different atoms combine and they form a *sanghāta*. The aggregates formed due to the distinctions (*bheda*) and *sanghāta* (union) are called *bheda-sanghātapūrvaka skandha*. For instance, at a particular moment one part of the *skandha* gets separated and at the same time another *skandha* comes and joins it and forms a new *skandha* then this *skandha* is called the *skandha* due to distinction and union.

In this way, the *skandhas* are formed in three different ways. The aggregate may be formed only by *bheda* or only by *sanghāta* or sometimes due to both the processes.

In modern science, the concept of aggregate has been designated as molecule and it is very much discussed in the physical sciences. It has been pointed out that physical objects are formed due to the aggregates. These molecules have tremendous velocity in various directions in the gases and in the aggregate *skandha*. For instance, a piece of chalk is considered to be an aggregate of atoms and molecules. If it is divided into two parts and further divided into two parts and in this way if we divide the piece of atoms into infinite parts, the nature of the chalk remains essentially as chalk. The minutest part of the chalk-piece is also *skandha*. But as we go on dividing a piece of object, we may reach a point where it cannot be further divided. That is the indivisible unit of the object and that is also an aggregate *skandha*. In this sense, the Jaina concept of *skandha* and the modern concept of aggregate (molecule) have some similarities although there are some differences. According to Jainism, one unit or collection of units of atoms is called *skandha*: it may be a pot or a table or a book. If the pot is broken into two pieces, then also there are two *skandhas* and if it is broken into thousand pieces, there are thousand *skandhas*. Similarly, if we grind the pot into powder, each particle of the powder is a *skandha*. Modern science considers such a particle as one *skandha* also. It is a molecule. But, if we go further, the indivisible part loses its characteristics of a pot and may form as a part of something else. According

to Jainism, however, the minutest part of the pot is also a *skandha*. It does not change the characteristic of a pot in the *skandha*, as long it does not reach the stage of an atom. The minutest parts of an aggregate are aggregate.

SKANDHA-DEŚA :

Skandha (aggregate of atoms) may be considered as one unit. This unit can be measured intellectually as one unit (through out our intellect) and is called *skandha-deśa*. If we imagine that this is a part of one pencil or a book it is considered to be *ekadeśa skandha*. It means that *deśa* and *skandha* are not separate. They are only discriminations made due to intellect. If they actually are separated, then they become separate *skandhas*.

SKANDHA-PRADEŚA :

The inseparable unit of a *skandha* is called *skandha-pradeśa*. It means the *paramāṇu* having the capacity to combine may be considered as *skandha-pradeśa*. It is the indivisible part, most subtle and which cannot be further divided.

PARAMĀṆU :

The indivisible unit of a *skandha* is called *paramāṇu*. As long as it has the tendency to combine, it is considered to be *pradeśa* and if it becomes separate and remains separate, it is called *paramāṇu*. The commentators on Jaina *śāstra* have explained the nature of *paramāṇu* in different ways. *Paramāṇu pudgala*¹ (matter), is indivisible (*avibhājya*), is indestructible (*acchedya*), cannot be pierced (*abhedyā*), *adāhya* (cannot be burnt), *agrāhya* (cannot be grasped). We cannot have divisions of *paramāṇu* by any means even with the sharpest of the instruments. It can remain on the tip of a sharp sword and remain uncut. Fire cannot burn it. The rains cannot make it wet. The great Ganges cannot wash it away. The *paramāṇu* as the minutest particle has no parts, does not occupy definite space and has neither beginning nor end.² It is neither long nor short, neither big nor small. It has one definite form. As it is subtle, it is

12 *Bhagavatī* 5, 7.

13 *Bhagavatī* 5, 7—*Paramāṇu poggale ṇam bhante ! kim sa-aḍḍhe, samajjhe, sapaese udāhu—aṇaḍḍhe amajjhe apaese ? Goyamā¹ aṇaḍḍhe, amajjhe, apaese, no sa-aḍḍhe, no samajjhe, no sapaese.*

itself the middle, the beginning and the end. It occupies a point or space.¹ That which has the beginning, the end, and the middle in itself and is not possible to grasp it through the sense-experience, has no parts and that minutest particle is *paramāṇu*.² In the *Pañcāstikāya sāra*,³ we get the description of some of the characteristics of *paramāṇu*. *Paramāṇu* is that particle of matter which has one colour (*varṇa*), one smell (*gandha*), one taste (*rasa*) and two *sparsa*. A *paramāṇu* is the cause of producing the sound, but by itself it has no sound. It is different from aggregate of *paramāṇu*. In the *paramāṇu*, the senses of colour, smell, taste and touch are present in specific degrees. But it does not have the sense of space (*kṣetrendriya*). The *śabda* or word is an expression of the aggregate (*skandha*) in the form of sound. *Paramāṇu* is the cause of *śabda*, but it is not possible to say that one atom is the object of the sense of sight, smell, and other *indriyas*. Yet these senses coming from the sense-organs are the basic characteristics of *paramāṇu*.

The distinction of *pradeśa* and *paramāṇu* from *skandha* can be explained with reference to the non-differentiation (*apṛthakbhāva*) and differentiation (*pṛthakbhāva*).

THE FIRST DISCUSSION OF PARAMĀṆU IN INDIA

In the Jaina *āgama* literature, is given an elaborate discussion about the nature of *paramāṇu*. According to the Jaina philosophers, whatever differentiations and non-differentiation, integration and disintegration in the things take place—all these are possible due to the coming together and separation of *jīva* and *paramāṇu*.

Some of the western philosophers are of the opinion that the atomic theory mentioned in some school of Indian philosophy has been borrowed from the ancient Greek thought. But this view does not appear to be satisfactory. There is no evidence for this. In Greek philosophy Democritus was the founder of the atomic theory, and he appears to have lived in the 5th century B. C. i.e. 460 to

1 *Rājavartika* 5, 25, 1—*Saukṣmyādyāḥ ātmamādhyāḥ ātmāntāśca*.

2 *Sarvārthasiddhi*, commentary, *sūtra* 5, 25.

3 *Pañcāstikāyasāra*

Ek rasa, varṇa, gandha, dvīspaśa śabdakāraṇamaśabdāḥ.
Skandhāntaritam dravyam, paramāṇu tam vijānti.

371 B. C.¹ The Greek theory of atomism has certain similarities with the Jaina theory of atomism. But there are certain fundamental differences between the two. According to the Jainas, the nature of atom is unconscious. But Democritus and *Cārvāka* in Indian thought have mentioned that what we call *ātman* or *self* is only the subtlest form of atom.

It has been mentioned by Śivadatta Jñānī that atomism is the speciality of only the *Vaiśeṣikas*. The roots of atomic theory as propounded by *Vaiśeṣika* system can be traced to the *Upaniṣads*. Jainas and *Ājīvakas* have given references to the atomic theory, but it was Kaṇāda who gave a systematic explanation of the doctrine of atomic theory.² But considered from subjective point of view, it can be said that *Vaiśeṣika* atomic theory was not prior to the Jaina theory of atomism and unlike the Jaina theory, *Vaiśeṣikas* have given specific details about the nature of the atomic theory. The term *aṇu* was used in the *Upaniṣads*. It reads "*Aṇorāṇīyān, mahato mahīyān*", but there is no mention of *paramāṇu* in the *Upaniṣads*, nor is there any discussion about the *paramāṇu* theory.

Dr. Jacobi is of the opinion that the mention of the atomic theory in the *Upaniṣads* and also in the philosophical literature of the *Upaniṣads* is very little and therefore in the *Vedāntic* literature, there is a refutation of the atomic theory as supposed to have been mentioned in the *Upaniṣads*. In the *Sāṃkhya-Yogadarśana*, atomic theory has not been accepted. And *Sāṃkhya-Yogadarśanas* claim to be as old as the *Vedas*. But the atomic theory is an integral part of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, and the *Nyāya* philosophers have accepted *Vaiśeṣika* theory of atomism. Both these schools of philosophy, the *Vedāntic* and the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* belong to the *Vedic* tradition. Jainas and *Ājīvakas* are considered to be non-Vedic in tradition. Jacobi says that he considered that Jaina theory of atomism is very ancient because Jainism has its theory of atomism on the theory of matter.³

Modern philosophers have accepted the view that the atomic theory was first presented in a systematic form by the Jainas.⁴

1 *Paśchimī Darśana* by Divānchand.

2 *Bhāratiya Saṃskṛti*, p. 229.

3 *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Part II, p. 199-200.

4 *Darśanaśāstra kā Itihāsa*, (Hindi), p. 129.

TWO FORMS OF PARAMĀṆU

We have already seen that *paramāṇu* is indivisible, indestructible, inaccessible to senses and it cannot be burnt, nor can it be divided into parts. The description of these characteristics might trace some difficulty in the minds of modern scientists, because modern science has shown that *paramāṇu* is not indivisible, it can be split,

If it is to be said that *paramāṇu* is not indivisible, we cannot call it "*Parama-aṇu*". Modern science has shown that what we call *paramāṇu*, can be split. We do not deny this aspect of the nature of the *paramāṇu* as that which can be split. What we need is the recognition of the view that the *Paramāṇu* is the ultimate indivisible unit and it can be split. A satisfactory answer for this can be found in the *Anuyogadvāra*. There it has been suggested that *paramāṇu* has two forms : 1. *sūkṣma paramāṇu* (subtle), and *vyavahāra paramāṇu* (*paramāṇu* from the practical sense).¹

The description of the *paramāṇu* as indivisible, indestructible etc. refers to *sūkṣma paramāṇu*. *Vyāvahārika paramāṇu* consists of aggregate of endless *sūkṣma paramāṇus*.²

Really speaking the aggregate of *sūkṣma paramāṇu* is the nucleus of *paramāṇu* (*paramāṇupiṇḍa*). This cannot be grasped from ordinary or normal sense as it is subtle. And it cannot be split by ordinary instrument or weapon. As it is *sūkṣma* in effect, it is considered to be *paramāṇu* from the practical point of view. And what the science calls 'atom' is the *vyāvahārika paramāṇu* (*paramāṇu* from the practical sense). Therefore, Jains also consider that if it is to split, it is practical *paramāṇu*.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PUDGALA

Pudgala has four primary characteristics : (1) *sparśa* (touch), (2) *rasa* (taste), (3) *gandha* (smell) and (4) *varṇa* (colour). In every *paramāṇu* of the matter these four characteristics are present. These

- 1 *Anuyogadvāra* (*paramāṇadvāra*) — *Paramāṇu* *duvihe paṇṇatte, tam jahā—suhumeya, vavahāriyeya.*
- 2 *Anuyogadvāra* (*paramāṇadvāra*). *Aṇantāṇaṃ suhumaparamāṇu poggalāṇaṃ samudayasamīti samāgayeṇaṃ vavahāriye paramāṇu-poggale nipphajjanti.*

characteristics express themselves to twenty qualities. They are—

(1) *Sparśa* (touch)—(i) *śīta* (cold), (ii) *uṣṇa* (hot), (iii) *rūkṣa* (rough), (iv) *snigdha* (oily or viscous nature), (v) *laghu* (light), (vi) *guru* (heavy), (vii) *mṛdu* (soft) and (viii) *kaṭhora* (hard).

(2) *Rasa* (taste)—(i) *amla* (acid), (ii) *madhura* (sweet), (iii) *kaṭu* (sour) (iv) *kaṣāya* (bitter), (v) *tikta* (astringent).

(3) *Gandha* (smell)—(i) *Sugandha* (fragrance), (ii) *durgandha* (foul smell).

(4) *Varṇa* (colour)—(i) *Kṛṣṇa* (black), (ii) *nīla* (blue), (iii) *rakta* (red), (iv) *pīta* (yellow) and (v) *sveta* (white).

We find the *Samsthāna* (formation), *parimaṇḍala* (globular), *vṛtta* (circular), *tryaṃśa* (triangular) *caturāṃśa* (square) and *āyata* (rectangular) in *Pudgala*. Still these are not the real characteristics of the *paramānu*.¹ These are the modes or form of *paramānu*.

The twenty characteristics of *Pudgala* mentioned above, can be considered in respect of its measurement and intensity into three distinctions, as (1) *sankhyāta* (measureable), *asankhyāta* (immeasurable) and (3) *ananta* (endless).²

From the point of view of substance, *paramānu* is partless and indivisible, but from the point of the view of modes, it is not so. Considered from the point of view of modes, the four characteristics of *varṇa*, *rasa*, *gandha* and *sparśa* have their infinite modifications.³ We have already seen that *paramānu* has the four characteristics as mentioned with its sub-divisions like *śīta*, *uṣṇa* and *snigdha*, *rūkṣa* etc. Considered from the point of view of modes, we find a *paramānu* with infinite modes can become a *paramānu* of one mode. And *paramānu* with one mode can express itself into many modes. And *paramānu*, according to the Jaina theory one *paramānu* can transform itself from one attribute of *varṇa* to *rasa* and to *gandha* to *sparśa*. The same is the case with the others.

The matter with one quality can remain in that stage approximately from one *samaya* to a *sankhyāta kāla* (innumerable points

1 *Bhagavati*, 25, 3.

2 *Sarvārthasiddhi* 5, 23.

3 *Sihānāṅga* 4, 135—*Cauvvihe poggalapariṇāme pannate, tam jahā—vaṇṇapariṇāme, gandhapariṇāme, rasapariṇāme, phāsapariṇāme.*

of time).¹ The same is the case in the case of transformation of *paramāṇus* of two qualities to *ananta* qualities. All the modifications in the *paramāṇu* on the basis of qualities are natural expressions of the modifications.

THE FOUR TYPES OF PARAMĀṆU

We have already seen that *paramāṇu* is indivisible and without parts. But it has been suggested that other substances have their minutest parts which are intellectual constructs and they are also called *paramāṇus*. In this sense, we can say that there four types of *paramāṇu* as :

(1) *Dravya paramāṇu* (substance *paramāṇu*) — *pudgala paramāṇu* (material *paramāṇu*).

(2) *Kṣetra paramāṇu* (space *paramāṇu*) — *ākāśa paramāṇu*.

(3) *Kāla paramāṇu* (time)—*samaya* (definite span of time).

(4) *Bhāva paramāṇu*—attribute.

Bhāva paramāṇu is of four types as *varṇa-guṇa*, *gandha-guṇa*, *rasa-guṇa*, *sparśa-guṇa* (colour, smell, taste and touch).

There are 16 sub-divisions of these qualities like—

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. <i>Kṛṣṇa</i> (black) | 9. <i>Madhura</i> (sweet) |
| 2. <i>Nīla</i> (blue) | 10. <i>Kaṭuka</i> (sour) |
| 3. <i>Rakta</i> (red) | 11. <i>Kaṣāya</i> (bitter) |
| 4. <i>Pīta</i> (yellow) | 12. <i>Tikṣṇa</i> (sharp) |
| 5. <i>Śveta</i> (white) | 13. <i>Uṣṇa</i> (hot) |
| 6. <i>Sugandha</i> (fragrant) | 14. <i>Śīta</i> (cold) |
| 7. <i>Durgandha</i> (foul smell) | 15. <i>Rūkṣa</i> (rough) |
| 8. <i>Tikta</i> (astringent) | 16. <i>Snigdha</i> (oily or viscous nature) |

These sub-divisions are one quality divisions (*Ek-guṇa*). In short we can say according to the Jaina conception of *paramāṇu* the *paramāṇu* possess the four qualities mentioned above.

PARAMĀṆU INACCESSIBLE TO SENSES (ATINDRIYATĀ)

Paramāṇu is not accessible to sense experience through the sense-organs, but it is not formless. It has form. It is so subtle that even when it has form, it cannot be grasped by the senses. It can only be seen through intuition or the higher perception.

1 *Bhagavatī* 5, 7.

The omniscient souls (*kevalajñānī*) can see the all substances, having form and formless. In the *chadmastha* stage of *guṇasthāna* where there is the destruction-cum-subsidence of *karma* and which is partial, one can know the *paramāṇu* and also may not know it. One who has clairvoyant knowledge (*avadhiññāna*) can see the objects with form upto a particular distance, can know the *paramāṇu* but one who can see only through the sense-organs cannot see the *paramāṇu*.¹

FORMATION OF SKANDHA

Imagine for a moment that each *paramāṇu* is independent, isolated like a brick, then the problem arises how the combination of *paramāṇus* and their integration bring the formation of *mahākāya-skandha*, the cosmos. When we construct a house, we keep the bricks one upon the other plastered with cement etc. But the cosmos is formed by its own principles of necessities and not by any external agency or intelligence. As the sky becomes laden with clouds and again becomes clear so also the *skandhas* are formed and are separated by their own nature. Still the problem remains—what is the object of such combination and disintegration of *skandhas* and atoms?

The universe as we see is material in nature and is due to the integration of the *paramāṇus*. *Paramāṇus* combine into *skandha*, and *skandhas* combine to form the visible and gross objects. In *Pudgala* we find the inherent forces of integration and disintegration.² When *paramāṇus* integrate *skandhas* are formed and by the integration and disintegration of the *skandhas* different objects are formed. These forces of disintegration and integration are natural to matter and these forces are also operative due to the *jīvas*, as *jīvas* are active. If the *Pudgala* has not possessed the inherent attribute of integration, *paramāṇus* would have remained isolated, and if the force of disintegration were not in operation then the *paramāṇus*, would have been found in an unorganised cluster. The cosmos would not be possible and there would be no use of the *paramāṇus* and *skandhas* for the *jīvas*.

1 *Bhagavati* : 18, 8.

2 *Sthānāṅga* 2, 221-225, *Dohiṃ thāṇehiṃ poggalā sāhannanti-sayaṃ vā poggalā sāhannanti pareṇa vā poggalā sāhannanti, evaṃ bhijjanti parisadanti, parivaḍanti viddhansanti.*

According to the Jaina science, the formation of *skandha* has been explained in the scientific way on the basis of the principle of chemical composition.

The formation of *skandha* can be explained in the following process :

1. The *paramāṇus* combine themselves into due to their characteristics of viscosity. The separation of the atoms out of the *skandhas* is due to the attribute of roughness.

2. The *paramāṇus* which are alike having *snigdha* come together and form into *skandha*. (If the two *paramāṇus* have the viscosity to a degree less than two, then the combination is not possible).

3. A *paramāṇu* which is viscous and the *paramāṇu* which is dried, if they come together it is possible to form *skandha*. (In these cases the intensity of dryness should be more than two degrees).

4. Viscous and the dry *paramāṇus* form *skandha* even when they belong to different categories.

In all these, there is one point of exception i.e., that *paramāṇus* cannot form *skandha* if the dryness and the viscosity are of one degree difference.

In other words, (i) The parts which have different characteristics (*jaghanya guṇa*) do not form into a combination.

(ii) The *paramāṇus* with identical attributes like either the viscous or dry cannot form a combination.

(iii) The two coming together would form a combination.¹

The *Śvetāmbaras* and the *Digambaras* have expressed difference of opinion regarding the formation or combination of *skandhas*. According to the *Śvetāmbara* tradition, if two *paramāṇus* with viscous nature having abominable attributes (*jaghanya guṇa*) comes together there would be no *bandha* (combination), but if one *paramāṇu* consisting abominable attributes and the other of unabominable attributes (*ajaghanya guṇa*) there would be a combination form; but the *Digambaras* maintain even if one *paramāṇu* is of (*jaghanya guṇa*) there would be no *bandha*. According to *Śvetāmbaras* in the formation of parts and from one part to the other the attributes of vis-

1 *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5, 32-35.

cousity and the dryness vary in increasing degrees from two, three, four, upto endless *guṇas*, then also, the combination is possible; but by the increase of one degree only *bandha* is not possible. But according to the *Digambara* tradition by the increase of attributes of two degrees only the combination would be possible. The parts having the degrees of intensity of viscousity and dryness from one unit to the infinite units in ascending order the combination would not be possible. The *Śvetāmbara* version says the two, three or more qualities in the *paramāṇus* would lead to the process of combination and this is possible if the qualities are of similar nature and not dissimilar; but the *Digambaras* say, the formation of combinations would be possible in both the cases where there are similar or dissimilar qualities. In short, the *Digambara* and *Śvetāmbara* version of the combinations would be as follows :¹

ŚVETĀMBARA TRADITION

	<i>Sādṛśa</i> (similar)	<i>Viśādṛśa</i> (dissimilar)
1. <i>Jaghanya</i> plus <i>jaghanya</i>	no	no
2. <i>Jaghanya</i> plus <i>ekādhika</i> (one addition)	no	yes
3. <i>Jaghanya</i> plus <i>dvyadhika</i> (two addition)	yes	yes
4. <i>Jaghanya</i> plus <i>triadhika</i>	yes	yes
5. <i>Jaghanyetara</i> plus <i>samajaghanyetara</i>	no	yes
6. <i>Jaghanyetara</i> plus <i>ekādhika jaghanyetara</i>	no	yes
7. <i>Jaghanyetara</i> plus <i>dvyadhika jaghanyetara</i>	yes	yes
8. <i>Jaghanyetara</i> plus <i>tryadhikādi jaghanyetara</i>	yes	yes

DIGAMBARA TRADITION

1. <i>Jaghanya</i> plus <i>jaghanya</i>	no	no
2. <i>Jaghanya</i> plus <i>ekādhika</i>	no	no
3. <i>Jaghanya</i> plus <i>dvyadhika</i>	no	no
4. <i>Jaghanya</i> plus <i>tryadhika</i>	no	no
5. <i>Jaghanyetara</i> plus <i>samajaghanyetara</i>	no	no
6. <i>Jaghanyetara</i> plus <i>ekādhika jaghanyetara</i>	no	no

1. (a) *Tattvārthasūtra*, Pt. Sukhalāji Sanghavi, pp. 202-203.

(b) *Jaina Dharma Darśana*, p. 195.

7. <i>Jaghanyetara</i> plus <i>dvyadhika jaghanyetara</i>	yes	yes
8. <i>Jaghanyetara</i> plus <i>tryadhikādi jaghanyetara</i>	no	no

After the combination of the atoms which of the *paramāṇus* effect combination with what type of *paramāṇus*, is a question that has been asked very often. Similarly, another question has been asked very often, of the similar and the dissimilar *paramāṇus* which of them combine together. The answer is, the *paramāṇus* of similar qualities do not form combination. If the *paramāṇus* are of dissimilar nature, they combine in the formation of the similar *paramāṇus* collecting together, or sometimes similar *paramāṇus* in two degrees combine with similar *paramāṇus* of one degree. The combinations are formed according to the substance and the place etc. The combinations are formed according to the integration of *paramāṇus*. These types of combinations are considered as *madhyamabandha*. The combinations of *paramāṇus* with higher intensity and qualities absorb the combinations of the *paramāṇus* with lower intensity and qualities.¹ In the tradition, similar qualities do not come together and the more intense qualities absorb the less intense qualities.²

DIVISIONS AND SUB-DIVISIONS OF *PUDGALA*

The two major distinctions of *Pudgala* can be stated to be *aṇu* (atom) and *skandha* (aggregate). On the basis of this distinction, we can classify the matter (*pudgala*) into 6 types.³

(1) *Sthūla-sthūla* (very gross)—It contains the gross objects like, —earth, stones, wood etc.

(2) *Sthūla* (gross)—It has the following varieties, like—milk, curds, butter, water, oil and other fluid material.

(3) *Sthūla-sūkṣma* (gross subtle)—It has the following forms, like—light, electricity, etc.

(4) *Sūkṣma-sīhūla*—Wind, vapour etc., belong to this category.

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5, 36.

2. *Tattvārthasūtra* 5, 37.

3. (a) *Niyamasāra*, 21—Kundakundācārya.

(b) *Gommaṣasāra*, *Jīvakāṇḍa*, 602.

(5) *Sūkṣma*—The objects belong to this category cannot be experienced by the senses *e. g.*, *Manovargaṇā* (atoms of mental structure), etc. They are called *Acākṣuṣa skandha*.

(6) *Sūkṣma-sūkṣma*—The minutest *paramāṇu* is the subtlest form of atom.

That part of matter which is the aggregate of *paramāṇus* due to the combination and disintegration is unaccessible to sense experience. If the aggregate of atoms becomes bigger and coarse (*sthūla*) then the aggregate becomes accessible to sense-experience. The combination and disintegration of atoms is considered to be the coming-together of atoms and separation. The degree of the combinations so as to enable the aggregate to be coarser and coarsest will make the aggregate accessible to sense-experience.

THREE TYPES OF PUDGALA (MATTER)

Pudgala (matter) can be considered into three types on the basis of the distinctions on the types of combinations of *paramāṇus*.¹

1. *Prayoga pariṇata*—The collection of atoms processed by the *jīva* in the formation of the body is called *prayoga-pariṇata*—sense-organs, body, blood, flesh, etc.

2. *Miśra pariṇata*—In this, the atoms are brought together by the *jīva* and they are again discharged, *e. g.*, nails which are cut, hair, cough and excretion etc.,

3. *Visrasā pariṇata*—In this, we find aggregate of atoms without the help of the *jīva*. The atoms come together by themselves, *e. g.*, rainbow, clouds, etc.,

ORIGINATION, CHANGE & PERMANENCE IN MATTER

Matter is both permanent and impermanent.² From the point of view of substance, it is permanent and from the point of view of modifications, it is impermanent. From the point of view of substance, a thing is permanent because the atoms that form the aggregate are permanent, although the objects that are formed due to the combination of atoms change their nature and structure, and as

1. *Bhagavatī*, 8, 1, 1.

2. *Bhagavatī*, 14, 4.

such, from the point of view of modifications of the substance due to the integration and is integration of atoms, it is impermanent. Due to the combinations of atoms, the substance is not considered to be permanent, but from the point of view of the original nature of atoms and from the points of view of place and the time of the combination, it may be considered to be relatively permanent.¹

THE TRANSFORMATION OF MATTER

Matter may be considered to be of two forms on the basis of the manner of the integration and disintegration of atoms. The two combinations are : (1) *Bādara* (gross), (2) *Sūkṣma* (subtle). Infinite number of atoms combine together to form objects. Sometimes the aggregates so formed are subtle and they are not accessible to the sense-organs. The subtle forms of aggregate of atoms have fourfold attributes of touch, like—(1) *śīta*, *uṣṇa*, *snigdha* and *rūkṣa*. If the atoms are combined to form gross objects, the objects have four forms of touch, like—*guru-laghu*, *mṛdu-kāṭhina*. If dry atoms are combined together, then the object has the quality of *laghu sparśa*, but if the combination of *snigdha paramāṇus* (viscous atoms) then the object gets the quality of *guru sparśa*. When molecules are affected by quality of softness and viscosity they combine into producing the quality of soft touch. Similarly, when heat and dryness are combined quality of roughness is expressed. In short, when the transformation² is from the subtle qualities to the gross qualities then there would increase four types of touch.⁴

THE EXTENT OF MATTER

The molecules (*skandha*) and *paramāṇu* (atoms) are considered from the point of view of flow, are beginningless and without any change. Considered from the point of view of effects, it has a beginning and it is characterised by change. *Paramāṇus* form themselves into *skandhas* and *skandhas* disintegrate into *paramāṇus*.

The *paramāṇus* can remain in their original states for atleast a period of one *samaya* or at the most upto *asaṅkhyāta-kāla* (innumerable points of time). In the same way, if the molecule remains

1. *Bhagavatī* 14, 4.

2. *Jainadarśana : Manana aur Mī māṃsā*, p. 175.

in its nature of molecule, it can do so atleast for one *samaya* and at the most for innumerable *kāla*.¹ After this period, transformation is inevitable.

From the point of view of *kṣetra* (place), we can say the *paramāṇu* and *skandha* can remain in a particular point of space for a *samaya* or at the latest for innumerable points of time (*kāla*.)

If a *paramāṇu* joins to form a molecule and again gets disintegrated to its original nature of *paramāṇu* it might take one *samaya* or at the most *asaṅkhyāta kāla*.²

The molecule with two atoms or the molecule with three atoms can come back to its original position *paramāṇus* and that would take one *samaya* at least or *ananta kāla* (endless time) at the most.³

If a *paramāṇu* or a molecule moves from one point of space (*ākāśa pradeśa*) and returns to that very point of sapce, it might take one *samaya* or at the most *ananta kāla*.⁴

A *paramāṇu* occupies one point of space, but a molecule may occupy one point of space, two, innumerable or numberless points of space. It may also pervade the entire *lokākāśa*. We have already seen that the aggregate *paramāṇus* pervading the entire universe is called *acittamahāskandha*. It is cosmos.

APRADEŚITVA (NON-SPACIAL POSITION) AND SAPRADEŚITVA (SPACIAL POSITION)

Paramāṇu considered from the point of view of substance and spacial position can be considered as *apradeśī*, as it does not occupy an extended point of space. But from the point of view of temporal extension, it is considered to be *apradeśī*, because it is in one *samaya*, but if it is in more than one *samaya*, it is called *sapradeśī*, as it covers extended space. From the point of view of *bhāva*, (nature) a *paramāṇu* is *apradeśī* (non-spacial), if it is one *guṇa* (quality) but if it is characterised by many qualities it is *sapradeśī* (spacial).

1. *Bhagavatī*, 5, 8.

2. *Bhagavatī*, 5, 8.

3. *Ibid*, 5, 8.

4. *Ibid*, 5, 8.

Considered from the point of view of substance, a molecule is *sapradeśī* (extensive in spacial extension). The molecule's extension is determined by the number of *paramāṇus* it has.

From the point of *kṣetra* (space), *skandha* (molecule) is *sapradeśī* (extensive) and also *apradeśī*. A molecule which covers one point of space is *apradeśī*, but if covers more than one point of space, it becomes *sapradeśī*.

From the point of view of *kāla* (time), a molecule which has a duration of one *samaya* is *apradeśī*. But if it remains for more than one *samaya*, it is *sapradeśī*.

From the point of view of *bhāva* (nature), a molecule is characterised by one quality it is *apradeśī*. But if has more than one quality, it is *sapradeśī*.¹

MOTION OF MATTER

Paramāṇu is *jaḍa* (unconscious) still it is characterised by motion. The motion of the *paramāṇu* is sometimes due to some cause and sometime without any cause. In fact, a *paramāṇu* is not always in motion. It is sometimes in motion and sometimes not. In one *samaya*, it can travel from one point of space in the universe to another point of space in the farthest point which is at a distance of innumerable *yojanas*. The characteristic of motion is inherent in the atom, although it may not always move. So, the principle of movement (*Dharma*) is the principle due to which motion in *paramāṇu* is possible. But the principle of *Dharma* is not the cause of the motion, it is only an efficient condition.²

A question arises, whether the motion in *paramāṇu* is due to itself or is caused by *jīva*.

The answer is that *paramāṇu* does not move because of *jīva*, as *paramāṇu* is not transformed or combined into molecules, due to *jīva*. It is material in nature. And the cause is material only. *Jīva* has no power to move the *paramāṇus*.

1. *Bhagavatī*, 5, 8.

2. *Bhagavatī*, 16, 8.

Paramāṇu can be described as being vibratory (*sakamṇpa*)¹ and non-vibrate (*akamṇpa*). It is not unsteady, and not constantly vibrating.

A molecule with two atoms has both the characteristics, and expresses both the characteristics like—vibration and non-vibration. It being composed of two atoms it has spacial vibration and also absence of spacial vibration.

Molecules with three atoms express similar forms of vibration and non-vibration. For instance, in the molecule one atom may vibrate and the other may not, the two atoms may vibrate and the one may not, and two atoms may remain non-vibratory while the one atom may not.

Molecules with four atoms may express all forms of permutations of vibration and non-vibration. One spacial point may express vibration while others may not. While the other points of space may express vibration and the one point may not and so on.

Molecules of five atoms and molecules upto the infinite number of atoms have similar characteristics of vibration and non-vibration.

LIMITS OF MOTION OF *PARAMĀṆU*

The motion in *paramāṇu* has certain limits. The natural motion is always in straight lines. If there are some cross-effects of other *paramāṇus* and material particles, the motion gets curved. *Jīva* is not directly responsible for the motion in a *paramāṇu* as it is extremely subtle. But *jīva* can influence the motion of molecules—big or small. As the maximum form of motion has been described, so has the minimum form of motion been described. A *paramāṇu* can move from one point of space to the other in slow motion in one *samaya*. The extension of the point of space is of the same extension as of *paramāṇu*.

The motion in *paramāṇu*, as we have seen earlier, may be due to more inherent causes or due to some other external factors present in matter. When the motion in the *paramāṇu* starts, is difficult to say, but one thing is certain that after infinite number of points of time, *paramāṇu* acts. Similarly, a *paramāṇu* may stop movement within

1. *Bhagavatī*, 5, 7.

one *saṃaya* or at the most within infinite part of *āvalikā*.¹ And after the infinite number of points of *āvalikā* the *paramāṇu* will definitely start motion.

The atoms are unobstructible (*apratighātī*) and they can penetrate any object of any type. For instance, atoms can penetrate a thick wall built of cast iron. Even the mountain like *Sumeru* cannot obstruct the movement of *paramāṇu*.

Sometimes the movement of the *paramāṇu* may be arrested by the particles of matter due to its contact with matter. But at that time *paramāṇu* also affects the matter to which it has come in contact.²

THE SUBTLE NATURE OF *PARAMĀṆU*

The special characteristic of *paramāṇu* is that it can occupy a point of space and the same point of space can be occupied by another *paramāṇu* without any resistance. Similarly, the subtle form of molecule consisting infinite *paramāṇus* can occupy the same point without any resistance. This is the special characteristic of *paramāṇu*. In this connection Ācārya Pūjyapāda has pointed out that there is no difficulty in atoms and molecules in occupying same point of space without friction or resistance because they have no visible extension and they are subtle in nature. For this reason, infinite number of atoms and molecules can remain in one *pradeśa* without any difficulty.³

For instance, a lamp lights a room to the fullest extent and this room can also merge the light of many other lamps. Similarly, the light of the lamp illumines the room fully; but if it is covered by a small pot, it restricts its illumination to the pervasion of that very pot.⁴ It is clear from this, that the material aspect of the atoms of matter have the characteristics of contraction and expansion. For this reason and because of the power of contraction etc.,

1. *Āvalikā* is 16777216th part of 48 minutes.

2. *Jainadarśana aur Ādhunika Vijñāna*, (Hindi), p. 37.

3. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 5, 16. Pūjyapāda.

4. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5, 16.

a *paramāṇu* can remain along with molecules in the same point of space.¹

The subtle transformation is contraction of a *paramāṇu* and in this it is reduced in its mass and effect.

THE SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF *PARAMĀṆU*

If we study *paramāṇu* in a scientific way, we find that *aṇu* (atom) is of two parts. The central part is a nucleus in which there are two functions—the protons and the neutrons. The external part is the orbital shell. It contains electrons which move constantly with the velocity which is unimaginable. The volume of a nucleus is much smaller than that of an atom. If the orbital shell splits, then the circumference of an atom becomes smaller. These split-atoms are called stripped-atoms. In the language of the astronomical science that some stars have density which is two hundred times more than the densest object on our earth. Edington has said that if one ton (28 maunds) of nuclear matter is taken, it can be contained in a basket or in our pocket. A star has been discovered whose density is 620 tons (17360 maunds) for every cubic inch. This heavy weight of the stars is due to the stripped atoms and the atoms in these, are primarily nuclear and they have no orbital shells. The Jaina theory of atoms explains these phenomenon by means of the subtle process of movement in atoms.²

Modern science has shown that atoms are very subtle in extension and the subtlety can be explained that 50,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,000 (50 *śaṅkhas*) of atoms weigh 2 *tolās* and occupy only one tenth crore of an inch space. In the thickness of a cigarette-paper lakh of atoms may stay. A mole of dust in the air contains more than 10,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,000 (*ten nīla*) *paramāṇus*.

The form of the atom orbits extension can also be measured if compared with the magnified size of a small drop of blood coming out of the head, if we pull one hair. The drop of blood may be magnified in size to the extent of 7 feet in diameter. Even then the atoms inside it will have the diameter of 1/1000 of an inch.³

1. *Dravyasaṅgraha*.

2. *Muniśrī Hazārimal Smṛti Grantha*, p. 374.

3. *Jainadarśana aur Ādhunika Vijnāna*, p. 47.

THE SIZE AND FORM OF THE MATTER

The material-atom is one, without parts, without middle and without space.

A molecule with two atoms is with parts, but without middle and it has spacial extension.

A molecule with three atoms is without parts, it is with middle and has spacial extension.

Molecules with even number of atoms have characteristics like the molecules with two atoms. And molecules with odd number of atoms express the characteristics possessed by molecules with three atoms.

In the *Bhagavatī sūtra* we get description of the four forms of the existence of atoms.¹

(1) *Dravya-sthānāyu* : It is the state when *paramāṇu* remains as *paramāṇu* and *skandhas* as *skandhas* i. e. molecules as molecules.

(2) *Kṣetra-sthānāyu* : This is the *ākāśa pradeśa*, in which *paramāṇus* and *skandhas* exists.

(3) *Avagāhana-sthānāyu* : The specified form and size of *paramāṇus* and *skandha*.

The differences between *kṣetra* and *avagāhana* is that the first is pertaining to space while the second to the *pudgala* (matter) itself.

(4) *Bhāva-sthānāyu* : In this form *paramāṇus* express the attributes of touch, taste, smell and colour, either in the form of *paramāṇus* or in the form of *skandha*.

EIGHT COMBINATIONS (*VARGAṆĀS*) OF *PUDGALA*

Paramāṇus have been classified into 8 forms of combinations on the basis of the intensity and extension. They are called *vargaṇās*.

(1) *Audārika vargaṇā* : It is gross matter. This consists of the combination of *paramāṇus* to form gross bodies for the *jīvas*, vegetable, earth, water, fire and air.

(2) *Vaikriya vargaṇā* : In this, we get the aggregates of matter which have the capacity of expressing the qualities, like—short and large, light and heavy, visible and non-visible, etc.

1. *Bhagavatī*, 5, 7.

(3) *Āhāraka vargaṇā* : This is the aggregate of matter formed by the *paramāṇus* and molecules with a capacity of forming body by *Yoga-śakti*.

(4) *Taijasa vargaṇā* : It is the aggregate of matter formed of the *paramāṇus* with energy.

(5) *Kārmaṇa vargaṇā* : It is the aggregate of matter formed of the minutest particles of matter which are responsible for the formation of *karma*, like—*jñānāvaraṇīya* etc. This forms the subtle body.

(6) *Svāsocchvāsa vargaṇā* : This is the aggregate of matter which enables the function of breathing.

(7) *Vacana vargaṇā* : The collection of matter which is responsible for speech.

(8) *Mano-vargaṇā* : This is the collection of minutest particle which are very subtle and which forms the mind for the sake of reflection and thinking.

Matter is of infinite variety. Among them, the eight varieties mentioned above are prominent. These types of matter have graded existence forming from the gross matter which we get in earth, water, etc., to the subtlest form of matter in mind. One form of matter can be transformed into another form of matter due to the formation of molecules and the integration of *paramāṇus* in different intensities.

According to the Jainas *vargaṇās* of one type may also be transformed into another.

The *vargaṇās* like *audārika*, *vaikriya*, *āhāraka* and *taijasa* have the qualities of eight types of touch and they are of the form of gross molecules. They possess the qualities—light or heavy, smooth and rough, etc. The *vargaṇās* like *kārmaṇa vargaṇās*, *bhāṣā* and *mano-vargaṇās* have four types of qualities of touch. They are subtle molecules and they have the qualities of cold and heat, viscous and dry. *Svāsocchvāsa vargaṇā* has four types of touch and also eight types of touch.¹

1. *Bhagavatī* 2, 1.

EIGHT DISTINCTIONS OF PUDGALA

The Jaina philosophers have studied the *pudgala* (matter) with its various distinctions, the like of which we do not get in other systems of philosophy. In modern science, we find recognition to large extent of the Jaina view of matter. According to Jainism the function of *pudgala* is ten-fold. (1) *śabda* (sound), (2) *bandha* (combination), (3) *saukṣmya* (subtlety), (4) *sthaulya* (grossness), (5) *saṁsthāna* (formation), (6) *bheda* (distinctions), (7) *tama* (darkness), (8) *chāyā* (shade), (9) *ātapa* (heat), (10) *Udyota* (cool-light).¹

(1) ŚABDA (SOUND)

Śabda (sound) is produced due to the friction of one molecule with the other.² The sound is the object of sense of hearing *i. e.*, ears.

Vaiśeṣikas do not consider *śabda* as a mode of matter. But they make it an attribute of *ākāśa*. *Sāṅkhya-darśana* considers the formation of *śabda* as the sense cause of *ākāśa*. Jains differ fundamentally from the *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Sāṅkhya* philosophers. They maintain that *śabda* (sound) is material in nature, because it becomes an object of sense-organ. *Ākāśa* is not material in nature. And it cannot produce sound. Similarly, *ākāśa* is not a product of sound as the *Sāṅkhya* philosophers say. Because *śabda* (sound) is material in nature and hence *śabda* (*tanmātrā*) the subtle elements should also become material in nature. If *śabdatanmātrā* were to be material in nature its product *ākāśa* should also be considered as material. But *ākāśa* is not material in nature. Therefore *ākāśa* is not a product of *śabdatanmātrā*.

Secondly, *ākāśa* is a substance which is formless. It has no qualities like touch etc. But *śabda* has form and it has qualities of touch etc. It can be grasped. The substance which is formless must have qualities which would also be formless. And then it cannot be grasped by the sense-organs which have form. The objects which

1. (a) *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5, 24.

(b) *Dravyasāṅgraha*, gāthā 16.

2. *Pañcāstikāya*, 71.

are formless cannot be grasped by the sense-organs which have form.

Thirdly, sound is produced by the friction of molecules and due to the friction there would be echo and sound production. If sound were to be the qualities of *ākāśa* which is formless such interruption of atoms and molecules would not be possible.

Fourthly, *śabda* can be arrested and checked. If it were the quality of *ākāśa* how could it be possible to check the *śabda*.

Fifthly, *śabda* has velocity (*gatimānatā*), but *ākāśa* is without any motion and is passive.

Sixthly, argument would be considered from scientific point of view, *śabda* cannot traverse in space if there were no matter. If *śabda* were the quality of *ākāśa* it would have penetrated into every point of *ākāśa*. Because quality pervades the substance having that quality and there is no question whether there is the need of the presence or not.¹

Jaina *āgama* literature has elaborately discussed the nature of *śabda* as material in nature and also the characteristics of *śabda* in its various aspects, like—the production (*utpatti*), velocity (*śighragati*), pervasion in the universe (*lokavyāpīva*), stationary nature (*sthititva*) and other forms.² According to *Jambūdvīpaprājñapti* the ringing of the bell (*sughoṣā ghaṇṭā*) in a particular region will be echoed in a bell in a far of place even though there is no medium of transmission like the wires except the medium of air. This can explain the function of a radio. The *śabda* pervade the entire universe in a fraction of moment. This phenomenon was recognised and explained by Bhagavāna Mahāvīra 2,500 years ago.³

We have already seen that sound is produced due to contact, friction and inter-action of the molecules formed by *paramāṇus*. *Śabda* is of two types (1) *prāyogika* (practical, artificial) (2) *vaiśvāsika* (natural).

1. Muniśrī Hazārimal Smṛti Grantha, p. 381.

2. Prajñāpanā, pada 11

3. Jambūdvīpaprājñapti.

Prāyogika—The production of the sound in this form is possible due to efforts and these efforts are of two types—due to speech and due to efforts without speech. (1) *Bhāṣātma* expresses some meaning. Therefore, it is called *arthapratipādaka vāṇī*. (2) *Abhāṣātma* does not convey any meaning. *Abhāṣātma* sound is of four types—(i) *tata*, (ii) *vitata*, (iii) *ghana*, (iv) *saṁsāra*.

The *tata* form of sound is produced by a musical instrument made of leather (*carma*) like *mṛdaṅga*, *paṭaha* etc. The *vitata* sound is produced by musical instrument having streams, like—*vīṇā*. The *ghana* type of sound is produced by musical instruments like *tāla*, bell etc. And *saṁsāra* form of sound is produced by musical instruments which are to be blown through mouth, e. g., conch (*śaṅkha*), flute, etc.¹

The *vaiśrasika śabda* is all sounds produced without any effort on the part of an individual, for instance, the thunder of the clouds is *vaiśrasika sound*.

An individual grasps a sound and communicates it through language. The moment it is communicated through sound to other individuals, it passes on to other individuals. The sound so produced spreads in the *ākāśa* and the waves of the sound travel throughout space. If the intensity of the sound produced is low, the sound travels like the waves of the water for quite sometime for several *yojanas* and then the waves of the sound fade away. If the intensity of the sound produced is high, the waves of the sound travel to farther distances even upto the end of the world.

The sound that we hear spoken by a particular person is not the original word of the person speaking. It is the sound waves that travels through *ākāśa* in the form of *śabda*. The sound waves so produced spread in all the six directions—east, west, north, south, up and down.

If the waves of the sound spread in even combination (*samaśreṇī*) then we hear the *mīśra śabda* (combined). It implies that we hear the

1. (a) *Tattvārtharājavārttika*, 5, 24, 2-6.

(b) *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 5, 24.

śabdadravya that is uttered by an individual and the *śabdadravya* i. e., contained the waves of the sounds. But if the waves of the sound are received in odd combination (*viśreṇī*) we hear the *śabda* in the waves of the sound only.¹

(2) BANDHA (COMBINATION)

Bandha means tying, joining and combination (*saṁhyojana*). Two *paramāṇus* or more than two *paramāṇus* can come together and become bound together. Similarly, two or more molecules can also come together. In this way, the combination or the aggregate can be of two or more *paramāṇus* or two or more molecules. In *saṁhyoga* (joining together), there is the combination without any distance (*antara rahita avasthāna*) but in *bandha* there is the identity or union of the aggregate.

Bandha is of two types—(1) *vaisrasika* (natural) and (2) *prāyogika* (artificial).

Vaisrasika bandha is of two types—(a) *sādi* (with beginning) and (b) *anādi* (without beginning). *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* have *bandha* which is without beginning, but in the case of matter the *bandha* has beginning. The *paramāṇus* may join together in a group of two or more and form molecules. These are formed at a particular time and they have a beginning. They may also be disintegrated. The lightening, meteors, the flow of water, fire and rain-bow, etc. have a beginning. Therefore their formation is *sādi*.

Prāyogika bandha is of two types—(a) *ajīvaviśayaka* i. e., connected with non-living matter and (b) combination which is connected with the living and the non-living substance (*jīvājīvaviśayaka*).

The *bandha* or union of *paramāṇu* in the case of wood and wax is of the *ajīvaviśayaka* types. The *jīvājīvaviśayaka* which is connected with the combination of the *paramāṇus* in association with *jīva* and *ajīva* may be referred to those of *kārmic* and quasi-*kārmic* (*no-karma*). The bondage of the soul with 8 types of *karmas* is called *karma-bandha*. The association of the soul with the bodily

1. (a) *Prajñāpanā*, pada 11, (b) *Nandī sūtra*

forms like *audārika* body etc., is called *nokarma-bandha*. That is, it is associated with quasi-*kārmic* material.¹

(3) *SAUKṢMYA* (FINENESS)

Sūkṣmatā is related to fineness. It is of two types—(1) *antya sūkṣmatā* (the ultimate fineness) and, (2) *āpekṣika sūkṣmatā* (relative fineness).² The ultimate fineness to be found in the *paramāṇu*. The relative fineness has a reference to relative extension of the objects. One object is finer and smaller in size than another object. For instance, the sizes of the fruits like the lemon and the mangoes vary in form. One is smaller than the other.

(4) *STHĀULYA* (GROSSNESS)

Sthūlatā refers to the largeness in size. It is of two forms : (1) *antya sthūlatā* which is all-pervasive. It is *mahāskandha*. It is the cosmos. (2) *Āpekṣika sthūlatā* is relative largeness of the size. It is concerned with determining the size of the objects. One object would appear larger than the others, if we compare the sizes of the objects,³ for instance as we have seen earlier the size of a mango is larger than the size of betel nut.

(5) *SAMSTHĀNA* (FORMATION)

Samsthāna connotes form or structural design. *Samsthāna* is of two types. The first type of *samsthāna* has been divided into two types as : (a) it is called *ūtham samsthāna* which related to geometrical forms like triangle, rectangle, circle, etc. (b) *anūtham samsthāna* refers to irregular forms.⁴ It has no specific form. However it has various structural designs—regular or irregular and it has been classified into different types, *utkara*, *cūrṇa*, *khaṇḍa*, *cūrṇikā*, *pratara* and *aṇucaṭana*.

The second type of *samsthāna* has reference to the different forms of the bodies which embody the *jīva*. It has also been classified into different types of : (1) *samacaturasra*, *nyagrodha*, *sāḍika*,

1. *Tattvārtharājavārttika* 5, 24, 10, 13.

2. *Ibid* 5, 24, 14.

3. *Tattvārtharājavārttika* 5, 24, 15.

4. *Ibid* 5, 24, 16.

vāmana, *kubja* and *huṇḍaka*. For instance, *vāmana* refers to a dwarfish body and *kubja* refers to hunch-backed body.

(6) *BHEDA* (DISTINCTION)

Bheda refers the disintegration of the molecules into different atoms or separation of some atoms from a molecule.

(7) *TAMA* (DARKNESS)

Tama is darkness. It is that which obstructs vision and which is opposite of light.¹

The Indian philosophers like *naiyāyikas* do not consider darkness (*andhakāra*) as a substance, referring to characteristics (*bhāvātma-ka dravya*), but these philosophers give a negative interpretation of darkness implying absence of light. But if light is a substance conception in nature (*bhāvātma-ka* in nature), it is necessary to consider darkness also as a substance. Because light has form so also the darkness has form.

Modern science does not give a negative interpretation of darkness. It is considered to be a positive substance, because darkness is possible due to infra-red heat rays. These rays could be found in the eyes of some of the animals like cats, owls, etc. The negative of the photographic plates expresses similar phenomenon. It shows that in addition to the visible light, we have the invisible light which may be considered as darkness.²

(8) *CHĀYĀ* (SHADE)

That which covers the light is called *chāyā* (shade).³ If light is obstructed by opaque bodies we get shade. Shade may be considered as a form akin to darkness. But it is not absence of light, it is to be considered as modification of matter.

According to modern science, the visibility produced by the various combinations of *parmāṇus* can also be considered in the light reflections and these reflections are of two types: (1) *vāstavika* (natural) and the other (2) *avāstavika* (unnatural). Similarly, *chāyā*

1. *Sarvārthasiddhi* 5, 24.

2. *Muniśrī Hazārimal Smṛti Grantha*, p. 385.

3. *Sarvārthasiddhi* 5, 24.

or shade can have reflections in these two types. We find that due to interference bands of the counting machine when worked, give dark band. These are like the electronic effects. The dark band is not merely the absence of light, but it is the electronic effect, in the form of a dark band.

The light can function through reflection (*darpaṇa*) and the refraction. These two functions can be natural or artificial. They also may be expressing different types of reflections and images. Inverted images would help formation of the correct images, if reflected upon.

(9) *ĀTAPA* (HEAT)

Ātapa is heat. It is the heat rays of light.¹ By itself, it is cool but its light is hot.

(10) *UDYOTA* (COOL-LIGHT)

Udyota refers to the rays of the light which give a cooling effect. It also gets cooled and its effect would be coolness. It is different from the heat of the fire.

The Jainas have considered the cooling and heating effect as the forms of light. This is a scientific approach to the problem and it shows remarkable insight and discriminating power into the phenomenon of light.

Scientists have considered light as the continuous process of movement. They say that the cosmos contains the light rays which are moving with a velocity which is un-imaginable. Earlier it was considered that light has no mass, but recent scientists have begun to realise that light has also mass (*bhāra*). It is characterised by electrical magnetism and every minute the light travels from the sun with unimaginable speed.

Heat is considered to be a quality of the matter. From the scientific point of view, *paramāṇus* have distinctions like *ghanāṇu* and *ṛṇāṇu* and they are constantly in motion, and inter-penetration. Then they express themselves in the form of heat.

Ordinarily, we find that electrical energy may be seen in two forms as *ghana vidyut* (electricity produced from the friction of

1. *Sarvārthasiddhi* 5, 24.

particles) and *jala vidyut* (electricity produced from water particles). These two are the modes of matter. Scientifically considered, *ghana* and *uṣṇa* are two forms of electrical energy. The basis of *ghana* is protons and the source of *vidyutkaṇas* is electron. When we find the lightning and the thunder produced, we find that there is friction of the proton and the electron particles and they produce electrical energy. This energy is accompanied by the sound. This process of radiation is called radio-active process. In ancient Indian science, the *paramāṇu* were not considered to be as capable of splitting. But modern science has shown that the ancient conception is wrong. It has been shown that when atom is split, infinite energy released. This is the principle for the manufacture of atom-bomb.

We find that the principle of manufacturing the radio-transistors, telegraph is based on the fundamental conception of the material nature of the sound. Sound is a mode of matter. Just as the electrical energy transmits the sound-waves to far distance, so also the light waves transmit images to far off distances, so we find expressed in television.

In Jaina literature, it has been described that every moment the objects in the universe are receiving reflections and spreading far and wide. These are caught and crystallised in mirrors and water, and other forms of matter. Television is based on this principle.

Modern science has discovered the function of the X-rays. They are very subtle rays creating invisible effects. Therefore, we can say that the light as former mode of matter is expressed in such phenomena like X-rays etc.¹ Thus we find all the sense-experience arising out of touch, taste, smell, etc., are nothing but modes of matter.

FUNCTIONS OF PUDGALA

The primary functions of *jīva* are six like *āhāra* (food), *śarīra* (body), *indriya* (sense-organs) *śvāsochhvāsa* (breathing), *bhāṣā* (speech) and *manas* (mind). These express fundamental functions of the *cetana* in various forms; and these are material in aspect.

1. *Muniśrī Hazārimal Smṛti Grantha*.

Ācārya Nemicaṇḍra has pointed out that matter is responsible for the production of the body. *Audārika śarīra* is due to *audārika vargaṇās* (clusters of *paramāṇus*). *Vaikriya śarīra* is formed by *vaikriya vargaṇās*. Similarly *āhāraka śarīra* is formed by *āhāraka vargaṇās*. We can describe the *śvāsochhvāsa* (breathing) based on *āhāraka vargaṇās* in the same way. *Taijasa* body is formed due to *taijasa vargaṇās*. The same can be said about *bhāṣā* and *manas*, and they are formed by the respective *vargaṇās* (fine particles of matter).¹

It is not necessary to give a detailed description about the *āhāra*, *indriya*, *śvāsochhvāsa* and *bhāṣā*. Jaina philosophers have made distinctions of *śarīras* in the *audārika*, *vaikriya*, *āhāraka*, *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* into five types. We can experience the *audārika śarīra* through the *indriyas*. The other forms of body cannot be seen through the sense-organs. They gradually become finer and finer.² *Taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* bodies do not interact with other bodies. They can move in *lokāśāśa* according to their capacities. They do not suffer from any external bonds. These two forms of bodies are associated with *samsārī jīvas* from beginningless times. They are with every *jīva*. Every *jīva* can have at the most four bodies at a time.³ But all the five bodies cannot co-exist because the *vaikriya* and the *āhāraka* functions do not simultaneously express themselves. The *vaikriya* function is generally possible in the *pramatta daśā* (in the uncontrolled state),⁴ but such is not the case of *āhāraka* function. Formation of *āhāraka* body is possible in the *pramatta daśā*. But when the *āhāraka* body is formed during the pure state of mind, *apramatta avasīhā* is inevitable. Therefore, *vaikriya* and *āhāraka* functions do not take place simultaneously.

The mental functions are not possible without the material basis. While we think, thoughts emanate from the mind through the

1. *Gommaṣasāra jīvakāṇḍa* 606-608.

2. *Tattvārthasūtra* 2, 38.

3. *Ibid* 2, 41-44.

4. *Tattvārthabhāṣya vṛtti* 2, 44.

molecules of *mano-vargaṇās*. The thought forms gets shape through *mano-vargaṇās* and these flit across leaving behind their traces in the form of thought-processes. These thought-processes have their different types of durations. Some continue to remain in the mind, some flash across the mind and some create impact in the mind as mental traces through the *mano-vargaṇās*. These *mano-vargaṇās*, therefore, leave the mnemonic traces on the cerebral and have their effect on body.

In short, a *samsārī jīva* is very closely associated with various forms as in the form of gross bodies and the subtle body and in the mental functions. In this sense, we can say the matter has a tremendous influence on the functions of the *jīva* and the formation of the universe as such.



Principle of Punya (Merit) and Pāpa (Demerit) : a Study

PRINCIPLES OF *PUNYA* AND *PĀPA*

Punya (merit) is auspicious *karma-pudgalas* and *pāpa* (demerit) is inauspicious *karma-pudgalas*. Both are *ajīvatattva*.

A question may arise that the auspicious and inauspicious *karmas*, which are enumerated under principle of *ajīva* are the auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of *ātman*; and the tendencies of *ātman* should be *jīva*, i. e., *jīva-rupa*, they cannot be *ajīva*. Why merit and demerit are enumerated under *ajīvatattva* ?

The question is answered as —the auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of *ātman* are mental, physical and vocal. These are enumerated under the influx (*āśravatattva*).¹ Here the *punya* and *pāpa*, only means that the *karma-pudgalas* which are attracted by the psychological, physiological and vocal tendencies of *ātman* and are connected with *jīva*; if they are auspicious, they are *punya* and if inauspicious, they are *pāpa*. The auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of *ātman* are *bhāva-punya* and *bhāva-pāpa*. As the result of *ātmic* tendencies, the *karma-pudgalas* gets connected with the *ātman*, they are called as *dravya-punya* and *dravya-pāpa*. Hence the tendencies of *ātman* are *bhāva-punya* and *bhāva-pāpa*, while the *dravya-punya* and *dravya-pāpa* are *pudgalas*—*ajīvatattva*.

As the *ātmic* tendencies are of innumerable types so the cause of *punya* and *pāpa* (merit and demerit) are also innumerable. Still

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 6/1-2

due to behavioural point of view, many causes are enumerated of these are described in *āgamas* like *Śhānāṅga* etc.

TYPES OF *PUNYA* AND *PĀPA*

Auspicious *karma-pudgalas* are called *punya*. It can be acquired by the auspicious deeds, like—to have sympathy and kindness towards the poor and distressed people and serve them, philanthropic deeds, to be glad to see good charactered people etc.

Āgamas have told that *jīva* can acquire *punya* by the nine deeds. These are—

(1) *Ānna punya*—to give food to the hungry ones keeping kindness and with faith and devotion to saints.

(2) *Pāna punya*—to give drinking water to the thirsty people.

(3) *Layana punya*—*Layana* means shelter. Everybody should give shelter (i.e., place for living) to the needy persons.

(4) *Śayana punya*—*Śayana* means to give space for sleeping.

(5) *Vastra punya*—to give cloths to the needy persons.

(6) *Mana-punya*—to think that every body should be happy, none should be sorrowful, etc.

(7) *Vacana punya*—It means to acquire *punya* by sympathetic and sweet words.

(8) *Kāya punya*—A man may acquire *punya*, if he serves others by his body. This type of *punya* can be acquired by physical auspicious activities.

(9) *Namaṣkāra Punya*—This type of *punya* is acquired by *vinaya*. To bow to the elders, virtuous and meritorious people is the cause of this type of *punya*.

In other words, it can be said that the *punya* can be acquired by giving food, drinking water, medicine, etc., and to give place to rest to the needy persons, to have good feelings to every one, to speak sweet and advantageous words and to do good deeds by body. To bow,

keeping devotion and faith in heart towards the *deva*, *guru* and *dharma* is also the cause of acquiring *puṇya*.

Ācārya Umāswāti tells, the auspicious mental, bodily and vocal activities are *puṇya*.¹ Auspicious and meritorious *karma-pudgalas* are called *puṇya*.²

Demeritorious *karmanas* are *pāpas*.³ In other words, due to *pāpa ātman* could not do auspicious deeds.⁴

There many causes of *pāpa*, yet, briefly, eighteen causes are described in the *āgamas*. These are also called *pāpa-sihāna* (the homes of *pāpa*). These are enumerated as under :—

1. *Himsā* (violence)
2. *Mṛṣā* (to tell a lie)
3. *Caurya* (theft)
4. *Abrahmacarya* (non-celibacy)
5. *Parigraha* (covetousness)
6. *Krodha* (anger)
7. *Māna* (pride)
8. *Māyā* (deceit)
9. *Lobha* (lust or greed)
10. *Rāga* (attachment)
11. *Dveṣa* (detachment)
12. *Kalaha* (to make dispute)
13. *Abhyākhyāna* (to nickname anybody, to call bad names)
14. *Paiṣunya* (back-biting)

1. *Tattvārthsūtra*, 6/3.

2. (a) *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, *Śilāṅka-Vṛtti*, 2/5/16 p. 127.

(b) *Mulācāra-Vṛtti*—*ācārya Vasunandī*, 5/6.

(c) *Samavāyāṅga*—*Abhāyadeva-Vṛtti*, 1, p. 6.

(d) *Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya*, *Guṇa-Vṛtti*, p. 137.

3. (a) *Pañcāstikāya-Vṛtti*—*Amṛtacandrācārya*, 108.

(b) *Samavāyāṅga*—*Abhayadeva-Vṛtti*, 1, p. 6.

(c) *Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya*, *Guṇa-Vṛtti*, 47, p. 137.

4. (a) *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 6/3.

(b) *Tattvārtha-Śrutsāgarīyā-Vṛtti*, 6/3.

15. *Para-nindā* (to blame)
16. *Rati-Arati* (*Rati* means inclination towards demerit and *arati* denotes non-inclination towards auspicious deeds.)
17. *Māyā Mṛṣāvāda* (deceitful lie)
18. *Mithyādarśana* (delusion).

From the spiritual point of view, merit and demerits both are bondages. Indian thinkers have widely discussed these merits and demerits. *Mīmāṃsakas* gave too much force to acquire merits. They regarded *puṇya* (merit) as the aim of life. But Jain philosophy, by the different points of view, regarded *puṇya* as *heya* (abandonable), *jñeya* (knowable) and *upādeya* (acceptable). By the noumenal point of view, *puṇya* and *pāpa*—both are abandonable. *Puṇya* is charming while *pāpa* reverse to it, i.e., uncharming. *Puṇya* is golden fetters while *pāpa* is iron fetters. Being sparkling and charming, the golden fetters is a bondage to *ātman*. It also bounds the *ātman*, as that of iron-fetters. There is no difference, if a sword is made of gold or iron. Both can be used equally to kill anybody. In the modern language, *puṇya* can be termed as first class imprisonment, while *pāpa* as rigorous imprisonment. But, for getting salvation, both are to be discarded.

According to behavioural point, *puṇya* can be called better than *pāpa*. Due to *pāpa*, *jīva* has to bear the agonies of hell, and many kinds of miseries and pains, disfigure etc., in this world. While as the result of *puṇya*, *jīva* gets the joyful heaven-life and fame, pleasure etc., in this world. The *puṇya* is like a shadow of tree. A traveller, after a long journey, under sharp sun-light, gets relief in the shadow of a tree; so *jīva*, during the long-long rigorous journey of his mundane life, gets rest and relief by the *puṇya*. Hence *puṇya* is regarded better and self-soothing.

TWO KINDS OF PUṆYA

Ācāryas described two kinds of *puṇya*. These are—

(1) *Puṇyānubandhī puṇya*—This type of *puṇya* (merit) is virtuous both in operation (*udaya*) and result (*phala-bhoga*). It also paves the way to salvation to *jīva*.

(2) *Pāpānubandhī puṇya*—This is a *puṇya*, which gives joy to

jīva, during operation; but leads it towards the wrong deeds. During this type of merit *jīva* earns *pāpas*.

For example, a man gets all types of worldly luxuries by his previously acquired meritorious deeds and in this life also he becomes virtuous, does philanthropic deeds, he keenly absorbs himself in such activities which may lead to the salvation, he acquires new *puṇyas*, while enjoying the consequences of previously acquired *puṇyas*. It is called *puṇyānubandhī puṇya*.

On the other hand, a man gets all means of happiness in world; but he leads a sinful life and earns new *pāpas* as the result of his bad activities. This kind of *puṇya* is called *pāpānubandhī puṇya*; because it is a cause of new *pāpas*.

In the Jaina literature, *puṇyānubandhī puṇya* is described like a guide, who leads *ātman* to his ultimate goal, i.e., salvation.

Quite reverse to it, *pāpānubandhī puṇya* is like a robber, who robs everything and makes man a beggar. So, this type of *puṇya* robs all the previously earned *puṇyas*; and becomes a cause of downfall of *jīva*.

Hence, *puṇyānubandhī puṇya* is regarded acceptable (*upādeya*) and *pāpānubandhī* as abandonable (*heya*).

TWO KINDS OF PĀPA

Like *puṇya*, *pāpa* is also of two kinds. These are—

(1) *Pāpānubandhī pāpa*—Troublesome in present experience and also acquires sinful *karmas* for future.

(2) *Puṇyānubandhī pāpa*—Troublesome in present experience but acquires meritorious *karmas* for future.

The first kind of *pāpa* is troublesome both for present and future. Because, due to this type of *pāpa*, *jīva* experiences agonies, pains, disame etc., in this life and also absorbs himself in sinful activities, so he acquires *pāpa-karmas* for future also. For example, butcher, fisherman are the men of this type.

The second type of *pāpa* is troublesome; but it acquires merits (*puṇyas*) for future. Because, due to this *pāpa*, though man experien-

ces miseries in present, but he absorbs himself in auspicious activities, so he earns *puṇyas* for future. Such persons are called as *pāpānu-bandhī puṇya jīvas*.

Hence, the principle of *pāpa* and *puṇya* is described in the Jaina literature with various points of view. By the noumenal point of view, being the fetters for *ātman*, regarded abandonable and kept in one category. While by behavioural point of view, *pāpā* is outrightly abandonable; but *puṇya* is acceptable upto some extent. Because, on account of this, *ātman* may progress and get the path of salvation, which is the ultimate goal and real home of mundane soul.



Principle of Āsrava (Influx) : a Study

PRINCIPLE OF ĀSRAVA (INFLUX)

The *āsrava*, in Jain *āgamas* and philosophy is defined thus—the thoughts, words and activities, by which the *pudgalas* of *karmavargaṇas* flow-in, to get connected with *ātma-pradeśas*, is *āsrava*. In other words, psychological, vocal and physiological activities—vibrations (*yoga*) of *ātman*, is *āsrava*.¹

Ātman and *pudgala*, both are of opposite nature. The qualities of *ātman* are—knowledge, consciousness and bliss; while that of *pudgala* are—touch, taste, smell and colour i. e., *rūpī*; it is also totally senseless, without consciousness and any kind of feeling. *Pudgala* is *rūpī* while *ātman* is *arūpī*.

Until and unless *ātman* remains in his own self nature, *karmas* do not inflow; but as soon as *ātman*, due to delusion, attracts towards other objects i. e., *para-bhāva* or *vibhāva*, the *pudgalas* of *kārmaṇa-vargaṇā*, which are called as *karmas*, flow-in. The way of flowing-in of *karmas* is called *āsrava*. *Ātman* gets *karmas* through *āsrava*.

As in a pond, water comes through a channel so the *karmas* come to the *ātman* through *āsrava*. Hence, *āsrava* or influx means the way of *karmas* to come to *ātman*.

FIVE TYPES OF ĀSRAVA

The causes of bondage are five, viz., *mithyātva* (wrong-belief),

1. (a) *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 6/2.
- (b) *Sūtrakṛtāṅga-Śīlāṅka-vṛtti*, 2/5/17, p. 128.
- (c) *Āvaśyaka-Hārībhadra-Vṛtti*, Mal. Hem. Hi. p. 84.
- (d) *Adhyātmasāra*, 18/131.

avirati (vowlessness), *pramāda* (negligence), *kaṣāya* (passion) and *yoga* (psychophysical activities). The thoughts of *ātman* by which *karmas* flow-in, is called *bhāvāsrava*, and flowing-in of *kārmic* matter is *dravyāsrava*. The emergence of *karma-paryāya* in the matter and coming upto *ātman* is *dravyāsrava*. Though wrong belief etc., five causes are called as thought-influx (*bhāvāsrava*); but really at the first moment these are the efficient causes of psycho-physical activities, which is the immediate cause of attracting the *kārmic* matter. So these (wrong-belief etc.) are called thought-influx. The next momentary thoughts are bondage. According to the varying intensity of thought-influx, the *kārmic* matter is attracted and attached with the soul.

The description of the five causes, i. e., wrong belief etc., is, briefly, as under—

1. WRONG BELIEF (*MITHYĀTVA*)

It means reverse or contrary belief; or lack of metaphysical knowledge. Due to wrong belief, a person considers non-living as living matter and vice-versa, he also cannot differentiate between *dharma* (path of salvation) and *adharma* (cause of bondage). He remains in illusory state.

Wrong belief is of two types : (1) natural (*naisargika* or *sahaja*) and (2) grasped (*gṛhīta*). Due to both of these wrong beliefs, the truth-seeking tendency cannot arise in the *jīva*. He exposes his belief in pseudo deities (*ku-deva*), pseudo-religion (*ku-dharma*), pseudo-saints (*ku-guru*) and public follies (*loka-mūḍhatā*).

Wrong belief is the root cause of the infinite *saṃsāra*.

2. VOWLESSNESS (*AVIRATI*)

Vowlessness means lack of control over five senses and mind. In this state, *jīva* does not renounce the sensual pleasures, even he has no wish to do so. He wants to enjoy sensual pleasures and has no inclination towards renunciation. Due to the intensive passions *ātman* cannot accept the vows of a monk (*śramaṇa-cāritra*) and not even householder's vows.

3. NEGLIGENCE (*PRAMĀDA*)

Negligence is the lack of enthusiasm towards the spiritual progress. It is of fifteen kinds, viz; (1-4) talks about food (*bhojan-kathā*), women (*strī-kathā*), ruler (*rāja-kathā*) and state (*deśa-kathā*),

(5-8) four passions —anger, pride, hyocrisy and greed (9-13) five kinds of sensual enjoyments, (14) sleep (15) affection. Being indulged in these fifteen kinds of worldly activities, the *jīva* forgets his own welfare and gives no preference to salvation-path (*mokṣa-mārg*.) Consequently, *jīva* begins to acquire *pāpa-karmas*. Whether he does or does not the sinful deeds, yet, on account of negligence, *pāpas* are acquired.

This is why, Bhagawāna Mahāvira said to his first disciple Gaṇadhara Gautama—

“Gautama ! Always be careful and do not be negligent for a single moment.”

4. PASSIONS (*KAṢĀYA*)

Passions (*kaṣāya*) are the root cause of misery, pain and agony etc., to *jīva*. These are the main causes of transmigration of the *jīva*.¹

Really the velocity of passions is very great. These are passions, which moves the *jīva* in the circle of life and death. As the passions extinguish, the circle of life and death stops. The passions keep the tree of transmigration green. Śāyambhava Suri said—“The uncontrolled passions keep the root of transmigration fresh, due to them it can not dry.”²

Passions are spiritual defects. May these be manifest or not, yet they make defective the inherent qualities of *ātman*. On account of these, *ātman* gets the pains, miseries and agonies etc., upto long-long time in this world. Ācārya Virasena in *Dhavlā*, says that passions make the *karma*-field fertile.

Passions are four in number, viz., anger (*krodha*), pride (*mānu*), deceitfulness (*māyā*) and greed (*lobha*). These are classified into two categories, i. e., attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*). Anger and pride are *dveṣa*, while deceitfulness and greed are *rāga*.

The four types of passions are fundamental passions. Besides these there are nine types of passions more. These are called *no-kaṣāyas* (quasi-passions).

1. *Pratikramasūtra-Vṛtti*—Ācārya Nami

2. *Daśavaikālika*, 8.

Some ācāryas have also classified four fundamental passions in many other ways, in *rāga* and *dveṣa*.

These *rāga-dveṣas* (attachment and aversion) are the main *āsravas* (influx). *Nyāya-sūtra*, *Gīta* and *Pāli Tripiṭaka* literature also ascertain the *rāga-dveṣas* the root of demerit or sin.

5. PSYCHO-PHYSICAL VIBRATIONS (YOGA)

The vibrations caused in *ātma-pradeśas*, due to mental, vocal and bodily movements, is called *yoga*. In *Yogabhāṣya* etc., *yoga* is described as the check of mental activities; but Jaina philosophy differs at this point. In Jaina philosophy *yoga* signifies the mental, vocal and physical activities. These activities make the contact of *karma-pudgalas* with the *ātma-pradeśas*, so these activities are called *yoga* and to check-up or control these *yogas* is termed as *dhyāna* (meditation).

Literally the word *yoga* means to add, to join, to contact. Jaina philosophy uses this term in the meaning—to contact the *karma-pudgalas* with *ātma-pradeśas*; while *yoga* philosophy means to join *ātma* with *paramātma*.

Really, *ātman* is an active substance. Due to mental, vocal, physical movements, the vibrations in *ātma-pradeśas* are caused. This activity continues upto 13th *guṇasthāna* (soul stage) i. e., *kevalin* state. The complete check up of *yogas* is possible only in 14th *guṇasthāna*. In this stage of soul the *jīva* becomes quite pure. According to Jaina philosophy, *jīva* can attain *nīrvāṇa* (salvation) only after the destruction of *kārmic* filth and *yogic* movements.

Yoga is influx (*āsrava*). Auspicious mental, vocal and physical activities causes auspicious influx (*śubha-āsrava*); while inauspicious activities becomes the cause of inauspicious influx (*aśubha-āsrava*). Inauspicious influx is also called meritorious (*Puṇya-āsrava*); while inauspicious influx denotes demeritorious (*pāpāsrava*).

TWO-FOLD DISTINCTIONS OF INFLUX (ĀSRAVA)

Influx (*āsrava*) is of two kinds—(1) Subtle influx (*īryāpathic āsrava*) and (2) *Sāṅgharāyika āsrava* (activities backed by passions).

Considered by the point of view of bondage, *īryāpathic āsrava*, is

is not the cause of *bandha*. Due to this kind of influx *kārmic pudgalas* flow in; but they do not combine with *ātma-pradeśas*; because the cause of bondage are passions and in this type of inflow, there is no existence of passions.

Sāṃparayika āsrava being backed by passions, is the cause of bondage. So, it is abandonable, for getting salvation.

INFLUX (ĀSRAVA) IN BUDDHIST LITERATURE

The original Buddhist literature is written in Pāli language and in Pāli word *āsrava* is transformed as *āsava*. Discussing *āsava* in Pāli literature, it is said—*Avidyā* is the cause of accepting any thing stable; while really it is unstable. *Āsava* is the cause of this *avidyā* (delusion).

Āsava is distinguished into four types :

(1) *Kāmāsava*—Desire to get sensual pleasures.

(2) *Bhavāsava*—Desire of life, i. e., non-desire towards death.

Due to this *āsava*, man wishes to live in the same body for a long time.

(3) *Dṛṣṭyāsava*—Opposite point of view that of Buddha philosophy.

(4) *Avidyāsava*—To accept unstable things as stable etc.

Āsava is the general result of *avidyā*; while sorrow, pain etc., are special results.¹

Professor Jacobi holds the view that "all the three words *āsrava*, *saṃvara* and *nirjarā* are as old as Jainism itself. Bauddhas have borrowed the word *āsrava* from Jainas, which is the most important among all the three. The Bauddhas use this word in the same meaning, as that of Jainas; but they make difference in literal usage. The cause of this difference is—they do not accept *karmas* as real entity and also does not accept *ātman*; and the existence of *āsrava* is only possible in *ātman*. This also proves that *karmavāda* (theory of *karmas*) is the original thing of Jainas and it is much more ancient than the beginning of Buddhism."²

1. (a) In *Aṅguttaranikāya* (3/58, 6, 63), three kinds of *āsravas* are described—(1) *kāmāsrava* (2) *bhavāsrava* and (3) *avidyāsrava*.

(b) *Jinadharmasār* (Hindi), p. 121.

2. *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, p. 472.

Principles of Saṁvara and Nirjarā: A Study

PRINCIPLE OF SAṂVARA

To check the influx (*āsrava*) is *saṁvara*. It is the principle, opposite to influx (*āsrava*). It checks the inflow of *kārmic* matter. *Āsrava* (influx) is like a channel through which the *kārmic* matter flow-in. By checking the same channel to stop the inflow of *kārmic* matter is *saṁvara*. The main function of *saṁvara*, is to check the impure activities of *ātman*, which are due to attachment and aversion (*rāga-dveṣa*).

Saṁvara is the activity of checking inflow (*āsrava*).¹ On account of *saṁvara* new *karmas* could not come and get contact with *ātma-pradeśas*.

There are two types or divisions and kinds of *Saṁvara*—(1) *Dravya Saṁvara* (material check-up of influx) and (2) *Bhāva-saṁvara* (thought check-up of influx).²

1. (a) *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9/1
(b) *Yogaśāstra*, 79
2. (a) *Yogaśāstra*, 79-80
(b) *Sihanāṅga*, 1/14 (*Ṭikā*)
(c) *Saptatattva-prakarāṇa*—*Hemacandra Sūri*, 112
(d) *Tattārtha-sarvārthasiddhi*, 9/1
(e) *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 2/34
(f) *Pañcāstikāya*, 2/142, *Amṛteन्द्रa-Vṛtti*.
(g) *Pañcāstikāya*, 2/142, *Jayasena-Vṛtti*.

Dravyasaṁvara (material check-up of influx) means the check-up of receiving the *karma-pudgalas*; while *bhāvasaṁvara* (thought check-up of influx) includes to give up the activities which are cause of increasing the circle of life and death, and to indulge himself in his own spiritual *sūddhopayoga* (natural conscious attentiveness). So, *samiti* (vigilance), *gupti* (self-restraint) etc., are regarded as *bhāva-saṁvara* (thought check-up of influx).

An example will be sufficient to clearly understand the subject.

Suppose, a man is throwing off water so that the pond may be empty. He is working hard; but the water of pond is as much as before was. What is the reason? The reason is that the water is regularly flowing in through the channels. How the pond may be empty? He should first of all check-up the channels so that water may not flow in. Then he should throw off the water. By this process the pond will be empty.

So is the position of *saṁvara*.

Now let us express the above example.

The *ātman* is a pond. The *karma* is like a water, which is filled in. *Āsravas* are the channels through the medium, new *karmas* regularly coming, as water flows in through channels. A devotee is throwing off *karmas* by meditation and penances; but he does not check-up the channels through which newly bound *karmas* are regularly flowing in. Imagine, how could he accomplish his goal of *mukti* or to be free from the ties of *karmas*?

Hence, *saṁvara* or to check-up the inflow of *karmas* is too much essential to get salvation.

TYPES OF SAṂVARA

Gupti (self-restraint), *samiti* (vigilance), *uttama kṣamā* (excellent forgiveness) etc. ten *śramaṇa dharmas*, *anuprekṣā* (reflection), *pariśaha-jaya* (victory over the hinderances during penances) and *charitra* (right conduct) are the ingredients of *saṁvara*, according to *Tattvārthasūtra*.¹ By all these, the *saṁvara* becomes complete. The

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9/2.

same view is adopted in *Navatattvaparakaraṇa*,¹ with slight difference in order. But the ingredients are the same as described by Umāswāmi in his *Tattvārthasūtra*.

Regarding the number of ingredients of *saṁvara*, there are many traditions.

But mainly there are five types of *saṁvara*²—

1. *Samyaktva*—to be free from wrong faith (*mithyātva*).
2. *Virata*—To renounce all the eighteen kinds of sinful activities.
3. *Apramāda*—to have a keen desire towards auspicious deeds or *dharma*.
4. *Akaṣāya*—subsidence (*upaśama*) of anger, pride, greed, hypocrisy etc.
5. *Ayoga*—stopping all the mental, vocal and bodily activities.

Besides these, to give up all the sins, like—violence, falseness, stealing, cohabitation or sexual desire, hallucination (*mārchā*) of possessions; to control all the five senses and to control the mental, vocal and physical activities are also *saṁvara*. In this way, there are 20 types of *Samhvara*.³

Śrī Devendra Sūri tells 57 types of *Samhvara*, viz., 5 *Samhi* (vigilance), 3 *gupti* (self-restraint), 10 *śramaṇa dharmas* (excellent forgiveness etc.) 12 *Anuprekṣās* (reflections), 22 *pariśaha-jaya* (victory over the hinderances during penances) and 5 *cāritra* (right conduct).⁴

Swāmi Kārtikeya in his *Dvādaśānuprekṣā*⁵ tells only four kinds of *saṁvara*. These are—(1) *Samyaktva-saṁvara*. (2) *Virati saṁvara*. It is of two kinds—(i) partial or small vows (*Deśa-virati*) and (ii) great vows or complete vows (*mahāvratā*). Partial vows are for

1. *Navatattva-prakaraṇa* 25.

2. (a) *Sthānāṅga*, 5/2/418.

(b) *Samavāyāṅga*, 5.

3. There is the description of 5 great vows in—*Praśna-Vyākaraṇa*, *saṁvara dvāra*; *Sthānāṅga* 5/2/418 and 10/1/79.

4. *Navatattva-prakaraṇa*, 42.

5. *Dvādaśānuprekṣā—saṁvarānuprekṣā*, 95.

house-holder and great vows for a monk. (3) *Kaṣāya saṁvara* (passions), and (4) *Yogābhāva saṁvara*, i.e., stopping the activities of of mind, body and speech.

Ācārya Kundakunda in *Samayasāra*¹ tells four types of *Samvara*. (1) *mithyātva* (wrong faith) (2) *ajñāna* (nescience), (3) *avirati* (vowlessness) and (4) *yoga* (activities of mind, speech and body)—these are *āsravas*; and to stop all these is *saṁvara*. Hence, *saṁvara* is also of four types.

As far as there is *āsrava*, due to it, the *ātma-pradeśas* (the space-points of *ātman*) always remain vibrating. This vibration stops only when the inflow of *karmas* checked up. So, it can be said that the restlessness of *ātma-pradeśas* is *āsrava* and the calmness is *saṁvara*. The restlessness of *ātma-pradeśas*, which is due to *āsrava* turns into calmness, as soon as the *āsrava* or influx of *karmas* is stopped. Due to *āsrava* there is regular inflow of *karma-pudgalas* in *ātma-pradeśas* and this inflow is stopped by *saṁvara*.² Therefore it is definite that the main cause of transmigration (*saṁsāra*) are *āsrava* (influx) and *bandha* (bondage) while that of salvation are *saṁvara* (stopping of influx) and *nirjarā* (shedding or annihilation of *karmas*).³

BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF SĀMVARA

Tathāgata Buddha also accepts *saṁvara*. In *Aṅguttaranikāya*, he tells that *āsrava* can be checked up by *saṁvara*. There the division of *saṁvara* is as follows:—

(1) By senses (*indriyas*)—By the *saṁvara* (checking up) of senses, the type of *āsrava*, which is possible due to senses, extinguishes.

(2) By *pratisevanā*—If a man does not eat food, drink water, wear clothes and take medicine, etc., then his mind can not be happy and due to unhappiness he is bounded with *kārmic* ties. Therefore, to keep the mind happy, he should take all these things. By this the inflow of *karmas* is checked up.

1. *Samayasāra*, 190-191.

2. *Tattvārtha-sarvārthasiddhi*, 9/1

3. *Tattvārtha-sarvārthasiddhi*, 1/4

But here he (*Tathāgata*) warns that if food is taken for tastefulness than it would be the cause of *āsrava* (inflow of karmas).

(3) By *adhivāsanā* (tolerance)—A man, who wants to tolerate the physical hardship then he does not like bodily pleasures. For such a man, the tolerance of bodily hardships is the cause of checking up the inflow of *karmas* (*āsrava-nirodha*)

(4) By *parivarjanā* (forbearance)—Fierce animals, like—elephant, lion, tiger etc., and poisonous creatures, like—scorpion, snake etc., the places full of thorns, the meantype friends etc.,—all these are painful to a man. Therefore, all of these should be forbidden. By it, also, the *āsrava* could be checked-up.

Here, it can be said that the *Tathāgata* Buddha does not believe in *Kāyakeśa tapa* (mortification of the body). He wants that the devotees and monks should forbid all the painful circumstances and should live in peaceful places, so that the external causes of *karma-bandha* (bondage of *karmas*) may not arise.

(5) By *vinodanā*—A devotee and a monk and even a layman should not indulge in the vain discussions, like—*himsa-Vitarka* (violent-discussions), *pāpa-vitarka* (discussions regarding sins), *kāma-vitarka* (discussions regarding mean and false desires, sensual pleasures etc.); because all of these are *bandhaka-vitarkas* (bounding discussions for *ātman*). By forbidding these *bandhaka-vitarkas*, this type of *āsrava* can be checked up.

(6) By *bhāvanā* (reflection)—*Āsrava* is also possible due to inauspicious reflections. If a man does not indulge himself in the auspicious reflections then the reverse, i. e., inauspicious *karmas* may flow in. For stopping these inauspicious *karmas* or *āsrava*, a man should always keep auspicious thoughts in his heart and head.¹

Aṅguttaranikāya also asserts that the checking up of *avidyā* (hallucination) is the checking up of *āsrava*.²

1. *Aṅguttaranikāya*, 6/58.

2. *Ibid*, 6/63

PRINCIPLE OF NIRJARĀ

Nirjarā means the annihilation or shedding off the *karmas*. In the order of *sapta tattvas* (seven essential elements), it comes after *saṁvara*. *Saṁvara* stops the inflow of new *karmas*; while *nirjarā* means the destruction of previous bound *karmas*. As the water of a pond dries up by the sharp sun-light, air, etc., if the inflow channels have been stopped. So the *karmas*, previously bound with the *ātma-pradeśas* are annihilated gradually, if the inflow of new *karmas* have been stopped by *saṁvara*. By this point of view *nirjarā* means the partial separation of *karma-vargaṇās* from the *ātma-pradeśas*.¹ According to *Dvādaśānuprekṣā*, *nirjarā* means the separation of *karma-vargaṇās* or aggregate of *kārmic* matter from *ātma-pradeśas*.² Umāswāmi says in his *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, being ripen by penances etc., the separation of *karmas* is called *nirjarā*.³

Suppose, a man is washing his dirty coat with washing powder or soap; but the dirt does not come out at the very moment. It comes out gradually as the soap enters through the threads of the coat. As much as the soap enters through the threads, the filth comes out. This can be an example of *nirjarā*. The ascetic or devotee as much indulges himself in penances, so much the *karma-vargaṇās* separate from *ātma-pradeśas*. Here we may take coat or cloth as *ātman*, the threads of which it is made as *pradeśas* and filth as the *karma-vargaṇās* or the *kārmic* matter. The ascetic has checked the inflow of new *karmas* by *saṁvara* and began the penances; but the filth of previously accumulated *kārmic* matter takes time to separate. As much as the filth of *karmas* removed from *ātman*, so much the spirit or soul becomes pure. Complete exhaustion of *karmas* is the pure state of soul and this is the salvation.

Nirjarā is like the ladders for getting the pure state of soul. As a man reaches the upper storey by step by step and every step should be firm and steady. So to get salvation *ātman* also have to march forward by steady steps.

1. *Tattvārtha-sarvārthsiddhi*, 1/4

2. *Kārtikeya-dvādaśānuprekṣā*, 66.

3. *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya*, *Haribhadriya-vṛtti*, 1/4.

Nirjarā is of two kinds, viz., (i) *sakāma nirjara* and (ii) *akāma nirjarā*.

The shedding of *karmas* on account of *vrata* (vows) etc., is called *sakāma nirjarā* and the annihilation of *kārmic* matter, ripen itself is *akāma nirjarā*.¹ In *akāma nirjarā*, *kārmic* matter separates itself after fruition and giving effects.

Vāchaka Umāswāti gives two types of *nirjarā*, as (i) *abuddhipūrvaka* (without the use of intellect) and (2) *kuśalamūla* (with intellect). The *kārmic* experience which the *jīva* gets unintellectually in the *narak gatis* etc., is called *abuddhipūrvaka nirjarā*. The *nirjarā* or shedding off *karmas* by penances, vows etc., is *kuśalamūla*.²

Swāmi Kārtikeya also describes two types of *nirjarā*. He says that the fruition power (the power by which the *ātman* experiences the effects of the *karmans*) of knowledge obscuring *karmans* etc., (*jñānāvaraṇīya karma* etc.) eight *karmans* is called their intensity (*amubhāga* or *rasa* or *vipāka*.) After the operation (*udaya*) of *karmas* and giving their fruits to *ātman* the *karma pudgalas* are separated from *ātma-pradeśas*. It is called *nirjarā* (shedding off the *karmas*). It is of two kinds—(1) *swa-kāla-prāpta* (at the completion of duration of time), and (2) *tapah-kṛta* (by penances etc.).

The first type of *nirjarā* or the exhaustion of previously accumulated *karmas* i. e., *swa-kālaprāpta nirjarā* is always in existence of all the *jīvas* of four *gatis*. It is regular, without any interruption. The second type *nirjarā*, *tapah-kṛta nirjarā* can be done only the vowful (*vratayukta*) *jīvas*, i. e., the *jīvas* who have accepted the vows.³

The *Candraprabhacarita* states—the exhaustion of *karmas* i. e., *nirjarā* is of two types, viz., (1) *Kāla-kṛta* (by the completion of duration of time) and (2) *upakrama-kṛta*. After experiencing the effects of *karmas*, the shedding off the *karma-pudgalas* is *kāla-jā nirjarā*

1. *Dharmaśarmābhodayam* 21/122-23.

2. *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya* 9/7

3. *Dvādaśanuprekṣā—Nirjarānuprekṣā*, 103-104.

(separation of *karmas* on the completion of the duration of time). The *upkrama-kṛta nirjarā* takes place by penances etc.¹

The *Tattvārthasāra* states—after the experience of effects, the annihilation of *karmas*, is *vipakajā nirjarā*, and to experience the *karmas*, which are not in operation, bringing in operation *āvalikā* (*udayāvalikā*) is *avipākajā nirjarā*.²

Really, *akāma-nirjarā* is automatic. It needs no efforts on the part of *ātman*. The other names *swakālaprāpta*, *abuddhipūrvaka*, *kāla-kṛta*, etc., also denotes the same fact. All the thinkers have the same opinion about this type of *nirjarā*; but they differ regarding *sakāma-nirjarā*.

Some of the differences of great thinkers are given here.

Sakāma-nirjarā is possible only by those who have adopted vows (*aṃuvratas* and *mahāvratas*) and self-control (*saṃyama*) and the *akāma nirjarā* takes place with all the rest *saṃsārī jīvas*—says Hemacandra Sūri.³

In the opinion of Swāmi Kārtikeya—*akāma nirjarā* is the regular formality of all the mundane souls residing in four *gatis* and *sakāma nirjarā* is possible only by the souls who have adopted vows.⁴

Generally prevailed phrase '*avipākā munīndrānām savipākākhi-lātmānām*' (*avipāka nirjarā* is possible only by the Jaina monks, who have adopted *mahāvratas* and *savipāka nirjarā* pertains to all the mundane souls) shows the above mentioned phantom.

A general view also prevails that only the souls having right faith (*Samyag-dṛṣṭi jīva*) can do *sakāma nirjarā*; while the souls deluded in wrong faith (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi jīva*) can not do it.

Paṇḍit Kṛpābacandra Siddhāntśāstrī gives his conviction in the following words—*yathākāla nirjarā* (shedding off *karma pudgalas*

1. *Candraprabhacaritaṃ* 18/109-110.

2. *Tattvārthasāra* 7/2-4.

3. *Sapta-tattva prakaraṇa*, gāthā 128.

4. *Dvādaśānuprekṣā—Nirjarānuprekṣā*, 104.

after completing the duration time) is the regular process, and it pertains to all the mundane souls; because all the previously accumulated *karma-pudgalas* sheds off themselves after the specified duration of time, giving their effects (good or bad) to the *jīva*. So this type of *nirjarā* should not be regarded as the element of *nirjarā*; because it does not help *jīva* to get salvation. The other type of *nirjarā*, i.e., shedding off the *karmas* by effort, is possible by penances, vows etc. Really, this must be called as principle of *nirjarā*; because it is the cause of salvation. Thus there is basic difference in the cause and effect of both types of *nirjarā* ¹

Hence it may be concluded that the annihilation of *karmas* due to penances, vows etc., is *sakāma nirjarā*.

The wet cloth dries up sooner, when we spread it under sharp sun-light; and if do not do so, then it would take too much time to dry. The same position is with *nirjarā*.

When a person (devotee or ascetic) indulges himself wisely and with discrimination in penances and vows, keeping only the aim of *karma-nirjarā* in his mind, then the *sakāma nirjarā* takes place. While *akāma nirjarā* is the result of unwise and without owning *mahāvratas*, penances etc., and the shedding off the *karmas* on the completion of their specified period.

Undiscriminatory and without self-control (*saṁyama*) the penances etc., are called unwise hardships (*Bālatapa*). Though *Bālatapa* is also a cause of *karma-nirjarā* and by it *jīva* can get worldly and sensenel pleasures; but it cannot be the cause of self-purification.

The one and only goal of the devotee is to break all the ties of *karmas*, which are accumulated in the *ātman* from the times beginningless (*anādikāla*), and attain salvation. So, it is suggested in *Daśavaikālika*— 'a devotee should never practise penance, meditation etc., to get worldly pleasures, like—fame, immense riches, wealth, majesty, grandeur etc., during other life etc., but he should practise penances etc., only with the aim of *nirjarā*. '

1. *Subhāṣya Tattvārthasūtra*, p. 378.

2. *Daśavaikālika* 9/3

TYPES OF NIRJARĀ

The covering of *karmas* around *ātman*, is destructed by penances. So the penances are also regarded as *nirjarā*.¹

The *Sthānāṅgasūtra* ascerts as *ege nījjarā*—one *nirjarā*.² There we get only these general wordings; but elsewhere twelve types of *nirjarā* are described.

As the fire has no distinctions, while we consider its nature; but due to instrumental causes (*nimitta kāraṇa*), it has distinctions, like—wood-fire, stone-fire etc. So being *nirjarā* as one, with the point of view of its nature; but due to instrumental causes it is divided in twelve types.³

There are innumerable kinds of penances (*tapas*), like—*kanakāvali* etc., so *nirjarā* may also be of innumerable types.⁴

Ācārya Abhayadeva writes in his *vytti* of *Sthānāṅga*—‘Considered from the point of view of *karmans*, *nirjarā* is of eight types; because *karmans* (knowledge obscuring *karman* etc.) are also of eight types. Being a produce of twelve types of penances, *nirjarā* is also of twelve kinds. As *nirjarā* is the result of many causes, like—*akāma* (without any desire) tolerating hunger, thirst, cold, heat etc., and the vow of celibacy etc., it (*nirjarā*) is also of many types.⁵

But mainly, there are twelve types of *nirjarā*, on account of twelve types of penances. All the thinkers are one-minded on this point. These twelve types of *nirjarā* or *tapas* (austerities) are as follow:—

1. Fasting (*anaśana*)
2. Eating less than one's fill or hunger (*ūnodarī*)
3. Taking a definite vow secretly to accept food from a householder only if certain condition is fulfilled (*bhikṣācarī*).

1. *Navatattva-prakaraṇa*, 11, *bhāṣya* 90, by Devagupta Sūri

2. *Sthānāṅga* 9/16—*Ege nījjarā*.

3. *Śāntasudhārāsa*—*Nirjarā Bhāvanā*, 2-3, *Vinayavijaya* jī.

4. *Navatattva-prakaraṇa*, 11, *Devagupta Sūri*.

5. *Sthānāṅga*, 1/16, *Ṭikā*.

4. Abstinence from one or more of the six objects of taste (*rasa-parityāga*).

These *rasas* or tastes are—1. *Kaṭu* (sour), 2. *Madhura* (sweet), 3. *Āmla* (acidic), 4. *Tikta* (bitter) 5. *Kāṣāya* (astringent) and 6. *Lavaṇa* (saltish).

5. Mortification of the body or to tolerate the pains, griefs given by other beings or aroused by previously accumulated demeritorious *karmas* (*kāyakleṣa*).

6. To be static in self-nature (*pratisamḥīnatā*).

7. Expiation (*prāyaścitta*).

8. Modesty (*vinaya*)

9. Servitude (*vatīyāvṛtya*).

10. Self-study (*swādhyāya*).

11. Meditation (*dhyāna*).

12. Giving up through non-attachment (*vyūtsarga*).

Among these twelve *tapas* (penances), first six are external penances or austerities (*bāhya tapas*) and the last six are internal austerities (*antaraṅga tapas*).

ANAŚANA (FASTING)

Fasting (*anaśana*) is the first of the external austerities. It is much more difficult to practise in comparison to other austerities. In this type of austerity a devotee has to win victory on hunger, and it is well known to all that hunger is too difficult to win. In other words, it can be said that hunger has got victory over every *jīva* of the world. It is a hero, who can be termed as world-victorious. Every type of sin is the consequence of hunger. But a devotee has to win this world-famous hero.

To win hunger and control the mind is *anaśana* austerity. Only to remain hungry cannot be regarded *anaśana* austerity. Many man and animals, creatures etc., have to remain hungry when they could not get food and drinking water. But their being hungry can not be regarded as austerity. It would be austerity when a devotee can get food easily, but he wilfully keeps fast and

controls his mind and indulges himself in auspicious and religious activities.

Considering from medicinal point of view, fasting is a cause of bodily-purification. It is the maxim of *vaidyaka śāstra*—to keep fast is the best medicine (*Lahghanam paramausadham*). The fast does not only purify the body but it also purifies the mind even.

Gītā says, by giving up to eat food the senses become pure and consequently mind also becomes pure.¹ That is why, a Vedic saint has said—‘there is no hardship greater than fast. But generally it is very difficult to practise, nay only difficult but most difficult to the superlative degree.’²

Really, to keep fast and observe *anaśana tapa* is a fire-bath. One, who can practise it, will be capable to burn all the filth of body and mind. He will shine like a sparkling star.

Gaṇadhara Gautama once asked humbly to Bhagawāna Mahāvira—Venerable! By keeping fast (*anaśana*) *jīva* accomplishes what?

Venerable Bhagawāna Mahāvira replied thus—O Gautama! By practising *anaśana tapa*, *jīva* is bereaved from the desire of living, alias his attachment towards the body and vital forces (*prāṇa*).³

Consequently the ascetic gets bereavement from the attachment towards his vital forces and body.

One thinker warned the person, while keeping fast, not to do three deeds, viz., (1) anger (2) pride and (3) negligence (*pramāda*). He as well suggested to do three deeds viz., (1) to observe celibacy (2) study the holy scriptures and (3) self-realisation.

The word *anaśana* means forbearance of food. It may be at least for one day and at the most of six months and in special circumstances life-long.

1. *Bhagavadgītā* 2/59.

2. *Maitrāyaṇī Āraṇyaka* 10/62.

3. *Uttarādhyayana* 29/35.

There are two distinctions of *anaśana*—(1) *Itwarika* (for specified period) and (2) *Yāvat-kathika*—life long or upto death.¹

During *itwarika tapa*, there remains the limit of specified period and after this period, the fast-keeper has the desire of getting food in his mind. So it is called as the austerity with desire (*sāvakāṅkṣa tapa*); while during *yāvat-kathika tapa*, there is no existence of desire regarding getting food. So it called as austerity without desire (*niravakāṅkṣa tapa*).²

There are innumerable kinds of *itwarika tapa*, i. e., to keep fast like—*Navakārasī* (for 48 minutes), *porasī* (for 3 hours), *pūrvārdha* (for beginning half of the day, i. e., for six hours from rising the sun) *divasa-carima* (for full day, it begins from the sun-set of the previous day and completes in the morning of the day-after) *caturtha-bhakta* (a full day-night fast), *rātribhojanatyāga* (not to eat and drink any thing after sunset upto the sun-rise the next day, i. e. full night) *chaṭṭha-bhakta* (two full day-night) etc. etc.³

Yāvat-kathika anaśana is of two types—(1) *pādapopagamana* and (2) *bhakta-pratyākhyāna*.⁴

During *bhakta pratyākhyāna*, besides giving up the food, it is necessary for a devotee to pass every moment in studying holy scriptures, meditation and self-realisation.

Pādapopagamana is harder than *bhakta-pratyakhyana*. During this type of *anaśana*, the devotee becomes static like a stalk. He does not even change his posture and remains in the same posture, in which he has accepted the vow of *anaśana*. For example, if he is standing then he will not sit, nor will lie or vice versa. If his eyes were open, he will not shut them and vice versa.

1. *Bhagavati* 25/7

2. *Uttarādhyayana* 30/9

3. *Jainadharma me Tapa : Swarūp and Viśleṣaṇa*, pp. 181-199 by Muniśrī Miśrīmalajī.

4. *Uvavāi sūtra*

For *pādapopagmana anaṣana* and *santhārā*, it is quite necessary that man must have *vajra-ṛṣabha nārāc saṅghanana*¹ of his body, otherwise it is impossible to be static like a mountain. Therefore it is not possible for other or general men. *Āgamas* definitely ascerts that with the dispersion (*vicheda*) of 14 *purvas* the *pādapopagmana santhārā* also disjuncts.

ĪNODARĪ

The next type of *nirjarā* is *ūnodarī* (eating less than one's hunger). It is second external austerity. It is also called *avamau-darya*. It can be said as to eat little food or limited food. Like food, *ūnodarī* also pertains to passions and possessions as well.

There are two division of *ūnodarī*—(1) *Dravya* (regarding matter or external) and (2) *Bhāva* (thought or internal).

Dravya ūnodarī is of many kinds.

Bhāva ūnodarī means to subside the passions, like—anger, pride, hypocrisy, greed and to speak as little as possible, not to come into conflict with any body, etc.

Really speaking *Dravya-ūnodarī* (external) makes the external life of an ascetic light and easy; while internal (*bhāva*) *ūnodarī* paves the way for attaining mental and internal happiness and the evolution of good qualities.

BHIKṢĀCARĪ

In general sense *bhikṣācarī* is to get food from a house-holder, but for Jaina monks it is an external austerity, because he accepts food and drinking water only when his secretly adopted vow and certain conditions are fulfilled. He is not a general beggar who can accept every and any kind of food. He accepts it according to his vows and limitations.

Ācārya Haribhadra Sūri describes three kinds of *bhikṣā*—(1) *Dīna-ṛtīl*, (2) *Pauruṣaghnī*, and (3) *Sarvasampatkārī*.²

1. It is the special type of bondage of the bones. It is such a strong, that cannot be broken or cut by the sharpest weapons.
2. *Aṣṭaka-prakarana* 5/1

The poor, orphans, oppressed, down-trodden, grief-stricken, and deaf-dumb-blind-maim etc., who takes food by begging is called beggary or *Dīna-vṛttī bhikṣā*.

Strong, sturdy, healthy persons capable to earn their livelihood, when beg to get food, it is called *pauruṣaghnī bhikṣā*. This type of beggary depresses the manhood and vigour of a person, so it is regarded the meanest type of beggary.

The non-violent and content saints take food according to their limitations from a house-holder only for giving dose (diet) to the belly is called *sarva-sampatkārī bhikṣā*. By it both the taker and giver gets auspicious *gatis*.

In the *āgamas*, there is the description of many kinds of *bhikṣācārī*.¹

Jaina monk accepts the alms only when it is completely faultless and without any kind of shortcomings.²

RASA-PARITYĀGA

Rasa literally means—enjoyment increasing ingredients. The ingredients, which inspires attachment towards any thing, like—food etc., is called *rasa*. There are six kinds of *rasas* regarding food. These are—(1) *Kaṭu* (sour) (2) *Madhura* (sweet) (3) *Āmla* (acidic) (4) *Tikta* (bitter) (5) *Kāṣāya* (astringent) and (6) *Lavaṇa* (saltish).

By these *rasas* the food becomes tasty and delicious; and being so it is eaten more than hunger. So the *rasas* are also called inspiring elements.³

Vigayas, like—Milk, curd, ghee, etc., are also called *rasas*.

Why these milk etc., are called *vigaya*? This question is answered by Ācārya Siddhasena. He says—by eating or taking these the perversion (*vikāra*) arouses in the tendency of *ātman*. So

1. (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 30/25

(b) *Sthānāṅga*, 6

2. (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 24/11-12

(b) *Piṇḍaniryukti* 92-93.

3. *Uttarādhyayana* 32/10.

the person falls down from the highest altar of *Samyama* (self-control) and consequently he has to go to *vigati* or *durgati* (downward conditions of mundane soul). Therefore, these things are the causes of sad effects (*vikṛti*) and bad or inauspicious *gati* (*vigati*). Hence, things are called *vigatī*.¹

But it should be remembered that the healthy diet is not altogether denied to monk. He can take *vigaya*, according to his needs, but he does not take it for the sake of taste only. For taste-sake even to chew and suck the food is also regarded as defect.²

Different types are described of *rasas* also.

KĀYAKLEŚA

Kāyakleśa literally means to give turmoil to the body. The turmoil or trouble are of two types—(1) *swa-kṛta* (done by own-self) and (2) *para-kṛta* (done by others). The ascetic keeps no inclination or attachment towards his body. He firmly believes that *ātman* and body both are quite separate from each other.

Ācārya Bhadrabāhu wrote in his *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*—‘*ātman* and body are quite different’—by this type of pure intelligence, the ascetic renounces the attachment towards his body, which is the cause of grief and *ain*.³

The thinking of spiritual thinker is thus—the pains, troubles and miseries are all to the body; not to me (self). The pain may be to body through trouble and turmoil. The body may be destroyed by the strokes of weapons. But *ātman* can never be destroyed, it can never be destructed (*natthi jīvaṣṣa naṣu tti*).⁴ He thinks that I, i. e., my soul is full of conscience, cognition and bliss etc. No power of the world is capable to destroy it. It can never be destructed. Fire cannot burn it and water cannot drench it. It is pure and blissful and this is my own nature.

1 (a) *Pravacanasāroddhāra Vṛtti*—*Pratyākhyānavāra*.

(b) *Yogaśāstra*, 3 *Prakāśa-Vṛtti*.

2 (a) *Bhagavati* 7, 1

(b) *Ācārāṅga* 8, 6

3 *Āvaśyaka-niryukti* 1547

4 *Uttarādhyayana* 2, 27

By the dint of this thinking and having deep faith to the core about *ātma-svarūpa* (nature of self) the ascetic tolerates all the agonies peacefully.

Sihānāṅgasūtra describes the type of *Kāya-kleṣa*—*Kāyotsarga*, meditation by *utkaṭuka* posture, to accept *pratima* (a special type of vow); *virāsana*, sitting in *pālathī* posture for the study of holy scriptures, stand erect (*Daṇḍāyat*) posture, meditation in standing posture.¹

Fourteen types of *Kāyakleṣa* are described in *uvavāī sūtra*.²

This shows that *Kāyakleṣa tapa* is the mortification of body.

PATISAMĪNATĀ

The process of bringing soul to its own nature, by taking off from external thoughts, is called *Pratisamīnatā*. So *samīnatā* is *svaīnatā* (to remain in own nature). To restraint internally, the passions, senses and *yogas*, bringing back from external tendencies, is *samīnatā*.

Bhagavatī sūtra has given four distinctions of *pratisamīnatā*. These are : (1) *indriya* (sense) *pratisamīnantā*, (2) *kaṣāya* (passions) *pratisamīnatā*, (3) *yoga samīnatā*, and (4) *vivikta śaiyyāsana* (sitting and stopping in a lonely place).³

PRĀYAŚCITTA

Prāyaścitta is the formation of two words—‘*prāyaḥ*’ and ‘*citta*’. The word ‘*Prāyaḥ*’ denotes sin and the word ‘*citta*’ denote *viśodhana* (purification). So *prāyaścitta* (expiation) is the process of purifying the sinful activities.⁴

According to Ācārya Akalaṅka offence is ‘*prāyaḥ*’ and ‘*citta*’ means purification. Hence *prāyaścitta* is the process by which crimes or offences are get purified.⁵

1 *Sihānāṅga* 7, 544

2 *Uvavāī*—*Samavasaraṇa adhikāra*,

3 *Bhagavatī* 25, 7

4 *Dharmasaṅgraha* 3, *adhikāra*.

5 *Tattvārtha-rājavārttika*, 9, 22, 1

In the Prākṛta language word '*prāyaścitta*' is termed as *pāya-cchitta*'. The origination of word '*pāyacchitta*' has been described thus—'*pāya*' means *pāpa* (sin or demerit) and '*cchitta*' means destruction. In this way, the process which destroys sin, is '*pāyacchitta* (expiation).'¹

There is a vast difference between expiation and punishment.

Suppose, a man has done a wrong deed due to negligence. After it he repents heartily for this wrong deed. He goes to his elders and clearly tells them all about his wrong activity and prays them to give any kind of punishment for the purification of that misdeed. He accepts the punishment told by the elders and practises the hardships etc., then it is expiation.

Now we take punishment. The ruler gives punishment to a criminal. First of all, he does not confess his guilt. He tells thousands of lies to escape himself from punishment. The judge or ruler needs proofs and witnesses to ascribe crime. If anyhow the crime is proved and he sentenced a legal punishment. Still there is no repentance in his mind and heart. He accuses judge, advocates and witnesses. So there is no chance of reform of the criminal by punishment.

Another difference is that, when expiation is self-punishment; while punishment is external. First is internal and second is external.

Ten types of *prāyaścitta* are described in *Sthānaṅga sūtra*.²

By *prāyaścitta* (expiation) the defects are removed and the heart becomes pure. The simple hearted man can practise *prāyaścitta* (expiation).

VINAYA

Vinaya (modesty) is directly related to heart. It is a spiritual quality.

The word *Vinaya* (modesty) has been used in three different meanings, in the Jaina literature. These are—

1 *Pañcāśaka sūṭika, Vivaraṇa* 16-3

2 (a) *Sthānaṅga*, 10 (b) *Bhagavatī*, 25, 7

- (1) *Vinaya*—discipline
- (2) *Vinaya*—self-control, *śīla*, good conduct.
- (3) *Vinaya*—*namratā* (modesty) good behaviour.

Ācārya Abhayadeva wrote in *Sthānāṅga-vṛtti*—*Vinaya* removes all the eight type of *karmans* and by it soul gets salvation.¹

In the *vṛtti* of the *Pravacanasāroddhāra*, it has been suggested that *Vinaya* refers to the removal of the *karmas* which lead to afflictions and which are enemies of the soul.

In the *āgama* literature like the *Bhagavatī*, distinctions have been made of the *Vinaya* : (1) *Darśana Vinaya* (2) *Jñāna Vinaya* (3) *Cāritra Vinaya* (4) *Mana Vinaya* (5) *Vacana Vinaya* (6) *Kāya Vinaya* and (7) *Lokopacāra Vinaya*.²

Vinaya (modesty) and formal courtesy or flattery (*cāpalūsī*) are diametrically opposed to each other. In the *vinaya* there is sincerity and the openness of the heart, but courtesy expresses only formality. It may not have sincerity. On the contrary, it may have veiled hypocrisy.

VAIYYĀVṚTYA (SERVITUDE)

Vaiyyāvṛtya refers to protection and service of things and individuals leading to the attainment of the righteousness. Through service, it is possible to be free from the *Nāma* and *Gotra karma*.³ Service to the diseased persons, the *sādhus* and the *ācāryas* leads us towards *Nirjarā*. Real and devoted service leads us to the freedom from the wheel of *saṃsāra*.⁴

Sthānāṅga mentions eight commandments and out of these two refer to the service to humanity.⁵

In the *Bhagavatī sūtra*⁶ ten types of *vaiyyāvṛtya* has been suggested.

1 *Sthānāṅga*, 6, *Ṭikā*.

2 (a) *Bhagavatī* 25, 7 (b) *Sthānāṅga* 7 (c) *Aupapātika*, *tapuvarṇana*.

3 *Uttarādhyayana* 29, 3

4 *Sthānāṅga* 5, 1

5 *Sthānāṅga* 8

6 (a) *Bhagavatī* 35, 7 (b) *Sthānāṅga* 10

A poet has praised the qualities of the *Vaiyyāvṛtya* and says that the excellence of service is so great that even the *yogīs* cannot easily understand its importance.

SVĀDHYĀYA (SELF-STUDY)

Svādhyāya refers to self-study. It is a systematic study of the *śāstras*.¹ *Svādhyāya* also means introspection on the nature of self.²

The self-study increases the capacity of intellect. As food is necessary for the development of the body, self-study is absolutely necessary for the development of the mind. Self-study and contemplation, lead us towards creative thinking and towards the development of the mental capacity.

Wrong types of physical exercises are harmful to the body. Unwholesome food is injurious to the body. Similarly, study of literature like—sex literature, would be very harmful to the purification and to the development of the mental states in the proper direction. Mental activities become distorted and one loses the power of discrimination. It would, therefore, be necessary that we always study wholesome literature, although we may study less.

It is possible to be free from misery, through *svādhyāya*.³ The accumulated *karma* coming from a chain of previous life can be annihilated by *svādhyāya*.⁴ *Svādhyāya*, itself is a form of important *tapas*. Ācārya Saṅghadāsagaṇī says, that *svādhyāya*, is unique and the austerity of *svādhyāya* is unparallel because such noble type of austerity has not been experienced in the past, nothing so great in the present and nothing similar to it in future.⁵

The Vedic seers have also said that *svādhyāya* is a form of the *tapas*.⁶ We should not be negligent of *svādhyāya*.⁷ Just as the wall becomes shining by constant rubbing and polishing, it reflects the

1 *Sthānāṅga*, *Abhavadeva vṛtti* 5, 3, 465

2 *Svasya svasmīn adhyāyaḥ—adhyayanaḥ—svādhyāyaḥ*.

3 *Uttarādhyayana* 26, 10

4 *Chandraprajñapti* 91

5 (a) *Bṛhatkalpa bhāṣya* 1169 (b) *Candraprajñapti sūtra* 89

6 *Taittirīya āraṇyaka* 2, 14

7 *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 1, 11, 1

image of the persons standing in front of it, so also *svādhyāya* if done carefully and seriously and without fault, becomes transparent and it reflects the essence of all the *śāstras*. Patañjali has said that it is possible to get the direct experience of the deities through *svādhyāya*.¹

Svādhyāya can be distinguished into five types as (1) *Vācanā* (reading), (2) *Pracchanā* (interrogation), (3) *Parivartanā* (rotating or repeating loudly), (4) *Anuprekṣā* (psychic preparation through meditation) and (5) *Dharmakathā* (listening to religious stories).²

DHYĀNA (MEDITATION)

Dhyāna is concentration of mind. Ācārya Hemacandra says that *Dhyāna* is the concentration of mind on a particular subject.³ Bhadrabāhu also says, that *Dhyāna* refers to the concentration of the mind on a particular subject and fixing the mind on that subject.⁴

Dhyāna is of two types : (1) auspicious and (2) inauspicious. Inauspicious *Dhyāna* (*aprasasta*) is of two types : (i) *Ārtadhyāna* (concentration of mind on things of the world) and (ii) *Raudradhyāna* (revengeful concentration). Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara has said "*Subhaika pratyayo dhyānaḥ*."⁵ It means auspicious *dhyāna* is concentration of mind on an auspicious object. It is suggested that the one who aims at the highest form of self-concentration which is called *samādhi* must avoid *Ārta* and *Raudradhyāna* and he must practise righteous concentration (*Dharmadhyāna*) and pure concentration (*Śukladhyāna*).⁶

Dharmadhyāna consists in the concentration of the mind on the auspicious and righteous objects. It is also been described as self-concentration i. e., concentration on the self by the self.⁷ In this

1 *Yogadarśana* 2, §44

2 (a) *Bhagavatī* 25, 7 (b) *Sthānāṅga* 5

3 *Abhidhāna cintāmaṇi koṣa* 1, 48

4 *Āvaśyakaniryukti* 1456

5 *Dvātrimśad dvātrimśikā* 18, 11

6 *Atta ruddāni vajjittā jhāejjā susamāhie.*

Dhamma sukkāṃ jhāṇāṃ jhāṇaṃ taṃ tu buhavae.

7 *Tattvānuśāsana* 74

way, the *ātman* withdraws itself from the external objects and concentrates on its own nature. Through *Dhyāna*, *karma* is destroyed, just as in fire, pieces of wood are burnt away.

VYUTSARGA (GIVING UP THROUGH NON-ATTACHMENT)

Vyutsarga has two elements—‘*vi*’ which means specific and ‘*utsa-*’ which means giving up, or renunciation. *Vyutsarga*, therefore, means giving up or renunciation in a specific way.

Ācārya Akalanka says that *vyutsarga* may be referred as renunciation, non-attachment, fearlessness and giving up of hunger and thirst for things of the world. For the sake of self-realisation and for the sake of righteousness, *vyutsarga* aims at self-denial and renunciation.¹

Vyutsarga is of four types, like—(1) *Gaṇa Vyutsarga* (renunciation of group), (2) *Śarīra Vyutsarga* (mortification of the body), (3) *Upadhi Vyutsarga* (giving up of the things connected with activities) and (4) *Bhakta-pāna Vyutsarga* (giving up of food and drink)²

Śarīra Vyutsarga is considered to be *Kāyotsarga*. It refers to the affliction through the body. The seeker after self-realisation practises *prāyaścitta* for all the ills that he has done. He gives up attachment for the body and resolves to be free from all faults. With this firm resolution and with a repentant heart the weight of the *karma* becomes lighter. The stream of auspicious concentration of mind flows freely. It gives peace and tranquility. The *ātman* enjoys the pure bliss.

In the practice of *kāyotsarga*, it is possible to have all forms of difficulties and obstructions from the gods, from men and from the lower animals too. But one who is engaged in the practice of *Dhyāna* accepts these troubles with equanimity of mind and by this process the *kāyotsarga* gets purified.³

Kāyotsarga is a routine procedure of everyday, and it is absolutely necessary for everyone to practise. In this, every moment, the mental preparation for *kāyotsarga* goes on. Bhagavāna Mahāvira

1 *Tattvārtha-rājavartika* 9, 26, 10

2 *Bhagavatī sūtra* 25, 7

3 *Āvaśyakaniryukti* 1549

says : “*abhikkhaṇaṃ kāṇṣṣaggakārī*” — the seeker practises *kāyotsarga* very often. *Kāyotsarga* has been distinguished into two types : (1) *Dravya-Kāyotsarga* is concerned with the bodily aspect of self-control and (2) *Bhāva-Kāyotsarga* is concerned with the psychic accompaniments of *vyutsarga*.¹ *Dravya-Kāyotsarga* refers to the control of the bodily states and *Bhāva Kāyotsarga* is involved in the *Dharmadhyāna*, and *Śukladhyāna*. *Kāyotsarga* is one of the important forms of *tapas* and for this reason we get in the *āgamic* literature the description that *kāyotsarga* is in fact a full form of the *vyutsarga*. The seeker after self-realisation will attain full *vyutsarga* if he is successful in the practice of *kāyotsarga*.³

There is a regular procedure and the graded process of the practice of *tapas* from *Anaṣana* (fasting) to *Vyutsarga* (renunciation). There is a steady flow of austerities in these graded processes.

From the discussions above, we may conclude that the Jaina description of *tapas* does not merely refer to the physical austerity, but it has also reference to mental austerity which consists of control and practice of mental states and events, which lead to the purity of the mind and soul.

1 *Āvaśyakacūrṇi*

3 *Jainadharma me Tapa—Svarūpa aur Viśleṣaṇa (Hindi)*, p. 523

The Principles of BANDHA and MOKṢA : A Discussion

THE PRINCIPLE OF BANDHA

The association of two things with each other is called *Bandha*. There are two types of *Bandha* : (1) *Dravyabandha* (the association or contact of the material things) and (2) *Bhāvabandha* coming together or joining of the psychic states and events). The *Kārmic* particles coming in contact with the soul and creating the veil of obscuraton, is called the *Dravyabandha*. The psychic states accompanying the physical activity and also those psychic states which are the causes of the physical activity and which come together and vitiate the *Kārmic* particles associated with a soul is *Bhāvabandha*. In the *Dravyabandha* the *ātman* is connected with the *Kārmic* particles. In the *Bhāvabandha* the psychic states are associated with the soul leading to the *Kārmic* bondage. These two are complementary to each other and the one is intimately connected with the other. If the particles of the matter are brought together, there would be the specific form of binding or association. It may create chemical action. For instance, if the viscosity and dryness are combined in the particles of matter, a new chemical action will be created and new properties are formed. The atoms come together to form molecules and when they are combined in different degrees, chemical reaction is possible. Similarly, if the *Kārmic* particles are formed into the aggregates of *Kārmic* particles, those will have some effect and association with the soul, although there is no chemical action in this activity. This is because the *jīva* and the *kārmic* particles are qualitatively different. The manifestation of the *jīva* is to be found in the psychic and the conscious states while the modes of matter are unconscious. The manifestation of *jīva* is

through the expression of *caitanya* (consciousness) and its states, while modes of matter are expressed in the qualities like taste, smell and touch etc.

THE TYPES OF *BANDHA*

The *Bandha* has been distinguished into four types such as :

(1) *Prakṛtibandha*, *sthitibandha*, *anubhāgabandha* and *pradeśabandha*. *Tattvārthasūtra* uses the word *anubhāva* in place of *anubhāga*.

Prakṛti karma refers to the nature of *karma*, *Sthiti-karma* has reference to the state and the limitation of the *kārmic* particles with the soul. *Anubhāga* is the intensity of the experience of *karma*, while *Pradeśa karma* has reference to aggregates of *kārmic* particles associated with the soul. Detailed discussion of this problem can be found in the theory of *Karma* as presented by the Jaina philosophers.

Philosophical literature on the *Karma* theory of the Jainas gives the analogical example of a pudding (*modaka*) with its medicinal properties. A pudding may be used for the sake of gastric trouble, some other puddings may be used for curing the diseases of phlegm and other types of intestinal disorders. Similarly, some form of *Karma* is responsible for obscuring knowledge, some other forms of *Karma* would obscure intuition, and still others would be responsible for limiting the inherent energy of the soul etc. There are some forms of *Karma* which create the deluding effects on the soul. This, we can say refers to the *Prakṛti-karma* and *Prakṛtibandha*.

Some puddings last for a day, while some others may last for a week and so on and after which the efficacy of the pudding will be lost. Similarly, the *kārmic* particles affecting the soul have their duration of the effect in varied degrees.

As some puddings are sweet and some sour, similarly the experiencing effect of the *Karma* will be different in intensity.

Just as a pudding may be half in size or full in size, similar description can be given about the *Kārmic Pradeśa*.

Prakṛti and *Pradeśabandha* are caused by activity (*Yoga*). *Sthiti* and *Rasa-bandha* are caused by *Kaṣāyas* (passions). The intensity of passions depends on the nature, and the potency of the *Kārmic*

particles. This is called by the expression of *Sthitibandha* and *Anubhāgabandha*. These types of *Bandha* are due to passions and emotional disturbances. In the case of those in whom the passions are subdued, and in the case of those, the passions are destroyed and similarly in the case of *Kevalins*, the *kaṣāyas* (passions) have no effects. There is no rise of *kaṣāyas* in the *Kevalin*. Even if the *kārmic* particles are encrued in the soud of a *Kevalin* due to activity, they are immediately washed away in the next moment because the soul has reached the state of purity. In these cases, *Sthitibandha* and *Anubhāgabandha* are not possible in these cases.

Bandha is of two types : (i) *śubha* and (ii) *aśubha*. *Śubhabandha* (auspicious bondage) brings in merit and *aśubha bandha* (inauspicious bondage) brings in demerit. As long as *Karma* does not fructify in the form of an effect, it remains potential, and it is called the *sattā* state of *Karma*. The moment the *Karma* fructifies *Puṇya* and *Pāpa* flow in. The potential form of *Karma* is *Bandha* and the fructification of *Karma* refers to the acquisition of *Puṇya* and *Pāpa*.

MOKṢA AND THE PATHWAY TO MOKṢA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

There are three great philosophies of the world—Greek philosophy, Modern Western philosophy and Indian philosophy. Aristotle, a great Greek philosopher said that philosophy begins in wonder. Plato also held the same view. Modern western philosophers like Descartes, Kant and Hegel hold a similar view expressed. It is said that the philosophical speculations are rooted in curiosity¹ and curiosity results in misery. Birth, old age, disease and death have to be overcome for the sake of self-realisation. (This is possible through the arousal of the metaphysical curiosity). Indian philosophy does not merely aim at the achievement of the knowledge of the reality, but it has a dual purpose of knowledge and virtue. The main purpose of philo-

1 (a) *Athāto dharmajijñāsa—Vaiśeṣika darśana*

(b) *Sāṅkhya kārīkā* 1.

(c) *Mīmāṃsā sūtra—Athāto dharmajijñāsā.*

(d) *Brahma sūtra* 1/1—*Athāto Brahmajijñāsā.*

sophy in India is to free oneself from the misery of this life. In this sense, we can say that in the western thought, the aim is purely academic, while Indian philosophy is practical and it aims at self-realisation. It is not merely an academic pursuit of knowledge of reality, but it has the highest aim of the realisation of the truth in life.

Mokṣa is the highest ideal of Indian philosophy. Śrī Aurobindo considers the concept of *Mokṣa* to be the central point of Indian thought. This is the distinguishing feature of Indian thought. In the description of the *Puruṣārtha*, *Mokṣa* is considered to be the supreme (*parama puruṣārtha*). *Mokṣa* is the highest ideal to be achieved and *dharma* is the means of achieving this supreme end.¹

In Indian philosophy the concept of *Mokṣa* may be considered from four different points of view; viz. *Vedic*, *Jaina*, *Bauddha* *Ājīvaka*. *Ājīvaka* has not remained as important philosophy. It is, therefore, not necessary here to consider the concept of *Mokṣa* from the point of view of *Ājīvakas*. The vedic tradition gives six *darśanas* like *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* and *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā*, *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* was primarily considered to be *Karma Mīmāṃsā*. It was mainly concerned with the study of *Mokṣa*.² But in the other five *darśanas*, the concept of *Mokṣa* is important.

We should remember that as there are differences in the presentation of the nature of self, so are there differences regarding their speculation on the nature of *Mokṣa*. Sometimes the concepts of *Mokṣa* are not only different but also contrary. Those systems of philosophy which have based their thought on the *Upaniṣads* and *Brahmasūtra* also differ regarding the nature of *Mokṣa*. Some philosophies make a distinction between the *Ātman* and *Paramātman*, some others consider them to be identical and still other philosophies consider the distinction and the identity to be equally real. Similarly, some philosophies have considered the *Ātman* to be all-pervading,³ and

1 *Jaina āgama Bhagavati* etc.

2 *Paṇḍit Sukhalāl Sanghavi—Ādhyātma Vicāraṇā*. (Gujarat Vidya Sabha, Ahmedabad) p. 74.

3 (a) *Muṇḍaka up.* 1, 1, 6 (b) *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* 7, 1, 22.

(c) *Nyāyamañjarī* (Vijayanagaram) p. 468 (d) *Prakaraṇa pañ* p-158

some others make *Ātman* to be atomic.¹ Some philosophic traditions have accepted the plurality of *Ātman* while others consider it to be one. However, all the philosophies mentioned above have accepted to primacy of the concept of the *Ātman* in one form or the other.

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika darśanas* have generally a common view-point of the nature of *Ātman*. They consider *Ātman* to be the ultimate and eternal substance. The *Ātman* is not one. They believe in the plurality of the *Ātmans*. There are as many souls as there are bodies. If the *Ātman* were one, there would be no possibility of diversity in life.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika darśanas maintained that *Ātman* has consciousness. But consciousness is not the essence of the *Ātman*, it is its attribute. The association of body, sense-organ and central function of mind give rise to cognition. This cognition is possible due to consciousness. But consciousness is not the essence of the self. It is only a quality. Therefore, it can be said that the self as consciousness and not that the self is consciousness. This view of the nature of the self is different from the view of the nature of self presented by the philosophical systems like *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and *Vedānta*. These systems do not accept the conception that consciousness is an attribute of the self. They consider it to be the essence of the self.² In the highest state of *Mokṣa*, according to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, self does not have any experience nor consciousness; it is pure *sattā* (reality). It does not experience pure consciousness or pure bliss, because in the state of *Mokṣa*, the accidental quality of consciousness of the soul is absent. It is qualityless, and therefore in a sense, we can say it is free from consciousness and also because consciousness is an empirical adjunct of the relational categories.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* says that the highest state of *Mokṣa* is

1 (a) *Bṛhadāraṇyaka up.* 5, 6, 1. (b) *Chāndogya Up.* 5, 18, 1.
(c) *Maitreī Up.*

2 *Adhyātma Vicāraṇā.*

absolute freedom from misery¹ and there is no possibility of the recurrence of misery in any form.

Vātsyāyana² the commentator on *Nyāyasūtra* says that when perversity of knowledge is removed through philosophy, all imperfections are removed. When imperfections are removed, then the tendency to perform *karma* also ceases. With the cessation of the tendency to do *karma*, the cycle of birth and death also stops.³ The commentators on the *Nyāyasūtra* have pointed out that in the state of perfection there is absolute cessation of misery.⁴ In the state of *Mokṣa* the nine attributes like intellect, happiness, misery, desire, hatred, will (*samkalpa*), *punya* (merit) and *pāpa* (demerit) do not exist.⁵ In the final state of *Mokṣa* the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* lays emphasis on the absolute cessation of misery and the cause of misery.

Mallisena in the *Syādvādamāñjarī* says that considered from the point of view of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* the worldly experience would be superior to the state of *Mokṣa*, because in the worldly experience, we sometimes get happiness, but in the highest state of *Mokṣa*, there is absolute cessation of happiness also. There is the absence of consciousness.⁶

A disciple of lord Kṛiṣṇa says that instead of the state of *Mokṣa* as described by *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, the description of life in *Bṛndāvana* is much better.⁷ Śrī Harṣa says that the state of *Mokṣa* described by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* presents a bloodless category since consciousness and sang happiness.⁸ *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* have analysed the concept

1 (a) *Āiyantika dukkhanivṛttiḥ mokṣaḥ*.

(b) *Carama dukkha dhvaṁsaḥ*—*Tarkadīpikā*

2 *Bhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra*

3 *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5, 2, 18

4 *Āiyantiko dukhābhāvaḥ*—*Nyāyavārtika*

5 (a) *Nyāyamañjarī*

(b) *Tadatyanta Vimokṣopavargaḥ*—*Sabhāṣya Nyāyasūtram*.

6 *Syādvādamāñjarī*, p. 61.

7 *Syādvādamāñjarī*, p. 63.

8 *Bharatīya darśana me mokṣa cintan : ek tulanātmaka aihyayana* (17, Malaviya nagar, 1973.)

of *Mokṣa* from the empirical point of view. According to them, one who wants to realise the highest end must aim at the removal of the misery and the unholesome and unrighteous states of existence. There is no evidence to show that in the highest state of *Mokṣa*, there is the presence of either the consciousness of bliss. In the highest state of *Mokṣa* the self subsists in itself without any attributes of knowledge (*jñāna*), and bliss (*ānanda*).

SĀṆKHYA AND YOGA DARŚANAS

Sāṅkhya and *Yoga darśanas* are complementary to each other. The *Sāṅkhya* presents the metaphysical aspect of reality, while *Yoga* is practical, in the sense, it presents the pathway to the realisation of the highest end. The *Sāṅkhya* gives the metaphysical foundations to *Yoga* and *Yoga* presents the practical pathway to the realisation of the highest end of perfection (*Kaivalya*).

Sāṅkhya presents the dualistic principles of *Puruṣa* (self) and *Prakṛti* (matter). *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* are the ultimate realities. *Prakṛti* is the primordial matter and it is the expression of the equilibrated state of the *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The presence of the *puruṣa* disturbs the equilibrium in the *guṇas* and the activity of the *Prakṛti*. The activity of the *Prakṛti* through the disturbance of the *guṇa* due to the presence of the *Puruṣa* gives rise to the evolution of the universe. The modes, both physical and mental in the world are the expression of *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* evolves but it is not the product of any other higher principle. The things of the world are the products of *Prakṛti*. But *Puruṣa* does not produce anything nor it is produced by anything else. *Puruṣa* is uncaused, eternal and is a spiritual substance. Consciousness is the essence of *Puruṣa*. In this sense, we can say *Puruṣa* is consciousness. The *Bandha* (bondage) and *Mokṣa* (the self realisation) are due to the states of *Prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* in its real nature is unaffected by the evolutes of the *Prakṛti*.¹ But through neiscience (*avidyā*) *Puruṣa* falsely identifies itself with the evolutes of *Prakṛti*. Just as the image of a bird flying in the air is reflected in the waters of the pond below, so also the states of *Bandha* and *Mokṣa* are reflected in the *Puruṣa*.

1 *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 62.

Sāṅkhya and *Yoga* philosophies have posited the plurality of self. This concept of plurality is not qualitative, but numerical. The *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* contends that if the *Puruṣa* were one, then with the death of the *Puruṣa* all individual selves would have cease to exist. Similarly, if one *Puruṣa* were to be in bondage or if a *Puruṣa* were to be free from bondage and reach the *Mokṣa* state, the same conditions would have been experienced by all the individual selves. Therefore, there are many selves. The *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* maintains that consciousness is the essence of the self and not a quality of the self as the *Naiyāyikas* contend. *Puruṣa* is a subject and the cogniser. The *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* concept of the nature of *Puruṣa* is similar to the *Vedāntic* conception of the *Ātman*, the Jain conception of *jīva* and the monad of Leibnitz.

According to *Sāṅkhya*, nescience (*avidyā*) is the cause of bondage. The self does not know its real nature. It forgets its real nature and identifies itself with the *Prakṛti* and its evolutes. This is due to *avidyā*. But with the awakening of the real knowledge and discrimination, *Puruṣa* realises that it is different from *Prakṛti*. Then ignorance is destroyed, and the self becomes free from the bondage (*Bandha*).

Kapila does not elaborately discuss about the nature of *Mokṣa*. Like the Buddha, he also says that this world is full of misery and the main object is to be free from misery. However, later *Sāṅkhya* philosophers have given description of the nature of *Mokṣa*.

The main cause of bondage is ignorance and the false identification of *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti* and its evolutes. This is the bondage. The self, when it gets enlightenment, realises that it is free from *Prakṛti* and this realisation leads to the freedom from the bondage. In the *Sāṅkhya darśana Mokṣa* is also described as *Kaivalya*.

The conception of *Mokṣa* of the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* is different from the conception that the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* presents. According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, although the self is a spiritual substance, it is not consciousness. In the highest state of *Mukti* there is no consciousness nor the mental states expressed in the self. In the state of *Mukti*, the states like intellect, happiness and other mental states are no longer

present and there is no scope for any activity of consciousness. According to *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* the self is free from any attributes (*nirguṇa*), self-luminous and consciousness is the essence of the self. Unlike the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* contends that in the highest state of *Mukti*, there is pure consciousness and bliss. This is the cardinal distinction between the two different schools of philosophy. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* considers that mental states experiences are due to the contact of the body, mind and the states like intellect, misery and happiness, desires and other forms of psychic states are completely absent in the state of *Mukti*. But *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* maintains that the mental states and experiences are not due to the self, but due to the *antaḥkarana* (the inner organs). These states arising due to the *antaḥkarana* are reflected in the self the self falsely identifies itself with varied mental states and experiences. The self falsely believes that it is experiencing all the empirical experiences. And that is *samsāra*. In the highest state of *Mukti*, the self realises that it is not the agent of the experiences but these experiences are reflected in it, and it is different from the *Prakṛti* and its evolutes. In the highest state of *Mukti*, the empirical experiences are absent, but pure consciousness is its real essence.

The earlier *Sāṅkhya* propounding twenty-four principles is different from the *Sāṅkhya* propounds twenty-five principles of evolution. According to this school, the empirical experiences like happiness and misery and knowledge and ignorance are primarily due to the *Prakṛti* and its attributes. In the highest state of *Mukti*, these empirical experiences are absent. But the *Sāṅkhya* propounding twenty-four principles does not say that the self which is consciousness is completely different from the empirical consciousness due to the dance of *Prakṛti*. In this sense, we can say to some extent that the *Sāṅkhya* with twenty-four principles presents similar view with the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. The former view of the *Sāṅkhya* points out that in the state of *Mokṣa* the activities of *Prakṛti* are differentiated from the pure nature of the self. While the later schools of thought show that in the state of *Mokṣa* there is the complete absence of the states of experience associated with the activity of *Prakṛti*. The first view oriented towards the *kārya prapañca* (empirical activities) and the second emphasises *guṇa prapañca* (the attributes of *Prakṛti*). The differences in the presentation of the nature of the self in the two schools

of thought are only due to terminological differences and not due to real differences.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* says that the empirical experiences like happiness, misery and desire are due to the states of consciousness which is the attribute of the self. Therefore, in the highest state there is absence of consciousness. The thing appears to be somewhat ideational strange, although its presentation depends in the ideational distinction between the self and consciousness. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* distinguishes between substance and quality. The attributes and the modes arising out of the attributes are not related to the substance which is the substratum of the attributes. The modifications and changes in the states do not adversely affect the nature of the substance. These modifications are related to the attributes only and not to the substance. In this sense, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* accepts the empirical states of the *Ātman* as doer, the enjoyer and that which is in the state of bondage.

But the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* does not accept the distinction between the substance and its attributes. The *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* posits the self as *nirguṇa* but consciousness as its essence.

The Vedāntic philosophers like Sāṅkara, Rāmānuja and Vallabha maintain that in the highest state of perfection there is the pure light of consciousness and bliss, although there are variations in their thoughts regarding the state of the *Mokṣa* in relation to the self and the *Brahman*. In this sense, again, we can say that the *Upaniṣadic* conception of *Mokṣa* is different from the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* conception in some form. The *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* conception of the nature of the *Mokṣa* comes nearer to the *Upaniṣadic* view. The *Upaniṣadic* view of *Mokṣa* presents the self as in the state of pure consciousness and bliss and of the ultimate reality of the *Brahman*.

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF *NIRVĀṆA* (*Nirvāṇa*)

The Buddhist refers to the conception of *Mokṣa* as *nirvāṇa*. *Nirvāṇa* is absolute cessation from misery. There is nothing real. Everything is momentary. There is no *ātman* as the permanent principle and *Nirvāṇa* is a state of freedom and from misery, in fact freedom from everything. *Nirvāṇa* is the most important conception

in the Buddhist philosophy. Prof. Murthy says that the history of Buddhist philosophy is the history of the conception of *Nirvāṇa*.¹

In the *Abhidhamma Mahāvibhāṅgā śāstra* the etymological meaning of *Nirvāṇa* has been discussed. *Vāṇa* refers to rebirth and *Nirvāṇa* is freedom from rebirth. *Vāṇa* also means bad smell and *Nirvāṇa* would be freedom from bad smell of the *karma*. In the third sense, *vāṇa* refers to the jungle and *Nirvāṇa* would be escape from the thick jungle of *karma*. In another sense, *Nirvāṇa* would be cutting of all the threads of empirical existence which are formed due to *karma*. The Pāli Texts Society explains the meaning of the word *Nirvāṇa* as extinction. It is extinction of all empirical existence. *Amarakoṣa* also presents the same view. Several philosophers like Rhys Davids, Thomas, Ānandakumāraswāmy, Dr. Rādhākṛṣṇan and others maintain that the state of *Nirvāṇa* does not represent the denial of the self or personality. It has moral overtones. It is the highest state of moral perfection and it is full of bliss. Dr. Rādhākṛṣṇan maintains that the concept of *Nirvāṇa* is negative in its content. It is nothingness. The Buddha said that *Nirvāṇa* is freedom from misery and it is different from the adjuncts of empirical personality. The Buddha does not deny that highest state of perfection expresses bliss. He was only silent about it. According to the Buddha, some philosophers contend that *Nirvāṇa* is the cessation of misery and the experience, but it is not the destruction of the *Ātman*. It is the destruction of the desire, the passions and the craving for life due to ignorance.² Max-muller maintains that there is no version in the *Dhammapāda* which gives the negative meaning of *Nirvāṇa* i. e., *Nirvāṇa* is absolute cessation. Wherever there is reference to the *Nirvāṇa* as cessation or destruction, there is ambiguity in the interpretation. Nāgasena has given the interpretation of *Nirvāṇa* as positive in content during the discussions with king Milinda.³ In this sense, the Buddhist conception of *Nirvāṇa* is different from the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* conception of *Mokṣa* as a state in which there is no consciousness.

1 *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, Vol. I, p. 212.

2 (a) *Dhammapāda* 154. (b) *Saṃyuttanikāya, Oghataracna sūta*.

3 *Saṃyuttanikāya Kematherī sūta*.

The Tathāgata Buddha said that *Nirvāṇa* is 'avyākṛta', indescribable in words and inexpressible in thought. *Nirvāṇa* cannot be described in words nor its nature can be comprehended by thought. The nun Khema, while explaining the concepts to Prasenajit, says that just as the sands on the banks of the Ganges cannot be counted, just as the waters of the sea are immeasurable, so also the *Nirvāṇa* is incomprehensible. It is beyond comprehension in thought and description in words.¹

The disciples of the Buddha however, took two different paths: The *Hīnayāna* and the *Mahāyāna* ways. They give different conceptions of the *Nirvāṇa*. The question arose about the nature of *Nirvāṇa* whether it pertains to individual existence or to the existence in general. Some say that *Nirvāṇa* refers to the individual freedom from misery, while some others have emphasised the cessation of existence in general as *Nirvāṇa*. The first is the individualistic and the second is the universal content. The first is called the *Hīnayāna* conception while the second refers to the *Mahāyāna* conception in its broad content.

The Buddha did not discuss the nature of *Nirvāṇa* and other metaphysical problems, because he was averse to metaphysical discussions. The metaphysical questions like *Nirvāṇa* are *avyākṛta*, inaccessible for speculation. The result was his disciples followed different paths of interpretation. Some adduced negative interpretation of *Nirvāṇa* as absolute cessation of existence, it is *Śūnyatā*. The others gave a positive content to *Nirvāṇa* as a state with the bliss as its category.²

JAINA CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA

There are varied interpretations regarding the nature of *Mokṣa* in the Buddhist and Vedic traditions. But the Jaina conception of *Mokṣa* does not accept differences of opinion. This is possible because the Vedic seers did not discuss the nature of *Mokṣa*. The later

1 (a) N. K. Bhagat : *Patna University Lectures*, 1924-25, p. 165.

(b) *Saṃyuttanikāya Khematherī sutta*.

2 Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 416-17.

philosophers of the Vedic tradition gave their own interpretations of the nature of *Mokṣa* when the concepts were introduced in the Vedic tradition. The Buddha never claimed to be an omniscient being. He did not impose his views on his disciples. He said to his disciples that they should accept whatever stands the test of reason and should not accept any view because the *Tathāgata* has said. This is one of the reasons why there developed differences of opinion regarding the nature of *Nirvāṇa* in the Buddhist philosophy. Moreover, the Buddha was silent over the nature of metaphysical problems like *Nirvāṇa* and the self. But this is not so with the development of Jaina thought. The Tirthankara Mahāvīra was an omniscient, a *Kevalin*. And the words of the *Kevalin* had absolute authority. Therefore, there did not appear to have differences regarding the metaphysical problems like the nature of the *Mokṣa*.

The Jaina conception of the universal and the particular, the identity and difference and the permanent substances and its changing modes as equally real has influenced the Jaina conception of *Mokṣa*. The principle of permanence, however, is not like the eternal principle of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. The Jaina conception of the *Ātman* is a synthesis of the principles of permanence and modes. From the noumenal point of view, the soul is permanent as a substance. From the phenomenal point of view, there are modes. Considered from the point of view of modes, the self is changing.

The Jainas do not consider the *Ātman* as all-pervading like the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* or atomic in nature like Rāmānuja's standpoint. They say, that *Ātman* is *madhyama pariṇāmī*, pervading the body that it occupies. It has the characteristics of both expansion and contraction in order to pervade the entire body, whether small or big. This is the empirical description of the soul from the empirical point of view. From the noumenal point of view the soul is eternal as a substance. It is non-eternal from the point of view of modifications. The Jainas have accepted the principle of the co-reality of substance and its modifications. For this reason, the Jainas contend that at the time of attainment of *Mokṣa* the pervasion of the soul becomes less

by one-third of the body of the soul just previously occupied by it at the time of *Mokṣa*.¹

It should be remembered that though the quality of the contraction and the expansion is inherent in the soul but it gets expression due to the *kārmic* body formed by the accumulations of particles of *karma*. The liberated soul has no body and therefore there is no question of contraction or expansion. The conception of the ultimate size of the soul just at the time of *Mokṣa* is based on the conception of the size of the body that it last occupied. The soul has no form but due to its extension in space, it is described as having form.

The Jaina conception of *Mokṣa* is different from other conceptions in Indian thought. This theory is a special contribution of the Jainas. This is because, the Jaina conception implies the pervasive quality according to the body; while according to some thinkers the soul is described as atomic in nature. This also gives a clear picture of the nature of the soul in the state of *Mokṣa*.

According to the Jainas, the liberated soul has infinite knowledge and bliss because of its inherent nature of consciousness and bliss. The eternity of the soul is not the static eternity as in some systems of Indian philosophy, but it expresses the inherent nature of infinite energy. This conception of the nature of the soul in *Mokṣa* is a special contribution of the Jainas. It agrees with the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* conception of the eternity of the soul so far as it refers to the soul as substance. In regard to the inherent characteristics of the soul as infinite knowledge, bliss and infinite energy, it is nearer to the *Sāṅkhya* conception of the *Puruṣa*. The Buddhist schools of philosophy of *Yogācāra* posits the conception of *Viññāna* as a centre of self and in the state of *Nirvāṇa* it is referred to the '*ālaya viññāna*' the storehouse of consciousness. In this sense of psychic energy of the soul, Jainas have a common point, but the Jainas do not accept the *Kṣāṇikavāda* of the Buddhists.

THE STATE OF MUKTI (MUKTI-STHĀNA)

There is a fundamental question regarding the state of the soul

¹ *Uttarādhyayana* 36-65.

at the time of *Mokṣa* : What is the state of the soul when it is liberated from the body ? There are different interpretation on this question based on the different philosophical predilections.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* maintain that the soul is all-prevading. They also maintain that there are many souls. According to this interpretation, the liberated souls do not possess, different states from those that they possessed in the *saṃsāra*. In the state of liberation the souls become free from the gross bodies and also from the subtle bodies which is due to a gross body. The *Jivātman* or a *Puruṣa* becomes different from the differentiated states and becomes all-pervading.

The *Kevalādvaitin* maintains that the *ātman* i. e., the *Brahman* has *vyāpakatva*, but there is no plurality. According to this theory, in the liberated souls the soul becomes free from the subtle bodies which is *antaḥkaraṇa*. As a consequence of this, freedom from the subtle body, the soul is free from all empirical adjuncts. It realises the state of the *Brahman*. The difference between the souls that are liberated and the souls that are in bondage is with reference to the freedom and the presence of the *sūkṣma śarīra* and the empirical adjuncts. The absence of the empirical adjuncts (*upādhi*) in the liberated state does not mean that the liberated soul is different from the empirical soul, it is the *Brahmasvarūpa* in its pure form.

The Madhva philosophy posits the souls as atomic in nature. They are different from *Pārabrahman*. According to this school of thought, the liberated soul lives in the *sānnidhya* of Viṣṇu.

Similarly, those who maintain the soul as atomic in nature like the *Viśiṣṭādvaitin* accept the plurality of souls. But in its real nature, the soul is not different from the *Pārabrahman*. When the soul is liberated it reaches the *Brahmaloka* and gets merged in the *Brahman*.

According to Vallabhācārya, souls are atomic in nature, but at the same time souls reach the state of *Brahma* in their state of merger with the *Brahman*. Some souls get merged with the *Brahma* but some other souls, due to devotional preponderance enter the *saṃsāra* in the state of practical liberation for the sake of expression of devotion.

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF THE *MUKTI-STHĀNA*

The Buddhists maintain that nothing is permanent. Everything is transitory and in flux. In the state of rebirth, there is no permanent self that emerges from the earlier birth to the next birth. It is only the psychic continuity of *viññāṇa* that projects itself into the next line. Just as a snow ball goes on accumulating, particles of snow in its movement, but it is not one substance, so also the *viññāṇa* the psychic energy, loaded with its *samskāra* the anamic mass projects itself into the next life i. e., rebirth. Therefore, there is no permanent self that is reborn.

The king Milinda asked to Nāgasena : which of the states of life prior to *Nirvāṇa* are nearer to the state of *Nirvāṇa* ? Ācārya said that there is no analogy to explain the state of *Nirvāṇa*. We cannot say that in the state of *Nirvāṇa*, the soul goes and settles in a *sthāna*.

King Milinda asked : "just as there are pearls in the sea, fragrance in the flower and the grains in the field, so also there must be a place for *Nirvāṇa* which is permanent." Nāgasena replied : There is no state analogous to these which can be called *Nirvāṇa*, in which we can say the self goes to settle there. However, the state of *Nirvāṇa* is real. *Nirvāṇa* is not something external. We have to realise the state of *Nirvāṇa* in the purity of mind. Just as through the friction of two pieces of metal fire is created so also the *Nirvāṇa* is a state of experience of the purity of mind. We cannot say that there was first the fire or first the friction and then the fire. Similarly, we cannot distinguish between the state of *Nirvāṇa* and the purity of experience.

The king said : We may accept the view that there is no special state of *Nirvāṇa*. However, there must be some state from which a *pudgala* experiences the state of *Nirvāṇa*. The Ācārya replied : *Pudgala* (the continuing self) is rooted in the *Śīla* (righteousness), and can experience the state of *Nirvāṇa* from any point of space. Therefore *Nirvāṇa* is the realisation from the purity of the mind.¹

1 *Milindaprasna* 4. 8. 62-64.

THE JAINA VIEW OF THE *MOKṢA-STHĀNA*

The Jainas say that the *Jiva* has the characteristics of *Ūrdhvagati* (tendency to go upwards).¹ When the *kārmic* particles are removed and when the soul is free from *karma*, it moves upwards to the end of the *Lokākāśa* and remains in its pure form in the *Siddhaloka*, at the end of *Lokāśka*. It does not move further because there is the absence the *Dharmāstikāya* in *Alokākāśa*. This state of perfection at the end of the *Lokākāśa* is called *Siddhaśilā*. The Jaina literature presents the extension of *Siddhaśilā* and such a description of the extension of the place where liberated souls reside is not stated in any other school of Indian thought. According to the Jainas the world where the human beings inhabit, has the extension of forty-five lakhs of *yojanas* and the extension of the *Siddhakṣetra* has also forty-five lakhs of *yojanas*. From the *Karmabhūmi* of the human beings, men can attain perfection through their self-efforts. In this sense, we can say, that the state of *mokṣa* is the highest state of perfection to be attained. It is the state of freedom from misery. It is a state of self-realisation.

MOKṢA MĀRGA (THE PATH-WAY TO *MOKṢA*)

We may now consider the pathway to *Mokṣa*. Just as in the science of medicine, four factors are important for consideration, like: the disease, cause of the disease, the removal of the disease and means of the removal of the same; so also in the understanding self-realisation, and the spiritual with path for the salvation, we should also consider the four important principles like *saṃsāra*, the cause of *saṃsāra*, *mokṣa*, and the pathway to *mokṣa*.²

The different schools of Vedic traditions have given their interpretations of the pathway to *Mokṣa*. The *Upaniṣads* and *Bhagavadgītā* are the foundational texts for the Vedic tradition. On the basis of the thoughts expressed in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, Patñjali has given an elaborate discussion about *Mokṣa* and pathway to

1 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 19. 82 *Uddharṇ pakkamaṃ disaṃ*

(b) *Praśamaratī Prakaraṇa* 294.—bhāṣya

(c) *Tattvārtharājavarṇikā*

2 *Yogadarśana Bhāṣya* 21. 25.

Mokṣa. According to him the four cardinal principles are : (1) *heya*¹ (misery), (2) *heyahetu*², (cause of misery), (3) *hāna*³ (cessation of misery) & (4) *hānopāya*⁴ (the pathway to the cessation of the misery). Vātsyāyana, the noted commentator of *Nyāyasūtra* has elaborated the four principles of the *Mokṣa* and pathway to *Mokṣa*⁵.

The Buddha enunciated, in his Sermon at Banares, the four noble truths (*Āryasatya*) : (1) *dukkha* (misery), (2) *dukkhasamudaya* (cause of misery), (3) *dukkha-nirodha* (cessation of misery) and *dukkha-nirodha mārga* (the pathway to the cessation of misery).⁶ In the Jaina *darśana*, the four fundamental truths have been enunciated : (1) *bandha* (bondage), (2) *āsrava* (cause of bondage) (3) *mokṣa* (state of liberation) and (4) *saṁvara* (the way to the cessation to the bondage).

The *Bandha* (bondage) is due to the passions arising out of ignorance. This creates misery. *Āsrava* is the influx of *karma*. It is the cause of misery. It is due to the passions and the activity. *Mokṣa* is the complete freedom from *kārmic* matter. It is the state absolutely free from misery. *Samvara* is the way to the cessation to the misery. This is possible if the influx of the *kārmic* particles is obstructed. The next stage would be the removal of the accumulated *karma*. This is the *nirjarā*. These two constitute the pathway to *Mokṣa*. In this sense, we can say that the Jainas have propounded the four fundamental and noble truths in the tradition of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic thought and similar to the Buddhist tradition too.

Every school of Indian thought have emphasised the importance of the concept of *Mokṣa* as the highest stage of self-realisation. They have suggested that the root-cause of *saṁsāra* and the misery in this life is due to *avidyā* (neiscience). *Avidyā* gives rise to passions (*rāga*-

1 *Yogadarśana : sādhanāpāda* 16

2 *Ibid* 27

3 *Ibid* 25

4 *Ibid* 26

5 *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1, 1, 1.

6 *Majjhimanikāya, bhāṣabheka sūta*, 4.

dveṣa), attachment and hardship (*kleṣa*). Patañjali says *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga-dveṣa* and *abhiniveṣa* are the five obstacles or hardships which cause misery and which bring obstructions to the path of liberation. He has suggested that *avidyā* is the root cause of all these things.¹ Īśvarkriṣṇa² in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* has elaborated the five obstacles in the way to self-realisation. Kaṇāda has said *avidyā* is the root cause which gives rise to all sorts of passions and difficulties.³ *Kaṭhopaniṣad*,⁴ and the *Bhagavadgītā*⁵ have also emphasised that *avidyā* is the primary cause of all passions and difficulties. In the Buddhist literature, like the *Majjhimanikāya* it has been described that the Buddha has said that *avidyā* is the root cause of misery because it leads to craving *tṛṣṇā* and other blemishes.⁶

Jainism asserts that the root cause of *samsāra* is *darśanamoha* & *cārītramoha*. *Darśanamoha* refers ignorance or perversity of attitude in the sense of *avidyā* used in other Indian thought. In the other systems of Indian philosophy, this has been referred to the cause of all blemishes. *Cārītramoha* is perversity in conduct which has been referred to by other systems of Indian philosophy as *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *tṛṣṇā*. In this sense, the Indian systems of philosophy, including the Jains, have given prominence to *avidyā* (nescience) as the root cause of misery.

Kaṇāda says that *avidyā* can be removed by *vidyā* (discriminative knowledge). Patañjali calls it *vivekakhyāti*. Akṣapāda has used the term *tattvajñāna* or *samyagjñāna* (right knowledge). The Buddhist have suggested that '*vipassanā*' or *prajñā* are analogous to *vidyā*. The Jaina have used the word *samyagjñāna* (right knowledge). It causes the destruction of *kaṣāyas* and other blemishes.

From the spiritual point of view, *avidyā* is perversity of know-

1 *Yogadarśana* 2, 3-4

2 *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 47-48.

3 *Nyāyasūtra* 1, 1, 2 : *Nyāyasūtra* 4, 1, 3: 4. 1. 6.

4 *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 1, 2, 5.

5 *Bhagavadgītā* 3, 15.

6 *Majjhimanikāya* i *mahatannesamkāya sutta* 38,

ledge. It is the absence of the right knowledge regarding the nature of the pure self. In the Vedic tradition, the pathway to destruction of *avidyā* and to the realisation of the *Mokṣa* has been suggested to be three-fold as : (1) *jñāna* (knowledge) (2) *bhakti* (devotion) and (3) *karma* (action). The Buddha advocated the eight-fold path, for the realisation *Nirvāṇa* : (1) *samyagdṛṣṭi* (right belief) (2) *samyag-saṅkalpa* (right resolve) (3) *samyagvāk* (right speech) (4) *samyagkarma* (right action) (5) *samyag ājīva* (right living) (6) *samyag vyāyāma* (right effort) (7) *samyag smṛti* (right thought) and (8) *samyag samādhi* (right self-concentration).¹ Buddhaghosa has enumerated three important ways, like *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā* for the sake of realisation of *Nirvāṇa*. Jainism has advocated the three-fold path for the attainment of perfection : (1) *samyagdarśana* (right faith), (2) *samyag-jñāna* (right knowledge) and (3) *samyagcāritra* (right conduct).² In this way the Indian philosophers, both of the Vedic and the non-Vedic traditions, have emphasised the importance of the realisation of *Mokṣa* or *Nirvāṇa*, as the highest end of life. This has exception only in the Cārvāka school. The different schools of thought have used their terminologies to describe the stages in the pathway to perfection, and in explaining the concept of *Mokṣa*. The difference in terminology is mainly verbal and it does not effect the basic unity in the conception of state of perfection and pathway to the state of perfection. We find that there is a fundamental similarity of approach and a unity of thought in the description of the highest end of life, viz., self-realisation (*Mokṣa*) and pathway to the realisation of this end. □

1 "Magganāṃ aṭṭhaṅgiko settho."

2 *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 1.

Part III

PRAMĀNAVĀDA

1. *SYĀDVĀDA*—THE BASIS OF
JAINA PHILOSOPHY
2. *SAPTABHAṄGĪ*—DISCUSSION
3. *NIKṢEPAVĀDA*—A STUDY
4. *NAYAVĀDA*—A STUDY
5. *JÑĀNAVĀDA*—AN ANALYSIS
6. *PRAMĀṆA*—A STUDY



SYĀDVĀDA : the basis of Jaina Philosophy

WHAT IS SYĀDVĀDA ?

Anekāntavāda is a special contribution of the Jainas to the philosophical world. It is the unique contribution that the Jainas have made to the logic and epistemology. It is the foundational principle for philosophical position of the Jainas. *Anekānta* is the basic attitude of mind which expresses the fundamental principle that reality is complex and it can be looked at from different points of view. The points of view are the *nayas* and the *naya* is the psychological expression of the basic principle of *anekānta*. *Syādvāda* is the logical expression of *nayavāda* in predication form. It has the significance of expression and communication in the logical and predicational pattern.

Syādvāda is formed of the two words 'syāt' and 'vāda'. 'Syāt' very often supposed to suggest the meaning of 'doubt' or 'perhaps' but 'syāt' does not express doubt or uncertainty. It refers to a point of view or in a particular context, or in a particular sense.¹ 'Vāda' presents a theory of logic and metaphysics. *Syādvāda* means a theory of predication of the description of reality from different points of view, in different contexts or from different "Universes of discourse." *Syādvāda* is the expression of the pictures of reality obtained from different points of view in definite and determinate logical predications.

1 (a) *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 296.

(b) *Pañcāstikāyaṅkā*—*Srī Amṛtacandra*

The Jaina *Ācāryas* have made *Syādvāda*, the foundation of Jaina philosophy. *Syādvāda* promotes catholic outlook of many-sided approach to the problem of knowledge of reality. It is anti-dogmatic and it presents a synoptic picture of reality from different points of view. *Syādvāda* expresses a protest against one-sided, narrow, dogmatic and fanatical approach to the problem of Reality. It affirms that there are different facets of Reality and they have to be understood from various points of view by the predications of affirmation, negation and indescribability. The thinker having one-sided view in his mind can see only one facet of Reality, such thinker cannot realise reality in full.¹ For this reason, Ācārya Samantabhadra says that the word *syāt* is a symbol of truth.² And therefore, the Jaina *Ācāryas* say that in some cases of predications, even if the term the *syāt* is not used, it is to be considered as implicit in the predication.³

Syādvāda presents a comprehensive and a synoptic picture of reality which expresses presence and co-existence with particular points of view, of the different characteristics like the permanence and impermanence, similarity and difference, expressibility and inexpressibility, reality and appearance.⁴

Generally *Syādvāda* is identified with *Anekāntavāda*, but considered from the logical distinctions inherent in two theories, we can say that *Anekānta* is the basic principle of the complexity of reality and the possibility of looking at reality from different points of view. *Syādvāda* is the expression of the *Anekāntavāda* in logical and predicational form.⁵ In this sense, *Anekāntavāda* is the foundational principle and *syādvāda* is the logical expression of the foundational principle.

Ācārya Samantabhadra says that *Syādvāda* and *kevalajñāna* (omniscient knowledge) are the foundational facts of knowledge.

1 *Eyante niravekkho no sijjhaṭ vivihayāvagaṇṇaṃ dāvvaṇṇaṃ.*

2 *Syātākāroḥ satyalañchanaḥ.*

3 *Laghīyastraya*, sl. 22.

4 *Anyayogavyavacched Dvātrīṃśikā*, sloka-25 Ācārya Hemacandra.

5 *Laghīyastryaya*, sl. 62. Akalaṅka

The difference between the two is that *kevalajñāna* expresses the comprehensible knowledge of reality while *Syādvāda* expresses the predicational propositions of the experience of reality presented in *kevalajñāna*. The first, is a direct experience, *Syādvāda* is the indirect expression of the direct experience.¹

SYĀDVĀDA : THE PRINCIPLE OF COHERENCE

The different systems of philosophy have given different pictures of reality. As a result, there is ambiguity and metaphysical confusion, because the pictures of reality presented by different schools of thought sometimes contradict with each other, and we are at a loss to know which theory of reality should be accepted. This creates intellectual chaos. For instance, even in the concept of the *Ātman*, there are different views expressed by different philosophies. *Cārvāka* denies reality of the *Ātman* as a permanent substance. Even in those schools of thought where there is agreement regarding the reality of the *Ātman*, there are distinctions in the presentation of the nature of the *Ātman*. *Sāṅkhya* philosophy accepts the eternity and substantiality of the *Ātman*. Consciousness is its essence. According to *Sāṅkhya* *ātman* is passive without attributes.² *Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika* posit the reality of the *Ātman* and say that *Ātman* is a substance which has qualities. *Mīmāṃsakas* maintain that *Ātman* is a substance and is eternal, although it expresses modification in different forms of status. Buddha, refuses to discuss the metaphysical problems like the *Ātman* and *Nirvāṇa*. He said that *Ātman* is a subject which is "*avyākṛta*" (indescribable)³ and became silent. In this sense, different schools of thought have given different interpretations about the nature of the *Ātman*. Some say, it is all-pervading like space (*Ākāśa*), some maintain that it is atomic in nature and some others say that *Ātman* is of the size of the thumb.

Regarding the nature of the *Ātman*, some say that it is the product of the elements. Some others maintain that consciousness is not the characteristic of the *Ātman*, but it is produced by the meta-

1. *Āptamīmāṃsā* 105

2. *apṛachyutānupannasthiraikarūpaṃ nityam*.

3. *Majjhimanikāya, cūla māluṅkya sutta* 63,

bolic changes of the body. Still others say that consciousness is not a quality of the soul, but is inherent in the soul. In this way, there are basic differences between the different schools of philosophy regarding the nature of the *Ātman*.

The differences in the views regarding the nature of reality presented by different schools of thought are based on their basic outlook of, and their approach of looking at reality. Some take the synthetic point of view and present the picture of reality in a synthetic sense. They seek unity in diversity, and posit that the reality is one. It includes the consciousness and the unconsciousness as aspects of reality. Some other schools of thought look at reality from the empirical point of view. They seek to emphasise diversity as presented in the universe. Reality, for them, is not one nor a unity, but it is many and diverse. Some other schools of thought have said that reality is incomprehensible (*ajñeya*). In this way, there is intellectual chaos in the study of the metaphysical problems.

Anekāntavāda seeks to find out a solution out of this intellectual chaos. It seeks to find meaning in the diversity of opinions and tries to establish that these diverse views are neither completely false nor completely true. They present partial truths from different points of view. The *Anekānta* seeks to determine the extent of reality present different schools of thought and gives a synoptic picture of reality. The eminent *Ācaryas*, like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalanka and Haribhadra have presented the subtle logical distinctions and the metaphysical thought involving unity and diversity, the oneness and duality and other forms of philosophy on the basis of *Anekānta*. A comprehensive picture of reality is sought to be presented by the theory of *Anekānta*.

And for this reason, the theory of *Anekānta* has become foundational for Jaina thought. In fact, the *Anekānta* outlook is the basis for other schools of Indian thought. The Jaina *Ācāryas* have presented a synoptic outlook in understanding the problems of philosophy on the basis of *Anekānta*. They say that *Ekānta* or dogmatism or one-sided approach to the problems of reality is not inherent in reality (*vastugata-dharma*), but it is due to the working of the intellect. It is the product of intellectual discrimination. If the intellect is pure in its essence

then *Ekānta* will disappear. The pure exercise of intellect will give rise to a synoptic view-point expressed in the *Anekānta* and the different partial view-points get merged in the *Anekānta*, just as the different rivers get merged in the sea.

Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya says that one who has developed the *Anekānta* outlook does not dislike other view-points. He looks at other view-points with understanding and sympathy, just as a father looks at the activities of his son. One who believes in the *Anekānta* outlook looks at the conflicting and diverse theories of realities with equal respect. He does not look at the diverse theories of realities as one superior to the other. He has the spirit of equanimity in approaching for the understanding of the problems of other theories. In the absence of the spirit of equanimity, all knowledge would be fruitless, and any amount of reading the sacred texts would not lead to any fruitful results.¹

Haribhadra Sūri says, that one who develops the *ekānta* attitude and insists on his point of view is one-sided in his approach and would like to lead others also to his points of view. But the one who develops the synoptic outlook based on the *anekānta* attitude is always guided by objective and rational considerations in evaluating the theories of reality.

Anekānta states that the nature of reality should be considered and studied purely from the rational point of view without prejudice or bias. The *ekānta* attitude is compelling and it drives us to accept its point of view and discourages us to accept the others' point of view.

A milk-maid churns the butter milk, and while churning the buttermilk, she pulls the string on the side and loosens the string on the other. The consequence is butter is extracted from the buttermilk. Similarly, if we look at the different points of view of knowing reality in their proper perspective, considering the primary points of view as important and the secondary points of view with their due considera-

1. Yaśovijaya—*Jñānasāra*

tion, truth can be understood in the true perspective and in a comprehensive way. The intellectual confusion is created by *ekānt* while the welter of confusion is cleared by *Anekānta*. The synoptic outlook of *Syādvāda* gives a comprehensive and true picture of reality.

THE IMPACT OF ANEKĀNTA ON OTHER DARŚANAS

The *Anekānta* attitude gives a comprehensive and synoptic view of life. Some of the systems of Indian thought have expressed their opposition to the *Anekānta* theory. Yet we can observe the impact of *Anekānta* on their theories also. It is not possible to disregard the *Anekānta* theory, as it is rational and objective in its outlook.

In the *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣada* *Ātman* has been described as a substance which moves and does not move, which is near and far, which is inside and outside. This is the expression¹ of the *Syādvāda* point of view.

Śaṅkaracāryā and Rāmānujācārya have argued against the validity of *Syādvāda* on the ground that contradictory attributes cannot co-exist at the same time. But in trying to refute the validity of *Syādvāda* they seem to have adopted the *Syādvāda* outlook only. The description of the *Brahman* as '*para* and *apara*' and the analysis of the degrees of reality as expressed in the *pāramārthika*, *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika satya*, does express the spirit of *Anekānta* and *Syādvāda*. Śaṅkara mentions that there is nothing in the world which is purely without faults and without attributes—*Iṣṭam kimapi loke'asmin na nirdoṣam na nirgūṇam*".

This would mean that everything has its good qualities and also its faults. Nothing is purely perfect and purely attributeless. This is the expression of the *Anekānta*.

Swāmī Dayānada Sarasvatī was once asked whether he was a wise man or not. He said that in the field of *darśana* he is wise, but with reference to the practical world, he is not wise. This is an expression of *Anekānta*.

The Buddhist conception of the *Vibhajjavāda* and *Madhyama*

1 *Īśā. Up. tadejati tannaijati, taddūre, tadantike, tadantarasyasarasasya tad sarvāsyāsyā bāhyataḥ.*

Mārga express the *Anekānta* spirit. The *Sāṅkhya* conception of *prakṛti* as having the three attributes of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in the state of equilibrium in the original state of *prakṛti* and as expressed in varied degrees in the process of evolution expressess the spirit of *Anekānta*.

Among the Greek philosophers, Plato has presented the theory of the degrees of reality. The world of ideas is real and the physical world is real to the extent of the participation of the ideas in the physical objects. This is also the expression of the *Anekānta*.

Einstein's theory of relativity express the spirit of *Syādvāda*.

From this, it is clear that *Anekānta* expresses the synoptic point of view and gives a comprehensive picture of reality in which partial pictures from different points of view are synthesised and harmonised. This spirit of *Anekānta* cannot be ignored by any school of thought because of its intrinsic value.

Having considered the impact of *Anekānta* on the different schools of thought, it would now be necessary to understand the extent of the expression of the *Anekānta* in the different problems of philosophy like the problem of permanence and change, of the identity of self and the body etc.

PERMANENCE AND IMPERMANENCE (CHANGE)

The *Anekānta* view presents a theory that every object is a synthesis of the attributes of permanence and change. From the point of view of substance, it is permanent and from the point of view of modes, it is changing. Substance and modes are inseparable and complementary. Without the one, the other does not exist. Without substance (*dravya*), modes (*paryāya*) are not possible and without modes substance cannot be understood. It is the thing that changes. Changes does not exist without a thing. A thing changes in its attribute. For instance, *jīva* is a substance and its various states are its modes. *Jīva* is necessary for the expression of the various states like man, lower animal and bird. These are the modes of the *jīva*. *Jīva* as a substance and the states of *jīva* in the empirical sense, are both necessary and complementary to each other. Substance is permanent, but modes are changing. *Jīva* is permanent and is indestructible. But the modes as expressed in the states of *jīva* are not permanent. In

this sense, *Syādvāda* expresses the synthesis of the theories of permanence and of change. Every substance is permanent but its modes are changing and in a flux. But it should be remembered that substance and its modes are not two different entities. There is not difference in essence, but the difference can be seen in expression. According to the *Anekānta* view, every object has the triple attributes of Origination, Destruction and Permanence. The modes originate and are destroyed but the substance remain permanent.¹ This is true of every object and there are no exceptions to this.

When we meet a person whom we have already met, we recognise him and say he is the same man that we met. Rain brings greenery on the land. We have camphor on the palm and anon it evaporates, and then we say it is not there. All these states express modifications of the substance but these different states taken independently for consideration express the theories of permanence, change and destruction.

There are different theories of causation regarding the origination of the substance and objects. Some of the theories may be mentioned as *Pariṇāmavāda*, *Ārambhavāda*, *Rūpāntaravāda* and *Vichedavāda*. Śāṅkhya philosophers have presented *pariṇāmavāda*. According to them, cause and effect are not different events. Effect is in the cause. Cause has the potentiality of the effect is the actualisation of the cause. This is called *Satkāryavāda*. According to *Satkarmavāda*, that which is not, cannot originate and that which is, cannot be destroyed. It is only a transformation. It is the actualisation of the potential. *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika darśanas* present the *Ārambhavāda* theory. It is also called *Asatkāryavāda*. According to this theory, cause and effects are different events. When the effect appears, cause disappears.

According to the *Naiyāyikas* *Īśvara* is eternal (non-changing reality) while the flames of a lamp are non-eternal. The Buddhists maintain that there is nothing permanent and what we call a thing appearing to be permanent is an aggregate of states which are fleeting. A philosophical system which maintains that reality is the permanent and the eternal cannot easily dispense with the facts of life, which

1. *Tattvārtha sūtra*, Adhyāya 5

present the changing modes. Similarly, a philosophy which gives exclusive importance to the flux cannot ignore a thing that changes. In this sense, the *Naiyāyikas* considered the perceptible objects as impermanent and the Buddhists considered everything as fleeting, as a vast continuum.

The modern scientific view of reality accepts the fact of transformation. It has been suggested that nothing is destroyed, it is only that an object gets transformed. For instance, a candle burns, but in its process of burning the substance of the candle is not destroyed. It is transformed into some other element.

Similarly, we find transformation of water into a different form like ice and water, the gases like hydrogen and oxygen. As we are aware, water is formed through the combination of hydrogen and oxygen in a definite proportion of 2:1. By the process of disintegration, the hydrogen and the oxygen can be separated of the water, and water expresses itself in the form of gases, of hydrogen and oxygen. This view is supported by actual scientific experiments.

Modern science has shown that matter and energy are mutually convertible.¹ The accepted principle of conservation of matter and energy has been a primary principle in the science of Physics and Chemistry. Therefore, matter and energy are convertible and conservice.

From the stand-point of *Syādvāda* Jainas affirm that a thing is never destroyed. That which is not, never comes into being.² There is nothing which is free from the modes of coming into being and destruction. Substance has the modes of origination and destruction. Therefore, every substance has its modes. A substance without modes cannot exist, and modes must have a substance for its substratum. Therefore, the Jainas maintain that substance and modes are both real. In this world, there is nothing which is purely permanent without modes and there is no change which has not got a thing as a substratum of change. For instance, the *jīva* is a substance, but it expresses itself the empirical world in its various modifications and states in diffe-

1. *General Chemistry* by Finis Pauling, pp. 4 and 5

2. *Pañcāstikāya*-15

rent forms of life like men and lower animals. Just as a candle which is a substance changes in accordance with its flames which are susceptible to change. In this sense, the *jīva* and the chandle have both the characteristics of permanence and change. They are premanent in the form of substance, but changing in the form of modes.¹

If a thing were to be purely permanent, it would have may remain in one static form only and there would not have been any states or changes. If there were only change and flux without any substance that changes, there would not have been any substratum and a support and any form. According to the *Syādvda* theory, permanence and change are equally real. It is thing that changes and has its modes. A thing as a substance is permanent, while the changing modes are not e manent. In this sense, a substance (*dravya*) has been considered a synthesis of pemanence and modifications. Substance is a substratum of change and changes take place in a substance. Modern science analyses an atom into its three constitutents (1) neutron which is its central and focal point, (2) electron which is moving with a velocity and (3) proton which is non-moving.

THE IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ĀTMAN AND THE BODY.

The *Ātman* and the body are both identical and different. Different philosophical systems has given varied explanations about the relation between the *Ātman* and the body. They consider consciouness to be a product of the metabolic changes of the body. With the destruction of the body, consciouness is also destroyed.² *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* has mentioned a similar theory of *tatjīva tatśarīravāda*. It is slightly different from the *Cārvāka* philosophy, yet basically it does emphasis the identity of the *jīva* and the body.³

Some other *darśanas* have considered that *Ātman* is different entirely from the body. While explaining this problem of relation of the body and the soul, Mahāvira said to his main disciple Gautama that *Ātman* is different from the body in one sense, it is identical with

1. *Anyayoga Vyavacchedika* sl. 5

2. *Bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanam kutaḥ ?*

3. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1, 1. 11.

the body in a different sense. If *Ātman* and body were considered to be identical, then the *Ātman* will be destroyed with the destruction of the body. In this state, there is no possibility of the conceptions of the *mokṣa* and rebirth (*punarjanma*). But rational considerations and testimony of the *Śāstras* do admit the possibility of *mukṭi* and rebirth. Therefore, it is necessary to accept the theory that the *Ātman* and the body are different. At the same time, it is also necessary to postulate the relation between the *Ātman* and the body as closely associated with each other from beginningless time. We experience pain if the body is hurt, but if the body of Devadatta is hurt, Jinadatta does not experience the pain, because the *Ātman* of Jinadatta is not associated with the body of Devadatta.

It is clear from this, that the *Ātman* of Devadatta is not associated with body of Jinadatta, yet the *Ātman* of Devadatta is associated with his own body. In this sense, they are very closely associated and in the empirical sense they may be considered to be identical. But in the real sense of *jīva* as a spiritual substance, the association of the *jīva* to a particular body is only external and temporary.

SATTĀ AND ASATTĀ (The Real and The Unreal)

Reality of a thing and the reality of its modes can be considered from the point of view of *Syādvāda*. In this sense, a comprehensive seven-fold predication of *Syādvāda* presents the manifold aspects of reality in its affirmative and negative forms of predications. The affirmation and negation have to be predicated with reference to the identical nature of the four-fold aspects of consideration called '*sva-catuṣṭaya*' and with reference to the four-fold aspects of other nature of a thing '*para-catuṣṭaya*'. For instance, the four-fold aspects of understanding the nature of the objects will be (1) *Dravya* (substance) (2) *Kṣetra* (place) (3) *Kāla* (time) and (4) *Bhāva* (its nature). Every thing can be considered from the point of view of its own substance, place, time and nature and it gives affirmations. It may also be considered from the four-fold aspects of the otherness of a thing in respect of substance, place, time and nature. This brings the negative predications.¹

1. *Āptamīmāṃsā*, sl. 16.

We may take the example of a pot made up of gold. Its substance is gold. Therefore, from the point of view of substance, it is gold. Affirmative predications may also be made in respect of the place in which it is, the time at which it is and the real nature of the pot. For instance, its yellow colour and other modes are of its nature. But the same pot considered from the point of view of other material like the clay out of which the pots are made, may give a negative predication. Similarly, with reference to another place, another time and another nature, we may give negative predications. In this sense, the golden pot is a golden pot and it is not a pot made of clay. It is in a particular place and not in any other place. It is at a particular time and not at other time and it is a golden pot with reference to its nature and characteristics like the yellowness of colour etc., and not a earthen pot with reference to the nature of the substance of clay. In this sense again, we may predicate affirmative predications with reference to its own four-fold aspects and negative predications make with reference to other four-fold aspects not belonging to it (*paracatuṣṭaya*).

Some scholars consider that affirmation and negation at the same time contradict each other. But it has been recognised that affirmation and negation may be predicated of a thing from specific points of view in specific situations. There should be no contradiction between affirmation and negation as predicted from different point of view of the same thing. For example, we may affirm that a particular person is a man; and deny that he belongs to any other species than that of man. We may say that a particular person is an Indian and that he is not a Westerner; he is at present living, but he is not eternal; he is wise and is not unwise. These statements do not contradict each other and these statements are not only logically compatible, but are also compatible in fact. Such varied statements from different points of view are necessary to present a coherent and comprehensive picture of the nature of a thing with its many facets.

These examples do emphasis the fact that it is possible to present a comprehensive picture of reality by predicating different aspects of reality in their negative and affirmative states. For this, the Jainas have formulated a methodological scheme presenting seven-fold predications. That is called *Saptabhāṅgī*.

SAPTABHAṆGĪ

Every thing is complex in its nature and it expresses many facets of its characteristics. To give a comprehensive picture of a thing in all its varied aspects the Jainas have formulated seven-fold predications incorporating affirmation, negation and inexpressibility with their possible permutations.¹ We shall discuss about this in the later chapter.

It is necessary to note that *Syādvāda* presents the predicational form of expressing the nature of reality in different aspects. The seven-fold predications are not fragments of imagination, but they are only expressions of the many facets of reality for the sake of comprehension. Herman Jacobi says that *Syādvāda* opens the flood-gates of the comprehension of the nature of a thing in its different aspects.

An American philosopher Prof. Archie J. Bahm has stated that *Syādvāda* is the expression of non-violence in the intellectual form. This doctrine would be more effective to establish world-peace, if popularised. It is the foundational intellectual attitude of the Jainas. Mahatma Gandhi gave importance to non-violence and he emphasised the primacy of *Syādvāda* as the intellectual basis of the ethical doctrine of non-violence. Acarya Vinobha Bhave has emphasised the need of understanding *Syādvāda* for the sake of world peace.

CLARIFICATION OF SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT

SYĀDVĀDA

It would not be out of place to mention some misconceptions regarding the validity of the theory of *Saptabhaṅgī*. In the earlier portion of the *Āgamas*, roots of *Saptabhaṅgī* have been mentioned briefly.² Ācārya Kundakunda has mentioned some predications of the *Saptabhaṅgī* as affirmation, negation and affirmation-negation.³

Later philosophers like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalaṅka, Vidyānandi, Hemacandra, Vālideva etc., have developed the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine in its fuller and detailed aspects of predications. Some

1 *Syādvāda mañjarī* 23 ṭīkā.

2 *Bhagavatī*, 7, 2, 773

3 *Pañcāstikāya, Pravacanasāra*

scholars have taken this as gradual development of the doctrine of *Saptabhāṅgī*. According to them originally, the theory of *Syādvāda* was formulated not in its full form and it was later developed in its seven-fold predications. But we should recognise that the Jaina *darśana* was first presented by *Tīrthaṅkaras*. The *Gaṇadharas* formulated and taught the same to their disciples. Later it was expressed in the form of written documents. This gradual presentation of the doctrine in an elaborate form from the *Tīrthaṅkara* to the *Gaṇadharas* and their disciples does not mean that the doctrine was not fully formulated at the time of the *Tīrthaṅkaras*. *Tīrthaṅkara* is an all-knowing *Sarvadarśī*. It is not possible to say that he did not know the *Syādvāda* doctrine in all its aspects. It would be apt to say that the doctrine of *Saptabhāṅgī* was only elucidated by the *Gaṇadharas* and the later philosophers and not that they developed the theory in an elaborate form.

The first *Tīrthaṅkara* of this era is Ṛgabhadra. His teachings were presented to people by the twenty three other *Tīrthaṅkaras* from time to time. These teachings were elaborated and crystalised in book forms by the disciples and philosophers of the later times. In the act of elaboration and presentation, certain factors like the capability of the *Ācāryas* who had elaborated and intellectual climate of the time when it was presented in a fuller and detailed form have to be considered. It is possible that the personal factors and the intellectual achievements of the later philosophers have influenced the presentation of the doctrines. Therefore, we find that in the later presentations in the book-form the scholars have used the two-fold objects of first presenting the other systems of philosophy as a polemic for refutation and later presented their own doctrine in a positive and constructive form. This type of presentation has developed in dialectical forms too.

But these factors have been ignored by scholars like Archie J. Bahm and they have misunderstood the elaborate presentation of the doctrines as the later developments. It has been suggested by scholars like him, that the *Saptabhāṅgī* doctrine is the development from the Buddhist conception of *Catuṣkoṭi nīṣedha*. This is far from the truth. If we look at this problem from the historical perspective we can very well say that *Saptabhāṅgī* could not have arisen and developed out of

the Buddhist theory of *Catuṣkoṭi*, because Jainism prevailed much earlier to time of the Buddha.¹ There were twenty three *Tīrthaṅkaras* before the Buddha. *Tīrthaṅkara* Pārśvanātha lived two hundred and fifty years before the Buddha. He has presented the doctrine of *Syādvāda*. Saṅjaya Velatṭhiputta lived much earlier to the Buddha. He had criticised the *Syādvāda* as a form of *saṁśaya-vāda* (the theory of doubt). From this, it is clear that *Syādvāda* was formulated before the time of the Buddha. The theory of *Catuṣkoṭi* was formulated much later than the Buddha.

We may also point out that there are fundamental differences between the *Catuṣkoṭi* and *Syādvāda*. The conceptual form of *Catuṣkoṭi* is formulated as follows :

1. it is not that a thing is;
2. it is not that a thing is not;
3. it is not that a thing is and is not;
4. it is not that a thing neither is nor is not.

But *Saptabhaṅgī* incorporates the predications of affirmation, negation, and inexpressibility in their possible permutations. It is not merely an expression of negation of a thing, it predicates the nature of a thing in its different aspects, in the form of affirmation and negation. The affirmation and negation are to be predicated with reference to the four-fold aspects of the self nature of the objects (*sva-catuṣṭaya*) and the four-fold aspects of the other-nature of the objects (*para-catuṣṭaya*). According to *Saptabhaṅgī*, the predications of the nature of man would be that he is a man and he is not a non-man like other animals. But *Catuṣkoṭi* would express negative aspect of predications, as it is not that a man is a man; it is not that a man is other than the man. It is not that a man is and is not other than the man; and it is not that the man neither is nor is not other than the man. In this way, *Catuṣkoṭi* is neither the expression of the affirmation nor is it the presentation of the different aspects of the nature of a thing.

Saptabhaṅgī does not deny the possibility of the affirmative

1. Herman Jacobi : *Jaina Sūtras*—introduction.

predications about the existence of a thing. It points that a thing is and has affirmative predications about its nature from its self-nature points of view in its four-fold aspects and it denies the absence of the other-nature points of view in its four-fold aspects. As we have seen earlier the Buddhist doctrine of *catuṣkoṭi* is fundamentally negative in its predications.

SYĀDVĀDA IS NOT A THEORY OF DOUBT

According to Jainism, the nature of a thing is complex. It has infinite number of characteristics.¹ In describing the characteristics, one has to look at it from different points of view. Therefore, the comprehensive description of the varied nature of the objects is possible by different predications involving affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. The word “*syāt*” in the *Syādvāda* has created a good deal of controversy. The word has been very much misunderstood. It is very often suggested that ‘*syād*’ means “perhaps” or “may be”. This would lead to doubt and more probability. It would lead to scepticism. But the word ‘*syāt*’ has to be taken in a proper perspective. It does not mean perhaps and it does not express any form of doubt in the seven-fold predications. ‘*Syāt*’ means “in a particular context” or from one point-of-view. It refers to a particular ‘universe of discourse’. In this sense, ‘*Syāt*’ does not lead to any element of doubt. *Syādvāda* would not present a theory of doubt. Prof. Baladeva Upādhyāya has also stated that *Syādvāda* is not a theory of doubt. It is not scepticism.

Śaṅkarācārya in his *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* has stated that *Syādvāda* has the element of doubt and it gives an indefinite knowledge. The illusioned conception began from Śaṅkarācārya is still prevailing to some what extent. But as we have already said, the confusion that arises due to the word ‘*syāt*’ is not to be taken as the final say regarding the value of *Syādvāda*. But, it may be pointed that the conditions of doubt are not present in the predication of *Syādvāda*. In the case of a man who is in doubt regarding his perception whether the object that he sees is the man or a tree, there is the elements of doubt and lack of determination. But in the case of seven-fold

1. *Anyayogavyavacchedikā, dvātriṃśikā.*

predication, the affirmation of existence and the predication of negation are well defined and certain from specific points-of-view. The condition of these determinations makes doubt impossible. Prof. Phanibhusana Adhikari has stated that there is no theory which has been as such misunderstood as the Jaina theory of *Syādvāda*. It is possible that Śāṅkarācārya did not go through the texts of the Jainas in their original form.

It is evident that *Syādvāda* is not the theory of doubt. All philosophies accept and utilise it in one way or other; but they hesitate to accept it by name.

The western thinker, Thomas says that *Syādvāda* theory has great depth and needs a keen intellect to understand. It gives a comprehensive picture of the varied aspects of reality. *Syādvāda* presents a picture of reality in its many-coloured aspects. The Jaina theory of *Syādvāda* is free from obscurations and inaccuracies of presentations. In philosophical world *Syādvāda* is like an emperor.

Once Bhagavāna Mahāvīra was asked what form of language the *sādhu* should use. Mahāvīra replied that the *sādhu* (ascetic) should use the language of *Vibhajyavāda*. *Vibhajyavāda* is interpreted as *syādvāda*.

REFUTATION OF CONTRADICTIONS

Śāṅkarācārya has criticised the *saptabhaṅgī* on the grounds of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing. For instance, a thing cannot have the attributes of coldness and hotness at the same time. But to one who has understood the theory of *Syādvāda* in its proper perspective of dialectical predication the charge of contradiction does not stand. If Śāṅkarācārya were asked who he was, he would have replied that he was a *saṁnyāsī*. If he were again to be asked, if he was a "*gṛhastha*" (a householder), he would have said that he was not. Therefore, there would be no contradiction if it were to be predicated that as a *saṁnyāsī* Śāṅkarācārya gives affirmative predications of his nature as a *saṁnyāsī* he would negate the characteristics of a *gṛhastha* of his nature. These two opposite predications are consistent in their contexts and from their points-of-view. Thus we find *syādvāda* presents the many-folded predication from the different points of-view in different contexts. It does

not present two contradictory predications from the same point-of-view. For instance, if from the same point-of-view, were to say that he is a *sañnyāsi* and that he is not a *sañnyāsi*, there would be contradiction, but there is no such uni-contextual predications in the *Syādvāda*. Therefore, *Syādvāda* presents dialectical predications from different points-of-view,

NAYAVĀDA

Nayavāda is the basis of *Syādvāda*. It is the psychological aspect of *anekānta*. *Nayavāda* presents the theory of different points-of view.

These points of view have to be expressed in predicational form for the sake of communication. That is done by *Syādvāda*. *Syādvāda* is the logical expression of *Nayavāda*. *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda* are varieties of *Anekāntavāda*. *Nayavāda* is analytical in character and *Syādvāda* is synthetic.

Pramāṇa expresses the different characteristics of an object. But *naya* presents the specific characteristics of an object. While presenting the characteristic of an object *naya* does not deny the possibility of other characteristics present in an object. If it were to deny the possibility of other characteristics, the denial would be dogmatic. That is "*ḍurnaya*"¹. Predications have a reference to *pramāṇa*. *Naya* is different from and is an aspect of the *pramāṇa* in a particular sense. Just as a part of the sea² is not the sea, nor is it non-sea. It is the part of the sea. The *naya* comprehends the aspect and the characteristics of an object. The different systems of philosophy project a particular point of view, a particular *naya* but their presentation is always one-sided. They cannot have a full and comprehensive picture of reality in all its aspects. But *Nayavāda* demands us to look at reality from different points-of-view. That gives a fuller picture of reality.

The Buddhist approach of looking at reality was from the point of view of momentariness. Therefore, they emphasise that there is nothing permanent in the world. Everything is in a flux. The Buddhist

1 *Pramāṇanyatattvāloka—Vāḍideva.*

2 *Śloka-vārttika—Vidyānandi.*

approach to the problems of reality, according to the Jainas is from the point of view of *Rjusūtranaya*. This partial approach of looking at reality does not give a correct picture of the real. Similarly, the *Advantin* looks at reality from the synthetic point of view ¹*Saṅgrahanaya*. The other points-of-view present only an appearance. But the *Nayavāda* does not discard any point-of-view nor does it give exclusive importance to a particular point-of-view. *Nayavāda*, therefore, gives a synoptic picture of different doctrines, like—*Dvaita* and *Advaita Niścaya* (noumenal) and *Vyavahāra*, *yadṛcchā-puruṣārthavāda* etc.

Nayavāda is against dogmatism which gives exclusive importance to a particular point-of-view. *Nayavāda* presents the catholic approach to the problems of reality. Ācārya Samantabhadra had made obeisance to Jinendra (*Tīrthaṅkara*) for presenting a synoptic approach to the understanding of reality in the *Syādvāda*. It has been said that a thing has three characteristics origination (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*) substantiality (*dhrauvya*). For instance, a goldsmith prepares a crown after breaking up the pot made of gold. In this case, the first state of pot is destroyed and a new form of crown is made. But the substance out of which it is made and the material gold, is the same in both. Therefore a thing is permanent as a substance. But its modes change. Again, if a person only takes milk and refuses to take curds, he takes the substance, but he is not prepared to take its modification. Similarly, if a person takes curds, but does not take milk, he accepts the modifications and does not accept the substance out of which it is made. But one who does not accept the milk and its modes, has to give up milk and the curds also. The formation of curds involves the destruction of the state of milk and the production of the state of curds. But in both these, the substance of milk is constant.

Therefore, a thing has its substantiality and modifications. One who looks at the objects from the substance point-of-view as a synthetic approach (*dravyārthika naya*) and one who looks at the objects from the point of view of its modes has *pariyāyārthika naya*. But the real nature of the object is complex. It has substance and its modes,

both real. The substance point-of-view gives exclusive importance to the substance (*dravya*). This is called *dravyārthikanaya*, and the point of view which looks at reality from the side of its modifications is the *paryāyārthikanaya*. There is enormous literature on this problem of *nayavāda* in the Jaina philosophy. I do not propose to elaborate on this point for the fear of being lost in the woods.



SAPTABHAṄGĪ : A Discussion

Anekānta is the foundational principle of Jainism. It is the very essence of Jainism and it pervades the thought and philosophy of the Jainas. It would not be an exaggeration to say that a thorough understanding of *Anekānta* would give the key to the understanding of the Jaina *darśana*. For this reason, Siddhasena Divākara, in his *Sanmati Prakaraṇa*, has stated that *Anekānta* is the very first and foundational principle which teaches us the first and the last lessons of the Jaina *darśana*. In everyday life, we find the spirit of *Anekānta* pervading the thought and life of the people. Therefore, he salutes the theory of *anekānta*.¹

The *Sāṃkhya* theory of evolution is expressed in the evolution of *Prakṛti* in the presence of the *Puruṣa*. The *Prakṛti* and the *Puruṣa* are the primary principles. The development of the *Vedānta* has culminated in the principle of *Advaita*. The development of Buddhism can be seen in the theory of *Vijñānavāda* i. e., (theory of consciousness). In this sense, *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda* are the be all and the end all in Jaina philosophy. The concepts of *pramāṇa* and *naya* can be properly understood if we know the essence of *saptabhaṅgī*. *Pramāṇa* and *naya* present the background of understanding of *Anekānta* and *Anekānta* is expressed in the form of *Saptabhaṅgī*.

SAPTABHAṄGĪ

Question has been very often asked regarding the nature and the function of *saptabhaṅgī*. The Jaina Ācāryas have discussed these problems elaborately. The nature of a thing is complex having many characteristics and the nature of any one of characteristic can be des-

cribed in seven types of words. This can be called as in seven different ways. Therefore, this is called seven-fold predication of *saptabhāṅgī*.¹

For understanding the nature of a thing, it is necessary to know the thing in the light of *naya* (point-of-view) and *pramāṇa* (valid source of knowledge). *Naya* and *Pramāṇa* do give a valid and comprehensive knowledge of the nature of the thing. The reasoning is of two types—*svārtha* (for one's own sake) and *parārtha* (for the sake of communicating to others).² *Svārthādhigama* aims at presenting the knowledge to oneself. While *parārthādhigama* is concerned with presenting the knowledge to others in the form of communication in language. This gives the predication form of expressions. In the *parārthādhigama* we have 2 forms of expressions : (1) *pramāṇa vākya* which is concerned with the predication of the validity of the knowledge and its source and (2) *naya vākya* which is concerned with predicating the nature of a thing from a particular point-of-view (*naya*). On this basis, a distinction has been made in the *saptabhāṅgī* as *pramāṇa saptabhāṅgī* and *naya saptabhāṅgī*.³ *Pramāṇa vākya* is comprehensive (*sakalādeṣī*) because it is more concerned with presenting the nature of the object as a whole in its various aspects through the valid source of knowledge. *Naya vākya* is considered to be *vikalādeṣī* (partial presentation) because it presents one aspect of the nature of reality from a particular point of view, although reality is complex and has infinite aspects.⁴

Mallisenā in his *Syādvādamāñjarī* while describing the nature of an object, has stated that an object is constituted of the attributes and its modifications. *Tattva*, *Padārtha* and *Dravya* are synonymous to a thing or reality.⁵

1 (a) *Syādvāda māñjarī* 23 īkā.

(b) *Saptabhāṅgītarāṅgiṇī* p. 1.

2 *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 6.

3 *Saptabhāṅgītarāṅgiṇī* p. 1.

4 *Anyayogavyavacchedikā*, kārikā 22

5 *Syādvādamāñjarī*, kārikā 23 vṛtti

Ācārya Akalaṅka has stated that in the presentation of the nature of the object in its infinite aspects we have to adopt predicational form in the seven-fold predication which may include the positive and negative predications also without contradicting each other.¹ The nature of the object can be considered from seven points of view and their predications would be seven-fold. Similarly, it has been said that curiosity (*jijñāsā*) may be analysed into seven forms; as a consequence there are seven-fold predications. Everything can be presented in seven-fold predications. These predications have been worked out on the basis of permutations of the fundamental three-fold predications of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. *Bhaṅga* refers to the partial presentation (*vikalpa*) or a particular form of expression.

SAPTABHAṆGĪ AND ANEKĀNTA

Anekānta is the basic attitude of the Jainas. It is the foundational principle. It expresses itself in the theory of *naya* (points of view) and the points of view are primarily epistemological and psychological. Predications from these points of view give us the dialectical form of propositional expressions. *Saptabhaṅgī* is primarily logical. It is the logical expression of the psychological basis in *Nayavāda*. *Anekāntavāda* is the foundational attitude. *Anekānta* emphasises, as we have said earlier, that reality is complex and it has infinite aspects to be known and understood. These can be presented from different points of view. A particular point of view gives one aspect of reality and these various aspects have been classified into seven fundamental forms on the basis of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. These predications are not absolute. They are related to each other. And all of them put together would give as a contradiction, if affirmational and negating propositions are presented. Again, we can say that *Anekānta* attitude gives a fuller picture absorbing all aspects of reality, *Syādvāda* is the dialectical presentation of the *Anekānta* attitude. The first is the expression and the second is the basis.

SYĀDVĀDA IN THE ĀGAMAS

If we study the theory of *Syādvāda* from the historical point of

1 *Tattvārtha Rājavārtika* 1, 6. 51

view tracing its presentation in the *Āgamas*, it is clear that *Syādvāda* and its predication forms are not later developments. We can find the presentations in the *Āgamas* enunciated from the philosophical points of view.

Gautama Gaṇadhara asked Bhagavāna Mahāvīra whether the earth called Ratnaprabhā is soul or not ?

Bhagavāna Mahāvīra replied, (1) "from one point of view, Ratnaprabhā is *ātmā*, (2) from another point of view it is no soul; (3) from still another point of view its nature is inexpressible."

Having heard these predications, Gautama asked again—Lord ! How you are describing the same earth in such different ways ?

Bhagavāna Mahāvīra said (1) it is a soul from the point of view of the self nature of the soul. (2) it is no soul from the point of view of other aspect than the soul and (3) from the point of both the aspects its nature is indescribable.¹

Then Gautama asked for clarifications on the same lines, regarding the nature of other earths, planets, the habitation of the gods (*devaloka*) and *siddhaśīla* (the place of the liberated souls). He received similar presentations from Mahāvīra. Then he asked about the nature of the *Paramāṇu* (atom) and he got similar precepts. He then asked about the description of the nature of molecules with two *pradeśas* (having two space units) & he got the following answer.

(1) Molecule with two space units (*dvipradeśika*) is *ātman* from one point of view.

(2) Molecule with two space units is not *ātman* from another point of view.

(3) Molecule with two space units is [indescribable (*avaktavya*)] from still other point of view.

(4) Molecule with two space points is *ātman* and is not *ātman* from different points of view.

(5) Molecule with two space points is *ātman* and is indescribable.

¹ *Bhagavatī*, śataka 12, 30, 10.

(6) A molecule with two space points is not *ātman* and is indescribable.

Bhagavāna Mahāvīra explained to Gautama Gaṇadhara when he was asked certain clarifications thus :

(1) A molecule with two space points is *ātman* from the point of view of its self-nature of *ātman*.

(2) From the point of view of its nature other than the *ātman* (*para-ādeśa*) it is not *ātman*.

(3) From the point of view of both the self-nature (*sva-ādeśa*) and the other nature (*para-ādeśa*), it is indescribable.

(4) From the points of view of the mode of existence of a molecule of one place unit (*ege deśī*) and of the mode of non-existence of the same a molecule of two space points has the predications of affirmations and negation.

(5) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and non-existence of the other place unit, molecule of two space has the predications of affirmations and inexpressibility.

(6) A molecule of one place unit having the modes of non-existence and the other place unit the modes of existence and non-existence a molecule of two space points has the predication of negation and inexpressibility.

Then, Gautama asked clarifications about the predications regarding molecules of three space points. Mahāvīra replied thus :

(1) A molecule of three space points is *ātman* from one point of view.

(2) A molecule with three space points is not *ātman* from a different point of view.

(3) A molecule with three space points is indescribable in nature from still another point of view.

(4) A molecule with three space points is and is not *ātman* from a different point of view.

(5) A molecule with three space points is *ātman*, but is not (two) *ātman*s.

(6) A molecule with three space points from another point of view is (two) *ātman* and is not *ātman*.

(7) A molecule with three space points is *ātman* and is indescribable.

(8) A molecule with three space points is *ātman* and (two) indescribable.

(9) A molecule with three space points from one point of view (two) *ātmans* and is indescribable

(10) A molecule with three space points is not *ātman* and is indescribable.

(11) A molecule with three space points is *ātman* and (two) indescribable.

(12) The molecule with three space points is not (two) *ātman* and is indescribable.

(13) A molecule with three space points is and is not *ātman* and is indescribable.

Gautama Gaṇadhara asked clarifications regarding the function of these different predications. Mahāvira said thus :

(1) A molecule with three space points is *ātman* from the points of view of the self-nature of the *ātman*.

(2) A molecule with three space points is not *ātman* from the other nature.

(3) A molecule with three space points is indescribable from the points of view of both the natures.

(4) A molecule with one space point can be considered from the points of view of the mode of existence and also of non-existence. From these points of view, a molecule with three place units (*tripra-deśīs*) is *ātman* and is not *ātman*.

(5) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and also of the mode of non-existence of two place units and a molecule with three space points is *ātman* and is not (two) *ātman*.

(6) From the point of view of the mode of existence of two

place units and the mode of non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of three space points is (two *ātman*) and is not an *ātman*.

(7) From the points of the mode of existence of one place unit and of both existence and non-existence of the second place unit a molecule with three space points is *ātman* and is indescribable.

(8) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and of existence and non-existence of the two place units, a molecule with three space points is the *ātman* and (two) indescribable.

(9) From the points of view of mode of existence of two place units and of existence and non-existence of one place unit a molecule of three space points is (two *ātmans*) and is indescribable.

(10) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of one place unit and of both existence and non-existence from other place units, a molecule of three space points is not *ātman* and is indescribable.

(11) From the points of view the mode of non-existence of one place unit and of mode of both existence and non-existence of two place units a molecule of three space points is not *ātman* and is (two) indescribable.

(12) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of two place units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one space point a molecule of three space points is not (two *ātman*) and is indescribable.

(13) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one place unit, and also the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of three space points is *ātman*, is not *ātman* and is indescribable.

After this, Gautama asked explanation about the predication of the molecule of four space points. Bhagavāna Mahāvīra enunciated nineteen predications—

(1) A molecule with four space points is not *ātman* from the self-nature of the *ātman*.

(2) A molecule with four space points is not *ātman* from the nature other than the *ātman*.

(3) A molecule with four space points is indescribable from both the points of view.

(4) From the view-point of the mode of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is *ātman* and is not *ātman*.

(5) From the view-points of the modes of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of numerous place units, a molecule of four space points is *ātman* and is not (numerous) *ātmans*.

(6) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is (numerous) *ātmans* and is not *ātman*.

(7) From the points of the view of modes of existence of two place units and of non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is (two) *ātmans* and is not (two) *ātman*.

(8) From the points of view of mode of existence of one space point and the mode of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is *ātman* and is indescribable.

(9) From the point of view of the mode of non-existence of one place unit and the modes of existence and non-existence of numerous place units and molecule of four space points it is *ātman* and is indescribable.

(10) From the points of view the mode of existence of numerous place units and the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is (numerous) *ātmans* and is indescribable.

(11) From the points of view of the mode of existence of two place units and the modes of existence and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is (two) *ātman* and is (two) indescribable.

(12) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of one place unit and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one

place unit, a molecule of four space points is not *ātman* and is indescribable.

(13) From the points of view of mode of non-existence of one place units and of existence and non-existence of numerous (place units) a molecule of four space points is not *ātman* and (numerous) is indescribable.

(14) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of numerous place unit, a molecule of four space points is not (numerous) *ātman*s and is indescribable.

(15) From the points of view the modes of non-existence of two place units and of existence and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is not (two) *ātman*s and is (two) indescribable.

(16) From the points of view of mode of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one space point and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is *ātman*, is not *ātman* and is indescribable.

(17) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is not *ātman* and is (two) indescribable.

(18) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit, of non-existence of two place unit and of both existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is *ātman* and (two) not *ātman* and is inexpressible.

(19) From the points of view of the modes of existence of two place units, of non-existence of one place unit and of both existence and non-existence of one place unit a molecule of four space points is (two) *ātman*s, is not *ātman* and is inexpressible.

After this, the questions were asked regarding molecule of five space points, and Bhagavāna replied by enunciating twenty-two predicational propositions from different points of view. They are :

(1) A molecule of five space-points is *ātman* from the point of view of the self-nature of the *ātman*.

(2) A molecule of five space points is not *ātman* from the point of view of other nature (*paratva*).

(3) A molecule of five space points is indescribable from both the self and other nature.

(4, 5, and 6) These are similar to the predicational propositions of the molecule of four space points.

(7) From the points of view of the modes of existence of two or three place units and of non-existence of two or three place units & of non-existence of (two or three place units) a molecule of five space point is (two or three) *ātmans*. (When we take the mode of existence of two place units, then we should take the mode of non-existence of three place units. When we take the mode of existence of three place units we should also take the mode of non-existence of two place unit.)

(8), (9) and (10) These are similar to the predicational forms similar to the molecule of four space points.

(11) From the point of view of mode of existence of two or three place units and of existence and non-existence of two or three place units a molecule of five space points is (two or three) *ātmans* and is (two or three) inexpressible.

12, 13 and 14 predicational forms are similar to the predicational forms of a molecule of four space points.

(15) From the points of view of the modes of existence and non-existence of two or three place units, and of non-existence of two or three place units, a molecule of five space points is not (two or three) *ātmans* and is (two or three) indescribable.

(16) This propositional form is similar to the propositional form of the molecule of four space points.

(17) From the point of view of existence of one place unit, non-existence of the one place unit of the modes of existence and non-existence of one of numerous place units, a molecule of space of five points is *ātman*, is not *ātman* and is indescribable.

(18) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit of non-existence of numerous place units and of existence and non-existence of one place units a molecule of five space points is *ātman*, is not (numerous) *ātmans* and is indescribable.

(19) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit, of non-existence of two place units of existence and non-existence of two place units a molecule of five space points is *ātman*, is not (two) *ātman* and is (two) inexpressible.

(20) From the points of view of the modes of existence of numerous place units, of non-existence of one place unit and of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of five space points is *ātman* is not (two) *ātman* and is (two) inexpressible.

(21) From the points of view of the modes of existence of two place units of non-existence of one place unit and from the point of view of the modes of existence and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of five space points is (two) *ātmans*, is not *ātman* and is (two) inexpressible.

(22) From the points of view of the mode of existence of two place units and of non-existence of two place units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of five space points is two *ātmans*, is not (two) *ātmans* and is *avaktavya* (inexpressible).

In this way, various combinations and permutations of the propositional forms regarding the molecule of six place points has been presented. There are twenty three propositional forms. Twenty-two predicational forms are the same as described above and the twenty-third is as follows :

From the points of view of modes of existence of two place points of existence of two place units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of six space points is (two) *ātmans*, is not (two) *ātmans* and is (two) inexpressible.¹

From the discussions given above, it is clear that the seven-fold

1 *Bhagavatī* 12, 10, 469,

predicational school called *saptabāṅgī*, is not a later development presented by the *ācāryas*. Dalsukh Mālavanīā¹ says that—

(1) The *syādvāda* doctrine is based on the predication of affirmation and negation.

(2) From the combinations and permutations of the two propositional forms, we get other predications.

(3) The primary predications of affirmation and negation give rise to the possible logical combinations for the sake of presenting other forms of predications. Each predicational form must have its own view point. Each predicational form is accepted and is proved. It is valid from a particular point of view in a particular universe of discourse.

(4) The word “*syāt*” has been prefixed to every predicational form for the sake of expressing the implication of the point of view.

Therefore, this theory is called ‘*Syādvāda*’.

On the basis of these considerations it is clear that the *syāt* is used for connoting a point of view or a specific situation. When this point of view is clear, the word ‘*syāt*’ need not be used. But when it is implied, the word ‘*syāt*’ has been used. Therefore, the word ‘*syāt*’ has a preference to the point of view or the context in a particular situation in the background of the other situations as a rational presentation.

(5) The third predicational form is “*avaktavya*” inexpressibility. Some Jaina philosophers have made it the fourth predication. But in the *Āgama* literature, this predication has not got the fourth place. It is worth considering, how and when the predication of “*avaktavya*” was given the fourth place; and who gave it.

() In the seven-fold predicational forms, there must be seven predications including the affirmation and negation, neither more nor less. Therefore, the doctrine of seven-fold predications has its roots in the *Āgamas*. In the case of the predications regarding the nature of the molecules with three place units and in the case of more place

1 *Āgama yug kā Jaina darśana*, (Hindi), pp. 112-113

units the predicational forms are many. But these predicational forms are only permutations of the seven-fold predications based on the number of space only. It would be a fallacy to say that the *saptabhāṅgī* doctrine is not restricted to seven-fold predications alone.

(7) The conception of the partial place unit structure (*vikalādeśa*) and complete place unit structure (*sakalādeśa*) is also to be found in the Āgama literature, for analysing the doctrine of *saptabhāṅgī*. In the *āgamas*, we find that the first three predications are '*sakalādeśī*' and the remaining predications are '*vikalādeśī*'.

THE METHODOLOGY OF SEVEN-FOLD PREDICATIONS

From the point of view of grammatical presentation of the propositions, there are two forms of predications (i) of affirmation and (ii) negation. These predications are complementary, because affirmation implies the negation of its opposite and negation implies affirmation of its contrary. From the absolute point of view there is relation between the affirmation and negation, but considered from relational point of view, the two forms of proposition of affirmation and negation are complementary to each other. These two propositional forms combine to give rise to seven-fold predications. The seven-fold predications are;

- (1) *Syād-asti*—From a particular point of view 'it is'.
- (2) *Syād-nāsti*—From a different point of view 'it is not'.
- (3) *Syād-asti-nāsti*—From a still different approach to problem 'it is and is not'.
- (4) *Syād avaktavyam*—From another point of view, 'it is inexpressible.'
- (5) *Syād astiavaktavyam*—From a point of view, 'it is and is inexpressible.'
- (6) *Syād nāsti-avaktavyam*—From another point of view 'it is not and is inexpressible'.
- (7) *Syād-asti-nāsti avaktavyam*—From a different point of view 'it is, it is not and is inexpressible'.

In the seven-fold predications affirmation, negation, and inexpressibility are primary forms of predications. With the combinations of

these three predications, we get the remaining four : *asti-nāsti* (affirmation and negation), *asti-avaktavyam* (affirmation and inexpressibility), *nāsti-avaktavyam* (negation and inexpressibility) and *asti-nāsti-avaktavyam* (affirmation, negation and inexpressibility).

These seven-fold predications have been mentioned in the *Āgama* literature. In the *Bhagavatī sūtra*, seven-fold predications are mentioned.¹ Kundakundācārya, in the *Pañcāstikāyasāra*² has mentioned the seven-fold predications. The predication of *avaktavya* (inexpressibility) has been made the third predication in the *Bhagavatī sūtra* and in the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*.³ In the *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, Kundakundācārya has made it the fourth predication,⁴ but in the *Pravacanasāra*, he has placed it as the third predication.⁵ Later philosophers have used both the methods of predications according to their convenience.

SYĀD-ASTI (FIRST PREDICATION)

The first predication is *syād-asti*. It implies that from a particular point of view of nature, a pot exists as a pot—*syād asti ghaṭaḥ*.

The question of the relative approach to the problems from a particular point of view, has been given in this predication. For example, we affirm the existence of the pot, as pot, in the context of its nature, of the materia! out of which it is made like the clay, the place in which it is, the time of its existence and its nature as the pot. These refer to the self-nature of the pot. The affirmation as a predicate does imply the affirmation with reference to its self-nature which is expressed in the four-fold scheme of expression of *dravya* (matter) out of which it is made, the place of its existence, *kāla* the time of its existence, and the nature of the function of the pot. The predication of affirmation also implies the predication of negation of its opposite. For instance,

1 *Bhagavatī sūtra*, śataka 12, 3010, p. 19-20.

2 *Pañcāstikāyasāra-gāthā* 14

3 *Bhagavatī sūtra*, śataka 12, 3010, p. 19-20 & *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, gāthā 2-32.

4 *Pañcāstikāya* 14.

5 *Pravacanasāra jñeyādhikāra gāthā* 115.

the pot is made up of clay or some metal like brass. It cannot be made out of sand. Similarly, the characteristic and function of the cloth would be a cover. If the pot is not able to perform its function of holding water, then it would no longer be called a pot. Similarly, if a piece of cloth does not possess the qualities of covering or the function that the cloth has to perform, it would be no longer be called a piece of cloth. These are the inherent characteristics. If these distinctions in the functions of different objects were not to be recognised, then there would be no difference between a quantity of manure and a similar quantity of jaggery. In this sense, the function of the predication of affirmation has its importance in presenting the self-identity of the objects.

SECOND PREDICATION (*SYĀD-NĀSTI*)

The second predication is the predication of negation. It is *Syād-nāsti*. It expresses that in a particular context with reference of the other nature of the objects (*para catuṣṭaya*), there is the predication of negation. This predication has reference to the four-fold expression of the other forms and nature of the objects like the material out of which it is made, the place, the time and its nature. From the points of view of its nature, other than its own and its expression of other forms like place, time and the material out of which it is made, the pot is not a pot. For instance, the pot would be a pot and would function as a pot only, if it had its own characteristics. With reference to the other characteristics like its creation out of different materials like sand and its other place and time, it would not be pot, because it may not function as an object holding water. This predication of negation from the other point of view is also important and the predicational forms would not be complete without the predication of negation. Vidyānadi says that the predication of negation has a reference to the other nature and the presence of opposite characteristics. If the negation were to be applied to the object with reference to its own nature, then the real nature of the pot would not be understood, and, in fact, the nature of the pot as pot would no longer be existent.¹ Similarly, if the negation were to be predicated

1 *Tattvārtha Śloka-vārtika* 1, 6, 52.

absolutely without reference to the other nature of the objects then it would lead to nihilism. It is, therefore, necessary to have second predication of negation.

THIRD PREDICATION (*SYĀD-ASTI-NĀSTI*)

The third predication is the composite predication of affirmation and negation. For instance, the pot is and is not. These predications are to be considered as presented successively from different points of view and not simultaneously. Otherwise, there would be contradiction. From the point of view of the four-fold scheme of expression of self-nature (*svacatuṣṭaya*), the pot exists as pot. And from the point of view of the expression of other nature (*para catuṣṭaya*) the pot does not exist as pot. In the first two predications, separate and independent expression of affirmation and negation have been made. But in the third predication the affirmation and negation are predicated of a thing successively for the sake of presenting the positive and the negative aspects of the thing.

FOURTH PREDICATION (*SYĀD AVAKTAVYAM*)

The fourth predication presents the concept of inexpressibility. For instance, from a particular point of view and in a contextual situation the nature of the pot is inexpressible. The real nature of the pot in its pure form may not be expressible in terms of words, because a thing is complex and has infinite characteristics. All of them cannot be presented in words. This refers to the impossibility of simultaneous affirmations and negations of the characteristics of the pot. This predication shows that we may understand the nature of the object in its various aspects, but it is difficult to predicate these characteristics in the form of language. But it should be realised that the predication of inexpressibility is not final. It has always reference to a particular point of view and the situation. Similarly, it is based on the acceptance of contradiction of the predication of affirmation and negation simultaneously. Otherwise, it would lead to agnosticism.

FIFTH PREDICATION (*SYĀD-ASTI-AVAKTAVYAM*)

This is the composite predication of affirmation and inexpressibility. For instance, it affirms the existence of the pot as a pot, but

expresses the inability to express the full nature of the pot. These two predications are also to be considered as presented from two points of view in a situation. To make this as an absolute predication would lead to dogmatism and ultimately to agnosticism.

SIXTH PREDICATION (*SYĀD-NĀSTI-AVAKTAVYAM*)

The sixth predication is a composite predication of negation and inexpressibility. In the first instance, from a particular point of view it is not a pot and in the second instance, from the point of view of simultaneous affirmation and negation, it is inexpressible.

SEVENTH PREDICATION (*SYĀD-ASTI-NĀSTI-AVAKTAYAM*)

The seventh predication is a composite predication of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. These predications are considered as successive and not simultaneous, although in the case of the predication of inexpressibility it refers to the impossibility of affirmation and negation, simultaneously and consequently inexpressibility of its nature. Therefore, there should be no contradiction or ambiguity in the presentation of the composite predication of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility.

The predications of the *saptabhāṅgī* are dialectical presentations of the predications which are possible to express in their various forms of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. The dialectics of logic has been an important contribution in the field of logic and metaphysics. Recent researches have shown that *saptabhāṅgī* doctrine is very useful in understanding the dialectic of the theories of probabilities and quantum physics. Eminent scientists like J. B. S. Haldane and Mahalanobis have recognised the importance of the doctrine of *syādvāda* for the dialectic of probability and for discoveries of biological sciences.¹

“CATUṢṬAYA” (EXPRESSION OF FOUR-FOLD ASPECTS)

A thing is complex in its nature with infinite number of attributes. Understanding a thing requires the insight of analysing its various aspects, positive and negative. From the positive aspect of self-nature, we can predicate the existence of a thing affirmatively. From the point

1. *Samkhyā* : Journal, Oct 1958.

of view of the four-fold expression of the aspects other than its own, we can predicate the negation of the existence of the object.¹ The four-fold aspects are : (1) the matter out of which a thing is made (*dravya*), (2) place of existence (*kṣetra*) (3) time of its existence (*kāla*) and (4) its nature (*bhāva*). From the point of view of the nature of matter out of which a thing is made, we may predicate its existence if it is consistent with its nature. If we have to refer to its place, time and its function, and if they are consistent with its nature, then we can predicate its existence. For instance, the pot is a pot, if it is made out of clay, if it is in a particular determined place, at a particular time and in its own nature. But if the object is referred to the four-fold expressions of its aspects other than its real nature, then we predicate the negation.

Syādvādamāñjarī present the four-fold expression of the aspects of a thing from the phenomenal or the practical point of view (*vyavahāranaya*). For instance, from the point of view of the substance out of which it is made, we can affirm the existence of the pot as made up of clay, then affirm the existence of the pot in Pāṭaliputra at a particular time, say winter and from the point of view of its nature as black.²

Every thing in the universe is complex in its nature with its infinite characteristics. Considered from points of view of its self-nature, in the four-fold expression of its aspects as mentioned above, we can predicate the affirmation of its existence as the object is considered from the point of view of the contrary nature with the objects with reference to the four-fold expression of its otherness of the aspects, we can predicate the negation of the object. In these predications there should be no contradiction at all, because as we have pointed earlier, a thing is not merely made up of positive qualities, it has also the negative qualities. Therefore, the Jaina conception of the seven-fold predication with reference to the four-fold expressions of the self-nature and the other nature is a coherent presentation of the analysis of the nature of the object. There is no inconsistency either logical or metaphysical in the seven-fold predications.

1. *Pancādhyāyī* 1, 263

2. *Syādvādamāñjarī*, kārikā 23.

Again, there is no doubt or uncertainty in the seven-fold predications. We have seen that the word 'syāt' is not an expression of uncertainty or mere probability. It is the expression of a particular context of a point of view. From a particular point of view the predication is always certain and never in doubt. Therefore, we find that the word 'eva' is suffixed to the predicate. For example, 'syāt ghaṭa asti eva'. It means that from a particular point of view of its self-nature the pot exists as a pot, and there is no doubt about it.

THE USE OF THE WORD SYĀT

Every predication of the seven-fold predications is characterised by the primacy of the self-nature of predication *svadharma*. The other nature of the predication (*anyadharma*) is secondary. The word 'syāt' is used for the sake of giving emphasis on the distinction of the primary and secondary emphases of the self-nature and the other nature of the predications. The word 'syāt' is primarily concerned with emphasising the specific nature of the objects from a particular point of view. It aims at distinguishing between the primary emphasis of the specific nature and the secondary emphasis of the other nature of the objects. In this, the function of denial is not contradictory, but is relational. The word 'syāt', therefore, does give importance to the analysis of the specific nature of the object and not to doubt. This becomes necessary because the nature of the objects and the expression of the objects in the form of language will possibly be different, because words cannot express the full nature of the object of experience, but it becomes necessary to predicate the different aspects of nature from different points of view. If the words had the capacity of a full expression of the entire nature of the objects, then 'syāt' would not be necessary.¹ The expression of *anekānta* would be also possible without the use of the word 'syāt'. For instance, in the proposition "*ahaṃ asmi*" (I exist), there are two terms : the subject and the predicate. These are the two terms which are consistent and are related intrinsically to each other. The proposition gives definite meaning of the existence of myself. In this proposition the use of

1. *Laghīyastraya, pravacanapraveśa* 63.

one of the words would be sufficient to give full meaning of the proposition, but for the sake of clarity and emphasis, the two words are used. Similarly, in the proposition—"pārtho dhanurdharaḥ", gives a clear meaning of the nature and the state of Arjuna. It is not necessary to use the word 'eva' because the two words are self-explanatory. Therefore, the word 'eva' is not used.¹ The proposition "asti ghaṭaḥ" (the pot exists) gives a full and determinate meaning about the existence of the pot. But for the sake of clarification and emphasis the word 'syāt' is also used, as it clears doubts and discrepancies. Ācārya Hemacandra says that the use of the word 'syāt' implies the expression of *anekānta* attitude.² Akalaṅkadeva says that the function of the 'syāt' is two-fold, in giving emphasis on the validity of *anekānta* (*samyakanekānta*) & the validity & rightness of expression of one point of view (*samyak ekānta*). So he wishes to use the word *syāt* in *naya* and *pramāṇa* both types of *saptabhaṅgī*.³

11.3. SAPTABHAṆGĪ IN OTHER DARŚANAS

We have seen that the primary predications of *saptabhaṅgī* are three-fold—affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. We find similar expressions in other schools of Indian philosophy like the Vedānta, Buddhism and *Vaiśeṣika*.

According to the *Advaitavedānta*, the reality is one. It is *Brahman*. It is inexpressible, still it is. Therefore, *Brahman* is real, but it is inexpressible (*avaktavya*). In the Buddhist philosophy, there is nothing permanent or real. Every thing is fleeting, and is inexpressible in words. Language is an inadequate instrument for expression of the complex nature of the objects and depth of the experience. Therefore, the Buddhist expression of the negation of a permanent reality still leaves the possibility of the real as being inexpressible. *Vaiśeṣika* school posits the seven-fold category and *sāmānya* (generality) and *viśeṣa* (particularity) as the two are independent categories which are equally real. Generality and particularity are independent categories though

1. *Tattvārthaślokaṇṭikā* 1, 6, 56.

2. *SyādvādaNāñjarī*, kārikā 5.

3. *Laghīyastraya* 62.

related to each other and though expressing the affirmation and negation as predications. However, the real nature of the categories cannot be expressed in language. It is 'avaktavya'. In this way, the fundamental predications of the Jaina theory of *Saptabhaṅgī* have been implied in the systems of philosophy like the *Advaitavedānta*, the *Buddhists* and the *Vaiśeṣika*.

PRAMĀṆA SAPTABHAṆGĪ

Pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī can be interpreted as the dialectic of the seven-fold predications with reference to the valid source of knowledge. It is comprehensive and all-covering, and it is called 'sakalādeśa.' While a predication from a particular *naya* (point of view) is the predication from a particular point, because it does not give a comprehensive presentation of reality from all aspects. Therefore, it is called 'vikalādeśa' (partial presentation). The seven-fold predications from the *saptabhaṅgī* are comprehensive if they are exhaustive & cover the different points of view. If the partial presentation is there, it is called 'nayavākya'. The comprehensive presentation is called *pramāṇa-vākya*.

Every thing is complex in its nature and is characterised by infinite attributes. To give a comprehensive picture of the nature of a thing in all its aspects, it would require to present the predications in an infinite number of ways. But such infinite number of predications is neither possible nor practicable. It would require infinite time but life is short and it does not permit us in the short span of time to present the entire nature of an object. Therefore, it is necessary to use significant words pregnant with comprehensive meaning. This is possible by the comprehensive presentation of the nature of the object in a language which uses the valid sources of knowledge. The synthetic view of presentation (*abheda upacāra*) is necessary for the comprehensive predication of reality. The synthetic and non-synthetic and non-dual presentation implies the diversity of expression also in giving the diverse nature of the object. This is '*pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī*.'

A question arises—what is the nature of '*abheda vṛtti*' (the approach of unity) & non-duality? What do we mean by the presentation, specially when there is abundant diversity in the things of the world? We can ask what is the basis of the oneness the comprehen-

siveness and oneness (*aheda* ?). The answer to this would be, that the real nature of the object does not express unity alone or diversity alone, it is complex and the predications have also to be complex. The predication of the unity does imply the expression of diversity though secondary & sometimes is mentioned as inexpressible. The unitary & synthetic approach to the understanding of the nature of a thing is expressed in the different predications as presenting the following aspects of the infinite nature of the object : (1) *Kāla* (time) (2) *ātmarūpa* (self-nature) (3) *artha* (meaning) (4) *sambandha* (relation) (5) *upakāra* (function) (6) *guṇideśa* (existence in a place) (7) *samśarga* (association) and (8) *śabda* (expression in words). In this way, by presenting the synthetic and the synoptic picture of the objects in its various aspects like its nature, its substance, relation, causality etc., we get a comprehensive nature of the objects. This is '*sakalādeśa*', because it comprehends to the various attributes of the object in a synoptic way.

In predicating the nature of the objects like *jīva*, we lay emphasis on the predication of existence (*astitva*) & this predication implies the predications of the other aspects of the objects like its nature, its relation, its function, the time and the place in which it is to be found. We analyse this with the reference to the eight aspects :

(1) *Kāla* : When we predicate the existence of a thing like a pot, we also predicate the existence of the other attributes like its colour, its size, its quality of hardness, etc. For this reason, with reference to the aspect of time the other attributes along with the existence are non-different and can be comprehensively apprehended.

(2) *Ātma-rūpa* : It refers to the real nature of the objects. In predicating the real nature of the object, as for instance of a pot (*ghaṭa*), we have also to predicate the other attributes like its black colour, its hardness etc., by implication. These attributes are inherent in the very nature of the objects. Therefore, the description of the objects implies the description of the inherent qualities.

(3) *Artha* : Existence is an attribute of the pot. Similarly, the attributes of blackness and hardness are related to the objects. All these attributes exist in the same place and therefore there is no difference between existence and other attributes with the view of (*artha*) meaning.

(4) *Sambandha* : Just as the relation of the attributes of existence with the objects is that of inherence, so also the relation of the other attributes with the objects is that of inherence. There is no difference in their relation.

(5) *Upakāra* : Just as the attribute of existence implies the use and the function of the object like the pot, so also the other attributes imply the characteristics of that pot. In this sense, there is the relation of non-difference (*abheda*).

(6) *Guṇideśa* : The relation between the object and its attributes is intimate and inherent in a specific place and situation. So is the relation of the object with other inherent characteristics. This type of relation is the product of intellectual discrimination.

(7) *Saṃsarga* : Just as the attribute of existence with the object is intimately connected, so also are the other attributes which are inherent. The distinction between the other attributes is not known through the senses. Therefore, the association of the objects with the inherent qualities can be considered to be one of non-difference.

(8) *Śabda* : The existence is predicated by the word 'is'. Similarly, the other inherent attributes of the objects are predicated by the word 'is'. The objects like the pot exists, is black, is hard etc. In these prepositions, the verb 'is' is the copula which connects the object with the attributes. If this connecting link were not to be there, then the attributes would not be associated affirmatively with the objects. The association of the object with its attributes is through the verb 'Is'. Thus it expresses the relation of non-difference.

In this sense, the relation of non-difference of the object with its essential attributes has to be considered in aspects of *kāla*, *deśa* etc. This is the characteristic of the *pramāṇa svarūpa* & *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī*. The relation of the object with its qualities with reference to the modes is not to be considered as primary in this connection.

NAYA SAPTABHAṆGĪ 14. 3

Naya is a point of view that one takes in looking at an object. It presents a partial picture of the object, without denying the predication of other aspects of the same object. *Naya* can be considered from

two points as 'Sunaya' (valid point of view) and 'Durnaya' (invalid point of view). *Sunaya* aims at presenting the picture of the object from a particular point of view, but it does not claim to say that it is the only and exclusive point of view. *Nāya saptabhaṅgī* (the seven-fold predications from the point of view of *naya*) is a valid presentation of the predications of the *naya* and hence it is 'sunaya'. Another consideration regarding the analysis of the *naya* would be that the predications of the *naya* imply the differentiations of predications and not the non-difference of presenting the attributes. It is essentially 'bheda-dṛṣṭi' to see the differentiated qualities of the thing, from a particular point of view.

From the Point of View of Kāla

Nāya saptabhaṅgī gives prominence to the modes of a thing. The presentation of the inherent characteristics of the substance in a synthetic way is secondary of the *Nāya saptabhaṅgī*. In the *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī*, we find the effort at finding out the synthetic presentation in the diversified predications. But in the *nāya saptabhaṅgī*, we give prominence to the diversifications and to the analysis of the attributes from different points of view. This analysis may be considered from eight aspects like *kāla* (time), *ātmarūpa* (self-nature), *artha* (object) etc as in the description in the *Pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī*. It is as follows :—

(1) *Kāla* (time) : The attributes of the objects undergo constant modifications every moment. The emphasis on modifications at different points of time is the primary consideration in the *nayasaptabhaṅgī*. In this sense, from the point of view of time, there is differentiation in the expression of modes and not the non-difference as in the case of *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī*.

(2) *Ātmarūpa* (self-nature) : The attributes of an object express themselves in different modes. The different modes cannot be considered as identical and the distinction between attributes of an object cannot be eliminated. If there are differences in the attributes and modes, then there would be no distinction between an object and another object and in the same object in different times. Therefore

from the point of view of the aspect of *ātmarūpa* also there is the expression of difference and non-difference.

(3) *Artha* : From different points of view, the substratum of the attributes will have to be considered different, because if they were to be considered as one, then, there would be no distinction between objects, and the substratum will become one. The difference in the *artha* is an important characteristic of the *naya-saptabhaṅgī* with reference to the *artha* of the substratum.

(4) *Sambandha* : With reference to the relation of the objects and the attributes of the objects, we find that the characteristics of differentiation is primary. For instance, the relation of Gurudatta with his son will be different from that of his relation with his wife or his brother.

(5) *Upakāra* : *Upakāra* refers to function or utility. This also implies differentiation in the context of the seven-fold predications of the *naya*. The functions of the different objects is different.

(6) *Guṇideśa* : The objects with different characteristics express differentiations in different situations and places. Otherwise, if they were to be considered as identical, then no distinction would be possible as for instance, in that case, the experiences of pleasure and pain of one man would not have been different from the experiences of another man. This is the essential characteristic of difference in the objects having different attributes and modes.

(7) *Saṁsarga* : The relation between the different objects and their modes expresses the essential characteristics of differentiations and diversities. For instance, while eating the different condiments, the experiences of the different tastes have to be recognised although the ultimate experience of these will be a synthetic presentation of all the tastes together, as in the case of eating the beetle leaf, the beetle nut and cardamom.

(8) *Śabda* : The predications of the nature of different objects will have to use different words. One word cannot express the differentiated functions of the different objects. If it were not so, then all experiences and the characteristics of objects would have been explained by one word only.

Thus we find that *Naya saptabhaṅgī* gives prominence to the differentiation of predication aspect, while *Pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* gives emphasis on the non-difference (*abheda*) of the predication form, as it is synthetic in nature.

Every object is a synthesis of attributes and their modes. The relation between attributes and modes is one of the combination of non-difference and difference. When we study the object with reference to the different aspects of *pramāṇa*, we look at the object in a comprehensive way, and the predications of *pramāṇa* give the picture of the object in a synoptic way by emphasising the different aspects as a coherent whole. The differentiation is secondary. But in the seven-fold predications of *naya*, the emphasis is on presenting one aspect of an object from a particular point of view and the predications analyse the different aspects of an object. It does not give a synthetic picture. It is concerned with the analytic function of the predication forms regarding the nature of object. In *Naya saptabhaṅgī*, the nature of the object is analysed from different points of view with reference to its modes in different aspects of time, *dravya* etc. Therefore, the function of differentiation¹ (*Bhedopacāra pramāṇa*) is *sakalādeśa* (comprehensive) and coherent, while *Naya* is *vikalādeśa* (partial) and analytic.

VYĀPYA AND VYĀPAKA BHĀVA (PERVADED AND PERVADING CHARACTERISTICS)

The relation between the *Syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgī* is of the relation of pervasive and pervading characteristics. *Syādvāda* is pervasive while *saptabhaṅgī* is pervading. *Syādvāda*, when expressed in definite predication forms, becomes *Saptabhaṅgī*. But *Saptabhaṅgī* may be considered to be a form of *Syādvāda* or it may not be. *Naya* is not to be identified with *Syādvāda*, but it has the characteristics of expressing itself in the forms of *Saptabhaṅgī*. This is to be found as a characteristic in the *Naya* and the *Syādvāda* doctrines.

NO INFINITE PREDICATIONS (ANANTABANGĪ)

We have seen that the nature of a thing is complex and it has infinite attributes. Therefore, a question has been asked that if the

¹ *Tattvārtha Ślokaṇṭika* 1, 6, 54.

attributes of a thing are infinite why should there not be infinite predications? The answer to this is, that it is true that there are infinite attributes of a thing, but each attribute can be expressed in the seven-fold predications, and hence there would be infinite number of seven-fold predications. If each attribute were to express one predication only, then there would have been infinite predications for infinite attributes, but that is not so. Each attribute or characteristic has its seven-fold predications and its nature can be expressed in the seven-fold predications. Thus there would be infinite number of seven-fold predications.¹

Ācārya Siddhasena and Abhayadevasūri maintain that the primary predications of the seven-fold predications would be affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. The other four predications are permutations of the same. They are “*vikalādeṣī*” (partial expressions).² Similarly, Ācārya Śāntisūri in his *Nyāyavatāra-sūtravārtika*³ has also suggested that the primary predications of *astī*, *nāstī* and *avaktavya* are ‘*sakalādeṣī*’ and the remaining four predications are *vikalādeṣī*. But Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya in his *Jaintarkabhāṣā* says that all the seven predications of the *Saptabhaṅgī* are *sakalādeṣī* as well as *vikalādeṣī*. Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda have said that the seven-fold predications are all ‘*sakalādeṣī*’ and ‘*vikalādeṣī*’.⁴

Those Ācāryas who have considered the primary predications of *sat*, *asat* and *avaktavya* as ‘*sakalādeṣī*’ and the remaining ‘*vikalādeṣī*’ are of the opinion that the first predication is of identity or non-difference from the substantial point of view and we get a full knowledge of the nature of the substance. The second predication refers to the *paryāyas*, and from the point of view of non-difference in the case of the predication of negation, we may get the comprehensive picture of the object. The third predication of inexpressibility expresses the concept of difference (*bheda*) in an implicit way (*avivakṣita*). In this

1 *Tattvārtha Śloka-vārtika* 1, 6, 52.

2 *Sanmati tarka, saṅkha*, p. 446

3 Pt. Dalsukh Mālvaṇia Ed. p. 94.

4 *Pūjya Gurudeva Ratnamuni Smṛti Grantha*, p. 133.

way, the knowledge of the full nature of the object is possible without much difficulty. From the point of view of the concept of non-difference (*abheda-rūpa*) the three predications comprehend the nature of the object in a fuller way (*sakalādeśī*), while the other four predications comprehend the nature of the objects in partial aspects. Therefore they are *vikalādeśī*.

Some other philosophers do not give prominence to this way of thinking regarding the comprehensive or the partial understanding of the nature of an object. Understanding of the nature of an object can be covered from the affirmative side by emphasising the positive aspects of the object; and by negating the contrary or the negative aspects of the object, we can very well get a fuller comprehension. Therefore, all the seven predications of the *saptabhāṅgī* can be considered as presenting fuller comprehension (*sakalādeśī*) or partial comprehension (*vikalādeśī*) according to the nature and the emphasis of the predications.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SAPTABHANGI

The Indian philosophers in the past, have presented four-fold aspects of the predications for comprehending an object. The four-fold predications are (1) *sat* (affirmation), (2) *asat* (negation) and (3) *ubhaya* (affirmation and negation), (4) *anubhaya* (neither affirmation nor negation). In the '*Nāsadiya sūkta*' of the *Rgveda*, two contradictory hypotheses of expression as affirmation and negation have been presented¹. It seems that before the seer of this *sūkta*, there were two opinions regarding the creation of the universe. Some suggested that the primary cause of the universe is being, while others said it is non-being. The seers then presented the third view i. e.—it is neither being nor non-being, but it is both neither being nor non-being (*anubhaya*). In this way, the three forms of expression of being, non-being and neither being nor non-being were expressed in the *Rigveda*.² Similar view is also to be found in the *Upaniṣads*, and there is the possibility of the

1 *Rigveda* 1, 164, 46

2. *Rigveda* 10, 129

presentation of both the points of view.¹ In this tradition three-fold forms of expression of being, non-being and being non-being (*ubhaya*) are also found. In the view, where there is negation of both *sat* and *asat*, we find the fourth predication of neither being nor non-being (*anubhaya*).

In the *Upaniṣads* we get the four forms as expressions as *sat* (being),² *asat* (non-being),³ *sadasat* (being and non-being) and neither both (*anubhaya*). *Anubhaya* may also be said to be *avaktavya* (inexpressible).⁴ The predication of *avaktavya* has three meanings as (1) it is a negation of being and non-being (2) it is a negation of being, non-being and both (*sadasat*) and (3) *sat* and *asat* are to be considered as predicated simultaneously. The predication of *avaktavya* is very important in the *Upaniṣads*.⁵ *Avaktavya* has been given the third place of predication, the first being *sat* and the second *asat*. In some places, the predications have been given the fourth place and in that case it expresses that the negation of the three predications of *sat*, *asat* and *sadasat*. The predication of *avaktavya* can be considered as of two forms, as *sāpekṣa* (relative) and *nirapekṣa* (absolute). *Sāpekṣa avaktavyatā* expresses the concept of inexpressibility of the *sat*, *asat* and of both. Nāgārjuna, the Buddhist philosopher, has presented the concept of inexpressibility of all the four predications of *sat*, *asat*, *ubhaya*, and *anubhaya*. This is the expression of *catuṣkoṭi*. In this way the *sāpekṣa* (inexpressibility) predication is based on the negation of the first, second and third or all the four aspects. It expresses, the negation of

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1. (a) *Iśopaniṣad*—*tadejati tannaijati*
 (b) *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 1, 2, 20—*aṇoraṇīyān mahato māhīyān*.
 (c) *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2, 2, 1—*sadsadvareṣyaṃ*
 2. *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6, 2—*sadeva saumyedadagra āsīt*.
 3. *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3, 19, 1—*asadevedamagra āsīt*.
 4. *Taittirīya Up.* 2, 4—*yato vāco nivartante*.
 5. (a) *Kenopaniṣad*, 1, 4—*yadvācanabhyudītam*.
 (b) *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2. 6, 12—*naiva vāca na manasā prāptum śakyaḥ*.
 (c) *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 7,

being, non-being, being and non-being and, neither being and non-being. These predications may be simultaneous or successive. This presents inexpressibility as a category. The concept of inexpressibility with reference to the predications is considered to be *sāpekṣa avakṭavyatā* (relative inexpressibility). *Nirapekṣa avakṭavyatā* (non-relative inexpressibility) is that which presents the concept of inexpressibility regarding the description of the nature of the object, as the nature of the object is incomprehensible.

The four-fold expressions mentioned above are to be found in the Buddha's concept of *vibhajyavada*, or *avyākṛtavāda*. The Buddha described the problems regarding reality as presenting an end (or *sāntatā*) or as endless. Similarly, reality as eternal or non-eternal are questions which are inexpressible and indescribable (*avyākṛta*). The problem regarding the continuation or not of *Tathāgata* after *nirvāṇa* is a problem which is inexpressible and indescribable.

When the Buddha was asked—(1) does the *tathāgata* exists after *nirvāṇa* ? the Buddha was silent. (2) does he not exist after *nirvāṇa* ? he was silent. (3) does he exist and not exist after death ?—the Buddha was again silent, the final question was (4) does he neither exist nor non-exist ?¹ He did not reply.

For the Buddha, these problems were *avyākṛta*. They were indescribable in words. The Buddha was silent about the metaphysical problems. Similarly, the problems regarding the fact of misery (*dukkha*) can be analysed in terms of *catuṣkoṭi*. The questions regarding the man who suffers, whether he suffers due to himself, due to others, due to both or due to neither, are all *avyākṛta* problems.

At the time of Mahāvīra, we find a similar four-fold approach to the problems in the *Ajñānavādu* (theory of nesience) of Sañjaya Velatthiputta. Sañjaya Velatthiputta gave answers to such problems neither in the affirmation, nor in the negation and not in both. He was advocating the theory of doubt and uncertainty. For him, such problems were neither *vyākṛta* nor *avyākṛta*. It is difficult to predicate anything about them. In this sense, we can say that his theory was

primarily a theory of uncertainty and doubt. It is scepticism. In modern western philosophy, we find Hume's position similar to that of Sañjaya Velatthiputta.

The theory of uncertainty was expressed by Sañjaya regarding some metaphysical problems like—(1) the existence of the other world, (2) the fruit of good or bad action and (3) the concept of immortality. According to him, it is difficult to say whether the world exists, whether it does not exist, whether it does and does not exist and whether it neither exists nor does not exist.

Sañjaya's theory of doubt is quite different from the *Syādvāda* of the Jains. The theory of doubt presents uncertainty in any predication, while *Syādvāda* stands from the foundation of certainty of expression of different points of view. There is no doubt in the predication form regarding the nature of the object predicated from different points of view. From a particular point of view, the predication is certain and not in doubt. Similarly, *Syādvāda* does not advocate, as the Buddhists do, the theory of inexpressibility as a final form of expression. The implication of the *catuṣkoṭi* of the Buddhists is that the nature of the problem is inexpressible in its fundamental aspect, but in the Jaina concept of inexpressibility (*avaktavya*) there is no uncertainty; it only says that the words cannot express the nature of the object in its different aspects. It is possible to predicate existence & non-existence simultaneously from a particular point of view, and therefore it is inexpressible. *Syādvāda* is neither scepticism, nor nihilism, nor the theory of ignorance. It is the theory of certainty of expression with a certain knowledge from a particular point of view.

Bhagavāna Mahāvira presented the synoptic approach to the understanding of the problems in his *Anekānta* and *Syādvāda* theories. Nature of a thing need not be analysed from the four aspects only as in the case of the predications in *catuṣkoṭi*. But the nature of a thing is complex, it has infinite aspects and each aspect can be predicated in infinite ways. Therefore, every aspect can be presented in the seven-fold predications, and there are infinite number of predications.

In the *Upaniṣadic* period, the problem regarding the aspects of existence and non-existence (*sat* and *asat*) of the objects and their

nature were discussed, but the discussion was not exhaustive. Sañjaya tried to explain away the problems by referring to the theory of ignorance and uncertainty. The Buddha presented the *Vibhajjavāda* and said that certain problems which are metaphysical are inexpressible (*avyākṛta*) but Mahāvira was not satisfied with such partial solutions of the problems. He gave a dialectic of the predications by the help of rigorous logical exercise and presented *Syādvāda* and *Saptabhāṅgī-vāda*.



NIKSEPAVĀDA :

A Study

TERMINOLOGY OF NIKṢEPA

Man uses language for expressing his ideas. Without the use of language, he cannot express his thoughts. Man is different from animals in this that he has the power of expressing in a language, while animals cannot make use of the language for expressing their experiences. Without the use of language it is difficult to carry on the activities in this world. Language is the medium of communication. There are numerous languages and millions of words in these languages. Each language uses different words for explaining things. It is, therefore, necessary to have knowledge of the use of language and the definite content of the meaning of the words that we use. Language would be useful and it will serve its function properly if its words are replete with exact meaning.

The function of *Nikṣepavāda* is to understand the exact content of the words in terms of meaning and its usage. This is the theory of *nikṣepa*. The essence of the *Nikṣepavāda* is to study the implications of the meanings in the words and in their definiteness and to try to find out the implications of the words in the meanings. In fact, the function of *nikṣepa* is to define words with reference of their content or the meaning and the usage.¹

The other sense in which *nikṣepa* is used is “*nyāsa*” it is implication and clarification. In the *Tattvārthasūtra*, the word ‘*nyāsa*’ has been used.²

1 *Dhavalā—Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, Book 1, p. 10.

2 *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 5.

In the *Tattvārtharājavārtika*, it is described as *nyāso nikṣepaḥ*, meaning the clarification and definitising of words.

UTILITY OF NIKṢEPA

In the *Anuyogadvāra* it is stated that the main function of *nikṣepa* is to clear the meaning of the word and to find a definite meaning of the words. This is its use.¹ *Laghīyastraya* describes the function of *nikṣepa* as to remove the inadequate meaning of a word and to present the exact meaning.² *Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya* says that the function of *nikṣepa* is to present the correct meaning of the word by removing ambiguity and indeterminateness.³

The function of *nikṣepa* is to remove ignorance, doubt or perversity of meaning of a word. The primary function is to determine the exact meaning of the word used.

A question has been raised regarding the necessity of *nikṣepa* in the logical analysis of the meaning of term, specially when *pramāṇa* and *naya* give us the knowledge of the nature of the object.

The answer is that, *pramāṇa* and *naya* are concerned with presenting the knowledge of the object *fully* or *partially*. But *nikṣepa* is more concerned with linguistic use of the words and their meanings. The utterance of a word expresses the meaning that is intended by the person using it in addition to the meaning that accrues to the word. The unintended meanings of the words are likely to create confusion and ambiguity in the use of words. For the purpose of understanding the nature of a thing, we have to depend upon the language that we use. Sometimes language presents difficulties in understanding the connotation of a word, because the real meaning and the intended meaning may differ. Therefore, we have to consider two types of meanings of the word : (1) primary meaning and (2) the secondary. To make a distinction between the primary and secondary meaning, it is important to analyse the linguistic function of *nikṣepa*. The distinction between the primary and the secondary meanings is

1 *Anuyogadvāra vṛtti*.

2 *Laghīyastraya svopajña vṛtti*. 7, 2.

3 *Tarkabhāṣā 3rd pariccheda*

possible to be understood through the different varieties of *nikṣepa* like *nāma nikṣepa*. So one cannot have the knowledge of object (*tattvārtha*) without the help of *nikṣepa*.¹

Bhaṭṭākalanka in his *Siddhiviniścaya*² has described the function of *nikṣepa* as the act of knowing and determining the meaning of the word used for understanding the nature of the things through *naya*. There are numerous forms of *nikṣepa*, but four of them are prominent. The object of these different forms of *nikṣepa* is primarily to dispel errors and misunderstanding about the meaning of the words used for explaining the nature of a thing. Through *dravyāārthika* (from the point of view of substance) and *paryāyārthika* (from the point of view of modes) *naya*, we can understand the exact nature of the categories of *jīva* and *ajīva* etc. *Nikṣepa* does not only give us the knowledge of the category, but it removes doubts and indiscrepancies in the meaning. The primary importance of *nikṣepa* is to emphasise that we must use appropriate words mentioning the connotation of a term for explaining the nature of the objects.

THE BASIS OF NIKṢEPA

The basis of *nikṣepa* can be analysed into four aspects as (1) primary (*pradhāna*), (2) secondary (*apradhāna*), (3) imagined (*kalpita*) and (4) un-imagined (*akalpita*). *Bhāva* is unimagined *dṛṣṭi*. It is therefore primary. The other three *nikṣepas* are more concerned with the mental constructions. Therefore, they are not primary.

Nāma nikṣepa enables us to recognise an object. *Sthāpanā nikṣepa* does not give us the qualities, but it gives us the idea of form. *Dravya nikṣepa* enables us to know the meaning of the word with reference to its functions and also with reference to its prior and posterior characteristics. In this sense, the *nāma*, *sthāpanā* and the *dravya nikṣepas* are expressions which are primarily concerned with grammatical and linguistic analysis of the statements and not so much with the expositions of the nature of the object. Therefore, they are not primary.

1 *Laghiyastraya*, p. 99

2 *Siddhiviniścaya*, *nikṣepa paddhati* 1.

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THE NIKṢEPA METHODOLOGY

Nikṣepa presents a harmonious blending of the word and its expression. It would be difficult to understand the significance of the meaning of the terms used without *nikṣepa*. The special characteristic of *nikṣepa* is that it gives clarity of expression and thought in analysing the meaning of the word as it is expressed by the word. The words signify the meanings and meaningful words are the primary considerations of the use of language. Words and their expressions convey the characteristics that the objects have. Sometimes, although the words do not convey the presence of attributes of an object, the implication of the presence of attributes is to be found in the use of the words. In this sense, the intention of the speaker is also important, otherwise the language will lead us astray and serious fallacies will arise. For example, a person who was a judge some time in the past, cannot be always considered to be a judge even at the present moment. It may be a false statement. This kind of a distinction in the use of the words and the significance of the meanings of the words in different situations is an important function of *nikṣepa*.

Nāma nikṣepa refers to the name, more specially the proper name, arbitrarily given to an object without considering the presence or the qualities suggested by the name. For example, the name of a very poor man may be *Laxminārāyaṇa*. A proper name has no connotation.

Sihāpānā nikṣepa, the denotation of a thing and the connotation is implied and projected in the object, although it does not by itself have that connotation. For instance, a stone image is referred to as God.

Dravya nikṣepa refers to the substance with its qualities implied in the word. For example, a pot which used to contain *ghee* in the past is even now called *ghee-pot*. Similarly, a pot purchased for keeping *ghee*, but which does not at present contain *ghee*, is also called a *ghee-pot*. A person who was an eminent lawyer gives up his practice as a lawyer and starts a business. Still he is called a lawyer. A person of wealth in this world is called *Indra* and a person who posse-

sses spiritual wealth of self-knowledge is called Indra in the spiritual sphere.

In this sense, the practical way of expressing the nature of things through words in order to present adequate meanings is called *nikṣepa* methodology.

NAYA AND NIKṢEPA ૫.૩

The relation between *naya* and *nikṣepa* is that of the relation between the object and expression of its qualities. *Naya* is *jñānāmaka* (concerning knowledge). It is epistemological, while *nikṣepa* is concerned with the expression of the contents of knowledge through language. It is logical and linguistic. *Nāma* and *sthāpanā* and *dravya nikṣepa* are all concerned with the substance and its attributes, while *bhāva nikṣepa* has reference to its modes.¹

NĀMA NIKṢEPA ૫.૩

Nāma nikṣepa refers to a proper name. It has no connotation. It is a name given to an object arbitrarily for the sake of recognising it for practical purposes. The proper name may have connotation when it gets an acquired connotation or it may be a meaningless name. For instance, in some cases we give a name to an object or an animal without consideration regarding its nature or qualities. An unlettered man may be called *Vidyāsāgara*. A poor man is named as *Laxmipati*. These names given to the two individuals are purely arbitrary and have no connotation. But if the names given to the individuals do acquire the connotations suggested by the name, it would be *bhāva nikṣepa*. When one who is called *Vidyāsāgara* becomes a learned man, then it would not be merely a meaningless name. It would acquire a connotation. The names like *Vidyāsāgara* and *Laxmipati* do suggest the connotation of learning and possession of wealth; but a proper name need not imply these characteristics, as they are given arbitrarily to an individual. The expression of the content of the meaning is not important in the *Nāma nikṣepa*, although the intention of the parents in giving these names to their children may be noble and filled with maud-

1 *Sanmati prakaraṇa* 1, 6.

line sentiments. But the function of the *Nāma nikṣepa* is only to present a name without the content of the meaning.

The *Nāma nikṣepa* refers to proper names, but some proper names have their various modes of expressions suggesting different meanings. For instance, *Indra* is also called *Devendra*, *Surendra*, *Purandara* and *Śakra* etc. But a proper name given to an individual cannot be exchanged to any one of these modes. *Indra* is always called *Indra*. He cannot be called as *Surendra*, *Śakra*, etc.

With reference to time, *Nāma nikṣepa* has two aspects : one is permanent and the other is temporary. The names which are permanent for things which are eternal refer to '*śāsvata-nama-nikṣepa*'. The names like *Sūrya*, *Candra*, *Mount Meru*, *Siddhaśilā*, *Loka*, *Aloka* etc. refer to *śāsvata* (permanent) *nāmanikṣepa*. In the cases, where there are modifications and developments, the name may not remain appropriate for the object after sometime. This would be *aśāsvata* (temporary) *nāmanikṣepa*. For example, a girl may be called *Kamalā* in her parents' house and she may be called *Vin. alā* in her husband's house. This is a proper name without connotation and it is not a permanent name given to an individual.

STHĀPANĀ NIKṢEPA

Sthāpana nikṣepa refers to the identification of the meaning of the word, although a meaning may not be identical. In this, we take a word and identify the meaning of the word with one object. *Sthāpanā nikṣepa* is of two types : (1) *Tadākāra* (of the same form) and (2) *Atadākāra* (of different form). In these *sadbhāva sthāpanā* and *asadbhāva sthāpanā* may also be distinguished. If the meaning of an object is fixed on the object of the same form, it is called *tadākāra sthāpanā*. For example, to identify the picture of Devadatta as Devadatta is called *tadākāra sthāpanā*. But the signets of chess are also called as elephant or horse etc., but they are not identical with the shape of horses, elephants etc. Such identification of signets as elephants and horses is called *atadākāra sthāpanā*. *Nāma* and *sthāpanā nikṣepa* are not very much significant with reference to the meaning of the objects in the practical life.

DRAVYA NIKṢEPA

Dravya nikṣepa does not refer to the mental, the physical ele-

ment, like the intention as to the nature of the object; and its state in the past, present and the future does not depend on our intention and idea. Therefore it is called *dravya nikṣepa*, because it expresses the state of the object in one of the transferable forms, like, past as used in the present etc. For example, sometimes we use the description in the present context of the state although it may refer to the past state. Similarly, of the future state, we may refer in the present state. A pot which contained *ghee* in the past may still be called the *ghee*-pot. Similarly, if a pot is purchased for keeping *ghee* in future, the pot may still be called the *ghee*-pot. A person who was a judge in the past, but has since retired, may still be called a judge; or a person who is to be a king in future may be addressed as a king.

The scope of *dravya nikṣepa* is very wide. It may cover the expressions relating to the past or the future as projected into the present tense. The future king is also called king. And when the king is dead, his body is also referred to the king.

Dravya nikṣepa is of two types : (1) '*Āgama dravya nikṣepa*' and (2) '*no-āgama dravya nikṣepa*'. *No-āgama dravya nikṣepa* is of three types : (1) *jñā-śarīra*, (2) *bhavya śarīra* and (3) *tad-vyatirikta*. The *Ātman* knows through a body and this is called *jñā-śarīra* or *jñāyaka śarīra*. Similarly, we see the dead body of a learned man, and then we say that he was a learned man. This is *jñā-śarīra*, *no-āgama dravya nikṣepa*.

If the *Ātman* is embodied and that *ātman* will be a learned man in future, it is called *bhavya śarīra*. For example, by observing the lustrous qualities of the body and other characteristics of a child we may say the child would become a learned man. This is a *bhavya-śarīra no-āgama dravya nikṣepa*.

In the first two types of *nikṣepa*, the emphasis is on the body which is only the medium. In the third, the emphasis is not so much on the body, but it is on the bodily activities, like—movement of the hands etc. For example, when an ascetic is preaching, he may make gestures with the hands. These gestures are *tad-vyatirikta no-āgama dravya nikṣepa*.

Āgama dravya nikṣepa refers to the implication of the meanings and the cognition content of the meaning, rather than the exact expres-

ssed form of the knowledge. In the *no-āgama dravya nikṣepa* there is the absence of both types of knowledge, expressed or implied. It only refers to the medium of knowledge i. e. the body. *No-āgama tadvyatirikta dravya nikṣepa* does not possess any content of knowledge. Therefore, it is called *dravya nikṣepa*. This is of three types : (1) *Laukika*, for instance, according to the common parlance of language "Śrīphala" is auspicious. (2) *Kuprāvacanika*, for example, according to this "Vināyaka" (god Gaṇeśa) is called auspicious. (3) *Lokottara* : From the ultimate point of view, religion with *jñāna* (knowledge), *darśana* (faith) and *eāritra* (conduct) is auspicious.

In this way, bereft of the content of the meaning, and also bereft of the present state of the object, we recognise the other states as the present and we impose the present state and consider to be always there. This is *dravya nikṣepa*.



BHĀVA NIKṢEPA

Bhāva nikṣepa refers to the grasping of the meaning of the nature of the object through the word.

The learned man who is a teacher and who is useful as a teacher may be said to be a teacher. This is *Āgama bhāva nikṣepa*. In this sense, he is a real teacher. A teacher who is engaged in the activities of teaching may be considered to be a teacher in activity from the point of view of "*No-āgama bhāva nikṣepa*".

In these cases, the word has no reference to the aspect or the function in partial form. It has three forms : (1) *Laukika*, (2) *Kuprāvacanika* and (3) *Lokottara*.


We have seen that there are similar distinctions in the *no-āgama tadvyatirikta dravya nikṣepa*, but there is a primary difference in the emphasis of the two forms of *nikṣepa*. The word 'no' in the *dravya nikṣepa* implies the absence of the cognitive functions (*āgama*). But in the *bhāva nikṣepa* there is a partial absence of cognitive functions.¹ The scope of *dravya tadvyatirikta* is primarily activity and not cognitive function. While the scope of *bhāva tadvyatirikta* is two-fold : i. e., the expression of activity and also the cognition implied in the activity.

1. 'āgama savva nisehe, no saddo ahava desa paḍisehe.

For example, a teacher makes some gestures by the hand and turns over the pages. These activities do not refer to the cognition. In this sense, the word 'no' in the *bhāva nikṣepa* refers to the partial negation. The function of the *bhāva nikṣepa* is primarily concerned with the expression of the present state and the mode of the object. In this expression of *nikṣepa*, there is the absence of the distinction of activity of the body as a medium of cognition. This is the difference between the two types of *nikṣepa*.

Every thing is expressed through *nikṣepa*. It is the linguistic expression, there are infinite number of expressions, but every thing has to be expressed in the form of four expressions of *nikṣepa*. Only one *nikṣepa* will not give a full picture of the state of the object. Every object has its name. It is *nāma nikṣepa*. It has its state. It is *sthāpanā nikṣepa*. It is referred to with reference to its material, it is *dravya nikṣepa* and there is the expression of its nature and its attributes. It is *bhāva nikṣepa*.

We give below the classification of *nikṣepa* as discussed in the earlier pages.



The concept of *Nikṣepa* is primarily linguistic in nature. It is aimed at giving the exact meaning of a term.



NAYAVĀDA :

A Study

THOUGHT AND ITS BASIS

Nayavāda is a significant contribution of the Jaina logic and epistemology. It helps to understand the nature of an object in a comprehensive way. It is the basis of the principle of *Anekānta*.

It would be necessary to understand the foundational processes of thought for the sake of our knowledge of the *Nayavāda*. The empirical activities are of three types :

1. Concerned with knowledge and its effects.
2. Concerned with the objects and its modifications.
3. Concerned with the language and the use of the word.

The process of thought in which there is the predominance of a purpose or a will, it is *jñānāśrayī*, based on the knowledge. *Naigamanaya* is of this type. That which is based upon the object is *arthāśrayī*. *Saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra* and *ījusūtra* *nayas* are *arthāśrayīs* as they primarily refer to the objects and their modification. In these *nayas*, there is the analysis of the varied aspects and distinctions of objects. The *saṅgrahanaya* is primarily concerned with finding out the unity in the diversity of the modes of the objects. *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* system of philosophy are based upon *vyavahāra naya*. *Kṣāṇikavāda* of the Buddhists is an expression of *ījusūtranaya*. The *nayas* which are concerned with the analysis of words and the linguistic study are called *śabdāśrayī*. *Śabda*, *Samabhirūḍha* and *Evamābhūta* *nayas* are pertaining to the words. These *nayas* are primarily concerned with the linguistic study and the persons who study these give importance to the science of language.

On the basis of the considerations mentioned above we may analyse the characteristics of the *nayas* as :

1. *Naigamanaya* refers to the purpose or the object in view that is in the mind of the person who is responding.
2. *Saṅgrahanaya* refers to the tendency to find unity among diversity.
3. *Vyavahāranaya* is very much concerned with particularity and the study of diversity.
4. *Rjusūtranaya* aims at presenting the aspect of reality from the point of view of the momentary present.
5. *Śabdanaya* analyses the function of the word and its meaning.
6. *Samabhirūḍhanaya* refers to the etymological meaning of the word.
7. *Evambhūtanaya* analyses the specific situations and the contexts in which a particular meaning is referred to the word.

THE BASIS OF DISTICTIONS OF *NAYA*

The primary consideration of *saṅgrahanaya* is the emphasis on unity, while that of *vyavahāranaya* is on diversity. *Saṅgrahanaya* does not accept diversity as the basis and *vyavahāra* ignores unity in its search for diversity. But the basis of *naigamanaya* is the synthesis of the diversity and unity. It asserts that unity and diversity are equally present in an object, but the emphasis may be on one or the other according to the purpose of the analysis. In some cases, the unity becomes primary and the diversity is secondary, while in some others diversity becomes primary and the unity is secondary. The varied emphasis on unity and diversity is primarily mental and is based upon the purpose and the predilection of the individual.¹ Sometimes, an object, which has the diverse modifications becomes important, but sometimes the modifications which are diverse are prominent.

Rjusūtranaya is based on the principle of diversity only. It is concerned with the analysis of the nature of the object from the point of view momentary present. It does not find any relevance for the

1. *Anyadeva hi sāmānyamabhinnaññānakāraṇam.*
Vīṣeṣaḍṣanyaya eveti, manyate naigamo nayaḥ.

past or the future modifications. *Śabdanaya* studies the meaning and function of the word. Its primary emphasis is on getting the exact meaning of the word. *Samabhirūḍhanaya* has reference to etymological meaning of the word. *Evambhūtanaya* is more specific and it aims at finding out the exact meaning of the word in a particular situation and in a particular context with reference to the present. These *nayas* are based upon the concepts of unity and diversity. The principles of unity and diversity are operative in these *nayas* in different forms as shown below :

1. *Naigamanaya* emphasises that the unity and diversity both are important.

2. *Saṅgrahanaya* gives prominence to unity and in that (a) *para-saṅgraha* emphasises absolute unity while (b) *apara-saṅgraha* gives prominence to relative unity or oneness.

3. *Vyavahāranaya* is concerned primarily with the diversity and difference of both absolute and relative types.

4. *Rjjuṣūtranaya* gives importance to diversity and difference.

5. *Śabdanaya* similarly gives importance to difference.

6-7. *Samabhirūḍha* and *Evambhūta* are also concerned with difference.

In these *nayas*, *saṅgrahanaya* emphasises non-difference or unity. Those which give emphasis on difference or diversity are five in number and *naigamanaya* gives importance to both difference and unity. The Jainas have said that unity and diversity, oneness and manyness, and substantiality and modifications are equally important and real. There cannot be any diversity without unity and there cannot be any unity without diversity. Both are real, both are complementary. One without the other is not possible.

THE TWO TRADITIONS

We have seen that the *nayas* can be classified into two types as (a) *dravyārthika*—those concerned with the understanding of substance and (b) *pariyāyārthika*—those concerned with the understanding of the modes. There are two traditions in understanding these *nayas*. One is the metaphysical tradition and the other is the logical tradition,

Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa outlined the metaphysical tradition. According to him, *naigama*, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra* and *ṛjusūtranaya* are *dravyārthika nayas*. While *śabda*, *samabhirūḇha* and *evambhūta nayas* refer to the *paryāyas*, therefore, they are *paryāyārthika nayas*. Siddhasena Divākara has given the logical tradition. According to him, the first three *nayas* are *dravyārthika nayas* and the remaining are *paryāyārthika nayas*.¹

The metaphysical tradition considers *ṛjusūtranaya* as *dravyārthika* as it refers to the substance. This view is based on the 14th sutra of the *Anuyogadvāra*.² According to this view, in this with reference to this *naya*, an individual without the *upayoga* (harmonic energy) is to be considered as from the point of view of substance as an individual. From the metaphysical point of view, if *ṛjusūtranaya* is not taken with reference to substance, it will contradict the statement in the *Anuyogadvāra*. But the logical tradition maintains that the statement in the *Anuyogadvāra* has reference to the modifications of an object at a particular point of time and reference to substance or object (*dravya*) is only formal.³ Therefore, there should be no contradiction in reading the statement of the *Anuyogadvāra* with reference to the analysis of the modes of a thing. The metaphysical tradition has given importance to the substance (*dravya*) which is secondary. Therefore, they considered it as *dravyārthikanaya*. But really speaking, according to the logical tradition, reference to the substance (*dravya*) is only secondary, while the modes are primary. Therefore, *ṛjusūtranaya* is primarily *paryāyārthika*. The metaphysical tradition gives importance to *dravya* as primary, while the logical tradition looks at it from the point of view of *paryāya*. These two are only distinctions in the approaches to the problems, but there is fundamental difference in their analysis. One presents the object from the point of view of substance and the other presents the object from the point of view of view of modes.

NAIGAMANAYA 1-5

Naigamanaya is the point of view by which the generality and

1 *Nyāyopadeśa* 18

2 *Anuyogadvāra* 14

3 *Naya-rahasya*, p. 12

particularity of the object is synthesised. It gives importance to the aspect of generality and particularity of an object and takes a synoptic view of the relative importance of generality and particularity.¹ *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*² *darśanas* maintain that generality and particularity are independent categories, but the Jainas do not accept this view, for the particular and general are inter-dependent. One cannot exist without the other. There is no particular without the reference to the general and there is nothing general without reference to the particular. A thing can be looked at from the points of view of generality or of the speciality of an object. When we want to distinguish one object from another, the emphasis is on particularity or differentia, although it has general nature in relation to other similar objects. We give secondary importance to general characteristics or the universality. For instance, when we distinguish one man from the other, we consider them in particulars, but the general nature of man as such remains secondary. Similarly, when we look at objects from the point of view of generality as belonging to a class, its special characteristics or differentia remain secondary, although they are there in the objects. When we consider two different men as man, we make the distinguishing feature of the two men, as secondary.

Naigamanaya is concerned with the synthetic approach to the problem of understanding the nature of the object and its qualities, the relational activity and the agent of the activity. The two aspects like the substance and activity, the relation and the objects of relation and activity and the objects of activity, have both the aspects of identity and difference. From a particular point of view, they can be considered as identical, because there is no absolute difference between the substance and its qualities etc. But from another point of view, i. e., from the point of view of looking at objects on the basis of distinctions and particularity, the differences are emphasised. In these cases, when the identity is emphasised differences are looked as

1 (a) *Tattvārthabhāṣya* 1, 35.

(b) *Nayakarṇikā*

(c) *Anuyogadvāra sūtra* 11kā.

2 *Syālvādīnāñjarī*, śloka 14th 11kā

secondary and while the differences are emphasised, identity is considered as secondary. This is the cardinal aspect of *Naigamanaya*. Akalanka says that when one considers identity (*abheda*) as primary, difference (*bheda*) is considered to be secondary. Similarly, while emphasising difference, identity is considered to be secondary. This is the main presumption of *Naigamanaya*.¹ For instance, the object and its qualities are intimately related to each other. They cannot be considered as apart. *Jiva* has its attributes and happiness is one of its attributes. When we say *jiva* is happy, sometimes there is the primacy of the identity of *jiva* and happiness. The difference between the *jiva* and happiness is also emphasised, but happiness here becomes secondary. To comprehend both the aspects in their primary and secondary forms is the function of *Naigamanaya*. It may also be noted that if the emphasis is given on oneness, then the diversity or manyness is secondary in its importance. Sometimes, identity gains primary importance and sometimes difference is emphasised upon.

There is a distinction between *Naigamanaya* and the synthetic comprehensive approach of looking at a thing which may be called *sakalādeśa*. In the *sakalādeśa*, all the attributes are considered equally important and it gives a synthetic approach. But in *Naigamanaya*, prominence is given to substance sometimes, and at other times its attributes gain secondary importance. Particularity is looked at from the relative point of view and the distinctions and entity are emphasised with the relative prominence.

In the phenomenal approach to the understanding of the nature of a thing, *naigamanaya* gives importance to a relative appreciation of generality and particularity. The generality is a unifying characteristic while particularity presents the differentia. For instance, if a hundred wrist watches were considered to be wrist watches, in this the generality is primary. But if each wrist watch is taken by individuals recognising it as his own, here particularity or its differentia or the special characteristics of the object as an individual object is emphasised. Thus both the aspects are present. The emphasis is mental and it depends upon the point of view that we take at a particular time.

1. *Laghīyastraya* 2, 5, 39

When we again take up two individual men as distinct with their personality, we emphasise the particularity and the difference although the generality is secondary. But if we consider the two individual men as men essentially, we give importance to the generality particularity.

If one is asked where he stays, he might reply that he stays in the world. If he is further asked to specify, he might go on particularising by stating that he stays in *Jambūdvīpa*, in *Bhāratavarga*, in Rajasthan, in a particular lane in Udaipur and or in a particular room in a house in a lane in the Udaipur city. If he is still asked to further specify the particular location, he would say, "I live in my body". In this way, with reference to the habitation or residence, *naigamanaya* presents the specific characteristic in light of generality. Progressively, he goes on particularising the place of residence. The previous statements are more general than the succeeding statements.¹

Some philosophers have referred the function of *naigamanaya* to the purpose or the end which an action or an object implies.² It has reference to the purpose of action. A man who is going to a forest with an axe to cut the wood is asked what he is doing and he would reply he is cooking. This statement has a reference to the object or the purpose for which an action is being done.³ This is the point of the *naigama*.

Naigamanaya is expressed in three forms : (1) *Bhūta Naigama* (2) *Bhaviṣya Naigama* (3) *Vartamāna Naigama*. To impose the characteristic of the present tense to the past incident or a thing, is called *bhūta naigama*. On the Dewali festival day, we say, to-day Bhagavāna Mahāvira attained salvation. Though 2500 years before Bhagavāna Mahāvira attained *nirvāna*, but in this, we impose the present tense to an incident which happened more than 2500 years ago. *Bhaviṣya naigama* imposes the present tense to a future incident. If a person is to attain *kevalajñāna*, we say that he attains *nirvāna* after a specific period. The *Vartamāna Naigama* refers to the imposition of the present tense to

1 *Haribhadraṭīyāvaśyakaṭippaṇe, nayādhikāra.*

2 *Tattvārtha Rājavārtika* 1, 35, 2

3 *Haribhadraṭīyāvaśyakaṭippaṇe nayādhikāra.*

an activity which has been started, but which has yet to be completed. For instance, if one starts preparing bread and if he were asked : what have you prepared ? she would say, 'I have prepared bread', although the bread is yet to be prepared and it is in the process of being prepared. Here we are imposing present perfect tense on the action that is yet to be completed.

Naigamanaya is of three types.¹ : (1) *Dravya Naigama*, (2) *Paryāya Naigama* and (3) *Dravya-Paryāya Naigama*. The functions of these three are : (1) to apprehend two objects (2) to apprehend two conditions and (3) to apprehend one thing and one condition respectively.

Naigamanaya expresses the *Anekānta* point of view. According to the Jainas, the one and the many are equally real. Without the one, many cannot exist, and the many have reference to the one. The concept of cow (cowness) is the one referring to the many individual cows. Similarly, the concept of the animal is common to the cows and other animals. From the point of view of the concept of the substance, all animals and inanimate objects have reference to that one concept. Similarly, existence is the one concept which refers to all that exists. The emphasis on the one or the many is a matter which has relation to the concept or is the intellectual construction. The unity and diversity are facts of life. The universe exists with its rich diversity. The diversity as considered from the point of multiplicity is a fact of life, which may express contrary qualities. The universe is constituted of the living and the non-living. From the point of view of looking at the universe as *cetanā* the universe may be considered as one, although there are many forms of consciousness.

From the point of view of consciousness and the unconsciousness there would be distinctions, but considered from the points of view of substantiality and inter activity, the diversity has one common element. Similarly, considered from different points of view, the one and the many are relational terms. Each refers to the other. Therefore, the Jainas said, the one and many are equally real.

1 *Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika*, p. 269—270.

NAIGAMĀBHĀSA (FALLACY OF NAIGAMANAYA)

Naigamābhāsa is a fallacy which arises out of the mis-interpretation of *Naigamanaya*. *Naigamābhāsa* consists in giving primary emphasis on the distinctions between the substance and its qualities, activities and the object of activities as absolute distinctions. 'But the object and its qualities and the action and the agent of activities cannot be distinguished in the absolute sense. If they were absolutely different then the relation of inference between the object and its qualities cannot be real. Therefore, the relation between the object and its qualities have to be considered a relational and equally real. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* considers the object and its attribute as denoting essentially difference. That would be *naigamābhāsa*.

The *Sāṅkhya* philosophers have considered knowledge and happiness which are qualities of the self as different from the self. According to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophers, knowledge (*jñāna*) and happiness (*sukha*) are inherently related to the tri-attributal (*tri-guṇātmaka prakṛti*). They come out of *Prakṛti* and also submerge in it. The self (*puruṣa*) due to contact with the *prakṛti* believes that knowledge and happiness are experienced by him. But these experiences belong to the *buddhi* (intellect) which reflects the states due to its contact with *prakṛti* and its attributes. Intellect is also not the inherent essence of the self. In this way, the *Sāṅkhya* philosophers consider knowledge, happiness and the self as distinct. This is *Naigamābhāsa*, because really there is no difference between the self and the knowledge. Wherever there is self, there is knowledge.¹

SAṆGRAHANAYA (SYNTHETIC POINT OF VIEW)

Saṅgrahanaya is the synthetic point of view which seeks to find unity in diversity.² It aims at finding out the common element in many objects. Every object is the synthesis of many qualities—generality and the particularity. It is the synthesis of the unity and the diversity. And to find out the unity in the diversity is the function of *Saṅgrahanaya*. *Saṅgrahanaya* seeks to establish the common point

1 *Ācārāṅga*—*je vinnāyā se āyā, je āyā se vinnāyā*.

2 (a) *Tattvārthabhaṣya* 1, 35

(b) *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 13

between objects and bring them together as belonging to one category, although they have many differences, excepting the one characteristic of existence. To seek the general among the particulars is the object of *saṅgrahanaya*.¹

Vedānta and the *Sāṅkhya darśanas* look at reality from the synthetic point of view (*saṅgrahanaya*). *Saṅgrahanaya* seeks to find reality as one without distinction.²

Saṅgrahanaya finds unity and oneness in numerous modes of an object. Similarly, it finds the one common point in the many objects due to the similarities.³ According to the *saṅgrahanaya* the one is real, the substance is real and the modes cannot exist without the substance.⁴

The *saṅgrahanaya* is of two types : (1) '*paraśaṅgraha*' and (2) '*aparasaṅgraha*'.⁵ *Paraśaṅgraha* aims at finding out the oneness of the reality from its diversity in the world. And *aparasaṅgraha* seeks to find the unity and the oneness in an object from its numerous modes. From the points of view of attributes it seeks to find out the common element among the many attributes. It finds out the 'cowness' from all the cows. Similarly, amidst the many individual men, the concept of the man in general is presented.⁶

The limit of the *aparasaṅgrahanaya* is up to the attainment of the unity in this world amidst diversity. This common point between the six *dravyas* has a reference to the *aparasaṅgrahanaya* and the common point is referred to as *apara-sāmānya*. "It is the phenomenal generality".⁷ This leads to the conception of substance (*dravya*). It expresses the common characteristics of *dravyatva* in the six substances.

1 *Saṅgraha ślokāḥ*

2 *Anuyogadvāra*

3 *Laghīyastraya śloka* 32

4 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 14

5 *Ibid* 7, 15

6 *Ibid* 7, 19

7 *Ibid* 7, 20.

1.3 SAṄGRAHĀBHĀSA (FALLACY OF SAṄGRAHANAYA)

Parasaṅgrahanaya refers to the concept of the oneness as the ultimate reality and *parasaṅgrahanayābhāsa* also refers the ultimate oneness of the reality. But the difference between the two is *parasaṅgrahanaya* does not deny the diversity and distinction in the phenomenal objects. But *parasaṅgrahanayābhāsa* denies the reality of the diversity of the phenomenal object. Hence it is called the *nayābhāsa*. It emphasises the reality of the absolute which is one and the multiplicity as an appearance.

Vedānta darśana is the example of *parasaṅgrahanayābhāsa* because it posits the reality of the absolute *Brahman* and considers the phenomenal world of diversity as an appearance. *Aparasaṅgrahanaya* accepts the reality of the general concepts like substance etc. And it does not deny the distinctions between the substances like *dharmadravya* etc. But *aparasaṅgrahanayābhāsa* denies the reality of the distinctions between the substances.

1.3 VYAVAHĀRANAYA (PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW)

Vyavahāranaya is the practical point of view. It is the analytic point of view. It can be considered to be an empirical approach to the problems of grasping the object from the synthetic point.¹ *Vyavahāranaya* analyses the different aspects of the objects in a scientific way and it helps in understanding the phenomenal world. The *saṅgrahanaya* grasps the generality, the *śūsūtrānaya* looks at the moments and not to the continuum while the *vyavahāranaya* attempts to understand the coherent relation between the substance and its attributes, general and the particular and also to the empirical significance of understanding the object. The general is comprehended through its specific nature. Therefore, this is called the practical point of view or the empirical point of view.

In other words *vyavahāranaya* comprehends reality from the

1 (a) *Tattvārtha Rājavārtika* 1, 33, 6

(b) *Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika* p. 271

(c) *Laghīyastraya kārīkā* 42 and 70

practical and the commonsense point of view.¹ A thing can be understood in respect of its substance and its modifications. With reference to the substance, it has its forms like the matter (*pudgala*), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest), *ākāśa* (space) and *kāla* (time). With reference to the modifications as substance, we find various classifications of the *jīva* substances, like the *siddha jīvas* and the *samsāri jīvas*. These classifications may be based on different principles like the presence of the attributes in different degrees at a particular time or the evolutionary process wherein the attributes are presented in a chronological order. This *naya* aims at analysing the nature of the object for practical purpose.² When we know an object like a pot (*ghaṭa*), we are more concerned with understanding the nature of the object in its modifications and attributes rather than in its generality i. e., potness or the pot in general (*ghaṭatva*). Similarly, if a patient is to be given medicine, we do not merely say that the medicine should be given, but we specify a particular medicine.

Vyavahāranaya is practical in outlook. Without its pragmatic nature for the empirical world *vyavahāranaya* has no value. *Vyavahāranaya* is of two types : (1) *sāmānya bheda* wherein we are concerned with presenting the general nature of the object. For example, in describing the *dravya* we try to present the distinction between the *jīva dravya* and *ajīva dravya* (2) *viśeṣa bheda*; gives the analysis of the specific nature of a thing and makes distinctions in the various types of the thing on the basis of differentia. For example, *samsāri jīvas* are classified into *nāraki* (living in hell), *tiryak* (lower animals), *manuṣya* (human beings) and *deva* (heavenly beings). This kind of distinction on the basis of specific nature of the object continues to be made till we reach the minimal point where we get the individual only and not a type of species. Below this point, there would be no distinction possible. The main use of this *naya* is to understand the phenomenal world in its details.³ It is consistent with the practical outlook of life.

1 *Tattvārthabhāṣya* 1, 35

2 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyavṛtti*

3 *Laghīyastraya* 3, 6, 70

Vyavahāra dṛṣṭi (practical point of view) does not merely grasp the substance, but it also presents the particular distinctions of the object for the sake of understanding the nature of the object. In this sense, we can say although its function is analytic, it is not restricted to the analysis of modes only. It is more concerned with the presentation of a thing with its specific attributes and modes. Therefore, it is referred to as *dravyārthika naya* (concerning *dravya*). *Naigama, saṅgraha* and *vyavahāra nayas* are forms of *dravyārthika nayas*.¹

~ VYAVAHĀRANAYĀBHĀSA (FALLACY OF VYAVAHĀRANAYA)

The point of view which is not consistent with the practical point of view and which presents a picture contrary the existing nature of the object is called *vyavahāranayābhāsa*. It is a fallacy concerning *vyavahāranaya*.² *Vyavahāranaya* makes a distinction between substance (*dravya*) and its modifications (*pariāyas*). But this distinction is not absolute. If the distinction were to be considered as absolute and not relative then it becomes inconsistent with the presentation of the object as it is. And that is *vyavahāranayābhāsa*. *Cārvāka darśana* does not make a distinction between substance and its modifications. It posits reality as consisting of the modes of the four elements—earth, water, fire, and air and nothing else. Consciousness also is a product of the modes of these elements i. e., due to the metabolic changes of the body. This is *vyavahāranayābhāsa*.³

~ ~ RĪJUSŪTRANAYA

Rījūstranaya is restricted to the understanding of the modes and the states of the momentary present, and not as a continuum. It looks at the object as a modification of the momentary present.⁴ The past modifications are destroyed, the future modifications are yet to come; the two cannot be comprehended. What we can get to know is the momentary present and the states and events in the present moment. Attempt to know the past modes or the future ones would be futile

1 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 6.

2 *Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika* p. 271

3 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 25

4 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 26

like seeing the sky-flower. It is not an object, it is only the state of the object in a particular moment.¹ The object is merely an aggregate of the states in the present moment. According to the *ṛjusūtranaya*, the object is from the real point of view not an object at all. It is only a state. When I say—I am happy, it only expresses the present state of my being. *Ṛjusūtranaya* gives importance to such modifications of the present moment, and considers that what is real is to be found in the present. For instance, the pleasure of the present moment and the possession of the wealth of the present moment are important and not their past and the future states. This does not mean that *ṛjusūtranaya* gives absolute emphasis on the present moment only. It only gives primary importance although the past and the future states are considered as secondary. It only says that they have no practical value. According to the *ṛjusūtranaya* every state of an object is different. The first and second states and others are distinguishable. The state of an object at a particular moment lasts only for that moment. Next moment, it is different. In analysing the statement "the crow is black" *ṛjusūtranaya* states that the crow is a crow and blackness is blackness. They are two different states. If both were considered as identical then the cuckoo and other black animals would be crow. The blackness of the crow does not exhaust the states of the crow, because it has other states present at the moment, like—its possession of blood, flesh, bone etc., which are of different colours, then how can we say that the crow is of black colour only.

According to this *naya* a potter (*kumbhakāra*) would not be considered as a potter as long as he is engaged in preparing some other articles like the umbrella or a palanquin, but the moment he is engaged in preparing the pot, he may be called the potter.

We cannot say that the wood is burning, because the act of burning requires a series of numerous moments. Innumerable moments are necessary in the process of burning. The moment the wood burns, it is no longer wood, it would have been destroyed as the wood and turned into coal. Again all wood is not burning, some of it is still un-

1 (a) *Anuyogadvāra*

(b) *Tattvārthabhāṣya* 1, 35

burnt. One can easily see that in the process of burning some portion of firewood is burnt, some is burning and still some of it is not burning. Therefore, it is difficult to say that the wood is burning. The wood can be described as burning and as not burning, as burning it is not wood and as wood it is not burning.

The *ṛjusūtranaya* in its subtle form would also maintain that in the act of eating, we are not eating at all. Because the act of eating involves the series of moment, and each moment presents a particular action. When we take food in the hand in a particular moment, it is not eating. Next moment we keep it in the mouth, it is also an act in a particular moment and when we gulp the food it is not eating at all. The *ṛjusūtranaya* does not accept the continuum of the actions in different moments. It looks at the object at a particular moment. It is not very much relevant for understanding the nature of the object from the practical point. The comprehension of the nature of objects from the practical point is possible from *naigama* and *vyavahāra nayas*. In the *ṛjusūtra naya* primary emphasis is given on modifications and that too of the moments, although there is the implicit acceptance of the substance which has modifications. But this is secondary.

Ṛjusūtranaya has two forms (1) *Sūkṣma ṛjusūtranaya* and (2) *sthūla ṛjusūtranaya*. The *sūkṣma ṛjusūtranaya* comprehends the state of the object at a particular moment only, but the *sthūla ṛjusūtranaya* looks at the state of the object as it is presented in the series of moments constituting the present.¹ Akalanka has given copious examples of *ṛjusūtranaya*.²

ṚJUSŪTRANAYĀBHĀSA (FALLACY OF ṚJUSŪTRANAYA)

Ṛjusūtranaya gives primary importance to the modifications (*paryāyas*) considering the substance (*dravya*) secondary; but the *ṛjusūtranayābhāsa* (fallacy of *ṛjusūtranaya*) totally neglects the substance and considers the modifications the only reality.³

The Buddhistic *kṣaṅkavāda* is a clear example of the fallacy of

1 *Nayacakra*.

2 *Tattvārtha Rājavārtika*, p. 96-97.

3 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 30.

ṛjusūtranaya,¹ because according to Buddhists, there is no existence of substance, only the modifications remain. Even in the state of salvation the continuance of consciousness extinguishes like a lamp. Thus it totally exhausts. And according to their view the substance of consciousness finally comes to an end.

ŚABDANAYA

Śabdanaya has a reference to the word and its meaning. It analyses the meaning of the word in the context of time, gender, number, case and prefixes that are attached to the word. According to various contexts of time, gender, number, etc, the meaning of the word changes. The aim of this *naya* is to determine the exact meaning of the word.² This *naya* is primarily concerned with the linguistic part of the expression of thought. According to this *naya*, the meaning of the word is determined by its function, the use in the various contexts with reference to the number, gender and the prefixes etc. When we say the mountain *Meru* was, is and will remain, it has a reference to the time element in the expression of the word. But the difference in each expression emphasises the difference in the contexts of time, the past, the present and future and accordingly in the object as well. It recognises the difference in the state of mountain *Meru*, of present, past and future time.³ We may determine the meaning of the word with reference to the modifications of the word. When we say that he prepares the pot and the pot contains water; in these statements the meanings emphasise different contexts with reference to the agent i. e. potter, and the function of the pot. Three genders of the word give different meanings. A word used in a masculine gender will have a different meaning from the same word used in feminine gender. The word *taṭah*, *taṭī* and *taṭaḥ* have different meanings.

1 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 31.

2 (a) *Laghīyastraya* sloka 44.

(b) *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 794.

(c) *Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika* p. 272, 273.

(d) *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 32.

3 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 33.

With reference to the prefixes the words will have different meanings also. Prefixes 'ā', 'vi', 'pra' and 'sam' for the word *hāra* will give different meanings. *Āhāra* means food, *vihāra* is walking about, *prahāra* is striking and *samhāra* is destruction. Due to the different prefixes, words will have different meanings. Science of language presents innumerable details regarding the meaning and function of the word. The linguistics is a developing science and the *Śabdanaya* is the root cause of this development. It incorporates all the traditions which are responsible for the development of linguistic science.

12-3 ŚABDANAYĀBHĀSA (FALLACY OF ŚABDANAYA)

Śabdanayābhāsa is a fallacy which consists in maintaining that the meaning of the word is not affected by the contextual situations and the different prefixes. Reference to different points of time may bring different modifications and these modifications have to be recognised as facts. But the *śabdanayābhāsa* does not recognise this important fact that there is the possibility of changes in the meaning due to contextual changes. To emphasise and retain the same meaning even if the contextual emphasis and references are changed is called *śabdanayābhāsa*.¹

12-4 SAMABHIRŪDHANAYA

Samabhirūḍhanaya refers to the meaning of the word, within the contexts of its etymological analysis. It goes to understand the meaning of the word with reference to its origin. The evolution of the word may lead to various changes in the meaning. However, the origin of the word needs to be considered for understanding the exact meaning of the word. In the varied modifications of the word it would be necessary to understand the stages of the modifications, and the modifications will show different meanings. To show this, is the function of *samabhirūḍhanaya*. *Samabhirūḍhanaya* accepts the difference among the synonyms of the same word.² In the *śabdanaya* we try to understand the meaning of the word with reference to its function

1 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 34

2 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 37

in context of the number, the gender and the prefix, etc. But *samabhirūḍhanaya* is concerned with analysing the etymology of the word and on the basis of this analysis it distinguishes the meanings of the same word due to its varied modifications in different contexts, may there be no difference of number, gender etc.¹ Words like *Indra*, *Śakra*, and *Purandara* are referred to the same person *Indra*. But they have different meanings.² Words like *Rājā* and *Nṛpa* may apply to the same man, but they have different meanings with reference to the etymology of the words. *Rājā* is one who shines and *Nṛpa* is one who rules. *Samabhirūḍhanaya* has given importance to the etymological sense of the word. On the basis of the roots of the word, its meaning differs. The words *Indra* and *Śakra*, although applicable to the same person, do not signify the same meaning.

In the *śabdanaya* we do not make a distinction in the meaning of the word in the same gender, but *samabhirūḍhanaya* finds differences in the meaning of the same word with reference to its roots and its variations in modifications. The dictionary gives different meanings of the same word, but really speaking the same meanings of the different equivalents of the word about an object do not mean the same thing. They have different shades of meanings due to the contexts of the origin of the word. For example, the word cow (go) has eleven different meanings, but these different meanings are only expressions of different senses due to the different contexts of the origin. In this sense the word has the force of meaning with reference to the agent as well as the expression of the word by the agent. These differences in the meaning can be considered as potency of the word. In this way, *samabhirūḍhanaya* refers to the distinctions in the meaning of the word with reference to its varied modifications.³

In the Jaina literature we talk of the universal spheres which have their galaxies. But in the scientific language we say that the universe consists of numerous stellar systems. *Samabhirūḍhanaya* gives

1 *Ślokavārtika*

2 *Pramāṇanayatattvaloka* 7, 37

3 Dr. Mahendrakumār Jain—*Jaina darśana*, p. 463-64 (Hindi)

definite meaning of the term with reference to its roots although the different words are applicable to the same object. It is necessary to have a scientific study of the etymological function of the word. So this *naya* is very much useful in the scientific analysis of any object. In a general sense the words like *ghaṭa*, *kuṭa* or *kumbha* refer to the same object i. e. the pot. But each word has different meanings, with reference to its roots. *Ghaṭa* refers to that which contains, *kuṭa* refers to that which has uneven form. Both the words are etymologically different.¹ With a view to avoiding confusion in the words it would be necessary to study the etymological sense of the words and to emphasise upon the definiteness and its truthfulness for fixing up the meaning. Otherwise, ambiguity in the meaning will create confusion. Avoiding the confusion and specifying accuracy is the speciality of this *naya*.²

Samabhirūḍhanayābhāsa

Samabhirūḍhanayābhāsa is a fallacy which arises in ignoring the distinctions arising due to functional sense and giving exclusive emphasis on the etymological distinction of the word.³

1-3

EVAMBHŪTANAYA

Evambhūtanaya is more specific and its meaning is narrowed down to the present context. The meaning of a word, in the case, is determined by its relevance to the present context.⁴ The functional meaning of the word based on its etymological content may be operative or may not be operative, but in the case of *evambhūtanaya* the emphasis is given on the present use and the content of the meaning operative at the time of expressing the word. The etymological sense is secondary although it may have remote relevance.⁵ Indicating the

1 (a) *Āvaśyakamalayagiri vṛtti*

(b) *kuṭa kauṭīlye, kuṭanat kauṭīlyayogāt kuṭaḥ.*

2 *Jaina darśana ke Maulika Tattva*, Muni Nathamal ji, Part I, pp. 385—386.

3 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 38

4 (a) *Sarvārthasiddhi* 1, 33

(b) *Akalāṅkagranthatraya tippaṇa* p. 147

5 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 40

present meaning of the word when the word is actually expressed is the significant factor in *evambhūtanaya*.¹ We call *Indra* as *Indra* only when he is sitting on the throne. When he is not sitting on the throne he need not be called *Indra*. The name *Purandara* would be meaningful when *Indra* is in the act of destroying the town. We can call him *śakra* when he exhibits his powers. The meaning of the *evambhūtanaya* has reference not so much to the individual as a name, but the name is applicable and is relevant in the present context of its function of meaning. A *pujārī* (priest) would be called a priest and the name of the priest would be relevant to him actually at the time of worshipping the deity. This *naya* visualises the expression of powers and qualities at the present moment.

Evambhūtanayābhāsa : (fallacy of *evambhūtanaya*)

Evambhūtanayābhāsa is a fallacy which consists in negating the relevance of the present function and its etymological meaning of a word. If a word were to be used in its etymological sense only sometimes the meaning may be relevant and sometimes the meaning may not be relevant, because its present function of the word may not connote the etymological sense. But to negate the present function only and trace it to the etymological sense and to apply to the individual is the fallacy called *Evambhūtanayābhāsa*.² *Evambhūtanaya* has reference to the meaning traceable to the etymological sense, but applicable to the present function. In this sense, to connote the general meaning of the word without reference to the present function would lead to the fallacy of *evambhūtanaya*.³ To call a broken pot a pot, would lead to this fallacy, because the etymological sense of the pot (*ghaṭa*) would be that which holds or which contains, but the broken pot, as it is broken, cannot contain or hold anything. Therefore, in the present context, it should not be called *ghaṭa*. Otherwise, similar meaning will have to be applied to the objects which have ceased to function, as in the case of the cloth that is destroyed. If the word has its mean-

1 *Dravyānuyogatarkaṇā*

2 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7, 42

3 *Nayopadeśa* 39

ing without reference to its function then any name would be appropriate to any object with any function. Therefore, it is necessary to restrict the meaning of the word to its function in the present context. Otherwise it loses its potency.

THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF *NAYAS*

We have considered the *nayas* in their different aspects from the *Naigamanaya* to *Evambhūtanaya*. As we proceed from *Naigamanaya* to *Evambhūtanaya* the scope of the meaning becomes restricted and narrower at every stage.¹ *Naigamanaya* is wider in its content because it embraces the generality and particularity, and unity and diversity. In this *naya* sometimes generality is given primary importance and particularity becomes secondary. Sometimes particularity is comprehended with greater emphasis and generality becomes less important. *Saṅgrahanaya* is less comprehensive than *naigamanaya* because it grasps only the general, the unity and not the diversity. The *vyavahāranaya* is less extensive and narrower than *saṅgrahanaya*, because it refers to the particularity and it is analytic only. *Rjusūtranaya* is restricted to a still narrower field, because it limits its understanding to the momentary present. It is more concerned with the modifications and not with the substance which has modifications. *Śabdanaya* is still narrower than *rjusūtranaya* in the sense that it is concerned with the understanding of the meaning of the word of the moment. *Samabhirūḍhanaya* narrows down its scope still further, because it refers to the root of the word and presents the etymological sense. Then we come to the limited field of application of the point of view in the *evambhūtanaya*. It refers to the meaning of the word in the present context and does not look before and after. There is a gradual narrowing down of the scope and the content of the *naya* from the *naigama* to the *evambhūta*. Because of this, the *nayas* in their various aspects have reference to each other and are related to each other in presenting the varied picture of the object in its content and meaning.

1 *Tattvārtharājavārtika* 1, 36.

METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF *NAYA* 12.3

So far, we have studied the logical and epistemological interpretations of the concept of *naya*. Now, we may now try to understand the metaphysical implications and content of the concept or *naya*. From the metaphysical point of view, *naya* can be distinguished into two types : (1) *Niścayanaya* (the ultimate point of view) and (2) *vyavahāranaya* (the phenomenal point of view). *Niścayanaya* presents the picture of the object and its meaning from the ultimate point of view. We may call it the noumenal point of view, because reality can be looked at from the phenomenal and noumenal point of view. The noumenal point of view, goes to the source of the reality and finds out the ultimate meaning of reality. *Vyavahāranaya* is the phenomenal point of view, it is analytical in nature and it presents the picture of the object in its relation to other objects. It is relational in its aspect. *Vyavahāranaya* is sometimes considered to be secondary to the *niścayanaya*. It is called *upa-naya* also. Ācārya Kundakunda says *vyavahāranaya* is “*abhūtārtha*” (the relational thought) and *niścayanaya* refers to the *bhūtārtha* in the sense it is ultimate and pure (*śuddha*).¹

Niścayanaya, being *śuddhanaya*, grasps reality in its ultimate aspect, while *vyavahāranaya* is practical in its approach, and tries to understand the phenomenal nature of reality.

In the Jaina Āgamic literature, there is distinction of the *niścaya* and *vyavahāranaya* whose functions are to look at reality from two points of view. i. e., from the ultimate and the practical points of view, just as in the *advaita* philosophy, we have the ultimate and the practical points of view which are referred to as “*Pāramārthika* and *vāvyahārika dṛṣṭi*”. The Buddhist mention the *pāramārtha* and *sāmy-vṛtta* points of view. The *Upaniṣads* mention the *sthūla* and the *sūkṣmadṛṣṭi*. But there is difference between the Jaina approach to the problems and the approaches of the other absolutistic philosophies. Jains look at reality from the *niścayanaya* in order to find out the real nature of the object, with reference to its substance and not so much with reference to the distinctions and *pariāyas*. But they do

not deny reality of the distinctions and the *paryāyas*, as do the *Vedāntins* in considering the external world as an appearance.

In the Buddhist literature, a distinction has been made between *paramārtha satya* (ultimate truth) and *lokasaṃvṛtti satya* (the practical truth).¹ What the Buddhist in the *Vijñānavāda* and the *Śūnyavāda* call the *paramārtha satya* and the *Vedāntins* call the *pāramārthika dṛṣṭi*, the Jainas call it the *bhūtārthanaya* or the *niścayanaya*.

Vyavahāranaya has been distinguished into two types : (1) *sadbhūta vyavahāranaya* and (2) *asadbhūtavvyavahāranaya*. *Sadbhūtavvyavahāranaya* refers to the analysis of substance and its qualities while describing a thing. This *naya* has two forms : (a) *upacarita sadbhūta* and (b) *anupacarita sadbhūta*. That *vyavahāra naya* which grasps the nature of the objects with reference to its substance and its attributes in the relational and conditional form is called *upacarita sadbhūtavvyavahāra naya*. And the *naya* or a point of view which tries to understand the relation between substance and its attributes without their being essentially related, is called *Anupacarita sadbhūta vyavahāranaya*. *Matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* are attributes of *jīva* from the practical point of view. In the case of *matijñāna* conditioned by empirical adjuncts due to the encrustations of *karma* is the *jīva*. It is considered to be a phenomenal approach to the understanding of the *jñāna*, because it is not pure and free *jñāna*. It is called *upacarita*. In the case of *anupacarita sadbhūta vyavahāranaya* there is the awareness of the distinction between the object and attributes. The soul and its attribute of *jñāna* are considered to be distinct and without any conditioning due to freedom from *karma*. *Kevalajñāna* is the pure *jñāna* of the soul and it is unconditioned. *Kevalajñāna* is free from impurities and passions. In this, we are aware of the distinction between the substance and its attributes.

Asadbhūtavvyavahāranaya can also be distinguished into two forms as (1) *upacarita* and (2) *anupacarita*. *Anupacarita asadbhūta vyavahāranaya* tries to understand the relation between the substance and its attributes as in the case of the body and the *jīva*. The relation is not inhe-

1 *Mādhyamikakārikā*, *āryasatyaparikṣā*, sl. 8.

rent in the *jīva*, but it is accidental due to conjunction. But this conjunction is inseparable as long as the empirical life lasts. Therefore it is *anupacarīta*.

But *upacarīta asadbhūta vyavahāranaya* understands the distinction between the substance and its attributes in the relation of accidents which are primarily separable as, in the case of *Devadatta* and his wealth. Relation between the *Devadatta* and his wealth is only accidental and also separable. This type of comprehending the relation is *upacarīta asadbhūta vyavahāranaya*.

Niścaya naya is the pure point of view. It is the ultimate point of view. It is the noumenal point of view. In this, there is the fuller understanding of the distinction between the substance and its attributes. The self is known in its pure form and its qualities are considered to be distinct, though accidentally related. They are not the essence of the soul. For example, the effective and connotive states are the modifications which arise out of knowledge, feeling and connotation. These are not inherently related to the soul, although consciousness is the essence of the soul. This type of an attitude gives a clear and a synoptic view of the relation of the soul and its attributes. And there is a clear awareness that the self is not these attributes. From the noumenal point of view, self is seen not bound and it is also apprehended that the bondage of the self is not eternal. The self is seen as pure and perfect without the impurities of the *kārmic* particles. The mind, body and the sense organs are considered as separate although they are related to the embodied soul. But this relation is not eternal.

From the practical point of view the self appears to be bound and as having a shape. But from the *niścaya* point of view the self is pure and perfect and is uncontaminated, with the *kārmic* matter. The *vyavahāranaya* is analytic and tries to find out the distinctions and differences, but *śuddhanaya* or *niścayanaya* looks at the object in its pure nature and the fundamental aspect of the object. *Niścayanaya* comprehends the pure nature of the self as distinguished from its attributes and modifications, which are mainly looked at from the practical point of view. *Vyavahāranaya* is the point of distinction,

while *niścayanaya* aims at getting the pure point of view of non-distinctions.

When we say that knowledge is the essence of the *Ātman*, we are saying this from the noumenal point of view. But when we say that knowledge is the quality of the soul, we are using the practical point of view. In these expressions, the *Ātman* is considered to be the substance having attributes and knowledge is the attribute possessed by the *Ātman*. This relation of the *Ātman* and knowledge as substance and attributes is to be considered not as a relation of dependence, but as of inherence. When we consider the relation of the *ghee* that is in the pot and the pot, the relation is of conjunction because the two objects are separable. But when we consider the relation of *jñāna* (knowledge) and the self there is the relation of inherence. According to Jainas, the relation between the substance and quality is neither that of exclusive difference nor of exclusive identity. It is the relation comprising of difference and identity. The attribute of knowledge cannot exist without the *Ātman*. This understanding is due to *sadbhūtavyavahāranaya*.

In order to understand the distinction between *niścaya* and the *vyavahāranaya*, it is necessary to analyse the spatial concept of relation as in the case of *jīva* and the *kārmic* particles. The *jīva* and the *kārmic* particles are to be found in space. Both of them are to be found in the same space. This is the practical point of view. From the noumenal point of view each object lives in its spatial position and not in the spatial position of others. The *Ātman* is in itself. *Karma* has its own spatial position. But from the practical point of view, we say that the bound soul is to be found in conjunction with the *kārmic* particles in the same spatial position, just as from the practical point of view we say, when we mix water and milk, that it is milk. We do not make a distinction between water and milk from the point of view of spatial position. But from the real point of view, water is water and milk is milk. They are distinct. Similarly, the *Ātman* and the *kārmic* particles are considered to be together from the practical point of view. But in reality, they are distinct, as also their nature is distinct.

It should be noted that the distinction made between the *naigama* and the other *nayas* and *vyavahāra* and *niścayanaya* has been made with the purpose of emphasising the practical and the spiritual point of view. *Naigama* and other *nayas* are meant to analyse the nature of the object and to understand their implications in the empirical world. But the purpose of distinction between *vyavahāra* and *niścaya* is to lead one to the spiritual world in understanding the real nature of the self. It aims at leading us from the facts to reality, from the world to the realisation of *mokṣa*.

PRAMĀṆA AND NAYA

It was considered in the previous stages that *naya* is the point of view that a person takes in knowing the objects.¹ It apprehends one specific feature of the object, but *pramāṇa* has no such distinction of partial understanding of the objects in relation to its other aspects. It comprehends the object in its fullness. *Pramāṇa* comprehends the nature of the pot (*ghaṭa*) in all its aspects. But *naya* grasps its nature in one of its aspects. In this sense, it is partial comprehension. *Pramāṇa* does not make a distinction between substance and its attributes but it grasps the object in its entirety. But *Naya* looks at the object from a particular point of view and gives emphasis on a particular aspect of the object. But both *naya* and *pramāṇa* are forms of knowledge. We can say that *pramāṇa* is *sakalādeśa* (comprehensive and full), but *naya* is *vikalādeśa* (partial). The comprehensive understanding of the object gives a synthetic picture of the object in all its aspects of substance in relation of its attributes. It is a comprehensive knowledge. *Naya* being *vikalādeśa* need not however be considered as purely practical and incomplete knowledge, because it looks at the object from a particular point of view and presents the picture of the object in some aspects, although the awareness of other aspects is in the background and is not ignored. Both the *sakalādeśa* and the *vikalādeśa* approaches to the understanding of nature of the object are equally important and complementary to each other. Both of

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- 1 (a) *Laghīyastraya*, sl. 55, Akalaṅka
 (b) *Siddhiviniścaya*, ṭīkā p. 517, Akalaṅka
 (c) *Nyāyāvatāra* ṭīkā 29, Siddhaṛṣigaṇī.

them are concerned with grasping the nature of the object in relation to its attributes. *Sakalādeṣa* grasps the objects with all its attributes while in *vikalādeṣa* it is restricted to the apprehension of one particular quality. *Sakalādeṣa* may be considered to be the expression of the *Syādvāda*, while *vikalādeṣa* expresses *naya*.¹

4.3 DRAVYĀRTHIKA AND PARYĀYĀRTHIKA POINTS OF VIEW

Dravyārthika and *paryāyārthika dṛṣṭi* refers to the point of view of substance and that of modes. *Dravyārthika dṛṣṭi* is a comprehensive point of view. It grasps the generality without ignoring the particularity of the modes. *Paryāyārthika dṛṣṭi* is analytic and is mainly concerned with the distinctions of the modes of an object. Ācārya Siddhasena says that in the teachings of *Mahāvīra* we find a synthesis of *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika* points of view. All other points of view are forms of these two points of view.² When Mahāvīra was asked whether *jīva* residing in hell is eternal or non-eternal, he said from the *dravyārthika* point of view *jīva* is eternal, but from the point of view of its modes existing in this world (*paryāyārthika* or *vyucchiṭti naya*) the *jīva* is non-eternal.³ *Dravyārthikadṛṣṭi* is also called *avyucchiṭti naya*. From the point of view of substance (*dravyārthika*) every substance is permanent with its modes. From the point of view of the modes the object is impermanent, because here we look at the object from the points of view of changing modes. The *dravyārthikanaya* presents an outlook of comprehension and non-difference, while *paryāyārthika naya* emphasises distinction and difference. In the *Bhagavatī sūtra* the word *bhāvārthika* has been used in place of *paryāyārthika*.⁴

4.4 DRAVYĀRTHIKA AND PRADEŚĀRTHIKA DṚṢṬI

Dravyārthika dṛṣṭi refers to the point of view of substance, while *pradeśārthika dṛṣṭi* looks at the objects in its different modes and its analysis in its spatial distinctions. The distinction between *paryāya* and *pradeśa* can be considered in respect the modes and the

1 *Laghīyastraya* 3, 6, 62.

2 *Sanmati prakaraṇa* 1, 3.

3 *Bhagavatī* 7, 2, 279.

4 *Bhagavatī* 18, 10/25, 3/25, 4.

spatial points. *Paryāya* refers to the different modes of an object, while *pradeśa* refers to the different parts of an object occupying the different spatial positions. A *pradeśa* is the point of space occupied by the smallest point of *pudgala* (matter). According to Jainas, matter occupies different points of space and there is no definiteness about this. But the other substance like, *dharma*, *adharma*, *lokākāśa* and *jīva* occupy determined space points. But in the case of matter there are variations according to the nature of the aggregates of the atoms coming together. Mahāvīra gave the analysis of substance from the point of view of spatial positions also. He said from the point of view of substance, modes, *pradeśa* and from the points of view of qualities, and bringing all these points of view in a synthetic sense "I am one". But from the point of view of *paryāya*, I am 'jñāna and darśana as two modes. From the point of view of *pradeśa*, I am permanent and is indestructible. From the point of *upayoga* I am changing (*asthira*) because I express myself into different mental states. Similarly, I express modes in the past and the present.¹ In this he has used the *pradeśa dṛṣṭi* for expressing the permanence and indestructibility of the *Ātman*. From the point of view of *pudgala-pradeśa* the self is not changeable and is eternal. There is no variation in the *Ātma pradeśa* (the spatial point of *Ātman*).

Pradeśārthika dṛṣṭi is useful in another way. From the point of view of substance, the object is one, but from the point of view of *pradeśārthika* the object may be looked as many, because it occupies many space points. In the *Prajñāpanā*, *dharmāstikāya* is considered to be understood from the *dravyadṛṣṭi* as one, while from the *pradeśārthika dṛṣṭi* it is many because of its numberless space points. The object which is comparable to other objects from the point of view of substance is not comparable from the point of *pradeśārthikadṛṣṭi*, just as the *dharma*, *adharama*, and *ākāśa astikāyas* are considered to be comparable (*tulya*) from the point of view of *pradeśārthika* as they occupy numberless *pradeśas*. But *ākāśa* being *anantapradeśī*, it is incomparable. In this way, the objects may be considered from the

1 *Bhagavatī* 18, 10.

points of view of *dravya* and *pradeśa*. They may also be considered as comparable and incomparable with reference to the points of space occupied by the objects. This gives a comprehensive picture of the objects.¹

VYĀVAHĀRIKA AND NAIŚCAYIKA DRŚTĪ

Philosophers have discussed about the problem of the reality of the objects. They have faced the question regarding the reality and have asked whether the sense-object is real or that which is beyond the sense experience and which can be grasped only by the intuition (*Prajñā*) is real. The *Cchāndogyā Upaniṣad* presents the view that knowledge which is through intuition is real and that which we get through sense experience is only an appearance.² The ultimate reality is one and non-dual. The diversity that we find in the phenomenal world which is known through sense experience is an appearance. But many philosophers held different views.

The *Cārvāka* holds that whatever is known to the sense experience is real and all the rest is unreal. The materialists maintain that matter alone is real. Different philosophers have emphasised the effusive reality of either things known to sense experience or reality apprehended through reason or intuition. But the Jainas does not find any contradiction in the assertions made by these philosophers. The Jainas take the stand on the basis of the *nayas* and on the methodology of *syādvāda*. Reality is complex and it can be looked at from different points of view. The noumenal point of view gives us the ultimate thing of the world. The real is known through intuition and reason. But from the practical point of view of the phenomenal point of view, the things of the world are as much real as the ultimate things known through intuition. There is no contradiction in maintaining realities of both spheres from the different points of view. The practical point of view gives us the picture of reality which is sensible, and could be grasped. The ultimate point of view

1 (a) *Prajñāpanā*, pada 3, sūtra 54-56

(b) *Bhagavatī* 25, 4.

2 *Cchāndogyopaniṣad* 6, 1, 4,

(*niścaya naya*) leads us to the comprehension of reality which is the subtle essence of the phenomenal world. Both of them are equally real.

In the *Bhagavatī* there is a dialogue between Bhagavāna Mahāvīra and Gautama Gaṇadhara regarding the different aspects of reality. Gautama asked Mahāvīra, there are how many colours, smell, taste and touch in treacle. Mahāvīra said, from the practical point of view it is sweet. But from the real or ultimate point of view it has five colours, two types of smell, five types of tastes and eight types of touch. Similarly, Gautama asked the question regarding the qualities of a black-bee. Mahāvīra said that from the practical point of view the bee is black. But from the real point of view (*niścayanaya*), it has five colours, two types of smell, five types of tastes and eight types of touch. In this way, Mahāvīra gave answers to many questions from the practical and the real points of view.¹ It is clear from this, that Mahāvīra understood that both the practical and the real points of view present the picture of reality which are equally real and valid. They do not contradict each other nor is one less real than the other.

ARTHANAYA AND ŚABDANAYA

Anuyogadvāra,² *Sthānāṅga*³ and *Prajñāpanā*⁴ mention seven *nayas*. Among these seven *nayas*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha*, and *evam-bhūtanayas* belong to the category of *śabdanayas*.⁵ *Naigama*, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra* and *ṛjusūtra nayas* have reference to the objects. Therefore, they are called *dravyārthikanaya*.

TYPES OF NAYAS

Ācārya Siddhasena maintains that there are as many *nayas* as there are statements. And there are as many views and theories as there are statements.¹ In this sense there are numerous *nayas* and

1 *Bhagavatī* 18, 9.

2 *Anuyogadvāra* 156.

3 *Sthānāṅga* 7, 552.

4 *Prajñāpanā* 16.

5 *Anuyogadvāra* 148,

6 *Sanmati prakaraṇa* 3, 47.

they have been variously described. However, the Jainas have attempted the primary ways of the describing a thing and main points of view which are the basis of their description. The *dravyanaya* and *pariyāyanaya* include numerous forms of expressing the nature of a thing and the numerous points of view, although in theory there would be infinite ways of expression. In the *āgama* literature, as well as according to the Digambara tradition,¹ seven prominent *nayas* have been mentioned. *Naigama*, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *ṛjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta* are the seven primary *nayas*. Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara does not consider *naigamanaya* as an independent *naya* and he mentioned six *nayas*. Umāsvāti has in the earlier part mentioned five *nayas* : *naigama*, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *ṛjusūtra* and *śabda* are the five primary *nayas*.² *Naigama naya* has been distinguished into two forms : *deśparikṣepī* and *sarvaparikṣepī*. *Śabdanaya* has three forms : *sāmprata*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta*.³

1 2 3 NAYA AS PRAMĀṆA OR APRAMĀṆA

Nayavāda is a comprehensive and a special form of thought in the Jaina logic. Every object is looked from the points of view which are *nayas*. Jinabhadra kṣa nāśramaṇa says that the *naya* theory pervades the entire Jaina philosophy and thought.⁴

Jaina logicians were faced with a question regarding the validity of the *nayavāda*. Is the *naya* a *pramāṇa* or not was the primary question. If it were a *pramāṇa* why are they differently mentioned ? And if it were not a *pramāṇa* then it would be false knowledge and there is no scope of false knowledge in the philosophical world.

The Jaina logicians say that *naya* is neither *pramāṇa* nor *apramāṇa* (not *pramāṇa*). It is part of the *pramāṇa*. A drop of water of the ocean can not be considered to be the ocean and also not the non-ocean, but a part of the ocean.⁵ Similarly, a soldier is neither

1 *Tattvārtha rājavārtika* 1, 33.

2 *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 34.

3 *Tattvārthabhāṣya* 1, 34-35, p. 314-315.

4 *Vīṣṇavaśyaka bhāṣya*

5 *Tattvārthasūtrakavārttika* 1, 6 *Naya Vivaraṇa*, sl. 6.

an army, nor a non-army; but the part of army. The same argument is true in the case of describing the *nayas*.

Pramāṇa comprehends the nature of the objects in the different aspects, while *naya* looks at it from a particular point of view. It grasps one aspect of the object. In this sense, *naya* is the partial presentation of the nature of the object, while *pramāṇa* is comprehensive in its presentation. But *naya* does not give false knowledge nor does it deny that the other aspects of knowledge of the nature of the object are true. In this sense it is synoptic in outlook and it is not invalid.

SUNAYA AND DURNAYA : RIGHT NAYA AND WRONG NAYA

We have seen that *pramāṇa* comprehends objects in its various aspects and it is exhaustive in its presentation. But *naya* looks at the object from a particular point of view. However *naya* does not deny the possibility of looking at the object from other points of view and it accepts that the nature of the object is complex and the presentation from other points of view may also be valid. This is *Sunaya*, but if the *naya* for a point of view were to insist that its presentation is only valid and all other presentations from different *nayas*, are invalid, this is *durnaya*. We may also say that *pramāṇa* comprehends the *tat*, (that) and the *atat*, while *naya* grasps only the *tat*.¹ *Naya* is concerned with the presentation of 'tat' only. *Durnaya* has a negative function also. It aims at negating and denying the other aspects of presentation.

Umāsvāti says that *Durnaya* is one-sided in its approach because it emphasises that the point of view taken by the *naya* is the only correct point of view and the other points of view are wrong. Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara has also stated that *Durnaya* is a *mūhyā dṛṣṭi* (perversity of attitude) because it is dogmatic in outlook. It asserts the truth of its point of view and rejects the other points of view.²

1 (a) *Aṅgasahasrī*.

(b) *Umāsvātikṛta Pañcāśaka*.

2 *Sammatī prakaraṇa* 1, 21.

But in order to understand the nature of the object in all its aspects, it is necessary to accept the presentation of the object in different points of view also. Otherwise, the picture would be one-sided, just as a garland of diamond can be called a garland only when the different individual diamonds are arranged and attached in a systematic way.¹ Just as the garland of diamonds depends on its cohesion on the thread that weaves out the diamonds, so also *nayavāda* weaves out the right attitude and right knowledge (*saṃyagdṛṣṭi*) and *saṃyag-jñāna*.

Ācārya Kundakunda says that the one who takes the stand of looking at the things from two different *nayas* understand the truth of the presentation of the two *nayas*. He does not reject the other point of view, because he knows that the other point of view has also its value.²

Everything is complex in its nature, presenting the many facets of its qualities. We cannot describe the entire nature of the objects from one point of view; that would give a partial and inadequate picture of the object. To understand the object in its various facets from different points of view, does not mean that we are presenting different views about the reality. There is no difference of opinion in presenting the different aspects of the objects from different points of view. Such a presentation would give a comprehensive picture of reality and not one-sided picture of reality.³

Everything can be looked at from the point of view of the knowledge about it, expression in words and the nature of the object itself. From the point of view of knowledge, we get different facets of understanding. From the point of view of the objects of knowledge, we can present different variations of the view. For instance, as the universe it is one. On the basis of the distinction between *jīva* and another *jīva* it is two. On the distinction of substances, there are six substances. Looked at from the point of view of *astikāya*,

1 *Sanmati prakaraṇa* 1, 22-25.

2 *Samayasāra* 143.

3 *Tattvārthabhāṣya* 1, 35.

there are five *astikāyas*. But these distinctions do not present different views, they only present different facets and variations of looking at the reality.¹

UNIFORMITY AND CONTINUITY IN THE JAINA DARŚANA

The study of different systems of Indian philosophy makes it clear that the Vedic tradition and the Buddhist philosophy present varied, and sometimes conflicting metaphysical theories among themselves. The vedic tradition gives the monistic, the dualistic and also the pluralistic theories of reality. Similarly, the Buddhist philosophy has been presented in various theories often conflicting with each other in their ultimate metaphysical stand-points. For instance, in the Buddhist philosophical systems there are divergent theories of realities like realism, subjective idealism, idealism and even nihilism. The *Hīnayāna* schools of thought like *Vaibhāṣika* and *Sautāntrika* presents the realistic approach to the understanding of the universe by positing the *dharmas* (elements). *Mahāyāna* schools of philosophy like *viññāna-vāda* (*Yogācāra*) and *Mādhyamika* present the idealistic stand. The *Mādhyamika* school is said to be nihilistic because according to this school everything is unreal, there is nothing real. The real is the *śūnya* (void), although *śūnya* has been interpreted by some as the absolute which is inexpressible. However, the Buddhist philosophy have a common current of thought expressed in the *pythakāda* (doctrine of momentariness) and *madhyamavāda* (the doctrine of middle path). Thus we find that the Vedic tradition and the Buddhist thought present a variety of philosophical school, very often diverting from each other, even to the point of being conflicting in the case of the realist and idealist schools of *Hīnayāna* and *Mahāyāna* sects. Similarly the vedic tradition also presents the realistic thought in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and the idealistic stream in the *vedānta*.

Seeing the vast differences in the various sects of vedic and Buddhistic traditions, it is hard to believe that these are the off-shoots of one current.

But if we survey the development of the Jaina thought, we find there is uniformity and continuity in the Jaina tradition. There is

1 *Jaina Darśana*—Dr. Mahendra Kumār Jain, p. 446.

consistency in their approach to philosophical problems. Jainism is realistic in its approach and empiricist in its methodology. The distinction between the *svetāmbara* and *digambara* tradition have shown certain differences which are only superficial pertaining primarily to religious practices. The fundamentals of Jaina philosophy have been accepted by both traditions. For instance, there is unanimity of thought in their acceptance of the doctrines like six substances (*ṣaḍdravya*), nine categories (*nava padārtha*) and seven *tattvas* (principles) and *pañcāstikāya* (five dimensional substances).

This unanimity and consistency in the Jaina tradition has been possible due to the fundamental outlook of the Jainas expressed in the *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*. The *nayavāda* gives scope for catholicity of outlook. It asserts that others may also be right and the rightness of each point of view is partial and it adds to the comprehensive picture of reality. In this sense, the Jainas have been tolerant in accepting the various points of view in order to present a coherent picture of reality. The *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* express the spirit of tolerance. They symbolise intellectual non-violence.



JÑĀNAVĀDA :

A Study

(THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE)

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SELF AND THE KNOWLEDGE

The self and the knowledge are related to each other, not in any external way, but the relation is inherent. It is *samavāyī* (inherent relation) and not conjunction, (*saṁyoga*) as external elements. *Jñāna* is not external to self, it is the essential characteristic of the self. Self has *Jñāna* and self cannot exist without *Jñāna*, but this relation need not be construed as a relation of a thing and its quality in the sense that the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* maintain. Therefore, knowledge is inherently related to the self. From the practical point of view we may distinguish knowledge and self. But from the pure and noumenal point of view, there is no distinction between knowledge and self.¹ Although *jñāna* is the essential characteristic of the self, it cannot be considered to be externally related. Knowledge and self are very intimately connected as even to say that they are identical.

Knowledge is self-illuminative and it also illumines the object of knowledge (*sva-para-prakāśaka*). Cognition illumines the object it cognises and also it illumines itself, cognises itself and this fact of self-cognition can be understood by an analogy. Just as the lamp illumines the object around it and it illumines itself, similarly the self has cognition as its essential quality and cognition cognises itself and cognises the object of cognition. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the nature of knowledge.

1 (a) *Acārāṅga* 5, 5 166—*je āyā se viññāyā, je viññāyā se āyā*

(b) *Samayasāra gāthā* 7

(c) *Bhagavatī* 12, 10 *nāna puṇa niyamam āyā*.

In the Āgama literature, the characteristics of knowledge have been presented from the points of view of identity and of difference. From the point of view of identity (*abhe'da*), it has been said that self and knowledge are one and there are no differences. From the point of view of difference, knowledge is the quality of the soul. From the point of view of identity and difference (*bhedābheda*), self can be said to be neither completely different from knowledge, nor completely identical with knowledge.¹ Knowledge is identical with the self. Therefore, it is not different. Knowledge is the quality of the *ātman*. Therefore, it is different also.

113 THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge and the object of knowledge are independent of each other. Knowledge is the quality of the self. Substance, quality and the modes are the objects of knowledge. Knowledge and its object do not produce each other. The object of knowledge may give us knowledge but it is not inherent with the act of cognition. It is related to the object when it is produced from the object, then it has the characteristics of the object. In that case, the identity of knowledge with the self would be remote. When we cognise an object the process of cognition involves the activity of the self. However, cognition depends on the object of cognition. The media through which we have to cognise an object are the body, sense-organs and the mind. But they are not conscious. When the senses come in contact with the object through the stimulations, then the process of knowledge starts. The act of cognition is not some new creation. It is the process of the activity of the self to the media of the sense-organs and the mind in contact with the object. The process of cognition and the extent of knowledge depends upon the capacity of the knower.

We have seen that knowledge is possible by the self through the sense-organs and the mind, but the function is limited. The mind also has a limited capacity. The mind comes in contact with a particular sense organ at a time. Therefore, we can cognise an object

1 *Svarūpa sambodhana*, 4.

through the operation of the sense-organs and through their limitation. But we also get knowledge without the media of the sense-organs. This knowledge need not be limited. Because the limitations of the sense-organs are not operative in the complete or unenveloped knowledge. Through the complete knowledge all the objects can be cognised at a time moment.

KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

The relation between the knowledge and the object of knowledge is like the object and its quality. The subject of knowledge is characterised by the possession of cognition. The object has a characteristic as the object of knowledge. Both these are independent. But both are intimately related in the sense that the object enters into relation with the cognition as the object of cognition and cognition has the relation of knowing the object. In this sense, we may say that there is no difference between the object and cognition.

KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION

The psychic energy that the soul possesses is expressed in cognition, perception, and experience. The eyes perceive. The other experiences are possible through the other sense-organs including the *manas*. According to the *āgamas* the experience through the eyes as well the experience through the other organs may be considered as *darśana*. *Avadhi* (clairvoyance) and *kevala* (omniscience) may also be considered as *darśana*. In this analysis *darśana* does not mean only perception. But it means the experience of the universe and the non-difference. Knowledge (*jñāna*) is analytic and it presents the varied characteristics of the object. *Jñāna* is of five types, while *darśana* is of four types. *Manahparyaya jñāna* (telepathy) is not considered as *darśana*, because it cognises difference only.

The universe has diversity when considered with reference to attributes, modes, but considered from the point of substance, it is one and undifferentiated. Therefore, we cannot say that the universe is one only or diverse only. The capacity of empirical knowledge is limited. Therefore, we first know the generality of the substance and then we cognise the diversity to be founded in the attributes and modes.

The *kevalajñāna* (omniscience) is not limited. Its capacity is infinite. It cognises everything including the substance and its modes. The omniscient knows everything in the moment of its experience, in the aspect of its universality. Then he cognises the diversity. This is the procedure of *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana*.

The *chudmastha* who has reached the tenth *gūṇasthāna* does not grasp everything in one moment of experience. He cognises the subtle nature of the cognition and after numerous moments he grasps the universality that is in the substance. The universality and the diversity of the object are progressively experienced. *Jñāna* cognises particularities and is analytic, while *darśana* experiences the universality and is synthetic. Knowing the generality first and then cognising the diversity would involve the process of *darśana* and *jñāna*.

KNOWLEDGE AND THE AFFECTIVE STATES (*VEDANĀ*)

Of the five sense-organs, the sense organs of touch, taste and smell are sensory. They cognise the objects and experience the senses of touch, taste and smell, but the sense-organs of sight and hearing are instruments of cognition only, because they cognise the objects, but do not experience the objects as there is no direct contact with them.

We experience the external objects through the sense-organs, but the process of experience is not the same in all the sense-organs. The sense-organ of sight has a greater capacity of cognition of cognition. But it cognises the object without touching it. The sense-organ of hearing is less in its capacity to experience, because it can cognise the sounds which touch it, or come in contact. The sense-organs of touch, taste and sound are less in their capacity of experience as compared with the other two. Because they can experience the object when they come in direct contact with the objects and therefore they can cognise the objects and experience the experiences. But in the case of the eyes and the ears there is no direct contact with the objects of experience. Therefore, they can only get knowledge, but they do not directly get the experience. In the case of the mind it can have both knowledge and experience, although it does not come in direct contact with the object. This is because the mind transforms itself

into the form of the object to be cognised. The mind can also have the higher type of experiences in the *manahparyayañāna* (telepathic knowledge). The cognition that we get without the contact with the object through the sense-organs is not sense-cognition, but it is extra-sensory experience. It is neither completely free from the sense-organs and the mind nor is dependent on them. It is the state which happens between these two.¹

AFFECTIVE STATES—PLEASURE AND PAIN 14.3

We experience the external world through the sense-organs and mind exaggerates it. The qualities of touch, taste, smell and form are original characteristics of an object and the sound is the modification of the object. The sense-organs receive the stimulations and the mind organises and interprets the sense stimulation. The feelings of pleasure and pain are due to the conjunction and separation of the external objects in relation to the sense-organs. These affective states are not pure cognition. Its experiences cannot be had through the unconscious sense-organs. Nor can these feelings be considered to be ignorance or *ajñāna*. The feelings of pleasure and pain are created due to the conjunction of cognition and the external objects.

The pleasure and pain are experienced through the sense-organs and mind. The animals without the possession of mind experience organic sensation and not feelings, while animals who have minds experience sensations as well as feelings. Pleasure and pain cannot be experienced simultaneously. The self experiencing these feelings is not in its pure state and the experience of pure bliss is not to be considered as the experience of feeling. Bliss is the pure state of experience, the soul gets in its pure form. The self-experience cannot be named as self-feeling, it is called as self-realisation.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE ĀGAMAS 14.5

The theory of knowledge in the *āgamas* is very ancient. In the *Rājapraśnīyasūtra*, Keśikumāra śramaṇa explains to Raja Pradeśi the theory of knowledge as presented in the *āgamas*. The *āgama* classify knowledge into five types :


1 *Jñānasāra aṣṭaka* 2, sl. 15.

1. *Ābhinibodhika jñāna* (sense experience)
2. *Śrutajñāna* (indirect knowledge)
3. *Avadhiñāna* (clairvoyance)
4. *Manahparyayañāna* (telepathy)
5. *Kevalajñāna* (omniscience)¹

Keśikumāra Śramaṇa belonged to the Pārśvanātha tradition. The five types of knowledge mentioned in the Pārśvanātha tradition have also been presented by Mahāvīra.²

In the *Uttarādhyaṇa sūtra* there is a dialogue between Keśi and Gautama.³ From this, it is clear that there was no difference of opinion between them regarding the theory of knowledge and metaphysics although there were slight differences regarding the practice. If there were difference regarding metaphysics these would have been mentioned in this discourse. The *Digambara* and *Svetāmbara* traditions have the same theory of 5 types of knowledge, although there is some differences regarding the nature of *kevalajñāna* and *kevaldarśana*.

From the point of view of the development of the theory of knowledge and on the basis of the *āgamic* theory of knowledge we get three stages.⁴ The first stage describes the 5 types of knowledge. It also mentions the distinctions in the *ābhinibodhika jñāna* (sense-experience) into 4 stages like *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*. The first stage gives the following classification of knowledge.



The second stage makes a distinction in the knowledge as *pratyakṣa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect) with its sub-divisions. There is

1 *Rājapraśniya sūtra* 165.


2 *Bhagavati* 88, 2, 317.

3 *Uttarādhyaṇa sūtra*, *adhyaṇa*, 23.

4 Pt. Dalsukh Mālvaṇī, *Āgama yuga kā Jaina Darśana*, p. 129.


5 *Bhagavati* 88, 2, 317.

no place in this for sense-experience as direct knowledge because according to this view direct knowledge is that which is obtained by the soul without the help of sense-organs. The sense-organs are obstructive to the acquisition of knowledge by the soul directly. The knowledge obtained through sense-organs and by other means like reason are considered to be indirect knowledge. The other systems of philosophy considered sense-experience as direct knowledge, but *Sthānāṅga* has made a clear distinction between the direct knowledge obtained by the soul without the medium of the sense-organs and indirect knowledge which is through the sense-organs and other means.¹ *Bhagavatī sūtra* presents the classification of knowledge which is slightly different from the two traditions that we discussed. In this *jñāna* has been distinguished into two types and not the 5 types. And these 2 types are *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. It evidently shows that it is the first stage of the theory of knowledge. *Bhagavatī sūtra* gives the classification of knowledge as shown in the table—



1 *Sthānāṅga* 71.

In the third stage there is a slight modifications in the classification of the types of knowledge. This classification distinguishes the *matijñāna* (sense-experience) into two types as *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. This is considered to be (a) due to sense-organs and (b) due to quasi-sense organs (*no-indriya*). We give below the classifications of (a) the sense organs and (b) due to quasi-sense organs as discussed. According to *Nandi sūtra*,¹ the gist of third stage of knowledge is as following :



The analysis of the theory of knowledge as presented in the three stages gives a picture of knowledge as developed from first to the third stage and graduality imply metaphysical consideration. The

1 Dr. Mohanlal Metha : *Jaina Darśana*, p. 209.

first stage has no metaphysical basis. This is the earliest presentation of the theory of knowledge. It has five divisions of knowledge and *matijñāna* has been distinguished into 4 different stages as *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*. The *Bhagavatī sūtra* carries the tradition of this stage. The second stage introduced metaphysical considerations with reference to the nature of the self. It distinguishes the knowledge into 2 types as *pratyakṣa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect). The later philosophers have followed this distinction. The basis for the distinction between direct and indirect knowledge is to be found in the clarity and certainty on one side and indefiniteness and relative knowledge on the other side. *Pratyakṣa* is the knowledge that the soul gets directly. *Parokṣa* is the knowledge which is acquired through the sense-organs and other indirect media. *Pratyakṣa jñāna* has been distinguished into three types as 1. *avadhi* (clairvoyance) 2. *Manahparyaya* (telepathic cognition) and 3. *kevalajñāna* (omniscience). From the point of view of the certainty and purity of knowledge there is the graduated excellence in the three types of knowledge. *Kevalajñāna* is a pure and project knowledge par excellence. *Abhinibodhika jñāna* and *Śruta jñāna* are *parokṣa* (indirect) knowledge. *Abhinibodhika* is also called *mutijñāna*. *Matijñāna* is knowledge acquired through the contact of the sense-organs and the mind by the soul. *Śrutajñāna* is arrived at through the functions of the mind. *Mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi* and *manahparyaya* have distinctions regarding the nature and the degree of certainty.

The third stage takes into consideration the viewpoints of other systems of Indian philosophy and attempts to correlate the Jaina standpoint with that of the other. The other systems of Indian philosophy consider sense experience as *pratyakṣa* but the Jainas considered it as *parokṣa*. With a view to avoiding ambiguity in the use of the terms the Jainas also adopted the term *pratyakṣa* for sense-experience. But they called it *sāmvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge from the practical point of view). *Nija-pratyakṣa* or *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* is the knowledge which is arrived at not through the sense-organs, but which the self gets directly. *Avadhi*, *manahparyaya* and *kevala* would be *nijapratyakṣa* according to the Jainas. Jinabhadraṇī Kṣamāśramaṇa has elaborated this point in the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*. From

this stand-point the schematisism of the classification of the knowledge would be as follows :

(1) *Avadhi, munaḥparyaya* and *kevala* is *pāramārthika pratyakṣa*.

(2) *Śrutajñāna* is *parokṣa*.

(3) *Indriya-pratyakṣa* (sense-experience) is *parokṣa* from the *pāramārthika* point of view and *pratyakṣa* from the practical point of view.

(4) Knowledge arrived at by the mind only is *parokṣa*.

Ācārya Akalaṅka and some other ācāryas have distinguished *pratyakṣa* into *pāramārthika* and *sāṃvṛtyāvahārika*. The distinction has its basis in the *Nandīsūtra* and *Vīṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*.¹

The *Ābhinibodhika, jñāna* has been distinguished into the four different stages like *avagraha, ihā, avāya* and *dhāraṇā*.

These stages have been scientifically analysed and discussed by the Jaina ācāryas. The mental states like memory (*smaraṇa*) and recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) have been defined with reference to their metaphysical implication by the later ācāryas. But there is not much basis for definition of the concepts like *smaraṇa* and *pratyabhijñā* in the *āgamic* literature. The main cause of this is, that there was not much of logical and metaphysical disputation at the time of *āgamic* literature. But later logicians has to compete with the scholars of other *darśanas* in interpreting their logical and psychological concepts. We may now consider the nature of five types of knowledge and also of memory (*smaraṇa*), *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) and *anumāna* (inference) etc., from the point of view of *pramāṇa* and also from the metaphysical implication.

MATIJJÑĀNA

Matijñāna is sense-experience. It is arrived at with the help of the sense-organs and the *manas* (mind).² In the *āgamic* literature

1 *Vīṣeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya* 95 and its *svopajña vṛtti*.

2 *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 1⁴

matijñāna has also been called *ābhinibodhika jñāna*.¹ *Tattvārtha sūtra*² mentioned equivalent names like *mati*, *smṛti*, *samjñā*, *cintā* and *abhinibhodha*. These words are used synonymously. In the *āvaśyakabhāṣya* the following terms are mentioned as equivalents:—*ihā*, *apoha*, *vimarśa*, *mārgaṇā*, *gaveṣaṇā*, *smṛti*, *mati*, *prajñā* etc.³

Nandīśūtra also uses the same words.⁴ In the *Tattvārtha sūtra svopajñābhāṣya*, a distinction has been made in the *sāmvyāvahārikamatijñāna*, into two types, as (1) *indriyajanya* (sense contact experience) and *anindriyajanya* or *manojanya* (i. e. knowledge born of the contact with the mind alone).⁵ *Siddhasenagaṇī* mentions three forms of *sāmvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* as *indriyajanya*, *anindriyajanya* (*manojanya*) and *indriyānindriyajanya* (born of the contact of the sense-organs and the *manas* both). That knowledge which is born of the sense-organs is *indriyajanya* and the knowledge which arises out of the contact with the mind alone is *anindriyajanya*, while in the case of *indriyānindriyajanya* the mind and the sense-organs function jointly.⁶

INDRIYA (SENSE-ORGANS)

The sense-organs is the distinguishing mark between the living organism and the non-living objects. Some *ācāryas* like *Pūjyapāda* has used the terminology and analyses the meaning of the word *indriya*. The etymological meaning of the word would be one who has power and wealth—*indratīti indraḥ*. But here the word *indra* refers to the *ātman*. Knowledge is possible through the means of *indriya*. According to this the meaning would be knowledge of the essence of the *ātman* through the medium of the *Indriya*. Similarly, the word

1 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 28, 4

(b) *Nandīśūtra*, sūtra 59, *Puṇyavijayajī*-ed, p. 25.

2 *Tattvārtha sūtra* 1, 13.

3 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* 396.

4 *Nandīśūtra* sūtra 77, Ed. *Puṇyavijayajī*, p. 27

5 *Tattvārthabhāṣya* 1, 14

6 *Tattvārthasūtra ṭīkā* 1, 14.

Indra has a reference to activity.¹ It means that the *ātman* has the natural characteristic of activity, but due to the accretion of *karma* the self cannot get direct knowledge. Therefore, it requires a medium and that medium is the sense-organ. Therefore, that through the medium or which the self gets the knowledge is called *indriya*. There are five sense-organs, the sense organ of touch (*sparsa*), the sense-organ of taste, the sense-organ of smell, the sense-organ of sight, the sense-organ of hearing. The five sense-organs have the five senses : Senses of touch, taste, smell, form and hearing. Therefore, these sense-organs have been considered as receptive of the stimulation. They are the means through which experiences are the possible.

1. The sense-organ receiving the stimulation of touch—the sense of touch.

2. The sense-organ of taste has sense of taste.

3. The sense-organ of smell has the sense of smell.

4. The sense-organ of form has (*rūpa*) the sense of sight (eyes).

5. The sense organ of receiving sound has the sense of hearing.²

Every sense-organ has two forms (1) physical sense-organ (*dravyendriya*) and (2) psychic sense-organs (*bhāvendriya*).³ The *dravyendriya* is expressed in the form of a sense-organ with its basic material form like the retina in the eyes or the ear for hearing.

The physical part of the sense-organs, therefore, is called *Dravyendriya* and the psychic part of the sense is *bhāvyendriya*. The physical part of the sense-organs is created by the rise of the corresponding *nāmakarma*, the psychical part of the sense-organ is caused by the destruction and subsidence of knowledge obscuring *karma* (*jñānāvarṇīya karma*). *Dravyendriya* is again sub-divided into (1) *nirvṛtti* and

1 (a) *Sarvārthasiddhi* 1, 14, 10², 3 *Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha*.

(b) *Rajavārtika* 1, 14, 1, 5^o *Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha*.

(c) *Dhavalā* 1, 1, 1, 33; 7, 2, 6, 7.

(d) *Jainendra Siddhāntakoṣa* Part I, p. 316.

2 *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 2, 21-23.

3 *Sarvārthasiddhi* 2, 16, 179.

(2) *upakaraṇa*.¹ *Nirvṛtti* is the organ itself and *upakaraṇa* is the protective physical cover like the eyelid in the case of the eye. Each of these two is again sub-divided into *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga*. *Bhāven-driya* has its distinction from the point of view of its *upayoga*. *Bhāven-driya* is a psychic part of the organ, it is also divided into two parts *labdhi* and *upayoga*.² *Labdhi* is the manifestation of the specific sense-experience due to the destruction and subsidence of the knowledge obscuring *karma*. It may be referred to as the removal of psychic impediment which have to be eliminated if sense-experience is to be made possible. *Upayoga* is the psychic force determining the specific sense-experience coming out of the contact of the specific sense-organs with the object of stimulation. Thus the Jainas make a distinction between the physical structure and the psychical element involved in the sense-organs. Jainas have given a detailed analysis of the structure of the sense-organ.

PROCESS OF SENSE EXPERIENCE


The development of the sense-organs is not uniform in all the animals. There are gradations in the animals according to the number of sense-organs possessed by them. We have one-sensed organism two-sensed organisms, three-sensed, four-sensed, and five-sensed organisms according to the number of sense organ they possess. Similarly, the size of the sense-organs and its capacity to experience may also vary with different animals. The capacity of sense-experience determines the different gradations of animals. Therefore, it can be said that *labdhi* (the capacity) is the basic factors for the distinction between different sense-organs and their function. Without *labdhi*, *nirvṛtti*, *upakaraṇa* and *upayoga* cannot exist.

Next to *Labdhi* comes *nirvṛtti* as an important factor in the function of the sense-organs. Thus, we find that it is possible to have *upakaraṇa* in the absence of *upayoga*, *nirvṛtti* in the absence of *upakaraṇa* and *labdhi* in the absence of *nirvṛtti*. But it is not possible to have

1 *Tattvārthasūtra* 2, 17.

2 *Tattvārthasūtra* 2, 18.

the functions as it is not possible to have *nirvṛtti* without *labdhi* and *upakaraṇa* without *nirvṛtti* and *upayoga* without *upakaraṇa*. We give below the table of the functions of the sense organs :



MIND (MANAS)

Each organ is different. One sense-organ can not receive the stimulation connected with other sense-organs. It requires a subtle sense-organ which is called, mind. Mind grasps the sense stimulation of all the sense-organs. Therefore, it is called *sarvārthagrāhī*.¹ It is a quasi-sense-organ because, it is very subtle. It is sometimes called *anindriya* because of its subtlety and not because the absence of the sense-organ. The function of mind, which is inner-organ is knowing and thinking. The Jaina theory of mind, as developed by the Jaina ācāryas, is a theory in which mind and nature are regarded as different in kind and as sharply separated and opposed. The analysis of the Jaina theory of mind shows there has been a conflict between the metaphysical and psychological approaches to the problems. It is predominantly a realistic approach. The mind and its state are analysed at empirical level.² The mind recollects the past impressions, grasps the present stimulations and imagines the future. Therefore, it is also referred to apprehending impressions of the long periods (*dīrghakālikā samjñā*). Jaina āgamic literature mentions the word *samjñā* with reference to the *manas* and the animals which possess mind have been called *samjñī*. The functions of the mind can be analysed as (1) analysis of the meaning of the impression-*īhā*, (2) *Apoha*-determination, (3) *mārgaṇā*-analysis and discrimination, (4) *gaveṣaṇā*-

1 *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 2, 24.

2 Kalghatgi (T. G.) : *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology* (Karnataka University, Dharwar) 1961, p. 17.

discrimination and distinctions, (5) *cintā*—obstructions and thinkings about the how and the why, (6) *Vimarśa* - analysis and appreciation. These constitutes the characteristics of *saṃjñā* and the organism, who possesses the characteristics is called *Samjñī*, i. e. having mind.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MIND

That through which we think, is mind. We may distinguish two types of substances in this world—(1) Substances having form and (2) Substances without form. The sense-organs are substances with form and they grasp the present stimulations only. Mind is a substance without form, and it grasps the present impressions, recollects the past impressions and imagines of the future ideas. Therefore, it has a reference to the past, present and the future.¹ The mind also, like the *indriyas* has a reference to the material aspect in connection with the psychic force. Therefore, mind is distinguished into two phases—(1) the physical mind and the (2) psychic mind (*dravya manas* and *bhāva manas*). In the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya*, we get a description of the two phases of the mind. The material mind may be called the mental structure. It is composed of infinite, fine and coherent particles of the mind meant for the function of the mind. It is further described as a collection of fine particles, which are meant for exciting thought-processes due to the yoga arising out of the contact with the *jīva* with the body.² In the *Gommaṭasāra jīvakāṇḍa* there is a description of the material mind as produced in the heart from the coming together of mind molecules like a full blown lotus with eight petals.³ The material composition of the mind consists of the subtle particles of matter which are called *manovargaṇās*. Therefore, it is different from the *ātman* and the *ajīva* (non-living substance).⁴

1 *Jainatarkabhāṣā*—*manah sarvendriya-pravartakaṃ, āntarendriyaṃ svasaṃyogena bāhyendriyanugrahakaṃ. ataeva sarvopalabdhi kāraṇaṃ.*

2 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* 3525 A. Ma and Abhidhāna rājendra Vol. p. 4 comm.

3 *Gommaṭasāra* : *jīva kāṇḍa*. verse 443.

4 *Bhagavati* 13, 7, 494 *ātā bhante maṇe anne maṇe ? Goyamā, ṇo ātā maṇe anne maṇe maṇijjamāṇe.....maṇe.*

The *bhāva manas* is the psychic function of the mind. It is the result of the activities of the *dravya manas*. It is expressed in mental processes like thinking. In this sense, *bhāvamanas* is sometimes identified with self, because it is a thinking self. Therefore, the self is both *manas* and not-*manas*, in the sense it is a thinking self and the psychic function is a quality of the self. The *bhāvamanas* is not therefore entirely distinct from the activity of the self, it is referred to as belonging to the activity of the self.¹ As we said earlier, *bhāvamanas* has two functions—*labdhi* and *upayoga*. First is the mental set and the second is the activity of the mind.

Dhavalā refers to the mind quasi-active (*nokarma*). The *dravya manas* is the result of the operation of certain forms of *nāmakarma*, while *bhāvamanas* is due to the destruction and subsidence of the *antarāyakarma* and the *no-indriya-karma*. The mind in its undeveloped form (*aparyāpta*) consists of the material particles which are yet to cohere. Therefore, in this state the developed psychic functions are absent.²

FUNCTIONS OF MIND

The function of mind, which is the inner organ, is knowing and thinking. *Sihānāṅga* describes it a *saṃkalpa vyāpāravati*. It is also referred to as *cittamanovijñāna*. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* defines *manas* in terms of mental processes.³ The mind grasps the sense-impressions received through the sense-organs.⁴ The mind gets knowledge for us through the sense-organs. But in all forms of knowledge, it is not necessary to have the instrument of sense-organs. The sense-knowledge is through the sense-organs and it is limited to the stimulations coming through the objects in this empirical world. But mind can also have its own function without the stimulation received through the sense-organs. They are knowledge through the mind only. It is *n.ānojanya*. Such psychic functions of the mind can be mentioned as *thā* (integration),

1 *Sūtrakṛtāṅgā vṛtti* 1, 12

2 *Dhavalā*, sūtra 36, p. 130

3 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* 3523

4 *Caraka sūtrasthāna* 1, 20.

avāya (association), *dhāraṇā* (retention), *smṛti* (memory), *pratyabhijñā* (recognition), *tarka* (implication), *anumāna* (inference) and *āgama* (knowledge from testimony).

PLACE OF MIND

The *Vaiśeṣikas*,¹ *Naiyyayikas*² and *Mīmāṃsakas*³ have considered mind as atomic in nature. Therefore, mind is not considered to be eternal, in its causes. *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga* and *Vedānta* *dr̥ṣṇa* consider mind to be a product of *prakṛti* and *ahaṃkāra* and is atomic in nature.⁴ It is due to *avidyā*. According to the Jainas and the Buddhists the mind is neither pervasive nor atomic in nature, it is *madhyama parimāṇa*. It is finite in its extension. *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* and the Buddhist philosophers consider mind as emanating from the heart.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist systems consider that the *manas* is in the heart. According to the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* and *Vedānta* the place of the heart is all pervasive in the body because it is in the *sūkṣma śarīra* (gross).⁵ According to Jainism, *bhāva-manas* is in the *ātman*, but regarding the place of the *dravya-manas*, there is no agreement. The Digambara tradition maintains that the place of the *dravya-manas* is in the heart, while *svetāmbara* tradition does not give any specific inclination about this. Paṇḍit Sukhalāl says that the *svetāmbara* tradition maintains that the *dravya-manas* is all-pervasive in the body.⁶ Although it is difficult to determine the exact location of the *manas* in the body, atleast there must be some centres of mind through which the mental function takes place. It may be located partly in the brain and functioning through the sense-organs.

The sense-organs are functioning in one direction only, because these are receptive and they are functioning in particular part of the

1 *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* 7, 1, 23

2 *Nyāyasūtra* 3, 2, 61

3 *Prakaraṇa* p. 151

4 *Māṭhara kārīkā* 27

5 *Yogaśāstra* 5, 2

6 *Darśan aur Cintana*, p. 140 (Hindi)

body. But from the point of view of psychic energy the sense-organs function in the pervasive way. The function of the sense-organs depends on the subsidence and destruction of the *kārmic* matter which gives rise to the removal of the obscurations connected with the point of sense-experience. This is all-pervasive in the body.¹ From the point of view of grasping and understanding the subject, *manas* can be considered pervasive of the body.

EXISTENCE OF THE *MANAS*

Different philosophers have given arguments for the existence of the *manas*. The *Nyāyasūtra* says that we can infer the existence of the *manas* because without *manas*, knowledge is not possible.² *Vātsyāyana* says that the *manas* can be proved because certain mental functions like memory and cognition are not possible to be obtained through the sense-organs only.³ *Annambhaṭṭa* says that mental states like pleasure are possible through the medium of *manas*.⁴ Jainas⁵ maintain that mental states like doubt, dream-cognition, pleasure and pain and connotive activity are not possible without the medium of *manas*.

We may now analyse the different stages of *avagraha*, *īhā*, *dhār-āṇā*, *avāya* as stages of sense-perception.

AVAGRAHA

Avagraha is a sensational stage where there is an awareness of the object without cognising the specific nature of the object.⁶ It only presents the general characteristic of the object in cognition. We cannot, in this, know the specific details about the nature of the object. This is the stage which may be considered to be the stage of sensation following the stage of *darśana* in the sense of the threshold of consciousness. In the *avagraha* we do not really get the general characteristics of the

1 *Nyāya sūtra* 1, 1, 16.

2 *Vātsyāyana bhāṣya* 1, 1, 16

3 *Tarkasaṅgraha*

4 *Sanmatiprakaraṇa ṭīkā kāṇḍa* 2

5 *Bhagavati* 1, 3.

6 *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 1, 26

object, but only the awareness of the object that we get.¹ In this sense, it would be different to make *avagraha* as determinate cognition coming after *darśana*. In that case *darśana* will become mere species of the *jñāna* and it would be reduced to mere sensation. The higher forms of *darśana* like the *kevaladarśana* would be meaningless.

Avagraha is therefore the stage of sensation. It is the first stage of experience. It is the given, it does not involve the stage of *darśana* which is qualitatively different from *jñāna*. *Avagraha* is a species of *jñāna*. It is immediate experience.

STAGES IN THE *AVAGRAHA* २१.२,

Avagraha has been considered to be the stage of consideration. This has been further distinguished into 2 stages : (1) *vyāñjana avagraha* and (2) *artha avagraha*.² *Vyāñjanāvagraha* is the earlier stage. In the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, we get the description of the *vyāñjanāvagraha*. It is a physiological stimulus condition of the sensation. It is only the reaction of the sense-organs and the object in the form of sense stimulations.³ In the *Nandīśūtra*, we get the example of the earthen pot and the drops of water. It gives a description of the stage of *vyāñjanāvagraha*. A clay pot is to be filled with water. In the beginning when water is poured, a portion of the water is absorbed by the pot. And there is no sign of the existence of the water. If we go on pouring the water again, at a certain stage the water will be visible. Then the water begins to accumulate. The stage when the water begins to be visible in the threshold of saturation. The drops of water below the threshold get absorbed in the pot. Similarly, a person who is asleep receives the sound stimulation continuously for sometime. The sound atoms reach the ear. Innumerable instances have to occur before the ear becomes conscious of the sound. So far he was not aware of the sound although the auditory stimulations were pouring in. We may call this, the stage of first awareness, "the threshold of awareness." The sound sensation begins to be experienced the moment

1 *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1, 15, 111

2 (a) *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 17-18

(b) *Dhavalā* 1, 1, 1, 115, 354, 7.

3 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 191, 193.

the threshold is crossed. That stage is *arthāvagraha*. *Arthāvagraha* is the experience of sensation, while *vyāñjanāvagraha* is the earlier stage of physiological stimulus condition. The *Nandīsūtra* has beautifully explained this point in the example given above. The illustration is called *mallaka dīṣṭānta*.¹ *Vyāñjanāvagraha* is a condition of *arthāvagraha*, which is the stage of sensation.² The presence of *vyāñjanāvagraha* may be admitted as a condition of *arthāvagraha* although it is explicit not because of its undeveloped existence.³

Avagraha has also been distinguished from the logical point of view as *vyāvahārika avagraha* and *naisargika avagraha*. *Naisargika avagraha* grasps as the generality without distinction. But *vyāvahārika avagraha* experiences the generality with the distinctions implicit. *Avagraha* has been described with some equivalent expressing its modes like *avagrahaṇatā*, *upadhāraṇatā*, *śravaṇatā*, *avalambanatā* and *medhā*.⁴ *Tattvārthabhāṣya* mentions the following synonymous terms like *avagraha*, *graha*, *grahaṇa*, *ālocana* and *avdhāraṇa*.⁵ *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* mentions the following as the equivalents, *avagraha*, *avadhāna*, *sāna*, *avalambanā* and *medhā*.⁶

Avagraha is the sensational stage and that does not give the knowledge of the nature of the object. It only gives awareness of that and does not explain the 'what'. The complete psychosis of perceptual cognition would be possible when we experience the other three stages of perceptual process than *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*. In this sense, our empirical experience will not complete with *avagraha*. *Avagraha* is not self-sufficient. *Arthāvagraha* is mere sensation which lasts only for only one instance. It immediately transforms itself into more specific cognition, i. e., *īhā*.

1 *Nandīsūtra* 34

2 *Jaina tarkabhāṣā*, p. 3,

3 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya* 196.

4 *Nandīsūtra* 51 p. 22, Puṇyavijayajī.

5 *Tattvārtha bhāṣya* 1, 15.

6 *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* 13, 5. 5 sūtra 37 p. 242

IĪHĀ

IĪhā is the second stage of *Matijñāna*. In it one cognises the nature of the sensation like the sound. *Nandīsūtra* gives synonyms of *iĪhā* : *ābhogaṇatā*, *mārgaṇatā*, *gaveṣaṇatā*, *cintā* and *vimarśa*.¹ Umāsvāti gives the synonyms as *ūha*, *tarka*, *vicāraṇā* and *jijñāsā*.²

Vyañjanāvagraha is the potential condition of awareness. *Arthāvagraha* is the dawning of the awareness. *IĪha* is the tendency towards cognising the specific features of the object. *IĪha* has been very often translated as speculation. But it would be more appropriate to use the word associative integration.

The Jainas thought that, as *IĪha* is striving for determinate and specific cognition, it is possible to confuse it with doubt (*samśaya*). But *iĪhā* shou'd not be confused with doubt (*samśaya*) although it does involve a striving towards the determinate knowledge. In the case of doubt, the alternatives are equally pressing and they are not certain, which is to be accented. But in *iĪhā* there is a tendency to determinate cognition. *IĪhā* is the mental state in which there is striving for the ascertainment of truth. It leads to the acceptance of the true and the avoidance of the untrue.³ Siddhasena Divākara also draws the same line of distinction between *iĪhā* and *samśaya*. For instance, on receiving a sense impression of sound, there arises a doubt, whether the sound comes from the cunch or horn. The mind is driven to consider the specific points of agreement and difference. The sound is perceived as a sweet and an agreeable. This quality is attributed to the sound of the cunch and not at the horn. In the *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* it is said that doubt crops up in the interval between sensation (*avagraha*) and associative integration (*iĪhā*), even when the object is the matter of habitual perception. But the existence of the state of doubt is not easily detected owing to the rapidity of succession of mental event.⁴

1 *Nandīsūtra* 52

2 *Ibid* 31

3 *Tattvārthasūtra bhāṣya* 1, 15

4 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya* 1, 83-84.

5 *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 1, 27

AVĀYA

The third factor in *matijñāna* is *avāya*. From the stage of associated integration (*ihā*) we come to the stage of interpretation. The sensations of interpreted and the meaning is assigned to the organisation of sensation. *Fhā* is integration of the sensations, *avāya* interpretes and determines the meaning of the sensation.¹ In *avāya* there is a definite determination about the meaning of the perception. In this we come to the judgement about the nature of the object. This is therefore called perceptual judgement, still it is non-verbal. *Avāyakaniryukti* defines *avāya* as determinate cognition.² In the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, we get the description of *avāya* as cognition of the true notion of the object through cognition of particular characteristics.³ Umāsvāti says that *upagma*, *upanoda*, *apavyādha*, *apeta*, *apaviddha*, *apanuta* and *apagata* are synonyms of *avāya*. They mean the determinate cognition.⁴ *Nandīsūtra* gives *āvartanatā*, *pratyāvartanatā*, *buddhi*, *viññāna* as synonyms.⁵ *Tattvārtha bhāṣya* describes *avāya* as the stage of ascertainment of right and exclusion of wrong.⁶ For example, on hearing sound, a person determines that the sound must be of a crouch and not of a horn, because it is sweet and not hard. This type of ascertainment of the existing specific features of the object is called *avāya* and it involves perceptual judgement.

Some Jaina logicians say that *avāya* has only a negative function. In this stage of experience there is only the exclusion of non-existing qualities. They ascribe the cognition of the existing quality to a later stage of experience called *dhāraṇā*. But Jinabhadra says that the view is not correct. Because *avāya* does not merely perform the negative function of excluding non-existing qualities. But it also determines the existing characteristics. Umāsvāti agrees with this view. Pūjapāda says that *avāya* cognises specific features of the objects cognised in the

1 *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1, 1, 28.

2 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya*, 1, 79.

3 *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1, 15.

4 *Tattvārthasūtra bhāṣya*, 1, 15.

5 *Nandīsūtra*, 53.

6 *Tattvārthasūtra bhāṣya*, 1, 15.

stage of *ihā*, in the final determination of the objects. *Avāya* can be used to be perceptual judgement and it can be compared to the apperception involved in the perceptual experience. But *avāya* need not be the final determination of the specific feature of the objects as it is the perceptual judgement. Therefore, in this characteristic of the describing the *avāya* the two traditions concerning the negative or the positive function of *avāya* are in agreement.¹

DHĀRAṆĀ

Dhāraṇā is retention. It is essential of the perceptual experience. *Nandisūtra* defines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual judgement for the number of instances or innumerable instances. It gives *sthāpanā* and *pratiṣṭhā* as synonyms of *dhāraṇā*.² Umāsvāti defines *dhāraṇā* as the final determination of the object, retention of the cognition thus formed, and recognition of the object on future occasions. According to Umāsvāti retention develops through three stages : (1) nature of the object is finally cognised, (2) the cognition so formed is retained, and (3) the object is recognised on future occasions. *Āvaśyakaniryukti* defines *dhāraṇā* as retention. Jinabhadra says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition. Pūjyapāda Devanandi defines *dhāraṇā* as a condition of the absence of forgetting the what has been cognised by perceptual judgement, by *avāya*.³ Akalaṅka says that it is the absence of forgetting what has been cognised by perceptual judgement.⁴ Some logicians like Vādideva do not accept *dhāraṇā* as a condition of recall on a future occasion. Thus we find that some logicians make *dhāraṇā* merely retention of perceptual experience, while some others make it also the condition of recall, of that experience on a future occasion. Hemacandra reconciles his views of retention and the condition of recall with the view of retention as the absence of the lapse mentioned in *Vīṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*. He says that retention is

1 Dr. Mohanlal Metha : *Jaina Darśana*.

2 *Nandisūtra*, sūtra, 54.

3 *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1, 15.

4 *Tattvārtharājavārtika*.

the absence of the lapse of perception, but it is included in the perceptual judgement.

The analysis of the perceptual experience shows that it involves the four stages of the development of the perceptual experience. The concrete psychosis does involve all these four stages of perceptual experience.

Dhāraṇā has been distinguished into three types : (1) *avichuti* in which there is the retention for a long time and it is not washed away. (2) *Vāsana*—It is the psychic condition of *dhāraṇā* after it ceases to function as *dhāraṇā*. This may be compared to the disposition that modern psychology uses. Dispositions are responsible for giving recollection. (3) *Anusmaraṇa* is a mental condition which arises out of *dhāraṇā* and which retains the effects of *dhāraṇā*. It will facilitate recollection. This may be compared to the engram complexes described in modern psychology. *Nandīsūtra* gives the following synonyms of *dhāraṇā*—*dharaṇā*, *dhāraṇā*, *sīhāpanā*, *pratiṣṭhā* and *koṣṭha*. *Umāsvāti* mentions *pratipatti*, *avadhāraṇā*, *avasthāna*, *niścaya*, *avagama* and *avabodha* as synonyms.²

We have so far seen that *matijñāna* is experienced through the stages of four factors like *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya*, and *dhāraṇā*. *Avagraha* has been distinguished into two types : *vyañjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha*. *Vyañjanāvagraha* is of four types, the sense of touch, taste, smell and hearing. *Vyañjana* has three different meanings (1) *śabda* etc, *pudgala dravya*. (2) *upakaraṇa indriya* (accessory material) and (3) *viśaya* and *upakaraṇa* conjunction i. e., the contact between the object and sense-organs. *Vyañjanāvagraha* is implicit awareness or apter to say that it is the threshold of awareness. The sense-organ of sight (the eyes) and the quasi-sense organ of mind are *aprāpyakārī* as there is no contact with the object and these sense-organs. And therefore, *vyañjanāvagraha* is not possible in these cases to experiences.

The Buddhist consider the sense-organ of hearing also as *aprāpyakārī*. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* do not consider the eyes and the *manas* as *aprāpyakārī*.

1 *Nandīsūtra*, 54 and 55

2 *Tativārthabhāṣya* 1, 15

From the scientific point of view the eyes and the *manas* do not come into contact by physical contact with the object of stimulation. The eye is considered to be a sensitive lense which receives stimulations sent by the objects, through the rays of light. The image of the object is formed on the retina and the mind consolidates it by interpreting the stimulations so received. Therefore, that the Jaina view that the mind and the sense-organs of eye are *aprāpaykāri*, is consistent with the modern scientific analysis, of the visual perception.

The four distinctions in *matijñāna* as mentioned above are *avagraha* (with its division *vyāñjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha*) *īha*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*. They have been further divided into different types : five sense-organs plus the *manas*. These six have the four stages of *matijñāna*. i.e. they are 24. The sense-organs except the eyes and *manas* have *vyāñjanāvagraha*. Therefore, they are 4 so the total would be $24+4=28$. According to the *Śvetāmbara* tradition, each type of cognitive experience is further sub-divided into 12 types like (1) *bahu* (many) (2) *bahubidha* (different types) (3) *alpa* (less) (4) *alpavidha* (less intense) (5) *kṣipra* (quick) (6) *akṣipra* (slow) (7) *aniścita* (interminate) (8) *niścita* (determinate) (9) *asandigdha* (definite) (10) *sandigdha* (indefinite) (11) *dhruva* (certain) (12) *adhruva* (uncertain). The *bahu* means many and *alpa* means one. The cognition of many objects is *bahugrāhī* and the cognition of one object is *alpagrāhī*. The cognition of many types of object is *bahuvīdhagrāhī*. The cognition of one type of object is *alpavidhagrāhī*. The relation between *bahu* and *alpa* has a reference to the number and the reference between the *bahuvīdha* and *alpavidha* has reference to the types. *Śīghra* (quick cognition) is called *kṣipra* and that knowledge which is not quick is considered to be *akṣipra*. The cognition which has been obtained without any motive is called *aniścita*. And that cognition which has been obtained due to certain motives and based on the previous cognition is called *niścita*. *Niścita* (definite) cognition is certain (*asandigdha*) and the indefinite knowledge is *sandigha*. *Avagraha* and *īhā* can also be distinguished on the basis of the criterion of indefiniteness. In these cognitions, there is the awareness of the object. But the specific nature is not determined. The cognition which arises out of the

definite stimulations (*avaśyambhāvī*) is certain (*dhruva*). But that cognition which arises casually undefined stimulations is uncertain (*adhruva*).¹ Out of the 12 types of cognition that we have seen, the 4 have reference to the object and the remaining have a reference to the subject cognising the aspect.

The *Digambara* tradition gives the classification of the distinction of the *matijñāna* with slight variation. According to the *Digambara* tradition *nīścita* and *anīścita* cognition have been considered and named *anīhśṛta* and *nīhśṛta*. *Anīhśṛta* cognition apprehends the stimulations partly and in the *nīhśṛta* cognition, we have the apprehension of the stimulations tully. In this sense the *Digambara* tradition also used the forms *anukta* (inexpressed) and *ukta* (expressed) in place of *asundigdha* and *sandigdha*. The *anukta* implies cognition through opinion and *ukta* implies cognition through the words.²

There are 336 kinds of *matijñāna*. These are obtained by multiplying 28 (as previously described) kinds with these 12 types, i. e., $28 \times 12 = 336$. There is light difference regarding the names of these in *Svetāmbara* tradition also.

ŚRUTAJÑĀNA

Śrutajñāna is knowledge obtained through discursive reasoning subsequent to *matijñāna*. It is necessary to have use of language for the *śrutajñāna*. In the case of *matī* the hearing of words is implicit, but when the words are uttered the meaning of the two words are remembered. *Matijñāna* in this sense expresses the potentiality of the meaning as implied in the stimulations of the word. But in the case of *śrutajñāna* knowledge arises due to the explicit expression of the meaning signified by the word. In this sense *śrutajñāna* would not be possible without *matijñāna*. The *śrutajñāna* would be possible when the *kārmic* matter obscuring the *śrutajñāna* is removed. This is the internal cause of the *śrutajñāna*. The external condition of *śrutajñāna* is *matijñāna*. This is because even if we have sense knowledge

1 *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 16

2 (a) *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1, 16.

(b) *Rājavārtika* 1, 16.

it may be not possible to have knowledge through discursive reasoning as in the case of *śrutajñāna*, because the *kārmic* encrustations obscuring the *śrutajñāna* are still operative. This may be interpreted as that unless the mental set is formed and psychic impediments are removed *śrutajñāna* is not possible.

In the early *āgamic* literature *śrutajñāna* has been considered to be knowledge through the scriptures. It is knowledge obtained through the scriptures given by the authorities (*Āptapuruṣa*) and also the knowledge obtained through the words of omniscient. There are two types of *śrutajñāna*—*aṅgapraviṣṭa* and *aṅgabāhya*. *Aṅgapraviṣṭa* is of 12 types and *aṅgabāhya* has many types.

Aṅgapraviṣṭa śrutajñāna may be referred to as knowledge obtained through the scriptures given to us in a codified form by the *gaṇadharas* of *tīrthaṅkara*. *Tīrthaṅkaras* have taught the doctrines. This is *arthaśruta*. While the *gaṇadharas* have codified and presented in the form of *śāstras*. This is *arthaśrutī*. Due to the deduction in age and the ability to grasp, the *ācāryas* in a later stage, wrote books explaining the knowledge contained in the *āgamas* on various subjects. This is *aṅgabāhyaśruta*. In this, original meaning was given by the *Tīrthaṅkaras*. This is *aṅgapraviṣṭa*. Later the meanings are elaborated by the elder *ācāryas* it is called *Aṅgabāhya*. The *aṅgabāhya* literature has various divisions like *kālīka* and *utkālīka* etc. The detailed description about this have been given in our work entitled *Jaina Sāhitya aur Saṁskṛti*. The *śrutajñāna* is primarily concerned with knowledge and the literature is called *śruta* because it gives knowledge.

Ācārya Bhadrabāhu has stated that there are various distinctions in the *śrutajñāna* based on the words and their permutations. It is not possible to give the elaborate description of the permutations of the words. However, we can mention 14 types of *śrutajñāna*: (1) *akṣara* (2) *anakṣara*, (3) *saṁjñī*, (4) *asaṁjñī*, (5) *samyak*, (6) *mīthyā*, (7) *sādika*, (8) *anādika*, (9) *saparyavasita*, (10) *aparyavasita*, (11) *gamika*, (12) *agamika*, (13) *aṅgapraviṣṭa* and (14) *aṅgabāhya*.

1 *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 20

2 *Āgama Sāhitya : ek Paryavekṣaṇa*, p. 1-54, Pub. Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan, Varanasi-1.

The fourteen types of *śrutajñāna* can be classified into different parts on the basis of the nature of the *śrutajñāna* (i) *akṣara śruta*—it has three sub-divisions—(i) *saṃjñākṣara* referring to the form of the letter (word) (ii) *vyañjanākṣara*—sound of the letter, it is pertaining to phoneticism (iii) *labdhyakṣara*—referring to the psychological maturation or the mental set of expressing the word. *Saṃjñākṣara* and *vyañjanākṣara* are considered to be *dravya śruta*, because they are concerned with the expression of the *śruta*, while *labdhyakṣara* is considered to be *bhāvaśruta*, because it is psychological in nature.

Coughing, respiration and sneezing are *anakṣara śruta* because they do not involve the expression of any letter.

Saṃjñā is of three types, therefore those possessing *saṃjñā* are also classified into three types. It is called *saṃjñī śruta* and is of three types : (1) *dīrghakālikī*—it covers the past, present and the future ideas. (2) *hetūpadeśikī*—in this we are primarily concerned with the thinking about the present circumstances with its consequences. (3) *drṣṭivādupadeśikī*—in this there is a right understanding and also the comprehension of the various aspects of the thing. Those who have these *saṃjñās* are called *saṃjñī* and those who do not possess these *saṃjñās* are called *asaṃjñīs*.

Asaṃjñīs are of three types : (1) those who cannot think of the future and cannot have the perspective regarding the long duration of time are the first type of *asaṃjñī*. (2) those who possess slight mental activity, although they are having mind are called *amanaskasaṃjñī* and they are of the second type. (3) Those who are possessed of perversity of attitude are the third type of *asaṃjñī*.

The *śrutajñāna* which comprises of the knowledge of the twelve *aṅgas* as presented by the *Tīrthaṅkara* and is called *samyakśruta*. And that knowledge which is contrary and which does not contain the knowledge presented by the *Tīrthaṅkaras* is called *mithyāśruta*.

That knowledge which has the beginning and which starts at a particular time is called *sādhika śruta*. And that knowledge which has no beginning and which are eternal truths is called *anādhika śruta*. The *śrutajñāna* may be considered to be *anādhika* from the point of

view of substance of knowledge and *sādhika* from the point of view of its modes.

That knowledge which comes to an end is called *saparyavasita*. And that which cannot be destroyed and which is eternal is called *aparyavasita śrutajñāna*. In this distinction also the criteria of points of view of substance and modes is operative.

That *śrutajñāna* which is comprised of the similarity of teaching is called *gamikaśruta* and that in which there is no harmony and similarity is called *agamika śruta*. We have already explained the distinction between the *aṅgapraviṣṭa* and the *aṅgabāhya śruta*.

MATIJÑĀNA AND ŚRUTAJÑĀNA

It is necessary to understand the relation between *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* in certain respects. Every empirical individuals (*samsārī jīvas*) has *matī* and *śrutajñānas*. But the question is regarding the upper limit of the possession of these two forms of knowledge in an individual. A question has been raised whether on the attainment of the *kevalajñāna*, there still remains *matijñāna* and does *śrutajñāna* operative. On this question, there is a controversy. Some Jaina scholars say that on the attainment of the *kevalajñāna* (omniscience), there is no place for *matī* and *śrutajñāna*, because (1) *matī* and *śrutajñāna* are obtained due to partial destruction and subsidence of the *jñānāvaraṇīyakarma*, and (2) in the case of the *kevalajñāna* all the four *kar-mas* have been destroyed. But some other scholars maintain that on the attainment of the *kevalajñāna* the *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* are not obliterated. They are still present and operative although the effect is negligible and unascertainable. Just as in the bright sunshine, the light of the stars and the planet is not clearly visible and is dim because it is merged in the light of the sun. So also, the effect of the *matijñāna* and the *śrutajñāna* are not discernible in the light of the *kevalajñāna*. The second view appears to be consistent with Jaina stand point.¹

Śrutajñāna is described as the knowledge accompanied by the expression in words and significant with meaning. *Matijñāna* is know-

1 Mohanlal Mehta : *Jaina darśana*, p. 229.

ledge which generally precedes *śrutajñāna* and is not accompanied by *śrutajñāna*. *Matijñāna* is of two types : *sābhilāpa* and *anābhilāpa*. But *śrutajñāna* is only of *sābhilāpa* type.¹ *Arthāvagraha* is not *sābhilāpa* while all other forms of *matijñāna* are *sābhilāpa*. *Śrutajñāna* is *sābhilāpa* but it should be noted that only *sābhilāpa jñāna* is not *śrutajñāna*. Because, knowledge which used words cannot be considered as *śrutajñāna*.² The knowledge which uses words is meant for others (*parārtha*) and it is meant to communicate the knowledge to the other individuals. It is used for explaining to others by means of language. *Matijñāna* can also be *sākṣara* as it uses certain expressions, but it is not meant for the sake of others and it does not serve the purpose of communicating to others. *Śrutajñāna* on the contrary is *sākṣara* and also it is primarily concerned with use of language for expressing the thoughts and experiences.³

The function of *matijñāna* is to experience the sensory experiences like touch, taste, smell, form, and sound and also to give meaning to these experiences. The function of *śrutajñāna* is to comprehend the meaning of these experiences to the use of words and sentences and to communicate to others. Therefore, *mati* is considered as *arthajñāna* and *śruta* as *śabdārthajñāna*.

The relation of *mati* and *śruta* is that of the cause and the effect. *Matijñāna* is the cause and *śrutajñāna* is the effect. *Śrutajñāna* is that knowledge which gives meaning through the use of the language and based on the memory. *Śrutajñāna* gives the possibility of acquiring meaning to the word and that meaning is retained after the knowledge is obtained. First, there is *matijñāna* through the stages of *avagraha*, etc. and then we get *Śrutajñāna*.

Dravyaśruta becomes the effect of the *matijñāna* (pertaining to the hearing sense-organ) but *bhāva śruta* cannot be the effect of *matijñāna* and therefore according to this viewpoint *śrutajñāna* is considered the effect of *matijñāna*. From another point of view *dravya śruta*

1 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya vṛtti* 100

2 *Ibid* 170.

3 (a) *Anuyogaadvāra* 2

(b) *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya vṛtti* 100

is not the consequence of the sense of hearing but it becomes the subject. This is because, knowledge is obtained through language; but language itself is not the essence of knowledge. Language is the medium through which knowledge is presented. Knowledge obtained through previous knowledge or convention in tradition can be considered as *śrutaniḥśrita matijñāna*, for instance, the knowledge that we get about the word 'cow' or the knowledge to the understanding of the nature of the cow on the perception of the animal is the *śrutaniḥśrita matijñāna*, because it based on the previous information and the *sam-skāras* that we have already obtained.¹

Matijñāna is primarily concerned with the cognition of the object in the present while *śrutajñāna* comprehends the objects with reference to the present, past and the future. Therefore, with reference to the presentation, *śrutajñāna* is considered to be different from *matijñāna*. In that case the *śrutajñāna* is primarily based on the use of language.

The knowledge which is expressed through the language for the sake of understanding and also for communication is called *śrutajñāna*. In the case of *matijñāna*, expression in the from the language is not primary.²

AVADHIJÑĀNA

Avadhiñāna is a from of extra-sensory perception. It is *pratyakṣa* or direct perception. In this, we apprehend objects which are beyond the reach of the sense-organs and the mind. However *avadhi* has limits, it can apprehend only such things which have form and shape.³ It cannot apprehend the things which have no shape and form. Of the six *dravyas*, *pudgala* becomes the object of *avadhiñāna*, because the other *dravyas* do not have form. Similarly, there are limitation in the *avadhiñāna* with reference to the substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and nature (*bhāva*) of the objects. *Avadhi* is that kind of extra-sensory perception which grasps the objects with

1 *Vīṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* vṛtti 168

2 *Tattvārthasūtra*—Pt. Sukhalalji pp. 35–36.

3 *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 28.

reference to its substance, place, time and nature and beyond the capacity of the normal sense-organs.¹

OBJECT OF AVADHIJÑĀNA

The *avadhiññāna* has limitations with reference to its objects in the light of the substance, place, time and nature.

(1) With reference to the substance it can apprehend the minutest particle and also it can extend its knowledge to the cosmos.

(2) With reference to space one can get *avadhiññāna* from the smallest part of the finger to the knowledge of the entire cosmos. It is possible to get *avadhiññāna* on the basis of the knowledge of the cosmos and imagine similar stellar universes.

(3) With reference to time *avadhiññāna* can cognise to the minutest part of the period called *āvalika*. And for the duration of the entire innumerable *avasarpinī* and *utsarpinī* periods.

(4) With reference to the nature of the object known through *avadhiññāna*, we can say that one can have clairvoyance cognition with reference to the mildest psychic mode to the entire clustre of modes.

ELIGIBLE BEING FOR AVADHIJÑĀNA

The living beings in the four states of existence are eligible for getting *avadhiññāna*. Gods (residents in heaven) and hellish beings get *avadhiññāna* by birth. Therefore it is *bhavapratyaya*.² Men and the animals get *avadhiññāna* due to efforts, it is *guṇapratyaya*. In the case of the beings in heaven and hell *avadhiññāna* is to be found in them by birth. They need not do any mental and moral practice for obtaining it. But this is not the case with human beings and the animals. In the case of human beings *avadhiññāna* is possible through mental and moral discipline. Men have to practice *vratas*, and they get *avadhiññāna* through the acquisition of merit. The *avadhi* of the human

1 *Nandīsūtra*, sūtra 28, p. 13 edited by Puṇyavijayaḥ

2 (a) *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 21-22

(b) *Sthānāṅga* 71

(c) *Nandīsūtra*, sūtra 13, p. 10, Puṇyavijayaḥ.

beings as well the five-sensed animals is due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant *kārmic* veil. Therefore, it is called *guṇa-pratyaya avadhijñāna*.

A question arises regarding the destruction and subsidence of the relevant *karmas* in the case of the birth of the heavenly and the hellish beings. Sometimes a question is asked that if these beings possess *avadhi* as *bhavapratyaya*, then is it not necessary that there should be destruction and subsidence of the relevant *karmas* in the case of these beings? The answer to this is that in the case of heavenly and the hellish beings the destruction and subsidence of the relevant *karmas* would have taken place at the time of their birth, otherwise the possession would not be possible. Therefore, those beings in whom destruction and the subsidence takes place at the time of birth, they will have *avadhi* and so it would be *bhavapratyaya*. But in the case of those who have to acquire merit for the sake of obtaining *avadhijñāna* it would be *guṇapratyaya*.

Guṇapratyaya avadhijñāna has been classified into six types.—

(1) *Anugāmī*—It is that type of *avadhi* which continues to be present with the individual wherever he goes.

(2) *Ananugāmī*—In this case the *avadhi* ceases to function, if the individual goes to another place, from the place where *avadhi* was acquired.

(3) *Vardhamāna*—In this *avadhi* increases in intensity as it goes on developing.

(4) *Hīyamāna*—In this the *avadhi* goes on decreasing in intensity as the time passes.

(5) *Apratipātī*—This *avadhi* lasts up to the life or until one attains *kevalajñāna*.

(6) *Pratipātī*—This *avadhi* does not last long. It vanishes after sometime.

With reference to the spatial extension of the object cognised in *avadhi* *Tattvārtharājvārtika* distinguishes three types (1) *deśāvadhi*, (2) *paramāvadhi* (3) *sarvāvadhi*.

1 *Nandīśūtra*, sūtra 15, p. 10

2 *Rājavārtika* 1, 22, 5 (*vṛttisahita*).

Deśāvadhi has been distinguished further into three types (a) *jaghanya deśāvadhi* in which one can know only the smallest part of the finger. (b) *utkṛṣṭa deśāvadhi* the scope of the knowledge of the *avadhi* in this is the entire universe and (c) *ajaghanya utkṛṣṭa deśāvadhi* intuits the objects of the medium size neither of the highest nor of the minutest part.

Similarly, *paramāvadhi* also can be distinguished into three different types.¹ But *sarvāvadhi* is of one type. The uppermost limit of the intuition in this is the innumerable place-points beyond the scope of *paramāvadhi*. The scope of this is the entire universe. And it cannot intuit anything outside the universe as there is nothing outside the universe. *Deśāvadhi* is possible to be obtained by the beings in the four states of existence, but *paramāvadhi* and *sarvāvadhi* are possible only for the *munis*.²

Jinabhadraṇi kṣamāśramaṇa says that it is possible to study *avadhijñāna* with reference to the seven *nikṣepas*—*dravya, kṣetra, kāla, bhava, bhāva, sthāpanā* and *nāma*.³

MANAHPARYAYA JÑĀNA

Manahparyaya jñāna is possible for human beings only; and only the human beings who are self-controlled and who acquire merits get the *manahparyaya jñāna*. In other words, only Śramaṇas can acquire *manahparyaya jñāna*. The human beings who are without self-control cannot possess *manahparyaya jñāna*. *Manahparyaya* is telepathic expression. In this one experiences and cognises the mental states of others. This view of *manahparyaya* based on the Jaina conception of the nature of the mind as material in content consisting minute and fine particles of matter called *ma'ovargaṇās*. Due to the infinite modes of the formation of the mind one understands the mental states operating in the minds of others.⁴

1 The measurement of extension is possible with the criterion of a finger.

2 *Tattvārthasāra*, Amṛtacandrasūri, p. 12. Gaṇeśaprasad Varṇi granthamālā I.

3 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya*

4 *Avāśyaka niryukti* 76.

Manahparyaya experience is not inferential knowledge, it is direct experience. This is not through the instrument of mind, but the soul gets it directly and mind and the mental states are the objects of knowledge of *manahparyaya*.

THE TWO TRADITIONS OF THOUGHT

There are two traditions for explaining the nature of *manahparyaya*. The first tradition is mentioned by ācārya Pūjyapāda¹ and Akalanka.² According to this tradition, *manahparyaya* cognition reveals the meaning of thoughts expressed in others minds. There is no distinction between the thought and the content of thought. It is the material objects and the state of thought by the mind of others that are intuited in the *manahparyaya*. The mind undergoes the process of change while thinking and the objects content of this process are intuited in *manahparyaya*.

The second tradition is given by ācārya Jinabhadragaṇi. According to Jinabhadra, one possessed of *manahparyaya* intuites the states of the mind-substance directly, but knows the external objects of thought by the mind only by inference.³ Therefore, we can say according to Jinabhadra that one possessed of *manahparyaya* knowledge, object thought of by others only by way of inference. *Manahparyaya* implies that we know the modes of the mental states and not the objects that are thought of by these mental states. The objects are known by inference.

It seems that the second tradition propounded by Jinabhadragaṇi is more consistent, because in *manahparyaya* it is not easy to get the intuition of the object thought of by the mind. The objects of thought are secondary and are not the main content of the thought.⁴ If *manahparyaya* were to intuit the mental states and objects, then this kind of intuition would have grasped the formed and the formless

1 *Sarvārthasiddhi* 1, 9.

2 *Tattvārtharājavārtika* 1, 26, 6-7.

3 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* 814.

4 *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 29.

objects, but this does not happen. In this case of the *avadhiññāna*, we can intuit objects having forms, but in the case of *manaḥparyaya*, we intuit the mental states. The objects of the mental states are known through inference and then because of this, the objects which have form and also formless can be known through *manaḥparyaya* by means of inference.¹

12.3 TWO TYPES OF MANAHPARYAYA

Manaḥparyāyaññāna has been distinguished into two types : (1) *ṛjumati* and (2) *vipulamati*. *Vipulamati* intuites subtle forms of mental states, while *ṛjumati* is not able to grasp the subtle forms.² *Rijumati* is temporary and it may last for sometime and vanish but *vipulamati* once obtained will continue atleast till the attainment of *kevalajñāna*.³

12.4 THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE OF MANAHPARYAYA

Manaḥparyayaññāna intuites different aspects of the knowledge from the points of view. i. e. *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva*. (1) From the point of view of substance (*dravya*) *manaḥparyaya* intuites mental states and events, through the *manovargaṇās* (fine particles of atoms constituting mind). (2) From the point of view of place (*kṣetra*) the scope of the *manaḥparyaya ññāna* is restricted to the region, where the human beings live. (3) From the point of view of time (*kāla*) it intuites mental states for innumerable moments of time and it can extend upto past and future. (4) From the point of view of nature (*bhāva*), it can intuit the infinite states of *manovargaṇās*.

12.5 AVADHI AND MANAHPARYAYA

Avadhi and *manaḥparyaya ññāna* are both extra-sensory perceptions which the self can get directly without the help of the sense-organs and the mind. But both these forms of intuition are restricted to the cognition of objects having form. Therefore, they are incomplete and not perfect forms of cognition. They are *vikala pratyakṣas*. But *kevala ññāna* is the complete and perfect. Therefore, it is *sakalapratyakṣa*.

1 *Jaina Darśana*—Dr. Mohanlal Mehta.

2 *Nandīśūtra*, sūtra 31.

3 *Ibid* 31.

Avadhi and *manahparyaya* can be distinguished from each other on the basis of the clarity (*viśuddhi*). The criterion of clarity (*viśuddha*) is, here, not concerned with any inadequacy. But it has reference to the intensity of experience, and the subtlety of cognitive forms. *Manahparyaya* intuits the mental states and events of other individuals. The distinctions between the two forms of direct cognition can be presented in the form of an analogy. A physician knows and treats the patient in general. He is the doctor, which cures the diseases of whole body. But there are doctors who are specialists as of eye, ear, heart etc., the different parts of the whole body. In both types of the physicians there is a difference of generality & speciality. Similarly, *avadhi* and *manahparyaya* have the distinction of subtlety, and un-subtlety of perception. *Manahparyaya* intuits the objects in its subtlety. While *avadhijñāna* gets a less subtle cognition of the objects. With reference to the *kṣetra*, *avadhijñāna* can intuit the objects from the minutest part of the finger in the entire cosmos. While *manahparyaya* is restricted to the human abode only. *Avadhijñāna* is possible for obtaining in all the four states of existence. But *manahparyaya* is restricted to the human being of self-controlled character. The scope of *Avadhijñāna* is to intuit the objects having form and not all of its modes. But the *manahparyaya-jñāna* intuits mental states which are based on the finest particles of matter constituting mind.

KEVALAJÑĀNA (OMNISCIENCE)

Kevalajñāna is direct cognition of everything in the universe. It has a reference to the knowledge which cognises without the help of sense-organs and the mind. The self intuits everything without the help of the sense-organs and the mind.¹ With the destruction of the *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* (knowledge obscuring *karma*) all distinctions disappear. And it is not necessary to have mind and sensory-organs as instruments for gaining the knowledge.

According to the Jainas the soul in its pure form is pure consci-

1 (a) *Vīṣṇavaśyakabhāṣya*.

(b) *Vīṣṇavaśyakabhāṣya* vṛtti 84

ousness and knowledge. It is omniscience. It is obscured by the *karmas* and the veil of *karma* is removed as omniscience dawns.

In the *Vyākhyāprajñapti* Gaṇadhara Gautama asked Bhagavāna Mahāvira, "does the *kevali* (omniscient) knows through the *indriyas* or the *manas*?" Mahāvira replied, "he does not know the objects through the *indriyas* and mind." Then Gautama asked, how does he know? Mahāvira replied, 'the omniscient knows the limited and the limitless. These cannot become objects of sense-organs'.¹

Kevala also means pure.² When the *jñānāvaraṇīya* is removed, all impurities are removed and therefore it is called *kevala* (pure knowledge). *Kevala* also means full or complete. When the *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* is removed one gets full or complete knowledge. Therefore, it is *kevala*.

The other meaning of the word *kevala* is extraordinary or superior.³ When the *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* is removed, the knowledge that we get is superior and nothing is comparable to the knowledge. Again *kevala* would also mean *ananta* (endless).⁴ When the *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* is removed, knowledge that we get has no end, because all the veil that cover the knowledge have been removed.

Kevala would mean omniscience (*sarvajñatā*), although *sarvajñāna* has to be taken in the right sense. When the impurities and obscurations of knowledge are removed, we get pure, super, normal and perfect knowledge. Therefore, there would be no deficiency or defect in that knowledge. Therefore, in this sense *kevalajñāna* may be called perfect and pure knowledge and omniscience.

The Jainas are agreed on the nature of the omniscience. Omniscience intuites all substances with all their modes of the world and the beyond⁵. All substances and modes are intuited by *kevalajñāna*⁶.

1 *Vyākhyāprajñapti* 6, 10

2 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* 84

3 *Ibid* 84

4 *Ibid* 84

5 *Daśavaikālika* 4, 22.

6 *Tattvārthasūtra* 1. 30.

There is nothing to be known and nothing unknown. It is the knowledge of all substances and modes of the past, present and future, all in one. The fullest realisation of the capacity of the self when all the impediments are removed is to be found in the *kevalajñāna*. When the *kevalajñāna* is attained, all imperfect knowledge is washed away.

THREE VIEWS ABOUT *DARŚANA* AND *JÑĀNA*

The Jainas make a distinction between *anākāra* and *sākāra upayoga*. They say that *anākāra upayoga* is indeterminate cognition, it is *darśana*. It is intuitive in nature. While *sākāra upayoga* is determinate cognition, it is *jñāna* in nature. *Sākāra upayoga* is specific cognition and cognises the specific qualities of the objects.¹ *Sākāra* & *anākāra* are the distinctions made on the basis of determinate and indeterminate cognition.²

The distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana* in the Jaina epistemology has been very ancient. The *kārmic* matter which obscures knowledge is *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* & that *kārmic* matter which obscures *darśana* is called *darśanāvaraṇīya karma*. When the relevant *karma* is removed, we get *jñāna* or *darśana* according to the intuition, where *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* or *darśanāvaraṇīya karma* has been removed. In the *āgama* literature *jñāna* has been referred to as *jāṇai* and *darśana* has been referred to as *pāsai*.³ *Digambara ācāryas* contend that the function of *jñāna* is external and is meant to grasp the external objects. It is extroverted (*bahirmukha*). The function of *darśana* is introverted and is mainly concerned with intuiting and grasping through intuition. It is *antarmukha*, introverted. *Ācārya Virasena*, in his commentary called *Dhavalā* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta says "what comprehends an external object of the nature of the universal-cum-particular is *jñāna* and comprehension of the self of the same nature is *darśana*. Virasena says that the only difference between them is that *jñāna* knows the external reality while the *darśana* intuites the internal self."³

The distinction between *darśana* and *jñāna* has been made on the basis of the nature of cognition, whether the cognition is of general or

1 *Tattvārthasūtra bhāṣya* 1, 9.

2 *Prajñāpanā sūtra*

3 *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama, Dhavalā* 1, 1, 4

particular. According to this view *darśana* intuites the general features of an object without analysing the particulars. While *jñāna* gives the cognition based on the analysis of the specific features. According to the Jainas the universal and the particular are equally important and both of them are the essential characteristics of the object. Without the one, the other cannot exist. Therefore, that cognition which grasps only the universal without understanding the specific features would not be a valid cognition. Similarly, the cognition which analyses the specific features of an object without grasping the universal aspect would also be not a true cognition.¹ Presenting this view point Brahmadeva, in his commentary on *Dravyasaṅgraha* has suggested that the distinction between *darśana* and *jñāna* also be studied from the points of view of *naya*, especially from the logical and metaphysical point of view. From the logical point of view, it would be better to say that *darśana* grasps the universal features of the object. But from the metaphysical point of view the self is to comprehend the general and the specific features of the object or the inner or the outer aspects.² From the practical point of view *darśana* and *jñāna*³ can be distinguished but from the noumenal point of view, there is no distinction between *darśana* and *jñāna*. The distinction between *darśana* and *jñāna* made on the basis of the principles of generality and particularity has been refuted by the Jainas from another point of view. It is said that this distinction has been made with a view to adopting the phraseology and falling in line of the other systems for the sake of logical distinctions. But one who has understood the Jain philosophy properly has grasped the *āgamic* view of *darśana* and *jñāna*. The *āgamic* point of view emphasises that the *ātman* is distinct from the other objects, but *darśana* and *jñāna* are aspects of the same *upayoga* of the soul.⁴

This type of the view of the non-distinction between *darśana* & *jñāna* has however been held by a few philosophers. Many Jaina philo-

1 *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama, Dhavalāvṛtti* 1, 1, 4.

2 *Dravyasaṅgraha vṛtti gāthā* 44.

3 *Dravyasaṅgraha vṛtti gāthā* 44.

4 *Dravyasaṅgraha vṛtti gāthā* 44.

sophers do accept the distinction between the *sākāra* and *anākāra upayoga*. Their contention is that *darśana* is a expression of *anākāra upayoga* which grasps the general features of the object. While *jñāna* is an expression of the *sākāra upayoga* which analyses the specific features because it is the expression of *upayoga* in its *anākāra* form. *Upayoga* has these two forms *sākāra* and *anākāra*. But here there is no distinction of generality and particularity in the object.

We may now consider the relation of *darśana* and *jñāna* from the point of view of *kāla* (time). Jaina philosophers are agreed that in the case of *chadmastha* (one who has reached upto the 10th *guṇasthāna*), he experiences *darśana* and *jñāna* successively. But in the case of the *kevalin* regarding the experience of *darśana* and *jñāna* there are different views. Three views have been mentioned. The first view says that the *kevalin* experiences *darśana* and *jñāna* successively. The second view gives importance to the simultaneous cognition of *darśana* and *jñāna*. According to the third view there is no difference between *darśana* and *jñāna*. They are identical. In the *Prajñāpanā*, there is a dialogue between Bhagavāna Mahāvīra & Gaṇadhara Gautama. Gautama asked Bhagavāna : Can we say that a *kevalin* who grasps the nature of the *Ratnaprabhā pṛthvī* through forms, example, its colour and area etc., at the same time he intuites the object. Mahāvīra said, this interpretation is not correct.

Gautama asked, does the *kevalin* not simultaneously grasp the general nature of the *pṛthvī* & understand the nature through various categories of cognition. What is the reason for this ?

Mahāvīra said, that the cognition of the *kevalin* is *sākāra* and his intuition is *nirākāra*. Therefore when he intuites (*darśana*), he does not cognise. But when he gets cognition, he does not intuites. They are successively possible. In this way up to the *adhaṣṭasaptamī-pṛthvī*, from *Saudharmakalpa* to *Ṛṣatpāgbhāra pṛthvī*, from the *paramaṇu* (atom) to the innumerable *pradeśa skandhas*, you should understand this order of cognition and intuition.¹

1 *Prajñāpanā pada 30, sūtra 319, p. 531.*

The *Āvaśyakaniryukti*¹ and *Viśeṣāvaśyakaniryukti*² maintain that in the case of the *kevalin* the *darśana* & *jñāna upayoga* cannot be present simultaneously. The *Svetāmbara āgamic* tradition supports this view and maintains that *jñāna* and *darśana upayoga* cannot be had simultaneously even in the case of the *kevalin*.³

The *Digambara* tradition however contends that in the case of the *kevalin* it is possible to have *kevaladarśana* and *kevalajñāna* simultaneously. All the *Digambara ācāryas* are agreed on this point.⁴ *Ācārya Umāsvāti* also says in the case of *mati* and *śrutajñāna* e.c., there is the successive presentation of *jñāna* and *darśana*, while in the case of the *kevalin* the intuition and cognition are simultaneous.⁵

Ācārya Kundakunda, in the *Niyamasāra* says just as the light and heat of the sun are simultaneously experienced, so also the *kevalin* experiences *darśana* and *jñāna* simultaneously.⁶

The third tradition is presented by *ācārya Siddhasena Divākara*, in the fourth century A. D. In his *Sanmatīṭarka prakaraṇa*, he has stated that distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana* could be made upto *manoḥparyaya*, but in the case of the *kevaladarśana* and *kevalajñāna* it is difficult to distinguish between the two.⁷ *Jñānāvaraṇīya* and *darśanāvaraṇīya karmas* are destroyed simultaneously. Therefore, expressions of *upayoga* as a result of the simultaneous destruction of *jñānāvaraṇīya* and *darśanāvaraṇīya karmas*, cannot be distinguished between *jñāna* and *darśana* as successively experienced.⁸ In the case of the *kevalin* when he attains *kaivalya*, *mohanīya karma* is first destroyed and then the *jñānāvaraṇīya*, *darśanāvaraṇīya* and *antarāya*

1 *Āvaśyaka-niryukti gāthā* 779

2 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya*

3 *Bhagavati* 18, 8; 14, 13.

4 (a) *Gommaṭasāra jīvakāṇḍa* 730

(b) *Dravyasaṅgraha* 44.

5 *Tattvārthasūtra bhāṣya*, 1, 31.

6 *Niyamasāra*, gāthā 159

7 *Sanmatī prakaraṇa* 2, 3.

8 *Sanmatī prakaraṇa* 2, 3.

karmas are destroyed simultaneously. When there is no succession of time in the destruction of *jñānāvarṇīya* and *darśanāvarṇīya karmas* there is no possibility of the successive presentation of the *kevala-jñāna* and *kevaladarśana*. They have to be presented simultaneously. And also because there is no distinction in the *upayoga*, although *upayoga* expresses itself in the *anākāra* and *sākāra* forms. In the case of the *kevalin* state there is no distinction between *darśana* and *jñāna*. And to consider *darśana* and *jñāna* as distinct would raise some other difficulties. If the *kevalin* is to know everything at one moment of experience, then for all times he will be knowing everything. In that case, his knowledge would not be perfect because he would go on knowing and experiencing. In that case, how can it be omniscient.¹ But in the case of omniscience, knowledge and experience are perfect and one. And there would be no distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana*. *Jñāna* is determinate (*saṁkalpa*) and *darśana* is indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*). This kind of distinction between the determinate and indeterminate cognition is not to be found when the *kārmic* matter obscuring knowledge and intuition are destroyed.² As long as there is perfect, not but imperfect expression of *upayoga* there would be distinction between determinate and indeterminate cognition. But when *upayoga* is perfectly and fully expressed, there would be no distinction of this type. One more difficulty would be that *darśana* (intuition) would be without the element of *jñāna*. But in the case of *jñāna*, the element of *darśana* is involved.³ In the case of the *kevalin* when he gets omniscient knowledge, then *darśana* again would not be possible because *darśana* is not involved with *jñāna* although *jñāna* involves *darśana*. Therefore, the successive cognition of *darśana* and *jñāna* in the case of the perfect knowledge would not be possible. The *Digambara* tradition accepts the simultaneous cognition of *darśana* and *jñāna*. But in the *Svetāmbara* tradition there are three streams of thought : (a) successive cognition of the two, (b) simultaneous cognition and (c) non-difference of *darśana* and

1 *Sanmati prakaraṇa* 2, 10

2 *Sanmati prakaraṇa* 2, 11.

3 *Ibid.* 2, 22.

jñāna in the case of the *kevalin*. These three streams of thought have been coordinated from the point of view of (*naya*) by the famous logician Yaśovijaya in the *vikrama* 17th century.¹ From the point of view of *ṛjusūtranaya*, successive presentation of *darśana* and *jñāna* in the case of *kevalin* is acceptable, because the view-point is to look at the particular moment the present. *Jñāna* and *darśana* in these moments can be considered as the cause and the effect. However, the relation of the cause and effect would be the view-point presented by *ṛjusūtranaya*. From the point of view of *vyavahāra naya*, the distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana* is accepted so the simultaneous cognition of both would be the acceptable view. From the point of view of *samgrahanaya* the emphasis is on non-difference between *jñāna* and *darśana*. It appears to be from the point of view of rational consideration that the non-difference point of view is more adequate.

There is the *āgamic* point of view which is based on the natural process of cognition and intuition. It is natural that in the first moment we experience the particulars as distinct and then we cognise the general among the particulars. The characteristic of cognition (*jñāna*) is of this type. It is a synthesis of *bheda* (difference) and *abheda* (non-distinct) and *bhedābheda*. However, knowledge with its emphasis on distinction and *darśana* with its emphasis on non-distinction cannot occur simultaneously.

Thus we have studied the problems of knowledge and intuition from the *āgama yuga* to the *dārśanikayuga*. Detailed discussion on these problems would be beyond the scope of this small book.

□

1 *Jñānabindu*.

PRAMĀṆA : A Study

PRAMĀṆA IN THE ĀGAMIC LITERATURE

In the *āgamic* literature, we get elaborate discussion of *pramāṇa* (valid source of knowledge). A good deal of discussion has been carried out on regarding the nature and types of *pramāṇa*.

In the *Bhagavatī sūtra*¹ there is a dialogue between Gautama Gaṇadhara and Bhagavāna Mahāvīra. Gautama asked Mahāvīra, 'Bhagavan ! in the case of the *kevalin* who is to relinquish the body for the last time, his cognition and intuition are perfect. Similarly, can we say how a *chadmastha*, gets knowledge ? Mahāvīra said, in the case of the *chadmastha*, knowledge is not spontaneous, it is through the valid sources of knowledge like *śravaṇa* (hearing) and other *pramāṇas*. On this, Gautama asked a question on the basis of hearing ? Mahāvīra replied, from the point of view of *kevalin*.....

Gautama again asked by what *pramāṇa* does the *chadmastha* get knowledge ? Mahāvīra replied, knowledge is possible through four *pramāṇas* : *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *āgama*. The description of the four *pramāṇas* has been given in the *Anuyogadvāra*.

In the *Sihānāṅga*, the term *pramāṇa*, and *hetu* has been used. From the point of view of *nikṣepa* *pramāṇa* has been distinguished into : *dravya pramāṇa*, *kṣetra pramāṇa*, *kāla pramāṇa* and *bhāva pramāṇa*.²

In the *Sihānāṅga* where the word *hetu* is used the four-fold

1 *Bhagavatī sūtra* 5, 3, 191, 192.

2 *Sihānāṅga* 321.

distinction of *pramāṇa* as *pratyakṣa* (direct), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison) and *agāma* (testimony) has been presented.¹

In some places three-fold distinction of *pramāṇas* has been mentioned. In that case the word *vyavasāya* is used, meaning determined cognition. *Vyavasāya* is of three types, *pratyakṣa*, *prātyayika* and *ānugāmika*.²

There are different traditions regarding the distinctions in the types of *pramāṇa*, some have mentioned three *pramāṇas* and some other four *pramāṇas*. *Sāṃkhya* philosophy mentions three *pramāṇas* and *Nyāya* mentions four *pramāṇas*. Both these traditions, are mentioned in *Sihānāṅga*. In the *Anuyogadvāra* there is an elaborate discussion of the *pramāṇa* which is mentioned below.

1.3 PRATYAKṢA (DIRECT)

Pratyakṣa has been distinguished into two types as (1) *indriya pratyakṣa* (sense-*pratyakṣa*) and (2) *no-indriya pratyakṣa* (knowledge without the help of the sense-organs). *Indriya pratyakṣa* is of five types, as (1) auditory perception (*śrotrendriya pratyakṣa*) (2) visual perception (*cakṣurindriya pratyakṣa*) (3) alfactory experience (*ghrāṇendriya pratyakṣa*) (4) experience of taste (*jīvhendriya pratyakṣa*) and touch experience (*sparśanendriya pratyakṣa*).

No-indriya pratyakṣa is of three types : (1) *avadhi pratyakṣa* (clairvoyance) (2) *manaḥparyaya pratyakṣa* (telepathy) and (3) *kevala pratyakṣa* (omniscience). The cognition through mind (*mānasa pratyakṣa*) has been included in the sense-experience (*indriya pratyakṣa*). Therefore, there is no separate mention of *mānasapratyakṣa*. The later philosophers have given a separate status for the cognition through mind.

1.4 ANUMĀNA (INFERENCE)

Anumāna (inference) has been distinguished into three types as (1) *pūrvavat* (from cause to effect) (2) *śeṣavat* (from effect to cause) and (3) *dṛṣṭasādharmyavat* (from universal to particular). *Nyāya*,³

1 *Sihānāṅga* 338

2 (a) *Sihānāṅga* 185

(b) *Sihānāṅga*, *Abhayadevaṣṭi*

3 *Nyāyasūtra* 1, 1, 5.

*Bauddha*¹ and *Śāṅkhya*² *darśana* have accepted these three forms of inference.

Pūrvavat—*Pūrvavat* proceeds from the cause to the effect, from the antecedent event to the consequent. For instance, when there are clouds, we say it will rain. Similarly, a mother seeing her son after several years, when he returns from abroad. In the first few moments she could not recognise, but she sees a sign on his body and instantly she recognises him as her son. This is *pūrvavat anumāna*.³

Śeṣavat—*Śeṣavat anumāna* is from effect to the cause, from cause to effect, from quality to the substance, which is the substratum of quality from constituent forms to the agent of constituent forms and the source of dependence to the dependent. These are the five types of *śeṣavat anumānas*.

From effect to the cause, we move from knowing the effect & we infer the cause. For example, from the sound of particular thing, we say it is a sound of particular instruments. We also proceed from cause to effect as in the case of, we infer the quality of a pot from the clay.

We infer the nature of the substance having qualities on the basis of the qualities, as for example we infer the standard of gold by rubbing it; from the smell, we infer the nature of the type of the flower, from the taste, we infer the salt of any other object.

In the case of inference: from the constituents to its objects, we infer, for example, from the horns the type of buffalo, from the ivory the elephant, from the hood we infer the existence a horse and from mane we infer the existence of lion.

When we infer the dependence of an object, from the object of dependence, we infer the presence of fire from the smoke; from the presence of a collection of swans, we infer the existence of water and from the good nature of a man we infer his family background.

1 *Upāyaḥṛdaya* p. 13.

2 *Śāṅkhyakārikā* 5-6.

3 *Anuyogadvāra sūtra, pramāṇa prakaraṇa*

We infer from the cause to the effect in two types. But in the case of *avayava* and *avayavī* etc., there is no such distinction.

Dṛṣṭasādharmyavat—In this, the inference is from the general to the particular, on the basis of common points and similarity. For instance, on the perception of a particular object with its quality, we infer the nature of similar objects. In this, from the particular object we go to the species and *guṇas*. For example, when we see a person we infer the existence of similar persons in that land.

There is a form of inference called *viśeṣa, dṛṣṭa anumāna*. In this, we distinguish one object from a large collection of objects and we infer the specific nature of that object. For instance, when we distinguish one man and recognise him from among the large crowd, we use this inference. *Sāmānya dṛṣṭa* inference is like *upamāna* (comparison) while *viśeṣa dṛṣṭa upamāna* is analogue to *pratyabhijñā* (recognition).

Anuyogadvāra has made a distinction in *anumāna* as of three types on the basis of the consideration of time : (1) *atīta kāla grahaṇa*—When we see the greenery all-round and the overflowing ponds, we infer that there has been good rain in that part. (2) *pratyutpanna kāla grahaṇa*—In this also, we infer the causes from the effect, although the causes may be remote causes. For instance, if an ascetic who goes for begging food, if he gets sufficient food, then he infers that there is plenty in this part. (3) *anāgata kāla grahaṇa*—It is from antecedent even to the consequent event. For instance, when we see thunder and lightning and when the sky is full of dark clouds, we infer that it would rain heavily.

Apart from these three types of *anumāna* based on the criterion of time we may infer wherein contrary situations might give negative inference. For instance, if we see the land very dry, we infer that there has been famine. When the ascetic does not get sufficient food during his begging round, he infers that there has been famine in that area.

THE CONSTITUENT PROPOSITIONS OF INFERENCE

(Syllogism)

Syllogism refers to the constituent propositions which are

called *avayavas*. There is not much discussion about this problem in the original *āgamas*. The syllogism is meant for the communication of one's thoughts to others. It presents the methodology and the procedure of expressing one's thoughts to others so as to it effective and valid. *Daśavaikālikaniryukti* has a discussion about this problem and it mentions various forms of syllogism from the syllogism with two propositions to the syllogism with ten propositions.¹ The syllogism with two propositions has been mentioned with two specific functions. In the case of syllogism with only two propositions, *hetu* is not mentioned only *udāharana* is mentioned along with *pratijñā*. We give below a schemata of the number of propositions involved in the various types of syllogisms based on the number of propositions : (1) a syllogism with two propositions mentions *pratijñā* and *udāharana* (2) a syllogism with three constituent propositions mentions *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharana*, (3) a syllogism with five propositions mentions *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *upasaṃhāra* and *nigamana*.

A syllogism with ten propositions has been elaborated as follows *pratijñā*, *pratijñāviśuddhi*, *hetu*, *hetuviśuddhi*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *dṛṣṭāntaviśuddhi*, *upasaṃhāra*, *upasaṃhāraviśuddhi* and *nigamana*, *nigamanaviśuddhi*.

The ten membered syllogism has also been mentioned in the following way : *pratijñā*, *pratijñāvivhakti*, *hetu*, *hetuvivhakti*, *vipakṣa*, *pratiśedha*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *āśaṅka*, *tatpratiśedha* and *nigamana*.²

It may be noted that there is sufficient discussions about the two-membered, three-membered and five-membered syllogism in the other *darśanas*.³ But Bhadrabāhu alone has given an analysis of the ten-membered syllogism.⁴

UPAMĀNA

Upamāna is comparison. It is nearer to analogy in the western logic. It is based on the points of similarity (*sādharmya*) and points of difference (*vaidharmya*). Accordingly, *upamāna* is distinguished

1. *Daśavaikālikaniryukti* 50.

2. *Daśavaikālika niryukti* 92.

3. *Nyāyasūtra* I, 1, 32.

4. See *Jaina Darśana* Dr. Mohanlal Mehta, p. 250.

into two types : *sādharmya upamāna* and *vaidharmya upamāna*. *Sādharmya upamāna* is further distinguished into three types :—(a) *Kiñcit sādharmyopanīta*. It consists of the similarity in terminology like *āditya* and *khadyota*, *candra* and *kumuda*. The terms applies to the similar objects on the basis of similarity of functions denoted by the words. (b) *Prāyaḥ sādharmyopanīta*—This is based on the points of similarity perceived in two objects. For instance, when we see an animal in the forest which resembles the cow we say that this animal is like the cow. Because there is sufficient similarity between the two. (c) *Sarvasādharmyopanīta*—In this there is complete similarity so as to deny the same quality to the other individuals and other objects. For instance, the object or the individual is unique because the qualities that one possess cannot be applied to others. For example, *indra* is *Indra* only, *Tīrthaṅkara* is *tīrthaṅkara* only and *Chakravartin* is *chakravartin* only.

Vaidharmyopanīta upamāna is based on the points of difference. It is also of three types : (a) *Kiñcit vaidharmyopanīta*—In it we express the distinction between the cow and the horse (b) *Prāyovaidharmyopanīta*—In this, there is emphasis on the distinctions on the contrary qualities. For instance, the black is not white. (c) *Sarvavaidharmyopanīta*—In this, the specific and peculiar qualities have been specifically distinguished. For example, a good man did actions which are good only and bad man very often does action consistence with his character.

Dr. Mohanlāl Mehtā says these examples are not adequate to explain this type of analogy. We may give examples of good and the bad, the servant and the master etc.¹

ĀGAMA

Āgama is testimony. It is the acceptance of an authority. It is of two type (i) *Laukika āgama* and (ii) *Lokottara āgama*. *Laukika āgama* refers to the expression regarding the empirical events and *Lokottara āgama* refers to the philosophical and spiritual discussions

1. *Jaina darśana* Dr.—Mohanlāl Mehtā p. 251,

as given in the *śāstras*. For instance, we can mention *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa* as *laukika āgamas* while the *aṅgas* like *Ācāraṅga*, *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga*, *Samavāyāṅga*, *Bhagavati*, etc., coming from the omniscient *tīrthaṅkara* are *lokottara āgama*.¹ *Lokottarāgama* has been distinguished into three types as *sūtrāgama*, *arthāgama* and *parumparāgama*.² *Āgamas* have also been distinguished into three types from another point of view : *ātmāgama*, *anantarāgama* and *paramparāgama*.³ *Āgama* has also been distinguished into two forms as *artharūpa* and *sūtrarūpa*. The *tīrthaṅkara* preaches the doctrines to his disciples, i.e. *artharūpa āgama*. It is *ātmāgama* for *tīrthaṅkara* because it comes from the omniscient only and not received from any other person. *Gaṇadharas* receive the teaching of the *tīrthaṅkara* directly. There is no third person in between them. Therefore this *arthāgama* received by the *gaṇadharas* is *anantarāgama* for themselves. But on the basis of this *arthāgama*, *gaṇadharas* present it to the others in the forms of *sūtra* (aphorisms),⁴ therefore this *sūtrāgama* for the *gaṇadharas* is *ātmāgama*. The disciples of the *Gaṇadhara* receive the teaching directly and there is no third person involved. Therefore, *āgama* teaching received by the disciples from the *Gaṇadharas* directly is called *anantarāgama* for the disciples. But from the point of view of the content of the teaching it is *paramparāgama*, because it comes from the master to the teacher in succession. In this sense, the teachings received by the *gaṇadharas* cannot also be considered as *ātmāgama* because it was received from the *tīrthaṅkara*. For the disciples of the *gaṇadharas* and their disciples in succession *sūtrāgama* and *arthāgama* are to be considered as *paramparāgama* only.⁵

So far, we have discussed the nature of *pramāṇas*. The validity of the *pramāṇas* have been discussed in the *āgamas* and on the basis of that discussion, the later *ācāryas* have developed a system of logic

1. *Anuyogadvāra* 49-50. p. 68—Punyavjayaji Ed.

2. *Ibid*, sūtra 470, p. 179.

3. *Ibid*.

4. *Āvaśyaka nirvyukti*, gāthā 92.

5. *Anuyogadvāra sūtra* 470, p. 170.

presented in the methodology of the polemic (*pūrva pakṣa*) and the construction of the theory of logic on the basis of the polemic. In this, the later ācāryas have made a significant contribution to the development of Indian logic.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRAMĀṆA

Pramāṇa is characterised by valid knowledge. The relation between *jñāna* and *pramāṇa* is one of pervaded and the pervasion. *Jñāna* is pervasion (*vyāpaka*) and *pramāṇa* is *vyāpya*, *Jñāna* is of two types : *Yathāratha* (valid) and *ayathārtha* (invalid). Valid knowledge is that which is consistent with the previous knowledge and is definite and certain. That knowledge which is expressed by doubt (*saṃśaya*) and perversity (*viparyaya*) is invalid knowledge. The knowledge which is valid is free from doubt and is certain and well-defined.

CAUSATION OF PRAMĀṆA

The general characteristic of *pramāṇa* is—"pramāyāḥ karaṇaṃ *pramāṇaṃ*" It is the instrument of the *pramā*. "*Tadbhavaṭi tatprakā-rānubhavaḥ pramā*" that object which is known as it is, called *pramā*. It is the object of valid cognition. For the cognition of an object several factors contribute, but all of them cannot be called *karaṇa* (instruments of knowledge). *Karaṇa* is that which is the instrument of knowledge and by which knowledge is cognised. The conditions for using an axe would be the hand and the blade. The hand would be a condition no doubt, it is the less essential condition than the blade.

The philosophers are agreed on the general nature of *pramāṇa*, but there are differences of opinion regarding the sources of the instruments (*karaṇa*) of valid cognition. In the Buddhist literature consistency and adequacy (*yogyatā*) are the criteria or *karaṇa*.¹ In the case of the *Naiyāyikas sannikarṣa* (contact) & *jñāna* (cognition) are the criteria or *karaṇa* of *pramāṇa*. But in the Jaina *darśana jñāna* is considered to be *karaṇa*.² Although *Sannikarṣa* and adequacy

1 (a) *Nyāyabindu* 1, 19, 20.

(b) *Pramāṇa samuccaya*, p. 24

(c) *Tattvārthaślokaṭīkā* 1, 3, 44.

2. *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1, 1, 3.

etc., are useful for grasping the meaning of the cognition, but *jñāna* is much more important for understanding the meaning. *Jñāna* establishes the intimate contact between itself and the object.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERMINOLOGY OF *PRAMĀṆA*

The *ācāryas* have used different terminology for explaining *pramāṇa*. According to the Jainas the essence of *pramāṇa* is well-defined knowledge (*nirṇāyaka jñāna*). *Ācārya Vidyānada* in his *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika* (1, 10, 77) says that *pramāṇa* is that which establishes the correct and well-defined knowledge. This is the characteristic of knowledge.

Pramāṇa determines the exact meaning of a thing. This is the characteristic of *pramāṇa*. The other characteristics mentioned about *pramāṇa* are only variations of the descriptions of the determinateness of the meaning of the thing. The use of other characteristics mentioned are due to three reasons : (1) to differentiate between the description of the *pramāṇa* given by one school from the description given by the others, (2) to refute the description of other characteristics of *pramāṇa* mentioned by other schools of thought and (3) to refute the discrepancies and errors in the description of nature of *pramāṇa*.

Ācārya Siddhasena in his *Nyāyavārtara* says that the function of *pramāṇa* is to illumine the self and also the object. Therefore, it is self and the other illuminating. The *Mīmāṃsakas* do not accept the view that the *pramāṇa* is self-illuminating. According to them *pramāṇa* is to cognise the object in a definite way. We cognise the object and therefore, we are the subject of cognition and cognition is the knowledge. This is the '*parokṣa jñānavāda*'.¹

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika consider cognition and the object of cognition as distinct. According to them, all knowledge except the divine knowledge is cognised by the other cognition. *Sāṅkhya* philosophers consider cognition as a product of *prakṛti* and therefore, *acetana* (unconscious). According to them, cognition is the mode of *prakṛti*, it is sometimes a perverse expression of the mode of *prakṛti*. There-

1. *Mīmāṃsā śloka-vārttika* 184-187.

fore, it is unconscious. Ācārya Siddhasena has refuted this argument and has used the word *sva-ābhāsi*.¹ According to Jainism, he says *jñāna* is *sva-ābhāsi*.² Its characteristic is cognition. The cognition is not the object of cognition nor is it the *pramāṇa*, as in the case of the cognition of *Īśvara*. Cognition is not unconscious and not the mode of *prakṛti*. Knowledge is the characteristic of the soul.³

The Buddhists⁴ consider cognition as real and the world of physical object as an appearance. Ācārya Siddhasena has refuted this stand by using the word "*para ābhāsi*". He has shown that the objects have an independent existence and reality, independent of the cognition of the object.

The Jainas maintain that knowledge and the object of knowledge both are real.⁵ *Viparyaya* (fallacious knowledge) is not a *pramāṇa*. Therefore, the term "*bādhavivarjita*" has been used. In this way, ācārya Siddhasena has attempted to distinguish the characteristics of *pramāṇa* as described by the Jainas from *jñāna* given by other schools of thought.

Akalanka has used the term "*anadhiगतार्थका*" and "*avisamvādi*" for explaining the characteristic of *pramāṇa*.⁶ And he has justified the use of the word "*sva-parāvabhāsaka*" as the characteristic of *pramāṇa*.⁷ Ācārya Māṇikyanandi has followed the footsteps of Akalanka. He has suggested that *pramāṇa* determines the exact nature and the real nature of the object. In this, he has followed the tradition established by ācārya Samantabhadra and Siddhasena and developed by Akalanka.⁸

Vāḍidevasūri says that *pramāṇa* is *sva-para-vyavasāyi jñāna* (cog-

1. *Syādvādamāñjarī*, kārikā 12.

2. *Ibid*, kārikā 5.

3. *Vasubandhuḥṛta viṃśatikā*.

4. *Syādvādamāñjarī*, 16.

5. *Aṣṭaśatī*, 175.

6. *Nyāyaviniścaya ṭikā*, p. 63.

7. *Parikṣāmukhamāṇḍana*, 1, 1.

nition of the self-natured cognition and of the object.)¹ In this, he has not given importance to the word *apūrva* used by Māṇikyanandi.

During this time, two schools of thought were developed. *Digambara* ācārya did not accept the knowledge which is received by stimulations and which is continuous (*dhārāvāhī*) as *pramāṇa*, while *Śvetāmbara* ācāryas have considered the cognition also as *pramāṇa*. Vidyānandi has made it clear that the cognition that determines the self-natured cognition and of the nature of the object as *pramāṇa*, whether it is received and comprehended or not comprehended.²

Ācārya Hemacandra has discussed this question in an elaborate way and had used very subtle and meaningful terminology, so we may say that the exposition of the Ācārya Hemacandra had given the final picture of the nature of the *pramāṇa*. He says *pramāṇa* gives the correct knowledge of the object (*samyak nirṇaya*).³

The *Digambara* and the *Śvetāmbara* tradition have used the different terminologies, but really there is not much of difference in the content of the meaning of the interpretations given by the two traditions. The development of the controversy regarding the nature of the *pramāṇa* reflects the prevailing logical tendency and disputation of the time.

KNOWLEDGE AND PRAMĀṆA

The analysis of the nature of *pramāṇa* shows that there is no difference between the knowledge and *pramāṇa*. *Jñāna* means *samyak-jñāna* (right knowledge). Knowledge reveals itself and cognises the object. The Jains hold the nature of cognition as *sva-par-prakāśaka*. Just as a lamp reveals the objects and also reveals itself, similarly knowledge reveals itself and cognises the other objects. The Jains have said that *pramāṇa* is knowledge which is fruitful, determinate and certain. In the *Nyāyabindu*, *nirvikalpako-jñāna* (indeterminate knowledge) has been considered to be a *pramāṇa*.⁴ But the Jaina logicians

1. *Pramāṇanayatatīvāloka* 1, 2.

2. *Ślokavārtika* 1, 10, 78.

3. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 1, 2.

4. *Nyāyabindu*, *prathama prakaraṇa*.

refute this view and they say that *nirvikalpa* cognition cannot be a *pramāṇa* nor even as *apramāṇa* because if there is nothing determinate we cannot say whether it is *pramāṇa* or not. *Nirvikalpa* can be attributed to *darśana*. *Pramāṇa* cannot be valid cognition if it is not determined and determinate.

THE CRITERION OF THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE (*PRAMĀṆYA*)

Pramāṇa is truth. There is no doubt about it, although different words have been used for describing the word *pramāṇa*. Several words have been used to describe the nature of *pramāṇa* : *yathārtha*, *abādhitatva*, *arthakhyāpana*, *apūrva*, *arthaprāpana* etc. These words have been accepted by some schools and rejected by others. Ācārya Vidyānandi explains the characteristics of *abādhitatva* as that wherein we find the absence of the *bādhita* (discrepancies). The criterion of *abādhitatva* is its being incoherent and consistent.¹ Ācārya Abhayadeva has refuted this stand in the *Sanmatī ṭīkā*.² Ācārya Akalanka, the Buddhists and the *Mīmāṃsākās* maintain that the function of *pramāṇa* is to make explicit the meaning of the word and to make the knowledge from the known to unknown.³ Vālideva sūri and Hemacandra have refuted this stand.⁴

In this way, there has been a long controversy on the nature and function of *pramāṇa* and the relation of *pramāṇa* and *jñāna*. It may be noted that the *pramāṇa* has to point to the pragmatic test. Unless the valid cognition leads to the successful knowledge, the cognition cannot be considered to be valid. At the same time it should be noted that cognition and truth must be constant and mutually related.

1. *Tattvārtha śloka-vārtika* 175.

2. *Sanmatī ṭīkā* p. 614.

3. *Tattvārtha śloka-vārtika* 175.

4. (a) *Pramāṇanayatatvaratnākarāvarikā* 1-2.

(a) *Pramāṇamūlā*.

THE VALIDITY OF COGNITION

We have seen that *pramāṇa* refers to *samyagjñāna* (correct knowledge). But it is necessary to distinguish between the correct knowledge *samyagjñāna* and *mithyājñāna*. The Jaina logicians have given the criterion of validity of knowledge on the basis of the two-fold functions (i) the self-cognition of the cognition and the cognition of the object. Sometime cognition becomes valid by itself and sometime it has to be verified by means of some other cognition.

Therefore, the words *svataḥ* and *parataḥ* are used. If cognition is self-valid, it is true to itself and it is a *pramāṇa*. But in some cases, cognition has to be verified through some other means. The *Naiyyāyikas* do not accept the validity of knowledge. According to them the validity or other wise of cognition has to be determined by some other criteria outside cognition. Therefore, it is *parataḥ prāmāṇya*.

The *Mimāṃsakas* maintain the view of the self-validity of knowledge. The invalid knowledge is due to external circumstances and differences. It is not necessary to have any external criteria for determining the validity of knowledge. This is the *svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*. The *Naiyyāyikas* do not accept the *svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda* (self-validity of knowledge). According to them validity of knowledge can be determined by circumstances which are eternal to knowledge. That knowledge is valid which corresponds to the facts or the external objects. That which is contrary to the fact is invalid knowledge. This is the criterion of correspondence to determining the truth or the falsity of knowledge. *Sāṅkhya darśana* is of the opinion that the validity and invalidity of knowledge are both determined by self. There is no necessity of an external condition to determine the validity or otherwise of knowledge. The Jainas are against the three views mentioned above. According to the Jainas, the validity of knowledge can be determined by the self or by the external circumstances according to the situation. They accept both the theories of *svataḥ prāmāṇya* and *parataḥ prāmāṇya* of the validity of cognition.¹ But they say

1 (a) *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 1, 18

(b) *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*—1, 1, 8.

the validity or otherwise of cognition is determined by the situation, for instance, a man is thirsty, he drinks water and he knows that the water has quenched his thirst. In this cognition, it is not necessary to have external circumstances for determining the validity of knowledge. Again, if we see light coming out from a closed room, and if we do not know from what source the light comes, whether it is from candle or an electric light, we have to open the door and see. In this case, the validity is determined by external circumstance. Therefore, in this situation it is *paratoḥ*.¹

RESULT OF PRAMĀṆA

Now the question has been asked : what is the result of the effect of *pramāṇa*. In the *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* (1,1,34) it has been suggested that the aim of *pramāṇa* is to make the object clear. It is to illumine the object. *Pramāṇa* enables to comprehend the two objects of the nature of the object. We cannot get a correct nature of the object unless we have the knowledge of the distinction between *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa*. The direct result of *pramāṇa* is to remove ignorance. This is the effect of all forms of *pramāṇas*. If we consider the effect of *pramāṇa* in various degrees, we find that in the case of *kevalajñāna* it leads to happiness and bliss. With this knowledge, one gets full comprehension, just as the rays of the sun's light make everything clear. The omniscient person wards away ignorance and enjoys eternal bliss. He develops an attitude of non-detachment for the things of the world. For those who have other forms knowledge except the *kevalajñāna* they develop the capacity of comprehension and discrimination. Similarly, they develop tendency towards good action and a disgust towards evil actions.²

THE NUMBER OF PRAMĀṆAS

In Indian philosophy, there is no agreement between the different schools of Indian thought on the question of the number of *pramāṇas*. The *Cārvāka* school maintains that sense-perception is the only valid source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). *Vaiśeṣikas* recognise *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* as *pramāṇa*. *Sāṅkhya darśana* mentions three *pramāṇas* ;

1. *Jaina Darśana*—Dr. Mohanlāl Mehtā, p. 255-257,

2. *Nyāyavātāra* 28.

pratyakṣa, *anumāna* and *śabda*. *Nyāya darśana* accepts four *pramāṇas* : *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*. *Prabhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsā* has given five *pramāṇas* : *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda* and *arhāpatti* (implication). The *Bhāṭṭa* school of *Mīmāṃsā* gives six *pramāṇas* by adding *abhāva* or *anupalabdhi* (cognition of absence). Buddhists have mentioned only two *pramāṇas* : *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.

In the Jaina epistemology, there are three different views regarding the number of *pramāṇas*. In the *Anuyogadvāra sūtra* four *pramāṇas* : *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *āgama* have been mentioned. Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara mentions three *pramāṇas* : *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* & *āgama*. Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthasūtra*, Vāḍidevasūri in his *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka*, and ācārya Hemacandra in the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* have recognised two *pramāṇas* : *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*.¹

The Buddhists have recognised *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.² The Jains have mentioned that *anumāna* is a form of *parokṣa pramāṇa* and there are *āgama* etc., many forms of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. The Jains maintain that the Buddhist classification of *pramāṇa* is not exhaustive, because it does not mention *āgama* etc. as a *pramāṇa*. The contention of the *Cārvāka* school that *indriyapratyakṣa* is the only *pramāṇa* is not correct because it ignores other forms of *pratyakṣa*, which we can get without the help of the sense-organs directly by the soul. Our knowledge of the mental states of others on the basis of the observation of external behaviours cannot be considered to be *pratyakṣajñāna*. It implies *anumāna*. Similarly, without *anumāna* it is difficult to get the knowledge of the relation of the cause and effect. We may state that without *anumāna* it is difficult to establish one's own position on the basis of the refutation of the opposite position and also to establish the truth for otherwise of the existence of the other world.³

The criterion of the validity of knowledge is that cognition should be valid and it must correspond to the facts. For all the

1. (a) *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 2.
(b) *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 1, 9 10,
2. *Nyāya'indu* 3.
3. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 1, 11.

forms of *pramāṇa*, this is the primary criterion. The *pramāṇas* can be classified into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. The *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *āgama* are considered to be *parokṣajñāna*. *Arihāpatti* is the form of *anumāna*, *abhāva* or *anupalabdhi* is a form of *pratyakṣa*. The object has its nature of existence or non-existence. We can apprehend the existence and non-existence and both these states are directly apprehended. Therefore, it is not necessary to enumerate *abhāva* or *anupalabdhi* as a separate *pramāṇa*. For example, we perceive the absence of the book on the table, in this, we perceive the table and in perceiving the table without the book which was there in the past, we perceive the absence of the book. This is a form of perception. Therefore *abhāva* cannot be different from *pratyakṣa*.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRATYAKṢA

The Jainas contend that clearness and distinctness (*vaiśadya*) as the characteristic of *Pratyakṣa*.¹ Siddhasena Divākara maintains that *pratyakṣa* apprehends the meaning of the nature of the object directly without the medium of any other form of source of knowledge.² This criterion can be understood when we know the distinction between *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. Akalaṅka in the *Nyāyaviniścaya* states that clearness and distinctness (*spṛṣṭvijñāna*) is a criterion of *pratyakṣa*.³ He has used the terms "*sākāra*" and *añjasā* to explain the criteria of clearness and distinctness for *pratyakṣa*. *Jaina darśana* does not accept *sannikarṣa* as a criterion as having been used in the *Vaiśeṣikas* and not do the Jainas accept "*kalpanāpoḍhatva*" as the criterion of *pratyakṣa*. *Vaiśadya* would mean that type of cognition which does not require any other form of cognition to make the meaning clear. In the case of *anumāna* and other forms of *parokṣajñāna* there are intermediary cognition and media like *lingajñāna* (the knowledge of the middle term), *vyāpti* (universal concomitance of the middle

1 (a) *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 1, 13.

(b) *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka* 2

(c) *Parīkṣāmukha*, 2, 3

2 *Nyāyavaiśara* śloka 4,

3 *Nyāyaviniścaya* śloka 3.

major-term) and *smaraṇa* (memory etc). This is the differentiating term and the characteristics of *pratyakṣa*. *Pratyakṣa*, therefore, cognises the object directly and fully without any other media. But while in the case of *anunāna*, we proceed from previous knowledge to some other knowledge based on the previous knowledge. That knowledge which is based on the previous knowledge, is *parokṣa jñāna*, it is not direct.

TWO TYPES OF PRATYAKṢA

The Jainas have classified *pratyakṣa* into (1) *ātmapratyakṣa* and (2) *indriyānindriya pratyakṣa*. *Ātmapratyakṣa* is the knowledge that the soul gets directly without the help of sense-organs. The *indriyānindriya pratyakṣa* is empirical knowledge which is obtained through the sense-organs through the mind or knowledge obtained through other sources like reason and testimony.

Ātmapratyakṣa has been classified into two types : 1. *Sakala pratyakṣa* which is *kevalajñāna*, 2. *Vikalapratyakṣa* which is *nokevala-jñāna*. It is partial knowledge short of omniscience. *Nokevala jñāna* is of two types : (1) *avadhijñāna* and (2) *manahparyaya jñāna*.

Indriya-anindriya pratyakṣa has four stages (1) *avagraha* (2) *ihā*, (3) *avāya* and (4) *dhāraṇā*. *Ātmapratyakṣa* is the direct knowledge that the soul gets without the help of *indriyas*, the *manas*, and other *pramāṇas*. This is *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* or *no-indriyupratyakṣa*. In the *indriya pratyakṣa* one gets direct cognition through the medium of sense-organs and the *manas*, without the help of the middle term or the process of reasoning.

Siddhasena Divākara¹ says that direct knowledge is that knowledge which is obtained through the sense-organs without the medium of reasoning procedure & the analysis of the meaning. In this analysis, he uses the word *aparokṣa* and that is a significant word. Because *Naiyyāyikas* consider *pratyakṣa jñāna* to be the knowledge which is obtained through the contact of sense-organs and the object. They do not use the word *aparokṣa* because it would convey negative meaning

for them. But the knowledge obtained through the contact of the sense-organs and the object is not knowledge that the soul or the cogniser gets directly, it is, therefore, not *pratyakṣa*. This contention of Siddhasena Divākara has the support in the *Bhagavatī*¹ & *Sthānāṅga*² on the analysis of *pramāṇa*.

Ācārya Hemacandra, Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandi have elaborated the nature of *pratyakṣa*. They have used the word "*viśada*" as a characteristic of knowledge, in place of "*aparokṣa*". From the practical point of view the use of this terminology has been mentioned and has the support of *Nandīsūtra*.³ According to them *pratyakṣa* has been distinguished into two types as *mukhya* and *saṁvyaṭahāra*. The *mukhya pratyakṣa* is the knowledge that the soul get directly without the help of the sense-organs. The *saṁvyaṭahāra pratyakṣa* is that knowledge which one gets through the sense-organs and the *manas*. In this analysis of the *saṁvyaṭahāra pratyakṣa* the words "*aparokṣatayā*" and "*arthagrahaṇa*" do not figure in as the criteria of *pratyakṣa*. Therefore, the word *viśada* has been used.

The word *viśada* is meant to clear the meaning of the cognition with reference to clarity and perceptual judgement. The meaning of the *saṁvyaṭahāra pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* would be clear with the use of *viśada*. However, the word *aparokṣa* is nearer to the concept of the *Vedāntic* analysis of *pratyakṣa*, and the word *viśada* has similarity with the description of the nature of *pratyakṣa*, as given by the Buddhists. But considering the content of the meaning in the two verses there are some fundamental distinctions. The *Vedāntins* maintain that *pratyakṣa jñāna* is possible through the medium of *antaḥkaraṇa* (inner sense-organs). The *antaḥkaraṇa* takes the modification of the object i.e., seen & is reflected through the intellect to the soul and that is a *pratyakṣa jñāna*. But according to the Jāinas, there is no other medium between the object and the cognition in the case of the *pratyakṣa jñāna*. To consider that *antaḥkaraṇa* is illumined by the *śuddha-caitanya* (pure consciousness) and also to maintain that *antaḥkaraṇa* gets modified to the size of the object is not very adequate explanation.

1. *Bhagavatī* 4, 3.

2. *Sthānāṅga* 5, 3.

3. *Nandīsūtra* 2, 3.

It is, therefore, more appropriate to maintain that *buddhacaitanya* directly cognises the object without the help of any modifications or reflections.

According to the Buddhists *pratyakṣa* is *nirvikalpa jñāna*. It is indeterminate cognition. But Jains maintain that *nirvikalpaka bodha* cognition (*darśana*) is not determinate cognition. Therefore, it is neither *pratyakṣa* nor even *pramāṇa*.¹

We have already seen that *pratyakṣa* according to the Jains have been distinguished from two points of view : (1) *pāramārthika* (the ultimate point of view) and *vyāvahārika* (phenomenal point of view).² In the *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* we have mentioned two types : *sakala* and *vikala*. And *vyāvahārika pratyakṣa* has been distinguished into four stages : *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*.

PAROKṢA

That knowledge which is *yathārtha* (adequate) and yet which has the characteristic of being unclear and distinct is called *parokṣa pramāṇa*.³ *Parokṣa* is opposite of *pratyakṣa*. In this, there is the absence of clearness and distinctness (*vaiśadya* and *spṛṣṭatā*). *Parokṣa* is of five types (1) *smaraṇa-smṛti* (memory), (2) *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) (3) *tarka* (logical discussion), (4) *anumāna* (inference) and (5) *āgama* (testimony).⁴

Most of the Jaina logicians have made these five distinctions in the *parokṣa pramāṇa*. But Vādirāja in his commentary on *Nyāyaviniścaya* called *Pramāṇa nirṇaya*,⁵ that *parokṣa* can be classified into two types : (i) *anumāna* and (ii) *āgama*. *Anumāna* is of two types : (1) primary (*mukhya*) and (2) secondary (*gauṇa*). *Gauṇa anumāna* is

1. *Jaina Darśana ke Maulika Tattva* (Hindi) Part I, 264—265

2. *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka* 2, 4

3. (a) *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 2.

(b) *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka* 3, 1

4. *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka* 3, 2.

5. *Pramāṇanirṇaya* p. 331.

of three types (1) *smaraṇa* (2) *pratyabhijñā* and *tarka*. *Smaraṇa* is the cause of *pratyabhijñā* and *pratyabhijñā* is the cause of *tarka*. Hence these three are the instruments in the formation of *anumāna*. Therefore he has considered these as *gauṇa*. There is another reason mentioned in the *Nyāyaviniścaya*, in that work *pratyākṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama* have been mentioned as *pramāṇas*, and other *pramāṇas* have been included as form of *anumāna*.

REFUTATION OF CĀRVĀKA VIEW

The *Cārvāka* maintains that sense-perception is the only valid source of knowledge, there is no other *pramāṇa*. The criterion for determining the *pramāṇa* suggested by *Cārvāka* is *avisamvāda* (non-contradiction with fact). And the other *pramāṇas* except the *indriya pratyākṣa* are based or do not possess these characteristics. *Anumāna* and other *pramāṇas* are based on probability. And there would be distinctions and differentiations in the strength of probability on the basis of the time element and the element of form. In these cases, it would be difficult to find the characteristics of *avinābhāva* and *avyabhicāra* (unerring). For example, a sour and bitter fruit may be transformed into a sweet fruit through the passage of time and in a different place due to some material transformations also. Therefore, the inference regarding the fruit as bitter would not be adequate. Similarly, the case is with *smaraṇa* and other *pramāṇas*.

But this contention of the *Cārvāka* is not satisfactory, because even to affirm the sweetness or otherwise of the fruit in the first instant would involve the process of inference and other forms of *pramāṇas*. Similarly, to make a distinction between *pratyākṣa pramāṇa* and other forms of *pramāṇas* as invalid source of knowledge on the basis of the criterion of *avisamvāda* (non-contradiction) would involve the process of inference. Similarly, it is not possible to know the mind of the others without the help of the inference. Because through the *indriyas* we cannot know the mind of others.

We can know the mental states of others by inference on the basis of the behaviour and their speech.¹ The inference is based on

1 *Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*

the universal relation between the middle term and the major term and the application of that universal relation to specific instance. If this application is inconsistent and incoherent, valid inference would not be possible. The *Cārvāka* maintains that the other world is unreal. This conclusion of *Cārvāka* is also based on inference. If we do not make use of the inference for getting knowledge, life would be difficult and knowledge impossible. It would be necessary to correlate the cause-effect relation for the sake of becoming valid conclusions in inference. Similarly, in practical life we have to depend on the testimony of others for the sake of knowledge. Otherwise the knowledge and the life would not be possible on surer foundation. Human knowledge has no limits. Therefore, knowledge obtained through other-means than the direct cognition through sense-organs, like inference and testimony would not become inconsistent and invalid.¹

MEMORY (*SMṚTI*) 143

The revival of the mental traces due to retention could be memory.² Memory depends on recollection of the mental states retained in the mind of past experience. The recollection of the impressions received in the past is due to various causes, physical and the mental. The mental states of interest would be an important condition of memory. Jāinas consider memory as a form of *prajñā*.

Other *darśanas* in Indian philosophy do not give the status of *pramāṇa* to memory. According to them memory cannot become a *pramāṇa* because it has reference to the past events and the past events were perceived in the past and are no longer present to the mind. At most, this is a form of revival of perceptual experience. But Jāinas maintain that the correct knowledge of object with reference to the past, present or the future may be considered to be a *pramāṇa*. Memory presents the valid cognition of the past event through recollection. Therefore, it is *pramāṇa*. Knowledge received through memory is

1 (a) *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 2, 3

(b) *Parīkṣāmukha* 3, 3.

2 Mahendra Kumār Jain, *Jaina darśana*, p. 294—295

consistent and has a reference to the past event. Because the criterion of *pramāṇa* would be correctness (*yathārthatā*) and correspondence to the fact of life.

The other *Darśanas* maintain that the past experience is no longer present and therefore how can it generate a valid cognition. The Jainas contend that the object is not the cause of cognition and cognition is possible through its own conditions of cognition. Cognition has its own capacity of expressing itself and revealing the object. Similarly, the thing can become the object of cognition. The relation between the cognition and the object is not to be considered as a relation between the effect and cause. The relation between the object and the cognition of the object can be expressed as the relation between the illumination and the illuminator. Therefore, the Jainas have rightly contended *smṛti* (memory) as a *pramāṇa*. If we do not accept *smṛti* as a *pramāṇa*, then *anumāna* cannot be considered as a *pramāṇa*. Because *anumāna* depends on the *liṅga* (middle term) which is not based on *pratyakṣa*. Similarly, the cognition of the major term is not possible without the memory of the universal relation of the major term and the middle term. Memory, therefore, is an essential condition of inference.

PRATYABHIJÑĀ (RECOGNITION)

Pratyabhijñāna is the valid cognition that we get through the synthesis of *pratyakṣa* and *smaraṇa* (memory).¹ In this, we say this is Devadatta. We recognise that the cow at home is the animal that we see. We also say that the buffalo is different from the cow. These statements are expressions of recognition. The process of cognition in this would be, we see Devadatta, we recollect that we have seen him in the past and we recognise that Devadatta that we see, is the same Devadatta that we have seen earlier. We see an animal in the forest called *gavaya*. We remember the cow at home which is similar to this animal and we say, we recognise that this animal is like the cow at home. This

1 (a) *Parīkṣāmukha* 3, 5.

(b) *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 2, 4.

is called *sādṛśa pratyabhijñāna* as it is based on similarity. But we can recognise the distinction between the buffalo and the cow. It would be recognition based on the point of dissimilarity. Therefore, it is "*vaiśāḍṛśa pratyabhijñāna*". *Pratyabhijñāna* is recognition arrived at through the process of perceptual memory. Similarly, all relational cognition like the statements : this is near, this is far, he is taller, and the elderer etc., are all forms of recognition.

The Buddhists maintain that nothing is permanent in the world. Everything is fleeting. Therefore, nothing continues to remain from the past. *Pratyabhijñāna* cannot be considered as a *pramāṇa*. Because, it is said to be cognition which proceeds from the past to the present. But as a thing is not possible and there is no continuity of thing, there cannot be a cognition of the past in the present. The past cognition has been destroyed. The present cognition has no reference to the past. Therefore, recognition cannot present the past cognition into the present. *Pratyabhijñāna* would include two cognitions. One refers to "that which was experienced in the past", & the other cognition refers "this which is actually experienced now". These two cannot become one cognition. Therefore, the Buddhists do not consider recognition as a *pramāṇa*. The other systems of Indian philosophy like *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Mīmāṃsakas*, say that *pratyabhijñāna* is a valid cognition, but it is a form of perception and it can be included in the *pratyakṣa*. But the Jainas contend that the Buddhist view of *pratyabhijñāna* as two separate cognitions and therefore not a *pramāṇa* and the view of other systems of philosophy making *pratyabhijñāna* as a form of perception are both inadequate. *Pratyakṣa* has a reference to cognition of the present. Memory refers to the cognition of the past event, but *pratyabhijñāna* gives a synthesis of the cognition of the present with the recollection of the past incident. Therefore, it is a *pramāṇa* and is a valid source of knowledge. It is a *parokṣa pramāṇa*.

TARKA (HYPOTHETICAL REASONING) ५-४

Tarka is hypothetical reasoning. It is conditioned reasoning.¹

1. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 2.

It is also called *gha*. It has also been referred to as *cintā* in the Jaina *śāstras*. It is inference based on the previous condition. It has two constituent conditional propositions as the major premise. It can be stated as "if 'a' is 'b' then 'c' is 'd', and because 'a' is 'b' therefore 'c' is 'd'." For instance, if there is fire, there is smoke and if there is no fire there is no smoke.

Vyāpti is the universal relation between the middle term and the major term. *Tarka* is inference based on the positive and negative conditions of the universality of relation between the middle term and the major term.

Generally all schools of Indian philosophy have accepted *tarka* as a *pramāṇa*. The *Naiyāyikas* maintain that *tarka* is a form of inference and not an independent *pramāṇa*. It is an auxiliary *pramāṇa* and is based on conditioned relation between the antecedent and the *pramāṇa*. The knowledge that we get through *tarka* strengthens the validity of knowledge. *Pramāṇa* is valid cognition and *tarka* strengthens and supports this cognition by hypothetical reasoning. Therefore, the *Naiyāyikas* has considered *tarka* as secondary *pramāṇa*. Logicians like Udayana and Vardhamāna have considered that *tarka* has function of supporting the valid conclusion by presenting the universality of condition. Knowledge of *vyāpti* is strengthened by *tarka*. But the *Nyāya* does not accept *tarka* as an independent *pramāṇa*. The Buddhists have accepted that *tarka* is useful in the establishment of *vyāpti*, but still they do not give the *tarka* the status of a *pramāṇa*. But Jains have recognised it as a *parokṣa pramāṇa*. According to the Jains the knowledge of *vyāpti* in its positive and negative aspect is possible through *tarka*.

Anumāna (inference) cannot take the place of *tarka*, because it is based on *tarka*. The knowledge of *vyāpti* is possible through *tarka* and inference is based on knowledge of *vyāpti*. Therefore, *anumāna* is possible because of *tarka*. And *anumāna* cannot take place of the *tarka*. The two are different *pramāṇas*.

ANUMĀNA (INFERENCE)

Anumāna is knowledge which is arrived at through the means

of other knowledge.¹ It is possible through the middle term and therefore it is said that *anumāna* is possible through *liṅga*.² *Liṅga* is the middle term which connects the major and minor terms. Just as we can infer the existence of fire through the perception of smoke. Smoke is the *liṅga*. It is the means through which inference is possible. Fire is the major term about which we infer. It is called *Sādhya* or *liṅgī*. *Dhūma* (smoke) is the attribute of fire. Without fire the existence of smoke is not possible. Therefore, the relation between fire and smoke is of *avinābhāvī* (universal positive relation). The absence of fire will also be the absence of smoke. The relation is also universal considered from the negative sense. But the converse is not true. By the absence of smoke we cannot infer the absence of fire, because there may be fire without smoke, but there cannot be smoke without fire.

The relation between the major term and the middle term will have to be universal, both positively and negatively. In the sense that the presence of the middle term will bring the presence of the major term. And the absence of the middle term will bring the absence of the major term. This type of relation is the basis of valid inference. Akalaṅka terms this relation as "*sādhyaavinābhāvābhiniibodh-aikalakṣaṇā*". This type of relation is also called *anyathānupapatti*, as it presents the universality of relation of the negative sense. *Sādhana* or *liṅga* is called *hetu*.

All the systems of Indian philosophy, except the *Cārvāka*, accept *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa*. *Cārvāka darśana* does not give *anumāna* the status of *pramāṇa*, because it is based on *vyāpti*. And *vyāpti* cannot be grasped by direct perception through perception. The *Cārvāka* does not accept the phenomenon of extra-sense-perception or knowledge obtained not through the sense-organs, but through other means. The other systems of philosophy have distinguished it into

1 (a) *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 2, 7.

(b) *Parīkṣāmukha* 3, 14.

2 *Laghīyastraya* 3, 22

two types : (1) *Svārthānumāna* (inference for oneself) and (2) *Parārthānumāna* (inference for the sake of others).

SVĀRTHĀNUMĀNA (INFERENCE FOR ONESELF)

Svārthānumāna is inference for oneself in which we get valid inference on the basis of the *vyāpti*. But this is not expressed in the verbal proposition. It is meant for oneself and the moment it is expressed in the form of proposition it becomes *parārthānumāna*. The universal relation may refer to co-existence or succession. For instance, in the case of the invariable concomitance of mortality, and man, there is the universality of co-existence. But in the case of the presence of clouds and the consequent rain there would be succession.

SĀDHANA

In the *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, Ācārya Hemacandra mentions five forms of *sādhana* : (1) *Svabhāva*, (2) *kāraṇa*, (3) *kārya*, (4) *ekārtha-samavāyī* and (5) *virodhī*.¹ *Svabhāva sādhana* is the essential characteristics of the object. As for instance, heat is the characteristic of the fire. *Śabda* (sound) is non-eternal because it is not the cause (*kāraṇa*), it is the effect (*kārya*). When we see the collection of dark clouds in the sky, we infer the possibility of rain and in this, the relation is between cause and effect (*kāraṇa-kārya*). In the inference between cause and effect there must be necessary relation between cause and effect and not the contingent relation. Moreover, the absence of that cause should bring the absence of the effect. The inference from effect to cause is the type of inference in which we proceed from effect to the cause of that event. For instance, we see the open space outside wet, when we get up early in the morning, then we infer that it must have rained. In this, we proceed from effect to the cause.

In some cases it is possible to have a conjunction of effect as in the case of juice of many fruits. To infer the nature of the juice from the fruit is the inference from cause to effect. But to infer from the juice, the nature of the fruit would be from effect to cause. This

1 *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 1, 2, 12

type of inference, is called *ekārthasamavāyī* inference, because there is the co-existence of the cause and the effect or the attribute and the object.

Inference from the negative relation of universality would be *virodhī sādhana*. For instance, fire and cold are contrary to each other. If one exists, the other cannot exist. In the presence of the fire, there would be no cold. But a small portion of fire cannot remove cold, therefore the relation between the cause and the effect or the attribute and the object of attribute has to be adequate (*samyak*).

PARĀRTHĀNUMĀNA (INFERENCE FOR OTHERS) 1 / 1

Parārthānumāna is inference meant for others. It is communicated for the sake of others.¹ *Svārthānumāna* is meant for self-expression. In the case of *parārthānumāna*, a person communicates his reasoning or the methods of reasoning for the sake of coming to the conclusion to other person who does not know. It is communicated through the propositional form (*avayava*). This knowledge and inference is not meant for one who already knows and has the knowledge of the methodology or reasoning.

In *parārthānumāna* knowledge is obtained by the self (*svayam-jñānātma*), and while it is communicated to others through the medium of communication in propositional forms.²

The conceptional content of *parārthānumāna* has to be communicated in the propositional form for the sake of giving knowledge to others. This type of communication in *parārthānumāna* may be considered in two forms : (1) affirmative and (2) negative. Both of them are based on the universal relation between the *sādhya* and *sādhana*. In the affirmative form of communication, the universal relation of the presence of the effect or the thing having attribute. For instance, the presence of smoke on the hill entails the inference of the presence of fire. The negative form of communication of universality of relation, gives the relation between the cause and the effect and the

1 *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 2, 1, 1

2 *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka* 3, 23

thing and its attributes in a negative way. The absence of the cause will entail the absence of the effect. Similarly, the absence of the essential attribute will entail the absence of the thing. The absence of fire on the hill will entail the inference of the absence of smoke.

AVAYAVA (CONSTITUENT PROPOSITION OF INFERENCE)

Parārthānumāna has to be communicated in propositional forms for the sake of giving knowledge to others. The question arises regarding the number of constituent propositions forming *parārthānumāna*. Logicians are not agreed on this point. *Sāṅkhya* philosophers say that there are three constituent propositions (*avayava*) : (1) *pakṣa*, (2) *hetu* and (3) *udāharaṇa*. *Mīmāṃsakas* mention four constituent propositions; (1) *pakṣa*, (2) *hetu*, (3) *udāharaṇa* and (4) *upanaya*. The *Nyāya* mentions five constituent propositions like : (1) *pakṣa*, (2) *hetu* (3) *udāharaṇa* (4) *upanaya* and (5) *nigamana*.

We have already discussed about the number of constituent propositions that the Jainas present. Generally for an intelligent man, two propositions mentioning the major term and middle term in one proposition and the second, the minor premise are sufficient for inferring the conclusion. But to men of dull intellect, ten propositions would be required for explaining the process of inference. Generally five constituent propositions are accepted.

PRATIJÑĀ

Pratijñā is the first proposition. It expresses the statement regarding the major term. It is the statement of what is to be proved.¹ For instance, we state there is fire on the hill.

HETU

Hetu is the statement of reason which mentions the presence of the middle term.² It states—because there is smoke, the presence of the smoke is a symptom for the presence of the fire, although we can say the presence of the smoke does not entail the presence of fire.

1 *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 2, 1, 11

2 *Ibid* 2, 1, 12

UDĀHARAṆA

Udāharaṇa is the statement of the major premise containing the universal relation between the major and middle term. And also the examples. In the Aristotelian tense it is a major premise, which examples the universal proposition and in which there is the universal relation between the major and the middle term. But in the *udāharaṇa*, there is also the example. For instance, the statement would be "where there is smoke there is fire as for example in the kitchen." *Udāharaṇa* is, therefore, a combination of the deductive and inductive process. While Aristotelian major premise impurely deductive and formal.¹

UPANAYA

Upanaya is the application of the universal proposition to a particular situation. It expresses the middle and minor term and says that this particular situation falls under the category of the major premise.² For example, there is smoke in this hill, this is the application of a particular situation to the general proposition.

NIGAMAṆA

Nigamaṇa refers to the conclusion which we arrive at finally on the basis of the combination of minor and major premises. It is the result of the application of the *vyāpti* and *pakṣa dharmatā*. It is the restatement in a final form what was intended to be proved in the *pratijñā*.³ For example, we say therefore there is fire on the hill. The inference based on five constituent propositions may be summarised as follows :

- (1) *Pratijñā*—there is fire on the hill,
- (2) *Hetu*—because there is smoke,
- (3) *Udāharaṇa*—where there is smoke there is fire, for example, in the kitchen.
- (4) *Upanaya*—this hill has smoke.

1 *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 2, 1, 13

2 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 3, 49, 50

3 *Ibid* 3, 51, 52

(5) *Nigamana*—therefore this hill has fire.

This form of inference is based on the universality or relation between the middle term and the major term in the positive sense of the existence of the relation. Therefore, it is called *sādhāraṇa dṛṣṭānta*, which shows the universal relation in the absence as in the case of the absence of fire in the water.

ĀGAMA

Āgama is testimony. It is the acceptance of the truthful statements of worthy man.¹ It is the *āptavacana*. *Āptapuruṣa* is the man of authority. He is the expert in the subject and he knows how to present his knowledge in a subject in a proper form. He is free from hatred and attachment. He is objective in his approach and has no prejudices or bias. He is not afflicted by *mithyātva*. From the practical point of view statement of such an *āptapuruṣa* is important. In the *parārthānumāna* *āptatva* is not necessary while in the *āgama* it would be necessary. The statements of an *āptapuruṣa* (the authority) are valid for all the time—past, present and the future. *Tīrthaṅkaras* are considered to be the *āptapuruṣa* par-excellence. We have already discussed about the *āgama* as a *pramāṇa* in the earlier chapter.

□

¹ *Framāṇanayatattvāloka* 4, 1

Part IV

KARMAVĀDA

DOCTRINE OF KARMA

KARMAVĀDA : A Synopsis

THE IMPORTANCE OF KARMA THEORY

The doctrine of *karma* is the most important doctrine in Indian thought. All the systems of Indian philosophy, except the *Cārvāka* accept the doctrine of *karma*. *Karma* is the basic pre-supposition of Indian thought. In this world, there is evident inequality in the status and the experiences of individual men. Some are happy while others are miserable. Very often the virtuous lead miserable life. Bad men are happy. Several attempts have been made in the different philosophies of the world to find out an adequate solution to the problems of inequality in life. The Indian philosophers presented the theory of *karma* as a possible solution to the inequality in life. The Jainas have given a systematic study of *karma* theory based on rational considerations. They have in fact built a science of *karma* theory. In the literature dealing with the theory of *karma*, we find that Jainas have made a substantial contributions to the literature of the *karma* theory. They are called as *karma śāstras* or *karma grāthas*. In addition to the specific writings on *karma* theory, we find abundant material scattered in various philosophical literature both *āgamic* and *non-āgamic* on the doctrine of *karma*.

LITERATURE ON KARMA THEORY

Jaina Literature on *karma* theory is very vast & thought-provoking. If we study the Jaina literature on this subject, we can make three divisions of the *karma* literature : (1) *pūrvāmaka karma śāstras*, originating from the sources of the *pūrvas*. (2) *Pūrvoddhṛta karma śāstra* which is based on *pūrvas* and elaborated on the basis of the doctrines given in the *pūrvas*. (3) *Prākaraṇika karma śāstra*, it is an

elaborate discussion about the development of the theory of *karma* as discussed in *karma* literature.

If we study the Jaina canonical literature, we find that 8th *pūrva* out of the 14 *pūrvas* relate to the discussion about the theory of *karma* and it is called *Karma Pravāda*. Similarly, a part of the second *pūrva* is also called *Karma Prābhṛta*. A part of the fifth *pūrva* is called *Kaṣāya Prābhṛta*. There is a discussion on the *karma* theory in these works. The *karma* theory is elaborated in the *pūrvoddhṛta* literature coming after the *pūrvas* and based upon original discussion in the *pūrvas*. The nature of the development cannot be easily explained as much of the *pūrva* literature is lost, according to both the traditions of the Jainas. Though some *pūrvoddhṛta karma śāstras* are available to us but there are slight variations in the presentation of the theory of *karma* in the two traditions. *Digambara* tradition gives importance to *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama* and *Kaṣāyaprabhṛta* as the two important works dealing with *karma* theory. In the *Śvetāmbara* tradition we have *Karma Prakṛti*, *Karma Śataka*, *Pañca saṅgraha* and *Saptatikā*. These are the *pūrvoddhṛta granthas*.

In the *prākaraṇika karma śāstras*, we have numerous works and they are based on the *pūrvoddhṛta karma* literature.

This form of literature was given during the periods from Vikrama 8th century to the 16th or 17th century. Later literature of the *karma* literature is the elaboration of the *karma* theory.

From the point of language in which the *karma* theory has been presented we find there is abundant literature in *prākṛt saṁskṛt* and regional languages. *Pūrvātmaka* and *pūrvoddhṛta* literature is to be mainly found in *Prākṛt* language. The *prākaraṇika karma* literature is also to be found in *Prākṛt* literature along with its commentaries. Later writings on *karma* theories are generally in *Saṁskṛt*. There is a good deal of literature on the *karma* theory in the regional languages like—Kannada, Hindi and Gujarati. Works in Kannada and Hindi mainly belong to the *Digambara* tradition and works in Gujarati refer to *Śvetāmbara* tradition. On the whole, the literature on *karma* theory is very vast and we may estimate that the *Digambara*

writing constitute about 5 lakhs of *ślokas* and *Śvetāmbara* literature comes to about two lakhs of *ślokas*.

In the *Śvetāmbara* tradition, the earliest independent work on the *karma* theory is the *Karma Prakṛti* of Śivaśarma Suri. It has 475 gathas. Ācārya has discussed in his work the eight processes of the *kārmic* mechanism like *bandhṇākarāṇa*, *saṅkramaṇākarāṇa*, *udvartanākarāṇa*, *apavartanākarāṇa*, *udīraṇākarāṇa*, *upaśamṇākarāṇa*, *nidhattikarāṇa* and *nikācunākarāṇa*.

There is also a description of the concepts of *udaya* and *sattā* of *kārmic* matter. There is a commentary (*Cūrṇi*) on this book. There are other commentaries (*ṭīkā*) written on this work Ācāryas like Malayagiri and Yaśovijaya. They are in *sanskṛt*. Ācārya Śivaśarma has also written a *śataka* on *karma* theory and Malayagiri has written a commentary on this. Candrarṣi Mahattara, a disciple of Pārśvarṣi has written *pañcasaṅgraha* and *svopajñā-vṛtti* on the *karma* theory. There is also a *Digambara* work called *Prākṛt Pañcasaṅgraha* which is earlier than this work. It appears that the *Digambara* work was not found to be consistent with the *āgamic* version. Therefore, Candrarṣi Mahattara wrote this (new) *Pañcasaṅgraha*. Ācārya Malayagiri has written a *sanskṛt* commentary on this. There are other works like *Karma-vipāka*, *Karma-stava*, *Bandha-svāmīva*, *Saptatikā* and *Śataka*. There are *svopajñābhāṣyas* also on these works. Devendrasuri has written five works on *karma* theory based on the early works on this subject. In this way, we find there is abundant literature in the *Jaina śāstras* on the theories of *karma*.

KARMA THEORY AND THE OTHER DOCTRINES

Before we study the nature of the theory of *karma*, it would be necessary to examine the other theories which attempt to explain the inevitable equality among man. Several theories have been presented. We mention a few of them like *Kālavāda*, *Svabhāvavāda*, *Niyativāda*, *Yadṛcchavāda*, *Bhūtavāda*, *Puruṣavāda*, *Daivavāda*, & *Puruṣārthavāda*.¹

1 *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 1, 2

There is a brief discussion about these theories in the works mentioned below.¹

KĀLĀVĀDA (THEORY OF TIME)

According to the theory of *Kālavāda* the various states of existence and happiness and misery of individual beings are determined by *kāla*. *Kāla* is the determining principle which creates and destroys. It determines the good and bad of actions. In the *Atharvaveda*,² there is an independent *sūkta* for describing the importance of *kāla* (time). *Kāla* has created the earth (*pṛthivī*), it is the basis of the sun and the heat of the sun. All the beings of the world depend on *kāla*. The eyes perceive things due to *kāla*. *Kāla* is the *Īśvara*. It is the lord of *Prajāpati*. *Kāla* is the first of the gods. There is nothing more powerful than *kāla*. In this *sūkta*, *kāla* has been described as the first cause of the universe.

In the *Mahābhārata*, there is the description of the importance of the *kāla* as a first cause of the universe and is the basis of life and death and happiness and misery of all beings, let alone the human beings.³

In the *Śāstravārtā-samuccaya*, it has been stated that time determines everything, living being entering into the womb of the mother, the childhood and all other incidents connected with life and experience, are determined by time. *Kāla* is the destroyer of everyone. *Kāla* is awake when everyone is asleep. It is not possible to transgress the limits of *kāla* and it is not possible to have any events or experiences in the absence of *kāla*.⁴ The concept of 'Time' is so important in philosophy that the *Naiyāyikas* gave time very important status equal to the creation of the universe.⁵

1 (a) See *Ātmamīmāṃsā* p. 86-94—Pt. Dalsukh Mālvapiā.

(b) *Jaina Sūhṛitya kā Bṛhad Itihās*, part 4, p. 8

(c) *Jaina Dharma aur Darśana*, p. 416--424 Dr. Mohanlāl Mehta

2 *Atharvaveda* 19, 53--54

3 *Mahābhārata*, *Śāntiparva* 25, 28, 32 etc

4 *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* 165-168

5 *Nyāyasiddhānta muktāvali* 45

SVABHĀVAVĀDA (THEORY OF NATURE)

According to this theory, everything takes place according to its nature. Nothing happens contrary to its nature. *Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad* mentions *svabhāvavāda*.¹ The *Bhagavadgītā*² and *Mahābhārata* have given a description of *svabhāvavāda*.³ In the *Buddhacarita*, we get the description of *svabhāvavāda* and it has been stated that according to this theory, the pointedness of the thorns and the variety in the birds and animals is due to the very nature of these things. *Svabhāvavāda* does not recognise the will or efforts of the individual.⁴ Ācārya Haribhadra in his *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*, says that according to *svabhāvavāda* the events and experiences are determined by the very nature of the objects. For example, the various stages of life like the childhood and oldage are determined by the nature of the individual. There is no external force. *Svabhāva* plays an important part in the life incident and experiences of individual beings. In fact, even pulses and rice can be cooked due to their very nature.⁵ For every action, the nature of the event or the object is the determining factor. This theory of *svabhāvavāda* does not recognise the creator or the controller of the universe except the very nature of the objects and events.

Niyati-vāda (Theory of necessity—Necessarianism)

According to this theory, everything happens out of necessity. What is to happen must happen, there is no chage in that. Everything is determined and there is nothing left to chance. Freedom of will has no place in the *niyativāda*. The western philosopher Spinoza says that it is due to ignorance that we say that we are free and that freedom of the will is an impotrant factor. Whatever happens, must happen. We cannot change the past because the past has already gone. We do not know the future and it is not desirable to swing

1 *Śvetāśvatara* 1, 2

2 *Bhagavadgītā* 5, 14

3 *Mahābhārata Śanti* parva 25, 16

4 *Buddhacarita* 52

5 *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* 169-172

from hopes and fears. Yesterday is dead and tomorrow is unborn. Everything is determined. It is therefore not proper to blame anyone for the failure nor to offer praises for the success.

The first mention of the *niyatīvāda* is to be found in the *Śvetāsvatara upaniṣad*. But the Buddhist *tripiṭakas* and the *Jaina āgamas* have given exhaustive discussion about this theory of *niyatīvāda*. In the *Dīghanikāya Sāmaññaphala sutta*, there is a description of *niyatīvāda* as given by Maṅkhalī Goṣālaka. According to Maṅkhalī Goṣālaka the evil that living beings do, has no other reason except its very necessity. Similarly, the good is necessary and has no other external reasons. We cannot say that we change our destiny and that by our efforts we can build up our personality. The beings in this world experience the pain and sufferings through six types of resistance. Having gone through the 84 lakhs of *mahākālpa* and the wheel of life, the wise and ignorant are like to become free from misery.¹

In the *Jaina āgamic* literature also, we get beautiful description of *niyatīvāda* and *akriyāvāda*. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*,² *Vyākhyāpṛajñapti*³ and *Upāsakadaśāṅga*⁴ have given adequate description of *niyatīvāda*. In the Buddhist literature, it has been suggested that Pakudha Kātyāyana, and Pūraṇa Kāśyapa advocated *niyatīvāda*.⁵ There is not much of a difference between *niyatīvāda* and *akriyāvāda*. They agree in their fundamental principles. But later the disciples of Pūraṇa Kāśyapa joined the fold of the disciples of *ājīvikas*.⁶

Ācārya Haribhadra while describing the nature of the *niyatīvāda* states that everything is determined by the origination of a thing in a particular way, the states of a thing and its destruction are all deter-

1 (a) *Dīghanikāya sāmaññaphala sutta*

(b) *Buddhacarita*, p. 171—Dharmānanda Kauśāmbī

2 *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2, 1; 12; 2, 6

3 *Vyākhyāpṛajñapti*, śataka 15

4 *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, adhyayana 6-7

5 *Dīghanikāya-sāmaññaphala sutta*

6 *Buddhacarita* p. 179—Dharmānanda Kauśāmbī

mined. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to refute its theory because refutation would be a form of *niyati* according to them. Necessity devours everything.¹

YADṚCHHĀVĀDA (ACCIDENTALISM)

According to *Yadṛchhāvāda*, whatever happens, happens accidentally without any reason. There is neither the cause nor reason for happening of the event. Therefore, it is not necessary to explain the causal relation between the different things. *Yadṛchhā* means accident and without any reason.² According to the *Naiyāyikas*, *Yadṛchhāvāda* refers to *animitavāda* and according to this theory, no explanation can be given for any phenomenon.³

We can find the mention of *yadṛchhāvāda* in the *Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad*,⁴ *Śāntiparva* of *Mahābhārata*⁵ and *Nyāyasūtra*⁶. We can, therefore, say that the *yadṛchhāvāda* is a very ancient theory. It has been referred to by various names like *akasmātvāda*, *animitavāda*, *akāraṇavāda*, *aḥetuvāda* and *yadṛchhāvāda*. In this theory, there is no relation between the cause and the effect, the reasons and ground of the reasons.

Some philosophers identify *svabhāvanavāda* with *yadṛchhāvāda* but it would be apt to say that there are some differences in the sense that *svabhāvanavāda* makes *svabhāva* (nature), the cause of the event. But *yadṛchhāvāda* altogether denies the causal relation.⁷

BHŪTAVĀDA (THEORY OF ELEMENTS)

The *Bhūtavāda* maintains that everything in the universe is due to primary elements like earth, water, fire and air. Material and mental phenomena are due to these four elements. There is nothing

1 *Śāstravārtīsamuccaya* 174

2 *Nyāyabhāṣya* 3, 2, 3

3 *Nyāyasūtra* 4, 1, 22

4 *Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad* 1, 2

5 *Mahābhārata Śāntiparva* 33, 33

6 *Nyāyasūtra* 4, 1, 22

7 *Nyāyabhāṣya*—Translated by Phaṇibhūṣaṇa 4. 1, 24

outside these elements. Those philosophers who advocate the theory of *ātman* are doing nothing, but expressing the materialistic approach of the *ātman* in the sense that the *ātman* is the product of the elements. There is no *ātman* which is different from this element. There is nothing like a spiritual substance, the body is found due to the combination of the elements and when the body is destroyed the elements are separated and there is no trace of the *ātman* at all.

Just as the assembly of small parts of a machine, make a machine running in order. So also the organism disintegrates if the limbs are destroyed. Similarly, by mixing beetle nut, beetle leaves and lime we get red colour. So also the combination of different forms of the four element gives rise to consciousness.¹ Consciousness is a by-product of the metabolic changes in the organism, if the body is destroyed, consciousness is also destroyed. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, there is the mention of *taijīva-taiśarīravāda* and *pañcabhūtavāda*. It has been suggested that body and mind are not separated. This theory is also called *anātmavāda* or *nāstikavāda*, because it denies the consciousness of mind or God. The theory of *pañcabhūtavāda* says that *jīva* is the product of the combination of the five *bhūtas* (elements) *pṛthvī* (earth), *jala* (water), *agni* (fire), *vāyu* (air) and *ākāśa* (space). There is a difference between *taijīva* and *taīśarīravāda* and *pañcabhūtavāda* in that the former maintains that the soul and body are identical while the later maintains that soul and consciousness are products of the combination of the five *bhūtas*. When the body is destroyed, the soul is also destroyed.

According to the theory of elements, whatever is amenable to sense is alone real. Whatever is not verifiable to sense-experience, is not real. In this sense, the other world, heaven and hell, the soul and god are unreal. *Pratyakṣa* is the only *pramāṇa*. The functional utility is the only criterion or activity of reality. It is in this sense materialistic and pragmatic in its approach. The Darwinian theory of evolution is an expression of this *Bhautikavāda*. It advocates the possibility of the development of the mind through the evolution from

1 *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha*, parichheda 1

matter. In this sense, consciousness is a form of matter and evolute of matter.

PURUṢAVĀDA (THE THEORY OF CREATOR)

According to this theory, *Īsvara* is the creator, sustainer and the destroyer of the universe. *Īsvara* is the person who is responsible for the origination, protection and the destruction of the universe. The intelligence and the power of *Īsvara* remain intact even at the time of *pralaya* (dissolution) of the universe. *Puruṣavāda* is, therefore, theistic in approach.¹

Puruṣavāda can be distinguished into two forms, as *brahmavāda* and *Īśvaravāda* which is theistic.

Brahmavāda maintains that just as the spider is the efficient cause of the web, and the banyan tree is the cause of the numerous roots branching downwards, so also *puruṣabrahma* is the efficient cause of the entire universe, in its creation, maintenance and destruction. *Brahman* is, therefore, the basic principle of the universe. It is the *upādāna kāraṇa*, in a sense, the primary or the material cause.

*Īśvaravādin*s maintain that matter and spirit are primordial and original substances. The interaction between matter and space and their association is due to *Īsvara*. In this sense, *Īsvara* is the efficient cause, of the creation, sustenance and the destruction of the universe. Without *Īsvara*, nothing is possible and nothing moves. He is the controller of the universe and he determines the nature of things and the movement of things.

DAIVAVĀDA (THEORY OF FATE)

Daivavāda emphasises the predominance of fate which is the determining factor in the activity of man. Everything is predetermined by fate or destiny. The moving finger writes and have written, moves on, not a word can be changed of it. We are children of fate. Man is a slave of fate. We have to suffer the onslaughts of destiny and experience the fruits of *karma*. Destiny shapes our end and we have to experience the *karma* determined by fate.² There is a distin-

1 *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, p. 55

2 *Ātmanīmāṃsā*, kārīkā 89-91

ction between *daivavāda* and *niyativāda* although they appear to be identical. *Daivavāda* accepts the authority of *karma* as a determining factor in the prevalent inequality of status. But in the *niyativāda*, fatalism and determinism are absolute and unexplainable and inexplicable.

4.3 PURUṢĀRTHAVĀDA (THEORY OF SELF EFFORT)

According to the theory of self effort, individual *jīva* is responsible for shaping its own destiny. There is nothing as fate or destiny which is supreme. Men are masters of their own destinies. Self effort is the main cause of the success of our work or the failure, as it may be. The principle of freedom of the will is the basis of this theory.

THE JAINA VIEW

The Jaina view of *karma* presents a synthesis of determinism and free will, of *kāla*, *niyati*, *puruṣārthavāda* etc. The Jainas maintain that the thing of this world and the activities are complex and as they are complex and we cannot explain the causes of the things and activities with reference to one or the other cause like : *kāla*, *niyati*, *svabhāva* and *puruṣārtha*. We have to find out the causes and the predominance of one or the other in the complexity of things, it is necessary to introspect and find out the causes of happiness and misery within oneself. Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara says, that it is not proper to give importance to one of the five causes like *kāla*, *svabhāva*, *niyati*, *karma* and *puruṣārtha* and to involve the other. A phenomenon or an event is complex and all the cause may operate in various degree.¹ Ācārya Haribhadra also has supported this view.² We have to take a synoptic view of things and look at these problems from the point of view of *anekānta* (manysided approach). Ācārya Samantabhadra says that we have to seek the causes for the effect born without any individual efforts in fate or destiny. But self effort and conscious effort make towards attaining a goal makes us give importance to *puruṣa* for understanding the result in activities.

1 *Sanmatiprakaraṇa* 3, 53

2 *Śāstravārtasamuccaya* 191-192

In some cases *daiva* (destiny) plays an important part and in some other way *puruṣārtha* also plays an equally important role.¹ We have to consider the *puruṣārtha* and *daiva* as playing their dual roles in the explanation of things. The Jāinas do not accept the predominance of *Īśvara* for explaining the living and the non-living substances of the universe. It would be fruit-less to believe that *Īśvara* or *Brahman* is the primary cause of the origination, maintenance and destruction of the universe. *Karma* is an important factor which cannot be ignored in explaining the inequality of the beings of the universe. Similarly, it would not be an adequate explanation to maintain the cause of the phenomena of the universe and also the states of the *jīvas*, is to be found in some material source like the elements or the matter. It is necessary to posit a non-material substance like the pure consciousness for explaining the activities of the living beings. It is not possible to accept that a material substance becomes a cause of the immaterial or the mental. If that were to be soul, the very causal principle will have to be given out. Therefore, it is necessary to postulate the reality of the material and the immaterial principle like matter and spirit for explaining the phenomena of the universe and giving an adequate explanation of the fruits of the *karma*.

KARMAVĀDA (A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE)

The study of *karmavāda* in the historical perspective would require us to look at the theory and its development from the Vedic times & onwards. The Vedas are the earliest records of the world. The question arises : Whether the Vedic seers were aware of the *karma* theory or not ? This has raised a controversy. There are two views on this subject.

The first view maintains that the Vedic seers were not aware of the *karma* theory. According to this view, there is no mention of the *karma* theory, in the Vedic literature, Vedic philosophers explained the variety and the unique value is the state of individual being with reference to external reality. Some said that the elements are

the root causes of the diversity in the world. Some others maintain, that *Prajāpati Brahman* is the ultimate source of this variety in this world. In this way, the cause has been referred as some divine destiny and we find the development of the thought in the *Rgveda* has been from polytheism, mono-theism and monism. But all of them looked outward to seek the causes of the complexity in the universe. Many gods like Mitra, Varuṇa were worshiped and invoked to give them happiness in this world. *Yajña* were performed and oblations like material objects and the living animals were offered in the *yajñas*. This stream of thought could be traced in the age of the *samhitā* and the *Brahmanas*.¹

But in the age of *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads* there is a shift in the emphasis in the philosophical speculation. The invocation to gods and the performance in the *yajña* become secondary. It is true that there is less discussion of *karmavāda* in the Vedic literature before *upaniṣads*. But it is also true that the *upaniṣads* were not agreeing regarding the diversity in the world. Some accepted *kāla* and others *prārabha*, and some others mentioned the view of *svabhāva* and *niyativāda*. The emphasis on *karma* casually gains ground.

The second view emphasised that although there is no specific and detailed discussion about the *karma* theory in the Vedic *samhitās*, there are mentions of the *karma* theory in the Vedas. In the *Rgveda* we get the following *mantras* : *Śubhaspatiḥ* (the protector of the *śubha karmas*), *Dhīyaspatiḥ* (the protector of good *karmas*), *vicarṣaṇiḥ* and *viśvacarṣaṇiḥ* (the seer of the good and bad *karmas*) and *viśvasya karmano dhartā* (the basis of all *karmas*). These *mantras* show that there is mention of the *kārmic* theory although in a brief way. The *karma* theory in its real form can be traced to *Rgveda*, although the development of the theory is to be found later. In the *Rgveda* it has also been suggested that one who does auspicious *karma* attains immortality (*amaratva*). *Jīva* continually takes birth and it dies in this world. Vāmadeva has given a description of many of his previ-

1 (a) *Ātmanīmāṃsā* Dabukh Mālvaṇiā p 78-79-80

(b) *Jaina Dharma aur Darśana*, Mohanlāl Mehtā

ous-births. Men worship gods and pray to them for the sake of getting themselves away from the evil effects of *karma* and rebirth. In the *Vedic saṃhitās*, there is a description of *sañcita* and *prārabdha karma*. There is also the description that those who do good *karmas* go to *brahmaloka* through the *devayāna* and those who have *sūdhārṇa karma* go to *candraloka* through *pitryāna*. It has also been described that the *jīva* due to its *karma* takes different forms in the different births like a tree or a creeper etc. It is clear from the following *mantras* “*mā vo bhujemānya jātameno*”, *mā vo eno anyakṛtāḥ bhujema*” etc. It has also been suggested that one can reap the fruits of *karma* gained by others through their activities. Therefore, these *mantras* have been recited. Primarily, a *jīva* experiences the fruits of *karma* due to the activities performed by oneself, but sometimes through a peculiar influence of a peculiar power, one *jīva* can experience the fruits of the *karma* of the other *jīva*.¹

From the discussion of the two views regarding the development of the *karma* theory in the Vedic literature, it may be noted that there has not been a full fledged discussion of the developed theory of *karma* in the Vedic literature, although there is mention of the concept of *karma*. But the concepts like theory of Fate and *yajña* have gained prominence and *karma* theory becomes secondary. We do not get adequate discussion about the nature of *karma* and the mechanism of the working of the *karma*. In the Vedic literature, there is emphasis on *yajña karma* and gradually gods have been invoked for the sake of equitable distribution of *karma*. Attempts have also been made to integrate *karma* theory with the theory of *yajña*. This we find in the *Pārvamīmāṃsā*. We also find that the development of the *yajña* theory has also led to the development of the *devavāda* (theory of deities). In the *Brāhmaṇas* we find a gradual substitution of Prajāpati in the place of many gods and there is suggestion that the dispensation of *karma* is done through Prajāpati. Prajāpati dispenses fruits according to different *karmas* acquired by individual beings, just like

1 (a) *Bhāratiya darśana* : Umseha Misra, p. 39-41

(b) *Jaina Dharma aur Darśana*, p. 432

a judge dispenses judgement. This current of thought is also to be found in the philosophical systems like *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Śeṭvara Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta*.

The performance of *yajña* has also been referred to as *karma*. It is non-permanent and it exhausts itself the moment the fruits of *yajña* are dispensed with. But this dispensation needed an agency. *Mīmāṃsā darśana* introduced the concept of *apūrva* for the purpose of distribution of fruits of *karmas* with the help of which the gods dispense *karma*. In *Vaiśeṣika* thought *adṛṣṭa* has been mentioned as an attribute and it has two forms of *dharma* and *adharma*. The *Nyāya* school consider *dharma* and *adharma* as *saṃskāras*. The soul is affected by *saṃskāra* through the effect of good and bad *karmas*, under the guidance of *adṛṣṭa*. *Adṛṣṭa* is the attribute of soul and it remains with the soul as long as the effect of the *karma* is not dispensed.¹

If *Īśvara* were not to dispense the fruits of *karma* to the *jīva* the fruits of *karma* would be meaningless. The *Sāṅkhya* consider *karma* as a product of *prakṛti*.² The good and evil tendencies are influenced by *saṃskāra*. *Saṃskāra* is a disposition to the *kārmic* effect. The Vedic tradition gives importance to the *karma* and its effects on the individual soul.

BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF KARMA

The Buddhist and Jain philosophies belong to the *śramaṇa* current of thought which give emphasis on *karma*. The Buddhists have given elaborate discussion on the invisible effects of *karma*. The Buddhists say that the variety and inequality among living beings is due to *karma*.³ Due to the infatuation and the effect of emotion, the *jīva* acts through the body, speech and mind, and produces like attachment and hatred. In this way, the wheel of *saṃsāra* moves on

1 *Nyāyasūtra* 4, 1

2 *Sāṅkhyasūtra* 5, 25

3 *Milinda praṇa* 3, 2

eternal.¹ It is beginningless and endless.² It goes moving upto infinite times.

Once, king Milinda asked Nāgasena : What is the effect of *karma* according to the activity of the *jīva* ? Ācārya said, it cannot be shown, where the *karma* resides.³

In the *Visuddhimagga*, *karma* is described as formless (*arūpī*).⁴ *Abhidhammakosa* describes *karma* as *avijñapti* (inexpressible).⁵ This type of description can be considered *sapratigha* and not *apratigha*.⁶ The *sautrāntikas* have considered *karma* as *arūpa* (having no form). And they do not accept the *avijñapti* nature of *karma*.⁷ The Buddhists have considered *karma* as (subtle) *sūkṣma*. Bodily, mental and speech activities are described with reference to *karma* and they are considered to be *viññapti* and *pratyakṣa*. In the Buddhist terminology, it is described as *vāsanā* and *avijñapti*. They considered mental *saṃskāras* as *vāsanā* and bodily and speech *saṃskāras* as *avijñapti*.⁸

The *viññānavādins* have described *karma* as *vāsanā*. *Prajñākara* says that all activities whether it is of *prakṛti* (*pradhāna*), *karma* and of *Īśvara* is due to *vāsanā*. Even if we consider *Īśvara* to be the judge dispensing *karma*, therefore it is needed for postulating *vāsanā* for explaining variety in the universe. We can, therefore, say in other words, that the *karma*, activity which is primarily of *Īśvara* also or of *pradhāna*--all these are the streams of *vāsanā*, which merge into the ocean of *vāsanā* only. According to the *Śūnyavādins*, the neissance (*avidyā*) which is beginningless is to be considered as *vāsanā*.

The Jainas have made a special contribution to the study of *karma* theory. The Jaina analysis of *karma* is scientific and they

1 *Aṅgutarānikāya*, *tikaṇipāta sūtra* 33, 1; p. 134

2 *Saṃyuktānikāya* 15, 5, 6 Part 2 pp. 181-182

3 *Milindapaṇṇa* 3, 15 p. 75

4 *Visuddhimagga* 17, 110

5 *Abhidharmakośa* 1, 9

6 See *Ātmanimāṃsā* p. 106

7 Naumi Oriental Conference p. 620

8 *Abhidharmakośa* 4th pariccheda

have developed the science of *karma*. There is enormous literature in the study of Jaina theory of *karma*. Etymologically, considered, *karma* means activity, it refers to any activity in this life. The grammarian Pāṇini has defined *karma* as that which is palatable to the doer is *karma*.¹ To the *Mīmāṃsakas*, *karma* is considered to be the performance of the *yajña*. It is *kriyākāṇḍa*. According to the *Vaiśeṣikas*, *karma* or activity is an inherent category of the substance. It is that which is not a quality nor conjunction or disjunction of objects.² The *Sāṅkhya* school describes *karma* as the expression of disposition (*saṃskāra*)³ The *Bhagavadgītā* mentions *karma* as “*karm aśīlatā*”, i. e. engrossment in action.⁴ The *Nyāyasastra* refers to the activities like expansion and contraction, movement in general, movement upwards and movement downwards as forms of *karma*. In the *smārta* tradition, the duties of the four stages of life (*āśrama*) and the four *Varṇas* are referred to as *karma*. The Buddhists have traced the variety and the inequalities of the *jīvas* to the *karma*. The Jainas have mentioned two forms of *karma* (*bhāva karma* and *dravya karma*). *Bhāvakarma* is psychic in nature, it refers to the psychic states responsible for the activities and *dravya karma* refers to the material particles of *karma* accruing to the soul and vitiating the pure nature of the soul. Ācārya Amṛtacandra says that the influx of *karma* is due to the activities (*yoga*) that the soul has in contact with the *puṇḍra*.⁵ *Karma* is material in nature according to the Jainas and it obscures the pure nature of the soul.

KARMA IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS

The Jainas have given the specific content for the conception of *karma*. The other systems of Indian philosophy have used different concepts like *māyā*, *avidyā*, *prakṛti*, *apūrva*, *vāsanā* *āśaya*, *dharma**adharma*, *adṛṣṭa*, *saṃskāra*, *daiva*, *bhāgya* etc., for

1 *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1, 4, 79

2 *Vaiśeṣikadarśanabhāṣya* 1, 17 p. 35

3 *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* 67

4 *Gītā* 2, 50

5 *Pravacanasāra tīkā* 2, 25

explaining the phenomenal reality in the world and the consequent inequality in the world. In the *Vedānta darśana*, we find the use of the concepts like *māyā*, *avidyā* and *prakṛti*. The *Mīmāṃsā* uses the term *apūrva*. The Buddhists have used the word *vāsanā* and *aviśṅapti* for explaining the varieties in the universe. *Sāṅkhya* used the word *āśaya* in a specific sense and we find the use of the words *adṛṣṭa saṃskāra* and *dharmādharmā* in the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika*.

In many of the schools of Indian philosophy the term *daiva*, *bhāgya*, *puṇya* and *pāpa* have been freely used. In Indian thought it is only the *Cārvāka darśana* which does not believe in the theory of *karma* and does not accept soul as a substance. *Cārvāka* does not also believe in the concepts like the past life, the other world and the other transcendental concepts.¹

According to the *Nyāya*² school of thought, the three-fold activity of the *jīva* (body, mental and speech) are affected by the passions and the emotional upsets like attachment and hatred etc., and it consequently gives rise to *dharma* and *adharma*. *Dharma* and *adharma* can be considered to be *saṃskāra*, *Vaiśeṣikas* have given 24 *guṇas* and *adṛṣṭa* is one of the *guṇas*. It is different from *dharmādharmā* and *saṃskāra*.³ *Dharma* and *adharma* have been included in *saṃskāra*. But in the *Vaiśeṣika darśana*, they have been included in *adṛṣṭa*. *Rāga* and *dveṣa* (attachment and hatred) give rise to *saṃskāra*, *saṃskāra* give rise to birth and *janma* is again responsible for *rāga* and *doṣa*. In this way, the root-cause of *saṃskāra* is beginningless.

According to *Sāṅkhya Yoga darśana*, the variety and complexity and also resulting in inequality are due to the five *kleśas*, like *avidyā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhiniveśa*. These complexities create *saṃs-*

1 (a) *Jaina Dharma our Darśana* p. 443

(b) *Karmavipāka ke hindī anuvāda kī prastāvanā*

—Pt. Sukhlālji p. 23

2 *Nyāyabhāṣya* I, 1, 2 etc

3 *Prastāpādabāṣya* p. 47 (Chowkhambhā Sanskrit Series, Benares 1930)

kāra. *Samskāra* has also been referred to as *āśaya*, *vāsanā*, *karma* and *apūrva*. In this form of description, *kleśa* and *samskāra* are the root causes of the wheel of life and they are beginningless.¹

The *Mīmāṃsakas* say that the various activities of men like the performance of *yajña* gives rise to *apūrva* and *apūrva* gives rise and gives the fruits of all the activities like the performance of *yajña*. *Apūrva* is the potency born of the performance of duties mentioned in the injunction of the *Vedas*. The other forms of activities are not considered to be *apūrva*.²

The *Vedāntins* have used the concept of *avidyā* and *māyā* for explaining the variety in the universe. *Īśvara* is *māyājanya* (the product of *māyā*). He dispenses the fruits of *karma*. In this sense, the experience of the fruits of *karma* is due to the agency of *Īśvara*.³

The Buddhists maintain that the dispositions born out of mental crisis are *vāsanā* and the dispositions arising out of the speech and bodily activities are *avijñapti*. The *lobha* (greed) *dveṣa* (hatred) and *moha* (infatuation) produce *karma*. *Jīva* gets engaged in activities in bodily, mental and speech due to these emotional disturbances, so also these disturbances and activities produce the *lobha*, *dveṣa* and *moha* in turn. This is the wheel of life, which is beginningless.⁴

THE NATURE OF KARMA ACCORDING TO JAINISM

The Jainas have considered *karma* as material in nature. The *kārmic* particles envelope the soul but do not destroy the real nature of the soul. They have an obscuring function. Therefore, they affect the different *pariyāyas* of the soul. Man is in bondage due to handcuffs, he gets intoxicated by liquor and becomes unconscious by chloroform. These are material objects. Similarly, the soul gets obscured and its pure nature is obscured and not destroyed due to the influx of *karma*.

1 *Yogadarśanabhāṣya* 1, 5 etc

2 (a) *Śābarabhāṣya* 2, 1, 5

(b) *Tantravārtika* 2, 1, 5

3 *Sāṅkarabhāṣya* 2, 1, 14

4 *Sāṅkarabhāṣya* 3, 2; 38—41

Karma is material in nature. The bondage by chain is material. It is of lesser strain that the bondage of *jīva* by *karma*. The *kārmic* bondage is subtle, yet material in nature. The *kārmic* particles enter the soul and vitiate its purity. The effect is very subtle and strong. The *kārmic* particles affecting the soul are called *karma-vargaṇās*. The particles of matter which are responsible for constituting the body are called '*Nokarma-vargaṇās*'. The two are the finest particles of matter and we can say that the atoms constituting *karma* are the material objects. The body is also material. The relation between the two is *samavāyī* (inherent). The earth particles are physical in nature, so also objects formed out of earth particles.

Palatable food brings the experience of pleasure. While injury by *śastra* (weapons) brings *dukha*. These two are *paudgalika* (physical) and so are the experiences of *karman paudgalika*.

From the point of view of bondage (*bandha*), *jīva* and *puḍgala* (matter) are not different, but are correlative. From the point of view of their nature they are different. *Jīva* is immaterial and formless and is characterised by *cetanā*. While *puḍgala* is material and is unconsciousness (*acetana*).

The objects of sense-organs are the experiences of touch, taste, smell, form and sound. They are *mūrta* [(having form)]. So are the *indriyas* (sense organs) which are the medium of experiences and expressions. Similarly, the experience of pleasure and pain are *mūrta* and so are *kārmic* particles which are the causes of these experiences.¹

The *mūrta* experiences *mūrta* only, *mūrta* binds the *mūrta*. *Jīva* is *amūrta* but it gives occasions for the bondage of *karma*. Therefore, *jīva* becomes occasion (*avakāśarūpa*) of the bondage of *karma*.

In the *Upaniṣads* & the *Bhagavadgītā*, the auspicious and inauspicious activities have been referred to as *karma*. But the Jains use the word *karma* in the sense of the after-effect of activities.²

Jīva attracts the *karma-vargaṇās* by the activity which is three-fold i. e., bodily, speech and mind. The *kārmic* encrustations with

1 *Pañcāstikāya* 141

2 *Ibid* 142

the *jīva* is due to these activities and the activities are in turn specified by the *kārmic* encrustations. In this way, the *kārmic* particles of encrustations and the *yoga* of the *jīva* are mutually interactive. *Karma* and the tendency to activity are intimately related with each other with the mutually casual relation.¹

In this way, *karma* is of two forms : (i) *Dravyakarma* and (ii) *bhāvakarma*. *Dravyakarma* affects the *bhāvakarma* and *bhāvakarma* affects the *dravyakarma*. They are mutually interactive. Just as the seed becomes the tree and the tree gives the seeds. This has been the process for beginningless time. Similarly, interaction of *dravyakarma* and *bhāvakarma* has been from beginningless time.²

While discussing the *karma* theory, we should note that the impact of *karma* on the soul which is immaterial has been studied in this perspective. *Dravyakarma* or the *bhāvakarma* are both to be considered in material nature. And also has the characteristic of consciousness as synthesis. *Dravya* and *bhāva karma* have the elements of the material nature and the element of consciousness is an aspect of soul are prominent, but the question of the presence or the absence of material or immaterial nature is not very important. The interaction of the material and the immaterial and the process of interaction has to be considered. In the *bhāvakarma* there is the *ātmic* aspect which is predominant, it is primarily psychological; while in the *dravyakarma*, the aspect of the material particles is prominent. The question has been asked that if *karma* is considered to be material particles, what would be the distinction between the *puṅgava* and *karma*? Similarly, if *bhāvakarma* has the *ātmic* aspect as predominant what is the difference between the soul and *bhāvakarma*?

The answers to these questions can be found in the analysis of the nature of the soul as the doer (*kartā*) and the enjoyer of the fruits of *karma* (*bhoktā*). Moreover, it is necessary to understand the distinction between the *saṃsārī jīva* (mundane souls) and the *mukta jīvas*. The mundane souls are in bondage of the *karma*. There is the mixture of the *caitanya* (consciousness) and the *jaḍatva* (material in nat-

1 *Karmaprakṛti*—Nemicandrācārya viracita 6

2 *Dharma aur Darśana*—Devendramuni (Hindi) p. 42

ure). The *mukta jīva* is free from this bondage. It is pure consciousness. It has no element of *jaḍatva*. The soul that is in bondage in this wheel of transmigration attracts the particles through the activities of speech, body and mind and the 'fusion' of the *kārmic* particles with the soul takes place just as water mixes with milk. In this way, there is the synthesis of the consciousness elements and the materiality of the body.

A further question arises regarding such synthesis of the material and the consciousness elements in the empirical *jīva* and also in the *karma*. If both have the same forms of combination, what is the difference in between the *karma* & the empirical soul? Answer to this may be given with reference to the nature of *karma* & *jīva*. The empirical *jīva* with reference to *karma* as *jaḍatva*, but same *jīva* with reference to the conscious aspects is consciousness. There is no possibility of pointing out the extent to which the *jīvatva* and the *karmatva* could be distinguished in measureable distinctions. It is not possible to say that the *jīvatva* and the *jaḍatva* are to be distinguished separately in the empirical existence. The distinction is not primary. But the fusion as apparent. The empirical soul is always engaged in activity and when it is free from empirical activity, it sheds off the *kārmic* particles accruing to it. In such cases, the absolute distinction between *kārmic* matter and the pure soul and consciousness, we can point out that there is absolute distinction. In the mundane soul and in the phenomenal existence these absolute distinctions are not amenable to empirical investigations. But in the highest stage of perfection, there is this distinction, between the pure *jīva* and pure *karma* as matter. Therefore, we can mention the three stages of the soul and *pudgala karma*: 1. *śuddha pudgala* (pure *kārmic* matter), 2. *śuddha ātman* (pure soul) in the state of perfection and 3. the co-mingling of the *kārmic* matter and the atomic element in the *saṃsārī jīva*. The empirical nature of the individual soul has been referred to as having the characterisation of *kartṛtva* and *bhokṛtva*.

RELATION BETWEEN *ĀTMAN* AND THE *KARMA*

Ātman or soul is immaterial while *karma* is material in nature. How can there be relation between them? This is a natural question

that has been asked. The answer to this question lies in the phenomenal nature of the *jīva* in the *saṃsāra*. The empirical soul is involved in the wheel of transmigration from the beginningless time. It is bound by the *karma* from the beginningless time and has been affected thereby. The *jīva* that has been in bondage due to *karma* is considered to be having form. In this sense, the *amūrta jīva* being involved in the wheel of life due to *karma* is *mūrta* and therefore the *jīva* has both the affects the *rūpī* and the *arūpī* aspects. The liberated *jīva* is *arūpī*, i. e., having no form, while empirical soul has form.

The souls which are free from the *kārmic* matter are not in bondage. The souls that are bound by the *karma* get themselves further bound by the *karma*. The relation between the *karma* and the *jīva* has neither beginning and is neither prior nor the posterior. Just as the material objects like the jaggery and the flowers when mixed and collected give rise to the intoxicating quality, so also, the material aspects of *karma* is encrusted with the immaterial self.

WHO BINDS THE KARMA ?

The *kārmic* bondage is possible only to those who are in bondage. *Jīvas* who are in bondage get the encrustation of *karma* more and more.¹ Due to the rise of *mōhaniya karma*, passions like *rāga-dveṣa* (attachment and hatred) are produced. They give to the influx of *aśubha karma* (inauspicious *karma*).² The *jīvas* which are free from attachment (*moha*) are called *vītarāgī* and in their activity there is *śubhakarma*.³ The new bondage of the soul by the *karma* is not dependent of the earlier bondage. And the souls which are free from bondage have no *kārmic* bond. We can say that the soul that is bound gets itself involved in bondage. But the soul that is free has no bondage.

Gautama asked Mahāvira : *Bhagavan* ! Is the *jīva* that is in misery, affected by misery ? or the *jīva* that is not in misery affected by misery ?

1 *Prañāpanā* 23, 1, 292

2 *Bhagavatī* 9

3 *Bhagavatī* 9

Mahāvīra said, "O Gautama ! the *jīva* that suffers misery is involved to suffer more misery, but the *jīva* that is free from attachment and misery does not experience misery. The sorrows afflict those *jīvas* which suffer from sorrow, through passion and the increase of misery. The souls that are free from misery do not attract sorrow.¹

Gautama asked Mahāvīra, "Bhagavan ! who binds the *karma saṁhyata* (self-controlled), *asaṁhyata* (non-self-controlled), *saṁhyatā-saṁhyata* (partially self-controlled).

Bhagavāna replied, "Gautama ! the self-controlled, the not self-controlled and the partial self-controlled, all of them attract the *kārmic* particles. The empirical *jīva* which is active gets itself-bound by the *karma*, and it is affected by *karma*.

CAUSE OF KĀRMIC BONDAGE

The bondage of the soul with the *karma* is from the beginningless time, but the question arises what are the causes of these bondage and Gautama asked Mahāvīra, to explain the cause of the bondage. Mahāvīra replied, "Gautama ! the rise of the *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* brings the intensity of the *darśanāvaraṇīya karma*. From the *darśanāvaraṇīya karma* comes the *darśanamoha karma*. Due to *darśanamoha karma* arises *mithyātva*—perversity of attitude and from the *mithyātva kārmic* influx arises.²

The *Sthānāṅga*³, *Samavāyāṅga* 5th *Samavāya* and *Umāsvāti* have pointed out the five types of *kārmic* bondage : 1. *Mithyātva* (perversity) 2. *Avirati* (lack of self-control), 3. *Pramāda* (negligence), 4. *Kaṣāya* (passion) and 5. *Yoga* (activity).⁴

In short, the *kārmic* bondage is possible due to two prominent causes : (1) *Kaṣāya* (passions) and (2) *Yoga* (activity).⁵

1 *Bhagavatī* 7, 1, 266

2 *Prājñāpanā* 23, 1, 289

3 *Sthānāṅga* 4, 8

4 *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 1

5 *Samavāyāṅga* 2nd *Samavāya*

The *kārmic* bondage is of four parts depending on the processes of the *kārmic* influx. They are *prakṛti*—the nature of *karma*, *sthiti*—the relation or duration, *anubhāga* (the intensity of the experience of *karma*), *pradeśa* (the extension of *kārmic* particles).¹

The bondage based on *prakṛti* and *pradeśa* is possible due to *yoga*, while the *sthiti* and *anubhāga* are due to passions.² Passions are a primary force for the bondage of *karma*. In the development of the stages of self-realisation, the two causes of passion and *yoga* work upto the 10th *guṇasthāna* and the bondage due to these two causes is considered to *sāmparāyika bandha* i.e., the bondage having the force of passions.³ In the case of the souls that are free from passions, still the *kārmic* flow may take place, but it is only due to the activity (*yoga*). It is temporary and it is called, *īryāpathika bandha* (bondage without passions)⁴ and have been described to be of two *saṁayas* in the *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* (29, 71) and *Prajñāpanā* (23, 13, 37). Paṇḍit Sukhlālji says that according to *Digambara* tradition the duration of the bondage of the *īryāpathika karma* is one *saṁaya*.⁵ There is *yoga* (activity) in this stage, but there is the absence of passions. Therefore, the *kārmic* bondage due to passion would not be possible. Passions bring the intensity and duration of *karma*.

Kaṣāya is of four types : *Krodha* (anger), *māna* (egoity), *māyā* (deceitfulness) and *lobha* (greed).⁶ *Sthānāṅga* and *Prajñāpanā* have mentioned four causes of *kārmic* bondage. In brief, passions can be considered of two types, (1) *rāga* and (2) *dveṣa*. *Rāga* and *dveṣa*

1 *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 4.

2 (a) *Śthānāṅga* 4th *sthāna*. (b) *Pañcama Karmagrantha*, gāthā 69

3 *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 2.

4 *Tattvārthasūtra* 6, 5.

5 (a) *Gommaṣasāra karmakāṇḍa*

(b) *Tattvārthasūtra*, Ed. Pt. Sukhlālji., p. 217

6 (a) *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2, 26. (b) *Sthānāṅga* 4, 1, 251.

(c) *Prajñāpanā* 23, 1, 290

include all the four forms of passions.¹ In *rāga* (attachment) deceitfulness, and greed and in *dveṣa*, we find the anger and egoity included.² *Rāga* and *dveṣa* bring about the bondage of the eightfold of *karma*.³ *Rāga-dveṣa* are considered to be *bhāvakarma*.⁴ The root-cause of *rāga-dveṣa* is *moha* (infatuation). Ācārya Haribhadra says that just as if a man anoints oil on his body and the anointed body attracts the particles of dust deposited on the anointed body. So also the *kārmic* particles get glued to the soul due to *rāga-dveṣa*.⁵ We should remember, that the perversity which is the cause of the bondage of *karma* is developed by attachment and hatred. The intensity of attachment and hatred crowds the understanding, and brings the perversity of outlook. It clouds the capacity of discrimination.

The Buddhists also, like the Jainas consider *mithyāñāna* (perverse knowledge), *moha* (delusion factor) as causes of the *kārmic* bondage.⁶ The *Naiyyāyikas* say that *mithyāñāna* is a cause of *moha*. *Moha* is not only responsible for deluding knowledge, but for creating a false identification of the self with the external object and with body, sense-organs, *manas*, feelings, etc. The *ātman* deludes itself to be all these. This is the cause of the *kārmic* bondage.⁷ *Vaiśeṣikas* support this view.⁸ According to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophers perversity of outlook is

1 *Uttarādhyayana* 32, 7.

2 (a) *Sthānāṅga* 2, 3. (b) *Prajñāpanā* 23.

(c) *Pravacanasāra*, gāthā 95

3 *Pratikramanaśāstravṛtti*—Ācārya Nami.

4 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 32, 7. (b) *Sthānāṅga* 2, 2, (c) *Samayasāra*, gāthā 94, 96, 109, 177. (d) *Pravacanasāra*, 84-88.

5 *Āvaśyaka* *ṭīkā*.

6 (a) *Suttanipāta* 3, 12, 33. (b) *Visuddhimagga* 17, 302.

(c) *Majjhima nikāya mahātaṇhāsāṅkhasutta* 38.

7 (a) *Nyāyabhāṣya* 4, 2, 1 (b) *Nyāyasūtra* 1, 1, 2; 4, 1, 3; 4, 1, 6.

8 (a) *Praśastapāda* p. 538—Viparyaya nirūpaṇa

(b) *Praśastapāda* *bhāṣya*—samsārāpavarga prakaraṇa

the *mithyājñāna*¹ and it is the cause of bondage.² The *Yoga darśana* mentions that *kleśa* (mental disturbances) are the causes of the *kārmic* bondage and *kleśa* is caused by *avidyā*.³ *Upaniṣads*,⁴ *Bhagavadgītā*⁵ and *Brahmasūtra* have traced *avidyā* to be the primary cause of bondage.

In this way, the other Indian systems of thought are in broad agreement with the conceptual content of the Jaina theory of bondage although there is wide variation in the use of terminology.

NIŚCAYA AND VYAVAHĀRA NAYA

The Jainas have studied the *karma* theory from both *niścaya naya* and the *vyavahāra naya*. *Niścaya naya* is the noumenal point of view in which we look at the ultimate nature of the objects in its inherent quality. *Vyavahāranaya* is the practical point of view which looks at the objects in relation to other objects.⁶ The question arises, whether *karma* can be described in terms of *kartṛtva* (activity) and *bhokṛtva* (enjoyment) from the points of view of *niścaya* and *vyavahāra nayas*. *Niścaya naya* presents the real nature of the objects in its intrinsic value without reference to any other object. In this sense, we can distinguish between the pure self (*śuddha ātman*) and the pure matter (*śuddha pud-gala*) and we cannot analyse the nature of the *jīva* which is embodied and which is mixed with the *kārmic* particles. Therefore, *vyavahāra naya* can present a description of the nature of the empirical individual ego in relation to the *kārmic* encrustation. From the noumenal point of view, the self is described in its pure state and *karma* in its pure state. Therefore, there is no contradiction to say that the two descriptions vary without conflict. The subject matter of both are different. Their jurisdiction is limited and distinct. *Niścaya naya* presents the pure nature of the self and the *karma* so it cannot describe the *kartṛtva* and *bhokṛtva* of *karma* by the soul.

1 *Sāṅkhyakārika* 44-47-48.

2 *Māṭharvṛtti* 44

3 *Yogadarśana* 2, 3, 4.

4 *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 1, 2, 5.

5 *Bhagavadgītā* 5, 156.

6 *Pañcama Karmagrantha—prastāvanā*, p. 11

KARTṚTVĀ (ACTIVITY) AND BHOKTṚTVĀ OF THE KARMAN

Some philosophers have ignored this distinction and have analysed the nature of the *karma* with reference to *kartṛtvā* and *bhoktṛtvā* from the noumenal point of view. This has created several problems, because in this, there is a confusion in the nature and the function of the *śuddha jīva* and *samsārī jīva* (empirical individual). Similarly, this view has also ignored the *karma* and the pure matter. According to this view, *jīva* is not the doer of the *karma* and the enjoyer of the fruits of *karma*, because *karma* is essentially material in nature and is not very much concerned with the immaterial *jīva*. They ask a question regarding the relation between the immaterial *jīva* and the material *karma*. How can the immaterial *jīva* be related to the material *karma*? Therefore, they say the relation is farfetched and the *kārmic* particles are due to the matter as originating from matter and the soul cannot act upon it.¹

In this analysis, the *jīva* is not considered to be related with the material *karma* with reference and enjoyment, because the conscious *jīva* cannot be related to the un-conscious *karma*. *Jīva* (spiritual substance) cannot be intimately connected with *karma* which is unconscious and material. But we should realise that empirical soul is associated with the material *karma* and the material *karma* is the modification of the pure *pudgala*. This association of the *jīva* with the *kārmic* particles is due to its activity (*yoga*) in body, mind and speech. If the self and the matter were to be in their pure state only, there would not be a question of the inter-mingling of the *jīva* and the *kārmic* particles. The *kārmic* particles get associated with and they enter into the self which is the empirical individual and not the pure self. In this sense, we can say that the *karma* is associated with the empirical *jīva* from the phenomenal point of view and not from the noumenal point of view. This inter-mingling of the *karma* with the soul is very often compared with the mixing of water and milk. Again matter which is pure does not transform itself into *kārmic* particles on its own but this transformation is possible due to the soul's activity.

1 *Pañcama Karmagrantha—prastāvanā*, pp. 11-12

Again we have to determine the relation between the *dravya-karma* and *bhāvakarma*. The relation between the two is considered to be mutual. *Dravyakarma* generates *bhāvakarma*. The perfect souls, like the *siddhas*, are free from the *dravyakarma* and therefore the *bhāvakarma* does not affect them. When the *jīva* attains the *siddha*-hood it is free from the certain material *karma*. In this sense, we can say that *jīva* which is empirical, i. e., the individual *jīva* in this world is the *kartā* of the *kārmic* particles and the *bhoktā* of the fruits of *karma*.

Those who do not accept the *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva* of the *jīva* give the analogy of handsome boy who attracts a beautiful girl. The girl gets attracted to the boy and runs after him. In this case, the girl is active and the boy is merely an occasion (*nimitta*) for her activity.¹ In this way, the *pudgala* gets attracted to the *jīva* and gets transformed into *kārmic* particles. In this, the *jīva* is not responsible for the activity and the *jīva* is the only occasion (*nimitta*). Activity is attributed to the *pudgala*. But this relation of the *bhoktṛtva* and *kartṛtva* can also be attributed to *karma*. If *āīman* were neither the doer, nor the enjoyer of the fruits of *karma*, then he would neither be in bondage nor would be released from the bondage of *karma*. These terms of bondage and release are not relevant. It is only from the phenomenal point of view, we can speak of the bondage and the release. And from the noumenal point of view, the relation of the bondage and release of the soul from the shackles of *karma* and the *karma* description with reference to the *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva* are not possible.

But the analogy of the boy and the girl with reference to the *karma* and soul is not adequate. The facts are different. The *pudgala* that is matter becomes active then the *pudgala* at once get attracted towards the soul and they are transformed into *kārmic* particles. The *kārmic* particles and the self get mixed up and on proper occasions the *kārmic* particles produce their effects and get separated again. This is due to the activity of the *jīva*. In this sense, this type of activity

1 *Pañcama Karmagrantha—prastāvanā*, p. 12.

is not possible for the *jīva* alone without the association of *pudgala* in the form of *kārmic* particles and similarly, *pudgala* in its isolated state cannot get attracted to the soul. The co-mingling of the *jīva* and *pudgala* is responsible for the association of *jīva* reference *kārmic* particles. Therefore, we cannot make a statement from the absolute point of view that *jīva* is pure *cetana* and *karma* is pure *jaḍa* (unconscious). *Jīva* also has been intimately associated with the *kārmic* particles can be considered as *jaḍa* and *karma* because of its association with the *jīva* can be described as having consciousness. When the *jīva* and *karma* becomes separated completely in the highest state of perfection, then we can say that *jīva* is pure consciousness and *pudgala* is pure matter and unconsciousness.

The *samśārī jīva* (empirical individual) get associated with the *kārmic* particles and due to the association, the *bhāvakarma* in the form of *rāga-dveṣa* (attachment and hatred) are born. A question arises that if *jīva* in its pure form and *pudgala* in its pure form are active in their own pure nature, then how can the *bhāvakarmas* be born and who would be responsible for these ? The *bhāvakarmas* are neither purely due to the self nor due to the pure *pudgala*. Therefore, what is the cause of the *bhāvakarma* ?

The answer is, the individual ego is neither the pure *ātman*, nor the pure *pudgala*. It is a mixture of the *ātman* with the *kārmic* particles which are modifications or expressions in the empirical sense of the *kārmic* particles. We can say that it is an organism and not a pure soul. The passions like *rāga-dveṣa* are produced due to the association of the *kārmic* particles with the conscious *jīva* through the activity of the *jīva* in the form of bodily, mental and speech. All this is due to the diversity and variety of the encrustations of the *kārmic* particles in the soul.

Those, who consider the relation of *karma* with the soul from the noumenal point of view, say that *ātman* has its essential nature in *jñāna*, *darśana* and *cāritra* and the expressions of the essential nature are due to be found in the emotional set up like *rāga-dveṣa*. And due to this, the *kārmic* particles pollute the soul. And therefore, the soul is not the *kartā* of the *kārmic* encrustations nor the *bhoktā*.

For instance, the potter is not the cause of the pot although he prepares the pot; In common sense of language, the potter is considered to be efficient cause of the pot. But in the real sense of the relation, the potter is only an occasion but the clay is the material cause of the pot.¹

But this analogical example is not adequate because the relation between the pot and the potter is neither inherent relation nor very intimate relation. But the relation between the self and *karman* is intimate like the mixing of the milk and the water. Therefore, the association of the *karman* with the self cannot be compared with the causal relation of the potter and the pot. The intimate combination of the *kārmic* particles with the soul has an effect of synthesis and one necessarily affects the other. This does not happen in the case of the relation between the potter and the pot. The *ātman* is not only an occasion, or the efficient cause of the *kārmic* particles enter the soul, but it is the *kartā* in the sense, due to its activity, in body, speech and mind *kārmic* particles enter the soul. Similarly, *ātman* is the *bhoktā*, the enjoyer of the fruits of the *karma*. Due to the various activities of the *ātman* in its empirical form, the *kārmic* particles have attracted and they become intimately associated with the soul. Therefore, *ātman* is considered to be the *kartā*. And because the *ātman* in its empirical sense has the experience of the fruits of the *karma*, it is also *bhoktā*.

LIMITS OF KARMA

According to the Jaina theory of *karma*, *karma* is intimately associated with the body, mind and the *ātman* (psyche), of the individual. These have their defined limitations and they function within these limitations. Similarly, the *karma* that is intimately associated with the individual self has to operate within these limitations. If we do not accept the limitations of the *karma*, then the *karma* would be all-pervasive like the *ākāśa*. We may also say that the self has the characteristics of pervading the body that it occupies and this is due to *karma*. Due to *karma*, the *ātman* gets involved and associated with the body that it occupies in its full pervasion. When the soul

1 *Pañcama Karmagrantha—prastāvanā*, p. 13.

gets freed from the body it also gets freed from the *karmas*. But the *sahsārī ātman* is somehow associated with one or the other body and, therefore, associated with the *kārmic* particles within that limitations.

Another question arises and has been asked : The *karma* associated with the body working in the limitation of the body—can it transcend the limitation and bear its fruits ? Is it responsible for the various types of the effects of *karma* expressed in the possessions like wealth and other external objects that a man gets which are not intimately associated with the body ? For such things also, is the *karma* responsible ? It is also possible that the self may not be directly or indirectly associated with the external objects and events although these objects have their impact of the experiences of the *jīva*. In such cases can we say that the *karman* is responsible for such type of association in bondage.

The answer is, the Jaina theory of *karma* mentions eight types of *karmas*, which are intimately connected in some form or the other with the *jīva*. *Jñānāvaraṇa*, *Darśanāvaraṇa*, *Mohanīya* and *Antarāya karmas* are considered as *ghātikarma* because they effect the essential characteristics of the soul like *jñāna*, *darśana*, happiness and *vīrya* (energy). *Vedanīya*, *Āyu*, *Nāma* and *Goira karmas* produce different states of the body. In this way, all the eight *karmas* are intimately associated with *jīva* and the body and not directly associated with other external objects. From the point of view of the usage of the term (*parampara*) of the word, it can be said that *karma* can be somehow connected to the other objects external to the body and the self, if such a connection is proved.

If the *kārmic* particles are intimately associated with the body and the self, then the question arises how can we explain the possession of wealth and richness which give happiness due to merit (*puṇy-d-janya*) ?

The answer is, the possession of wealth and having relations who give happiness and other pleasant experience are due to the rise of *karma*, it is possible to say in such cases, that these are the *upa-puṇya*, i. e. *karma* brings *puṇya* and *puṇya* gives rise to experiences of pleasure and bliss. In fact, the function of *puṇya* is to give the experiences of

pleasure and *puṇya* is possible through *śubha karma*. It is also true that the external objects and creations are the cause of experiences of pleasure. The experience of pleasure and pain and all bodily, mental and *ātmic* experiences are due to the internal causes. The association of *karma* is seen with the internal causes and not with the external objects. The external objects have their own causes of origination, duration and destruction, and they are not due to *karma*. The *karma* is limited to us only i. e., the embodied self and the body, and not all-pervading. These external objects have nothing to do with *karma*. *Karma* is associated with the embodied individual soul and the *jīva* attracts the *kārmic* particles in varying degrees according to its activities. The external objects are only occasions by which the self gets experiences of pleasure and pain and therefore, on common parlance, it is said that the external objects are the results of *puṇya* and *pāpa*.

The various physical and mental states of an individual are due to *karma*. The body, sense-organs, the functions of mind and body are all due to *karma*. But the possession of external objects like wife or the husband or the relation or the loss of these, famine or bumper crops, various natural calamities like the earth-quake etc. or the anger of the king—all these are not the effect of the *karma*. These are only the occasions, the experiences, that man gets because these are primarily mental states. It is true that some of them do affect the mental states. The possession of wealth and other relatives may become occasions for creating pleasure in our mind. The loss of wealth may bring pain, but these external things are not themselves due to *karma*. For instance, the birth of a son is not due to the *puṇya* of the father, nor the death of a relative is due to the *pāpa* of the individual soul. These are due to the *karmas* of those individuals affected and *karma* in their cases also is occasioned by the external objects. It may be true that we get pleasure by the birth of a son. This experience of pleasure is due to the *Mohanīya Karma*, but the birth of a son is not due to *Mohanīya Karma*. The experiences of pleasure and pain on the occasion of birth of son or loss are due to the *puṇya* or *pāpa* of the father occasioned by the birth or the death of the son. In this sense, the son is not born due to the *puṇya* of the father, nor is loss of the son is due to the *pāpa* of the father. In this way, the relation of the indi-

vidual self with other objects can be explained on the basis of personal experiences which are due to *puṇya* or *pāpa* occasioned by the events and individuals in the environment. The operation of the *karma*, the rise, the suppression (*upaśama*) and destruction of the *karma* (*karma-kṣaya*) are all determined by the limits of the individual self or the body due to the activity of the organism through body, mind and speech. The rise of the *karma* is not possible beyond this. The crux of the problem is that external objects and events are due to their own causes and not due to the rise of the *karma* to the individual soul.

RISE OF KARMA (UDAYA)

Udaya refers to the rise of the *karma*. It refers to the span of time of the operation of *karma*.¹ The *kārmic* particles bound to the soul get matured enough to express themselves (*niṣeka*)—and then they express themselves, i. e., the *udaya* of the *karma*. The rise of the *karma* is possible from two ways : 1. when the *karma* gets matured and fit to express itself it becomes *prāptakāla udaya*.² 2. If it expresses itself prematurely, it is called *aprāptakāla udaya*. When the *karma* gets bound to the soul, it does not get the potency of getting expressed immediately, it requires a definite time to mature itself and till that time, it is in the potential stage. This is called *abādhākāla*. During this period, the *karma*, in its potential form, not yet expressed. *Abādhā* means the period of potency.

The period of potentiality of *karma* (*abādhākāla*) can be divided into two forms of durations (*sthiti*) : 1. *avasthānakāla* and (2) *anubhāva* or *niṣeka kāla*. In the *abādhākāla*, the *kārmic* effect is not yet expressed. It is in the potential form. It is in the *avasthāna kāla*. But when the *abādhākāla* is mature enough to express itself, we get the experiences of *karma*. The *abādhākāla* and the *anubhāva kāla* have their own specific duration. If we exclude from consideration the concept of the *abādhākāla* we can say that *niṣeka* and *anubhāva* are of equal duration. The longer duration of the *karma* can be due to

1 *Bhagavatī* 6, 3, 236

2 *Bhagavatī* 6, 3, 236-*vyṭṭi*.

the intensity of the experience of *karma*. This can be reduced in the duration and intensity of experience through the *tapas*. The soul can become free from the *karma* in a shorter time.

The rise of the *karma* is possible after the completion of the duration of the time of potentiality and when the problem of actualisation comes. In the normal course when the time of *karma* arises, and is affected extraneous forces like ascetic practices, *tapas* and other *sādhana*s would not be possible. But due to *apavartana* the *kārmic* variation through *udīraṇa* would be possible. But if the *karma*-rise is yet to take place, then *tapas* and *sādhana*s would be useful for the premature realisation of the *kārmic* effect.

The rise and fruition of *karma* may be *sahetuka* (by means of willed effort) or *nirhetuka* (without willed effort). The rise and the fruition may take place naturally without any external pressure or due to some pressures like internal or the external pressure. For example, without any external cause one may get angry and *vedanīya kārmic* particles may effect the soul. This is *nirhetuka udaya*.¹ In the same way, experiences of laughter,² fear and other forms of emotional upset may give rise to *kārmic* particles to flow in.³

THE KARMA THAT ENTERS WITHOUT EFFORT

(*Svataḥ udaya hetu*)

The *kārmic* particles that develop the soul may be due to some natural causes without any effort (conscious or unconscious). It is of different types :

1. *Gatihetuka udaya* - It refers to the *kārmic* matter due to the state of the self (*gati*) at the particular time. For instance, in the state in the hell (*naraka gati*) there is the rise of *asātāvedanīya karma* (pain producing *karma*).

2. *Sthitihetuka*—This refers to the state of an individual at a particular time. For example, at the time of the rise of the *mohanīya*-

1 *Sthānāṅga* 4, 76, vṛtti ; p. 182.

2 *Sthānāṅga* 4

3 *Sthānāṅga* 4, 75-79.

kārma in its intense form, it is possible to have perversity of outlook (*mithyātva moha*) and attachment.

3. *Bhava hetuaka udaya*—This refers to the rise of different types of *karma* in a particular life span. Though all the *saṃsārī jīvas* have rise of *Darśanāvarṇīya karma* and this *karma* is the cause of sleep but *manuṣya* and lower animals are affected by sleep, while heavenly beings and the hellish beings do not get sleep. This is *bhava hetuaka udaya*.

These three types of *kārmic* influx and bondage are due to *svataḥ vipāka udaya* (rising out of their own internal causes).

THE RISE OF THE *KARMA* DUE TO EXTERNAL CAUSES

The *kārmic* rise may be due to external causes also. These may be considered as due to two causes as : (1) *pudgala hetuka udaya*. This is due to the *kārmic* particles rising out of some material causes. For example, if a stone is thrown or if some one hits us, we get pain. This is to *aśātāvedanīya karma*, arising out of material causes. Similarly, experience of pain is possible due to some form of unpleasant exchange of words which give rise to anger. These are *sa hetuka vipāka udaya*. (2) In the sense, that the *kārmic* bondage arises due to some particular causes the bondage of the *kārmic* particles due to the consequence of the material cause (*pudgala pariṇāma*). For example, taking heavy meals or due to some diseases organic disturbances take place. This is also (*hetuka udaya*) rising out of the consequences of the material causes, giving rise to the bondage of *kārmic* particles to the soul. Again, for example, intoxicating liquor affects the clarity of mental states. This is also *pudgala pariṇāmana hetuka*.

In this way, the rise and fruition of the *kārmic* particles into the soul is due to various causes.¹ If these causes are not operative the fruition of the *karma* is not possible. It is called *pradeśodaya vipāka*. In this, the experience of *kārmic* effect is not very clear. It is indistinct. However, the *kārmic* bondage has to be experienced and exhausted.

1 *Prañhāpanā* 23, 1, 293,

Gautama asked Mahāvira : 'Bhagavan! can we say that one cannot be free from the experiences of the *karma* which are inauspicious.'

Mahāvira said ; 'Yes, it is true that we have to experience the *pāpa karma*'.

Gautama asked Mahāvira to explain the process. Mahāvira said, 'O Gautama ! I have described two types of *karma* : 1. *Pradeśa karma* (extension of the *kārmic* particles) and 2. *anubhāga karma* (experience of the *kārmic* effect). *Pradeśa karma* has to be exhausted, some may be exhausted through the experience of the intensity and some without experience in the intensity of the *kārmic* particles.¹

PURUṢĀRTHA (SELF EFFORT) AS DETERMINING FACTOR

What we call *puruṣārtha* (self effort of an individual *jīva*), does play an important part in the intensity and experience of the *kārmic* bondage. From the point of view of the past *kārmic* bondage, we can say that it is both important and not an important factor in shaping the experiences of *karma*s. If the efforts, made in the present time, are less than the efforts made in the past, then the present efforts will have less impact on the manner of experience of *karma*. If the present impact is greater, it is possible that it may modify the intensity and experience of the past bondage of the *karma*.

Karma need not be considered only in two parts as *bandha* (bondage) and *udaya* rise of *karma*. There are other states of impact of *karma*. The *kārmic* particles and the *kārmic* experiences can be attributed and modified to particular processes like *apavartanā*, *udvartanā*, etc. These processes of the rise, experience and the exhaustion of *karma* may be mentioned as follows :

1. *Apavartanā*—In this, the *kārmic* intensity may be decreased in experience, it is *rasaghāta* or *mandīkaraṇa*.

2. *Udvartanā* -The intensity of the *kārmic* experience may be increased. This is *udvartanā*, or it is also called *tīvrīkaraṇa*.

¹ *Bhagavatī* 1, 4, 40 *vytti*

3. *Udīraṇā*—In this the *kārmic* states which is to fructified at a later date more intensely can be made to be fructified and experienced in a less intense way.

4. *Saṅkramaṇa*—It is the transformation of *karma* in its different intensities of experiences. For instance, some part of *karma* is auspicious *karma* (*śubha karma*) and its fruition (*vipāka*) is also auspicious. Some part of *karma* is auspicious, but fruition is inauspicious (*aśubha*). Some forms of *karma* is inauspicious, but its fruition is auspicious. In some cases both the rise of the *karma* and its fruition are inauspicious. That type of *karma* which it binds inauspicious way and rises auspiciously it is called *aśubha-śubha vipāka*. But the *karma* which is in the form of auspicious bondage, but arises in an inauspicious way, it is *śubha-aśubha vipāka*. That *karma* whose rise is inauspicious, but fruition is auspicious is called *aśubha-śubha vipāka*. And that *karma* whose rise and fruition is both auspicious has been referred to *śubha-śubhavipāka*.

The difference in duration between the *kārmic* bondage and its rise is called *saṅkramaṇa*. *Saṅkramaṇa* is the transformation of the *karma-prakṛti*. In this, the transformation takes place between the substance of the same *karma*. For instance, in the *darśanāvaraṇīya-karma* transformation between the *cakṣu* and *acakṣu darśanāvaraṇīya* is possible.

Saṅkramaṇa is of four types : 1. *Prakṛti saṅkramaṇa* 2. *Sthiti saṅkramaṇa*, 3. *Anubhāva saṅkramaṇa* and 4. *Pradeśasaṅkramaṇa*. *Prakṛti saṅkramaṇa* is a transformation of the *kārmic* bondage already collected into the *kārmic* experiences are at present being received. Similarly, *sthiti* (duration) and *anubhāga* (intensity of experience) also get transformed.

Apavartanā, *udvartanā*, *udīraṇā* and *saṅkramaṇa* refer to the rise (*udaya*) of the *kārmic* matter. In this rise and at the time of rising, there is no transformation. But the *kārmic* matter that is yet to rise can be transformed by the individual efforts like *sādhana*. In this sense, we can say that the individual *jīva* is responsible for its own *karma* and for the exhaustion of the *karma*. If this freedom of the will in the process of the transformation of *karma* were not to be accepted, then we land ourselves in *niyatīvāda* (the theory of necessity).

IS THE *ĀTMAN* FREE, OR IS IT BOUND BY *KARMA*?

We have seen that the individual states and its position are determined by the bondage of *karma* that the individual has acquired. Auspicious *karma* brings auspicious results and inauspicious *karma* gives inauspicious results.¹

The *kārmic* process has primarily two forms : bondage and the other rise and fruition. The individual *jīva* is free in the sense that it can do the *karma* and the bondage that he gets is due to his own activity. In this sense, he is free because he acts and gets the bondage. But the *kārmic* bondage that he has already acquired due to his own activity has to be experienced and exhausted by him. In this sense, in the case of rise and fruition of *karma* that has already been bound to him, he has no choice, he has to experience the effects of the *karma* that he has accumulated. And therefore in the fruition of *karma* and experiences, he is not free.² For instance, one is free to take opium, but once he takes the opium he cannot escape the effects of opium. Whether he wills it or not, the opium produces its effects on his organism. He has no choice in it. This does not mean that he completely disavows of the fruition of the *karma* that he has already acquired. He can transform the *kārmic* effect in its intensity of experience by reducing the intensity or increasing the intensity. For example, after having taken the opium he may try to reduce the effect of the same by taking the counter affecting medicine. By this, he can reduce the intensity of the opium. Similarly, he can reduce the intensity, as we have seen, of the experience of the *kārmic* effect by means of certain processes and practices. In other words, the question of the dependence of the *jīva* and *karma* is difficult to be determined, because if the soul gets sufficient strength due to the maturity of its activity and duration of *karma*, the activity of soul becomes predominant, and the *karma* is subordinated. But if the *karma* becomes stronger the soul's activity becomes subjected to *kārmic* particles. Therefore, in some cases soul predominates and in some others, *karma* predominates.

The mechanism of the operation of the *karma* may be considered as of two types :

1 *Daśāśrutaskandha* 6

2 *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya* 1, 3.

1. *Nikācīta*, in which the maturation of the *kārmic* process will take its determined course.

2. *Anikācīta*, in which the maturation of the *kārmic* process may take different terms and may fructify in different ways. The same can be put in the different forms—

(a) *Nirupakrama* where the process of the operation of *karma* takes its determined course and there would be no resistance from the individual moral activities.

(b) *Sopakrama*, in which the individual effort may deviate the *kārmic* process.

The *jīva* is subject to the *kārmic* activity in the process of *nikācīta* process of the rise of the *karma*. As long as the *jīva* does not make effort to thwart or to deviate the fruition of the *kārmic* activity, *jīva* will be in the hands of *karma*. But if the *kārmic* process has to be channelised either in the direction of suppression or the destruction of the *kārmic* process the *jīva* has to make consistent moral effort and observe *tapasyā* (ascetic practice).

In the *Pātañjala Yogabhāṣya*, it has been suggested that the *vedanīya karma* born out of *adrṣṭa* has three different forms of expression. One of them is that some *karmas* can be exhausted without fruition by the moral practices like *prāyaścīta* (confession).¹ In the Jain terminology it is called *pradeśodaya*.

UDĪRANĀ

Gautama asked Mahāvīra : ‘Bhagavan ! does the *jīva* increase the intensity of *karma* when it has risen or does the *jīva* increase the intensity of *karma* when it has not risen ? Does the *karma* increase the intensity when the *karma* has risen and expressed itself in the form of *kārmic* particles ?

Mahāvīra replied. 1. The intensity of *karma* is not increased when the *karma* has not already risen or expressed itself. It does not increase the intensity when it has not risen. Only when the rise of the *karma* is possible because of the capacity of the rise of the *karma* although at the moment it is not expressed itself, in such cases the *jīva*

1 *Pātañjalayoga* 2, 13 *bhāṣya*.

assists the increase in the intensity of the *kārmic* experience. Similarly, after the rise of the *karma*, it is not possible to increase the intensity of experience.¹ The increase in the intensity of *karma* would not be possible if it is already increased, because if the increase of intensity is further increased, there would be no increase of intensity of *kārmic* experience and there would be no end to the process of increase. 2. The increase in the intensity of *kārmic* experience would not be possible in the cases where the increase in the intensity will take place in future date. 3. The rise of the *kārmic* particles will not give occasions to intensities, if the *kārmic* particles are weak after its rise. 4. The rise and the intensity of *kārmic* particles will be possible only in such cases where there is not yet the rise and increase of the intensity of *karma*, but where there is potentiality and capacity for the increase of the *kārmic* intensity.

THE CAUSATION OF *UDĪRAṆĀ*

Sometimes, the rise of the *kārmic* process takes place by itself and in such cases there is no need to do self-effort. When the duration of *kārmic* bondage is over, the rise of the *kārmic* process takes place by itself. It is ripe for the rise and therefore no special efforts on the part of the *jīva* are necessary for effecting the rise.

Gautama asked Mahāvīra, 'Bhagavan ! when the *kārmic* process is about to rise, but which has not yet risen and which is capable of rising (*udīraṇā yogya*) and increase, in such cases when the increase in the intensity of *kārmic* process takes place and we say that individual effort, the strength of the individual *jīva* in these efforts and the capacity (*bala*) and the near energy (*vīrya*) are necessary to operate or are not necessary.

Mahāvīra said, that *jīva* helps the process of rise and increase of the *kārmic* process which are not yet risen cannot be made to rise and increase in intensity.²

In this process, the one's destiny and the efforts of the individual *jīva* are both necessary. Due to the individual efforts the *jīva* effects

1 *Vyākhyāpajñapti* 1, 3, 35.

2 *Bhagavati* 1, 3, 35.

certain processes in the *kārmic* particles. This is possible to the *yoga* (activity) of the *jīva*, which is of three types : body, speech and mental. If the activity is auspicious, that is *śubhayoga*, if the activity is inauspicious which lead towards the obstruction of self-realisation, it is inauspicious.

Mithyātva (perversity), *avratā* (lack of self-control), *pramāda* (negligence) are all instrumental to *yoga*. But the activity without the *kaṣāyas* is *śubha* while the activity that is accompanied or motivated by *kaṣāya* is *aśubha*. *Śubhayoga* brings auspicious tendency and *aśubhayoga* brings inauspicious tendency. The two tendencies *sat* and *asat* bring about the process the *udīraṇā*.¹

VEDANĀ

Gautama said to Mahāvīra : “Bhagavan ! some say that the *jīva* experiences *vedanā* according to the type of bondage that it takes place. Would it be correct to say that ?”

Mahāvīra said : “Gautama ! the explanation given by these persons is one-sided and is not the whole truth. Some *jīvas* experience the *vedanā* (emotional states) according to their desserts earned through the type of *karma* acquired. But some other *jīvas* experience different *vedanās* also.

Gautama said : ‘how is it ?’

Mahāvīra replied : ‘that *jīva* which experiences the *vedanā* or affective states according to the type and intensity of *karma* can be said to experience *evaṃbhūta vedanā* and those *jīvas* which experience different emotional experience from the desserts are said to experience *unevaṃbhūta vedanā*.

Mahāvīra replied to another question stating that *vedanā* (feeling) rises out of the *kārmic* particles accrued in the past. The *kārmic* particles flowing in into the soul at the present moment do not produce *vedanā*.

NIRJARĀ

Ātman and the atomic particles of matter are distinct and as long as they are distinct, both of them are pure. But when there is contact

1 *Vyākhyāprajñapti* 1, 3, 35.

between the *ātman* and the particles of matter, *ātman* is considered to be *rūpi* (having form) and atomic particles are converted into *karma-vargaṇās*. When these *kārmic* particles get glued to the soul, then they are considered to be the *karma* which have the capacity of producing effect. When the *kārmic* effect gets exhausted the particles of *karma* is separated, and they become mere *puḍgala* or matter. They become *akarma* and are separated from soul. This process of extraction of the *kārmic* particles from the soul is called *nirjarā*.

In the common parlance it is said that *nirjarā* is a process where the *karma* is separated from the soul, by the exhaustion of the effect of *karma*.

The fruits on the tree become ripe in two ways. The fruits may become ripe on the tree only, after the period of maturity is over or they may be made ripe by plucking them from the tree and using artificial methods. In the later case, it may take lesser time for the fruits to be ripened. In the same way, *karma* becomes mature for expression of its effects either in its natural process or it may be made to fructify prematurely by certain moral and spiritual process. If the fructification of *karma* takes its natural process, this is called *karma-paripāka*. But if the *karma* is made to fructify prematurely by means of certain moral and spiritual practices, then we call it *karma nirjarā*. *Karma-paripāka* is neither *dharma* nor *adharma*. *Nirjarā* is a process of fructification of *kārmic* effect, much earlier than it would have been possible for the *karma* to fructify in normal course. The fructification of *karma* is very auspicious also. Therefore, *nirjarā* would be *avipākī nirjarā*. It is also considered as *sahetuka nirjarā*. And this is *dharma*. *Śubha nirjarā* is *dharma*.

PRIORITY OF THE *ĀTMAN* OR THE *KARMA*

A question has been asked regarding the priority of the *karman* or the *ātman* which is earlier? The answer is, both the *karman* and *ātman* are *anādi* (beginningless) and the relation between them is also beginningless. However, there is the *karma* flow into the soul and new *karma* enters into the soul every moment. There is not a single

moment in an empirical *jīva* when the *karma* does not enter in. In this specific sense, we can say that the influx of the *karma* has a beginning and in the general sense of the relation of the *karma* to the soul.¹

A question has been pertinently asked regarding the adequacy of explanation of the usual statement that the *kārmic* influx is *anādi* (beginningless), but it has an end. How can that which is beginningless can have an end ?

The answer is, in general sense that which has no beginning has no end, specifically with reference to the generic relation. But with reference to particulars this fact of relation need not be true. For instance, the relation between the gold and ore of the gold, between milk and ghee is *anādi* because gold is in the ore and ghee is in the milk. But they can be separated, in this sense, the relation has an end.

But from the point of view of the relation of the specific *karma* to the soul, we can say that the association of *karma* with the *jīva* has a particular point of time and therefore, it had a beginning. Similarly, the *karma* that has accumulated in the soul can also be washed away at a particular time, and the new *karma* enters. And there is new bondage. But the flow of *karma* as such into the soul in its generic aspect is beginningless.² Although from the point of view of specific *karma*, it has beginning and also an end. The *karma* that is flowing into the soul from the beginningless time can be exhausted by the self-control, *tapas* and other moral and spiritual activities. The accumulated *karma* gets destroyed and the *ātman* becomes free from the *kārmic* encrustation.³

THE SUPREMACY OF THE *KARMA* OR OF THE *ĀTMAN*

A question has been asked regarding the supremacy of the *ātman* or of the *karma* which is supreme, which is more powerful ?

- 1 (a) *Pañcāstikāya* -- Ācārya Kundakunda.
- (b) *Paramātmaprakāśa* 1, 59-60.
- 2 (a) *Pañcādhyāyī* 2, 45, Pt. Rājamalla
- (b) *Lokaprakāśa*—424
- (c) *Sihānāṅga* 1, 4, 9, *ṭikā*
- 3 *Uttarādhyayana* 25, 45.

The answer is that both are supreme and both are powerful. Both have infinite energy. Sometimes *jīva* gets opportunate moments for the fruition of *karma* and by its activity in the righteous direction. It drives out the *kārmic* bondage. But sometimes *karma* becomes predominant, and *jīva* has to suffer the effects of the *karma* and be under its control.¹ From the point of view of looking at objects as an external reality, the *karma* appears to be more prominent. But if we introspect on ourselves we find the *ātman* is equally important and powerful. Just as a spider weaves its web and gets into it, so also the *jīva* acquires *karma* and gets involved in the *kārmic* bondage. If the *jīva* wills, the *kārmic* bondage can be cut off. Therefore, it can be said that however, powerful the *karma* is, the *jīva* is more powerful than the *karma*. From the commonsense point of view, we find an experience that the stone which is hard is very often cut by the liquid water that flows over it. The flowing waters of the river cut through the hard and solid rocks. Similarly, the *ātman* is more powerful than *karma* if it wills. As long as Hanumāna did not know his real strength, he suffered indignities from *Ravana* and from the *Nāgapāśa*. But once he realised his real strength, no body could control him. In the same way, the *ātman* has infinite strength and energy and we do not know it. As long as we do not know it, we suffer the bondage of the *karma*. But the moment, we realise the inner strength of the *ātman*, the shackles of the *karma* fall down one by one.

THE FRUITS OF KARMA

The empirical *jīva* experiences the fruits of *karma*. From the point of view of enjoyment of fruits of *karma*, the fruition has been distinguished into two types : (1) *Śubha karma*, auspicious fruits of *karma*, which may also be considered as *punya* (merit) or *kuśala* (auspicious and good); and (2) *aśubha karma*, the fruits are inauspicious, it may be referred *pāpa*, which is also *akuśala* (inauspicious and evil). This distinction has been mentioned in various schools of Indian

1 *Gaṇadharavāda* 2, 25.

philosophy like *Jaina*¹, *Bauddha*², *Sāṅkhya*³, *Yoga*⁴, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*⁵ and *Upaniṣads*.⁶ The fruits of the *karma* which are conducive to the spiritual realisation give rise to *puṇya* and those which are not conducive to self-realisation are inauspicious and they give rise to *pāpa*. All desire *puṇya* and do not want *pāpa*. However, one cannot escape the effects of *puṇya* and *pāpa*.

The *kārmic* bondage that the *jīva* has already acquired has to be experienced and exhausted in this life or in the succeeding life.⁷ There is no escape for the *ātman* from experiencing the fruits of the *karma* good or bad arising out of the *kārmic* bondage.⁸

The Buddha said to his disciples that one cannot escape the fruits of the *karma* at any cost, whether you want to avoid it by various means, you may fly in the skies, you may enter the sea, or fall in the valley, wherever you go *karma* cannot be escaped and the effects of *pāpa* have to be experienced.⁹

Similar views has been expressed by the great poet Sihalana Miśra belonging to the Vedic tradition.¹⁰

According to ācārya Amitagati, we experience the fruits of good and bad *karmas*, that we have acquired. If we have to experience the fruits of *karma* from other sources, the *karma* that we have acquired would be meaningless.¹¹

1 *Tattvārthasūtra* 6, 3-4

2 *Visuddhimaggo* 17, 88.

3 *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 44

4 (a) *Yogasūtra* 2, 14

(b) *Yogabhāṣya* 2, 12.

5 (a) *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 472.

(b) *Praśastapāda*, pp. 637, 643.

6 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3, 2, 13.

7 (a) *Bhagavatī sūtra* (b) *Sihānāḥgasūtra* 77,

8 *Uttarādhyayana* 4, 3.

9 *Dhammapada* 9, 12.

10 *Śāntiśatakam* 82.

11 *Dvātrīṃśikā* 30

Ācārya Kundakunda says that *jīva* and the *kārmic* particles are mixed together and at appropriate occasions they get separated. But as long as they are mixed together, the *karma* continues to give its effects either auspicious or inauspicious way. We get pleasure or pain accordingly.¹

The Buddha had his foot pricked by a thorn once. He said to his disciples that "in my ninety one previous life, a man was murdered by my sharp weapon therefore, the thorn has pricked me".²

Similarly, Bhagavāna Mahāvīra had to suffer great physical and mental tortures during his period of *sādhanā*. All this must have been due to the effect of *karma* that he had acquired in the previous lives.³

ĪŚVARA AND KARMAVĀDA

The Jainas maintain that every individual *jīva* experiences the fruits of *karma* according to his desserts.⁴ He does not accept *Nyāya*⁵ conception of *Īśvara* as the dispenser of *karma*. Because *Īśvara* has no place in the system of *karma*. *Karma* is associated with *jīva*. It envelops the *jīva* and produces the effect.⁶ The *kārmic* effect is determined by the *kārmic* matter,⁷ the extensity of *karma*, the time, the *bhāvakarma* and other factors like the birth, the *sihiti*, (duration)⁸ etc. All these determine the total *kārmic* dispositions and shape the personality of the individual. The food that we take may be sweet or bitter, palatable or not, the food itself has not these characteristics, but these experiences come because of its association with the cogniser and the psychic effects and the individual consciousness. The individual self experiences these different types of food according to the variation in physical and psychic condition.

1 *Pañcāstikāya* 67

2 *Śaṅkarāraṇa samuccaya* 11k

3 See; *Bhagavāna Mahāvīra : Ek anuśīlan* by the author.

4 *Uttarādhyayana* 20, 37.

5 (a) *Nyāya darśana*, sūtra 4, 1.

(b) *Gautamaśūtra*, aśbyāya, 4, ā, 1, sūtra 21.

6 *Bhagavati* 7, 10.

7 *Pañcasāṅgraha*.

8 *Prajñāpanā*, p. 23.

The śramaṇa Kālodāyī asked Bhagavāna Mahāvīra, "Bhagavan ! can we say that *jīva* experiences the bitter fruits of *pāpa karma* as bitter ?"¹

Bhagavāna Mahāvīra said, "Yes." Then Mahāvīra was asked to explain the process of experience the fruits of inauspicious *karma*.

Mahāvīra said, 'just as if one were to eat the food well and cleanly prepared, yet mixed with poison, he may experience the taste of the food as good and tasteful, but the effect of the food, as it contains poison will be gradually harmful to the body. Similarly, the *kārmic* effect due to the activities actuated by various *kaṣāyas* and the eighteen types of inauspicious deeds from violence upto *mithyādarśana* may be pleasant in the beginning, but they do show inauspicious effect.²

Kālodāyī asked further question, "Bhagavan ! if the *jīvas* perform good *karmas*, will the fruits of those *karma* be good ?"

Mahāvīra said 'Yes'. Then Kālodāyī asked him the process of the fruition of auspicious *karma* into merit.

Mahāvīra said : 'just as actions performed due to auspicious merit, one who does not injure any living being and is free from all the 18 sinful acts from violence upto the *mithyādarśana* (perversity of attitude) will earn *puṇya* (auspicious fruits of *karma*). The auspicious work brings auspicious fruits of *karma*.³

Just as a machine like the electronic calculator having no intelligence, still makes complicated calculations, which in the case of a human being would require good deal of intelligence, so also *karma*, though material in nature consisting of *kārmic* particles, works out the schemata of the effects of *karma*. It is not necessary to postulate the presence of *Īśvara* for the dispensing of *karma*. He is not free to distribute *karma* as he wants. One man's *karma* cannot be transformed to another. If this were possible, then freedom of the will have

1 *Bhagavati* 7, 10.

2 *Vyākhyāprajñapti* 7, 10

3. *Bhagavati* 7, 10

no meaning and the *Īśvara* would have been powerful and *karma* would be some commodity to be distributed at His will. But we find, that *karma* works his own way. There is a regulated mathematical and determined effects of *karma* which works their own course. In this sense, *Īśvara* has no place in the *karma* theory.

TRANSFERENCE OF KARMA

According to the Vedic tradition, the individual *ātman* is at the mercy of the all powerful *Īśvara*. Without the grace of *Īśvara* the *ātman* cannot do anything. *Īśvara* is the one Who dispenses *karma* to different individuals, Who sends one to the hell or heaven.¹

The Jaina theory of *karma* does not accept this view. There is no possibility of dispensation of *karma* by any external agency like *Īśvara*. *Karma* cannot be distributed like pieces of money. One man's *karma* cannot be transformed into other. The individual soul is free. It is by its own activity that it earns the *kārmic* bondage in this empirical world. Each individual soul is responsible for its rise or fall. The *ātman* which gets involved in the wheel is like the river *vetaraṇī* or the tree *kūṣāśālmālī*. The soul expresses its two nature, gets the fruits of perception.² The individual soul is the doer of its own *karma* and the enjoyer of the fruits of *karma*. The soul that follows the righteous path is its own friend, while the soul that goes astray and follows un-righteous path is its own enemy.³

The Jaina theory of *karma* maintains that the fruits of *karma* expressing in happiness and misery are the results of the activity of the soul. The soul gets the fruits according to its dessert.⁴ The Vedic tradition and the Buddhist view are refuted by the Jainas, regarding the distribution and the transform of *karma*.⁵

1 *Mahābhārata*, Vanaparva, adhyāya 30, śl. 28.

2 *Uttarādhyayana* 20, 36

3 *Uttarādhyayana* 20, 37

4 *Uttarādhyayana* 4, 4; 6, 3

5 (a) *Ātmanīmāṃsā*—Pt. Dalsukh Mālvaniā p. 131

(b) *Sri Amara Bhārati, Bhāratiya darśano me karma vivecana*
—*Upādhyāya Amaramuni*

One man's *karma* cannot be transformed to another. If that were so, the efforts of the *jīva* would be futile because the *jīva* would not know that its good actions would give him good results. It would then be possible in such cases that one does good actions and someone else would enjoy the fruits of that *karma*. This would not be an adequate explanation for the distribution of *karma*.¹

THE FUNCTION OF KARMA

The function of *karma* is to get the soul involved in this wheel of life and death. As long as the flow of *kārmic* bondage continues, the soul gets involved in this wheel and is not free. This is the general function of *kārmic* action. In the specific sense different types of *karma* have their different functions, in creating the bondage, to the individual soul.

TYPES OF KARMA

Jaina *karma* theory has distinguished *karma* into eight types; 1. *jñānāvaraṇīya karma*, 2. *darśanāvaraṇa*, 3. *vedanīya*, 4. *mohanīya*, 5. *nāma*, 6. *āyu*, 7. *gotra* and 8. *antarāya*.²

Out of these eight *karmas*—*jñānāvaraṇīya*, *darśanāvaraṇa*, *mohanīya* and *antarāya* are *ghātī karmas*, because they obscure the inherent nature and capacity of the soul, like *jñāna* and *darśana*.³ *Vedanīya*, *āyu*, *nāma* and *gotra karmas* are *aghātī karmas* because they do not affect the original capacity of the soul nor do they obscure the capacity. Therefore, they are called *aghātī karmas*.⁴

The consciousness is the characterisation of the soul. The soul has infinite energy. Similarly, it is characterised by infinite knowledge (*ananta jñāna*), infinite intuition (*ananta darśana*), infinite bliss

1 *Dvātrīṃśikā*, Ācārya Amitagati, 30-31.

2 (a) *Uttarādhyāyana* 33, 2-3. (b) *Sihānāṅga* 8, 3, 596, (c) *Prajñāpanā*, 23, 1, (d) *Bhagavatī*, śataka 6, uddeśaka 9 p. 453 (e) *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 5 (f) *Prathama karmagraniha*, gāthā 3, *Pañcasanṅgraha* 2, 2.

3 (a) *Pañcādhyāyī* 2, 998.

(b) *Gommaṣasāra—karmakāṇḍa* 9

4 (a) *Pañcādhyāyī* 2, 999.

(b) *Gommaṣasāra karmakāṇḍa* 9

(*ananta sukha*) and infinite energy (*ananta vīrya*). *Jñānāvaraṇa karma* obscures the intellectual knowledge of the soul. *Darśanāvaraṇa karma* covers the *darśana*, *mohanīya karma* obscures the right attitude and faith and right conduct also. Therefore the *ātman* will be bereft of the *ananta sukha*. *Antarāya karma* obscures the infinite energy of the soul, by which the soul will be temporarily incapacitated for expressing the energy which is inherent in the soul. In this way, the *ghātī karmas* or obscuring *karmas* are basically responsible for the different states of the *karma*.

Those types of *karma* which do not affect the original nature of the *jīva* but which affect the fruits and the determining effect of the original nature of the *jīvas* are called *aghātī karmas*. *Aghātī karmas* are directly connected with the *kārmic* particles of matter and not directly with the *jīva*. By the rise of the *aghātī karmas*, the soul gets mixed with the *paudgalika dravya* (material particles of *karma*).

Because of this, the *jīva* which is *amūrta* will be considered as *mūrta*. The *jīva* is bound with the *śarīra* (body), and the inherent characteristics of *jīva* like infinite *jñāna*, infinite *sukha*, *amūrtakatva* (formlessness) and *agurulaghutva* (neither small nor big) do not get occasions to get express themselves. *Vedanīya karma* obscures the infinite happiness or bliss of the soul. *Āyu karma* obscures and obstructs the eternity of the soul. By *nāma karma*, the *jīva* is limited in its expression of the status. And the *gotra karma* thwarts the expression of *agurulaghutva*. When the *ghātī karmas* are removed, the *ātman* attains omniscient knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) and omniscient intuition (*kevala darśana*) and becomes *Arihanta*.¹ But when the *aghātī karmas* are also removed, the body is cast away, and the *ātman* is freed from the material existence, and becomes *siddha*, *buddha* or *mukta*.

Jñānāvaraṇa karma

Jīva is characterised by pure consciousness. *Upayoga* is the essential characteristic of the *jīva*.² *Upayoga* has been variously interpreted, sometimes as an expression of *jñāna* and *darśana* and sometimes as the resultant of consciousness.³ *Sākāra upayoga* expresses *jñāna*

1 *Tattvārthasūtra* 10, 1

2 *Uttarādhyayana* 28, 10

3 *Niyamasāra*, 10

and *nirākāra upayoga* expresses *darśana*.¹ Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi in his book, "Some Problems in Jaina Psychology" has interpreted *upayoga* in psychological term stating that *upayoga* may be referred to as the *kārmic* energy which is primarily responsible for expression of *jñāna* and *darśana*. He has used the word *upayoga* on the pattern of the Macdugallian sense with certain modifications.² *Jñānopayoga* is the expression of conscious energy which is associated with discriminative knowledge by which the self distinguishes between species, the attribute, action and other forms of distinguishing of the empirical *jīva*. *Darśanopayoga* apprehends the generality of the object in a concrete psychosis.³ *Jñānāvaraṇa* obscures such discriminative knowledge. Just as a piece of cloth tied round the eyes so as to obstruct the perception will obscure the sense perception through the eyes.⁴ The consequential expression of *jñānāvaraṇa karma* will be to obscure knowledge of the five types: *matijñāna* (sense perception) 2. *śruta-jñāna* (inferential knowledge) 3. *avadhijñāna* (clairvoyance perception) 4. *manahparyāyajñāna* (telepathic cognition) and 5. *kevalajñāna* (omniscient cognition).⁵

Matijñānāvaraṇa karma obscures sense experience, obtained through the contact of sense organs and the *manas*. The *śruta-jñānāvaraṇa karma* obscures knowledge obtained through inference and discriminative knowledge which is defective. *Avadhijñānāvaraṇa karma* obscures knowledge which may be considered as clairvoyance knowledge and which is mainly concerned with the perception of objects having form. *Manahparyāya-jñānāvaraṇa karma* obscures the telepathic cognition. *Kevalajñānāvaraṇa karma* covers the omniscient knowledge which includes the simultaneity of knowledge—the substance and modes.

1 *Tattvārthasūtra* 2—9 and its *bhāṣya*.

2 Kalghatgi (T. G.) *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology* (Karnatak Uni. 1961)

3 *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 2. 7.

4 (a) *Prathama Karmagrantha* 9

(b) *Gommaṣāra (karmakāṇḍa)* 21

(c) *Sthānāṅga* 2, 4, 105 *īkā me uddhṛta*

5 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 4 (b) *Prajñāpanā* 23, 2 (c) *Sthānāṅga* 5, 464 (d) *Tattvārtha sūtra* 8, 6—7.

The consequential expression of the *jñānāvaraṇa karma* may be either *sarvaghātī* (complete) or *deśaghātī* which is partial.¹ *Sarvaghātī jñānāvaraṇīya karma* obscures the knowledge which is complete and which arises from the obscuration of knowledge, while *deśaghātī jñānāvaraṇa karma* obscures partial knowledge obtained through the *matijñāna* and other forms of *jñānāvaraṇa*. *Matī, śruta, avadhī* and *manohparyaya jñānāvaraṇa* are *deśaghātī*, while *kevalajñānāvaraṇa* is *sarvaghātī*, because the *sarvaghātī jñānāvaraṇa karma* is concerned with the total obscuration of knowledge. However although *sarvaghātī kevalajñānāvaraṇa karma* obscures omniscience but the *jñāna* of the *ātman* is not wiped out of the essential. When the dark clouds cover the sky, the light of the sun percolates through the clouds and enables us to distinguish between the night and the day.² Again, just as the light of the sun piercing through thick dark clouds obscuring the vision of the sun illumines different parts in the surroundings and the buildings according to the natures and the type of construction and colour pattern. So also the *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* obscuring *matijñāna* illumines various things with different intensities. There is no complete destruction of *matijñāna*. If that were to take place, *jīva* would be considered to be *ajīva*.

The maximum duration of this *karma* is 30 *koṭākoṭi sāgaropama* and minimum "*antarmuhūrta*" (less than 48 minutes).³

Darśanāvaraṇa karma :

Darśanāvaraṇa karma obscures the intuitive experience. It obscures and inhibits the possibility of the cognition in which we apprehend the generality of an object without the discriminative knowledge of the particulars. Due to the obscuration of the *darśanāvaraṇa* the

1 *Sihānāṅga sūtra* 2, 4, 105

2 (a) *Sihānāṅga*, 2, 4, 105 *ṭīkā*

(b) *Sihānāṅga-samavāyāṅga*, pp. 94-95 Pt. Dalsukh Mālvanīyā

(c) *Nandīsūtra* 43

3 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 19-20

(b) *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 15

(c) *Pañcama Karmagrantha*, gāthā 26.

avenues for knowledge are generally closed. Analogical example in this connection may be mentioned in that the *darśanāvaraṇa* may be compared to the watch man (*dvārapāla*) at the door of a king. Without whose permission we cannot see the king himself. Similarly, if the *darśanāvaraṇa karma* obscures intuitive experience, we cannot get easily the *jñāna* (discriminative knowledge).¹

Darśanāvaraṇa karma is of nine varieties : 1. *cakṣu darśanāvaraṇa* 2. *acakṣu darśanāvaraṇa* 3. *Avadhi darśanāvaraṇa* and 4. *kevala darśanāvaraṇa* 5. *nidrā* (sleep) 6. *nidrā-nidrā* (deep sleep) 7. *pracalā* 8. *pracalāpracalā* and 9. *styānardi*.²

Cakṣu darśanāvaraṇīya obscures the visual experience. *Acakṣu darśanāvaraṇīya* obscures the forms of experience obtained through the sense-organs other than the eyes, and the mind. *Avadhi darśanāvaraṇīya* obscures the clairvoyance intuition and *kevala darśanāvaraṇīya* veils the omniscient experience. *Nidrā* is a form of activity which is responsible for the obscuration of *darśanāvaraṇīya karma*. It is sleep which is considered light sleep. *Nidrā-nidrā* is heavy sleep. *Pracalā* is a form of stupor by which one gets sleep even sitting or standing. *Pracalā-Pracalā* is a heavy sleep which one gets even while walking. We may consider this as somnambulistic. *Styānardi* is a very deep sleep where even activity is possible during sleep. It may be referred to hypnotic form of sleep.

Darśanāvaraṇa karma may be partially affecting (*deśaghātī*) or totally affecting (*sarvaghātī*). *Cakṣu*, *acakṣu*, *avadhi darśanāvaraṇīya* are *deśaghātī* while the remaining are *sarvaghātī*.³ *Kevaladarśanāvaraṇīya karma*, like *kevalajñānāvaraṇīya karma* is *sarvaghātī*.

1 (a) *Sthānāṅga* 2, 4, 105 *tikā*.

(b) *Prathama Karmagrantha* 9

(c) *Gommaṣasāra (karmakāṇḍa)* 21, Nemicandra

2 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 5—6

(b) *Samavāyāṅga sūtra* 9, (c) *Sthānāṅga* 8, 3, 668,

(d) *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 8, (e) *Prajñāpanā* 23, 1.

3 *Thānāṅga* 2, 4, 10—*darśanāvaraṇīje kamme evaṃ ceva.*

tikā—*deśadarśanavarṇīyaṃ cakṣuracakṣuravadhidarśanāvaraṇīyaṃ ; sarvadarśanāvaraṇīyaṃ tu nidrā pañcakam kevaladarśanāvaraṇīyaṃ cetyarthaḥ, bhāvanā tu pūrvavaditi,*

When *darśanāvaraṇīya karma* is completely removed the *jīva* experiences infinite intuition. If the *darśanāvaraṇīya karma* undergoes suppression and destruction, partial (*kṣayopashama*), then *cakṣu darśana* and *acakṣu darśana* and *avadhi darśana* experiences would be possible. The minimum duration of *darśanāvaraṇa karma* is one 'antarmuhūrta' while the maximum duration will be 30 crores of crores *sāgaropama*.¹

Vedanīya karma

Vedanīya karma causes experience of the pleasure and pain. It is of the two forms (i) *sātāvedanīya* which is responsible for the experiences of pleasure concerning senses and the mind; while (ii) *asātāvedanīya* brings about painful experience.² These two experiences are concerned with the body and the mind.³ *Vedanīya karma* can be compared to a drawn out sword besmeared with honey. *Sātāvedanīya* is like the honey on the sword, while *asātāvedanīya* is like cutting one's tongue while licking.⁴

Sātāvedanīya karma is of eight types like : *manojñā śabda* (pleasant words), *manojñā rūpa* (pleasant form), *manojñā gandha* (pleasant smell), *manojñā rasa* (pleasant taste), *manojñā sparśa* (pleasant touch), *sukhita mana* (mind which is pleased), *sukhita vāṇī* (pleasing speech) and *sukhita kāya* (pleasing body).⁵

Asātāvedanīya is similarly of eight types associated with unpleasant experiences of *śabda*, *rūpa*, *gandha*, *rasa*, *sparśa*, *mana*, *vāṇī* and unpleasant body (*dukhita kāya*).⁶

Asātāvedanīya karma causes painful feelings through the senses and the mind, thereby bringing misery to the being.⁷

- 1 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 19-20 (b) *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 15
(c) *Pañcama Karmagrantha*, gāthā 26 (d) *Prajñāpanā*, pada 29 u. 2, su. 293
- 2 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 7 (b) *Sihānāṅga* 2, 4, 105.
- 3 *Tattvārtha* 8,8 *Sarvārthasiddhi*
- 4 (a) *Prathama Karmagrantha*, 12 (b) *Sihānāṅga* 2, 4, 105 *īkā*
- 5 (a) *Sihānāṅga* 8, 488 (b) *Prajñāpanā* 23, 2
- 6 (a) *Sihānāṅga* 8, 488 (b) *Prajñāpanā* 23, 3, 15
- 7 (a) *Sihānāṅga* 8, 488 (b) *Prajñāpanā* 23, 3, 15

The shortest duration of the *vedanīya karma* has been mentioned as *antarmuhūrta* in *Uttarādhyayana sūtra*¹ and *Prajñāpanā*.² *Bhagavati* mentions two *samayas* as the minimum duration.³ There is no contradiction between these different statements, because *muhūrta* includes *antarmuhūrta* which can be described as having the duration of two *samayas*. But *Tattvārthasūtra* and *Karmagrantha* have mentioned twelve *muhūrtas*⁴ as the minimum duration of this *karma*. This discrepancy may be explained with reference to the *sāmparāyika āsrava* and *īryāpathika āsrava*. The maximum duration would be 30 crores of crores *sāgara*.

Mohanīya karma

Mohanīya karma is deluding *karma*. It causes emotional disturbances and leads one astray, making him believe that this world is very much real and one clings strongly to the experiences of this world. In this sense, we may say it causes "delusions". This is the most powerful of the eight *karmas*. *Mohanīya karma* is the primary form of *karma* which is responsible for the wheel of *saṃsāra*.⁵ In this sense the real nature of the *ātmān*, which is pure and non-attached, free from the passions, is very much affected by the perversions of the emotional disturbances. By this *karma*, one ordinarily loses the power of discrimination. The effects of this *karma* can be compared to the effects of alcoholic drinks in which one loses the power of thought and discrimination and the sense of discriminating good from bad.⁶

1 *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 19-20.

2 *Prajñāpanā* 23, 2, 21-29

3 *Bhagavati* 6, 3—*Vedanījjaṃ jaha do samayā* I

4 (a) *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 19.

(b) *Tattvārthabhāṣya*

(c) *Navatattva Sāhitya Saṅgraha*; Devananda Sūrikṣta, *Saptatattva Prakaraṇa*

(d) *Jaina Darśana*, p. 354 · Dr. Mohanlal Mehta.

5 *Vinayacandra Caubtsi*

6 (a) *Prathama Karmagrantha*, gāthā 13

(b) *Sthānāṅga* 2, 4, 105 ṭṭkā

(c) *Gom n i s ā r a (karmakāṇḍa)* 21,

Mohanīya karma is of two types : (1) *Darśanamohanīya* which affects the intuitive experience and (2) *Cārītramohanīya* ; it affects good conduct.¹ *Darśana* in this sense refers to the state of intuition of right *tattvas* and the real nature of the *ātman*.² Just as the consuming of liquor stupifies, so also *mohanīya karma* causes stupification of the mind by which he loses the power of discrimination between right and wrong. In this, one identifies himself with all that is external to him.³ And without discriminating the righteous from the unrighteousness, one identifies himself with the unrighteous activity.

Darśana mohanīya karma is of three⁴ types : 1. *Samyaktva mohanīya*, in this, the expression of *samyaktva*, if it is to come, cannot be obstructed, but it is slowed down and vitiated with numerous faults. 2. *Mithyātva mohanīya*, in this the faith in the righteous item is lost. 3. *Miśra mohanīya*, in this one develops the mixed attitude in which righteous is also present along with wrong attitude. It is also called *samyakmithyātva mohanīya*.⁵ *Mithyātva mohanīya* is *sarvagḥātī*, while *samyaktva mohanīya* is *deśagḥātī* as it partially affects discrimination.⁶ But *miśra mohanīya* is *sarvagḥātī* with reference to the relation of relative emphasis of the *mithyātva* and *samyaktva*.

Second distinction in the *mohanīya karma* is the *cārītra mohanīya karma*. It affects the right conduct of the soul. It thwarts activity leading to right conduct.⁷

Cārītra mohanīya is of two types : 1. *kaṣāya mohanīya* and

1 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 8

(b) *Sihānāṅga* 2, 4, 105

(c) *Prajñāpanā* 23, 2

2 *Tattvārtha sūtra* 1, 2

3 *Pañcādhyāyī* 2, 93, 6-7

4 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 9.

(b) *Sihānāṅga* 2, 184.

5 *Prathama Karmagrantha*, gāthā 14-16

6 (a) *Gommaṣasāra (karmakāṇḍa)* 39

(b) *Sihānāṅga* 2, 4, 105, *ṭikā me uddbhṛta*

7 *Pañcādhyāyī* 21, 6.

2. *nokaṣāya mohanīya*.¹ *Kaṣāya* refers to the passions and emotional upset. *Kaṣāya mohanīya* is of 16 types while *nokaṣāya* which refers to the quasi-passions or quasi-emotional upsets has seven or nine types.²

Kaṣāya mohanīya has reference to the emotional upsets. It etymologically comes from *kaṣa* and *āya* meaning attachment or attraction towards *saṃsāra* which is *kaṣa*. These emotional upsets lead us to the attachments to the worldly things and empirical experiences and the consequent involvement in the wheel of life.³ *Krodha* (anger), *māna* (egoity), *māyā* (deceitfulness) and *lobha* (greed) — these are four types of passions. Each of them has four different levels of intensity : 1. *anantānubandhī*, 2. *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa*, 3. *pratyākhyānāvaraṇa* and 4. *saṃjvalana*. In this way, there are sixteen variations of expression of emotional excitement. The rise of these *mohanīya karmas*, i. e., *kaṣāyas* or emotional upsets like anger, disturb the individual's mental activity.

Anantānubandhī is of longer duration and because of this, the soul wanders into worldly life for endless time (*anantakāla*). This is responsible for the destruction of *samyaktva*.⁴

Apratyākhyānāvaraṇīya has the effect of partial destruction and due to this *ātman* cannot accept the *śrāvaka vratas* or *aṇuvratas* and follow the righteous path.⁵

Pratyākhyānāvaraṇa obstructs the *ātman* to become a monk or *śramaṇa*.⁶

Due to the *saṃjvalana kaṣāya* it is difficult to get the opportunities for practicing right conduct for a *śramaṇa*.⁷

1 (a) *Uttarādhyaṃsya* 31, 10. (b) *Prajñāpanā* 23, 2.

2 (a) *Uttarādhyaṃsya* 33, 11. (b) *Prajñāpanā* 23, 2.
(c) *Sthānāṅga* 9, 700 (d) *Samavāyāṅga* 16.

3 (a) *Āvaśvaka Malayagiri vṛtti* p. 116
(b) *Viśeṣāvaśvaka bhāṣya*, gāthā 1227.

4 *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 10 *bhāṣya*

5 *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 10 *bhāṣya*

6 *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 10 *bhāṣya*

7 *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 10 *bhāṣya*

Gommaṭasāra also mentions these points.¹

Anantānubandhi kaṣāya operates for the whole of life. *Apratyākhyāna* has its effects for one year. *Pratyākhyāna kaṣāya* produces its effects and continues its operation for four months. While *saṃjvalana* has its effects for 15 days.²

In the *Gommaṭasāra karmakāṇḍa* there is a description of the duration of the effects of *kaṣāyas* with reference to the emotional experiences.³

No-kaṣāya Mohanīya—We now describe the intensity and duration of *nokaṣāya mohanīya karma*. *Nokaṣāya* refers to quasi-passions which arise due to the operation of *kaṣāyas*.⁴ They are also called as *akaṣāyas*.⁵ *Nokaṣāya* does not mean absence of *kaṣāya*, but it is a quasi-passion in which there is the intensity of passion without the qualitative differences.⁶ There are nine types of *nokaṣāyas* : 1. laughter (*hāsyā*), 2. *rati* (liking towards the other living or non-living things or dislike towards the *saṃyama*), 3. *arati* (disliking towards the worldly affairs and interest towards self-control *saṃyama*) 4. *bhaya* (fear), 5. *śoka* (grief) 6. *jugupsā* (disgust)⁷ 7. *strīveda* (sensual desire with a man) 8. *puruṣaveda* (desire of intercourse with a woman), 9. *napuruṣa-kaveda* (desire of sexual intercourse both with the man and woman). In the *Uttarādhyayana* seven distinctions have been mentioned. There the three types of *vedas* have been considered as one. In other words, by the single word *veda* all the three *vedas* have been denoted.

It would be worth-while considering on the basis of psychological analysis, to be associated with somehow with instincts or the better word propensities in the sense that McDonell has used. This

1 *Gommaṭasāra, jīvakāṇḍa, gāthā* 283.

2 *Prathama karmagrantha, gāthā* 18

3 *Gommaṭasāra karmakāṇḍa*.

4 *Kaṣāyasahavartitvāt, kaṣāyapreraṇādapi.*
Hāsyādinavakasyoktā nokaṣāyakaṣāyatā.

5 *Tattvārtha Rājavārtika* 8, 9-10.

6 *Sarvārthasiddhi* 8, 9

7 *Ācārya Pūjyapāda*—

yaḍudayādātmadogṣasāṃvaraṇaṃ paradoṣāviṣkaraṇaṃ sā jugupsā.

needs further psychological study. In this way, *cārītramohanīya karma* has twenty-five varieties and among them four *saṃjvalana kaṣāya* and nine *nokaṣāya* i. e., thirteen varieties are the disturbances which affect partially. Therefore, they are called *deśaghātī*, while the others (i. e. remaining twelve varieties have their effects totally. Therefore, they are called *sarvagātī*.¹ The duration of the *mohanīya karma* is for one *antarmuhūrta* at the minimum and for 70 crores of crores *sagara* at the maximum.²

Āyuskarma (Age Determining Karma)

Karma that determines the age of an individual *jīva* is called *āyuskarma*. When the age determined by the *karma* is over the individual *jīva* embraces death.³

This *karma* has been compared to the prison house. The judge sentences a prisoner to undergo punishment for a specific period and as soon as that period is over, he is released from the prison. Similarly, the individual *jīva* gets embodied in a particular body in a particular life for a specified period of time. For the determined period of time, the soul cannot be free from the bodily existence in that particular body.⁴ The *āyuskarma* is not concerned with giving pleasure or pain, but its function is to determine the age limit of a specific individual *jīva*.⁵

The consequential distinctions of *āyuskarma* is of 4 types :

1. one that determines like the life span in the hell (*naraka āyu*),
2. the one determines the life span in the lower animals (*tiryāṇica*

1 (a) *Sihāhāṅga* 2, 4, 105, *īkā*

(b) *Gommaṣasāra*, *karmakāṇḍa* 39

2 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 21

(b) *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 16

3 (a) *Tattvārtharājavarṭika* 8, 10-2

(b) *Prajñāpanā* 23, 1

4 (a) *Navatattva Sāhitya Saṅgraha*; *vṛttyādisametaṃ*, *Navatattva-prakaraṇaṃ* 74.

(b) *Gommaṣasāra*, *karmakāṇḍa* 11.

(c) *Prathama Karmagrantha*, *gāthā* 23

5 *Thāṇāṅga* 2, 4, 105 *īkā*

āyu), 3. the life span determining *karma* in the case of human being (*manuṣya āyu*) and 4. that which determines the age of the residents of heaven (*devāyu*).¹

The age determination may be considered in two ways : 1. *apavartanīya* and 2. *anapavartanīya*. *Apavartanīya* refers the decrease in the age due to external condition. *Anapavartanīya* refers to the non-decrease under any circumstance of the duration of the *āyu*.²

Apavartanīya āyu does not however mean that it is possible to terminate the life of an individual *jīva* without exhausting the duration of the age as determined by the age determining *karma*. It only means that one can hasten the experience of the *āyu karma* which would have taken a longer time. This experience of *karma* can be reduced in *antarmuhūrta*. In the common-sense parlance, it is called premature death. But we should remember that in the case of the human being and the lower animals residing in *karmabhūmi* it is possible to have such reduction in the experiences of the exhaustion of *karma* bringing about premature death. But there cannot be such reduction of age in the hellish beings, gods, *īrthamkaras* and even human beings and lower animals of *bhogabhūmi* i. e., the land of enjoyment.

Āyukarma extends in its duration to one *antarmuhūrta* at the lowest and 33 crores of *sāgaropama* at the highest.³ *Bhagavati* mentions the highest duration as a third part of the *pūrvakoṭi* and 33 *sāgaropama*.⁴ This includes the period of time required for formation of the new life after the *karmabandha* in the previous life is out off, to the time when the germination of the new life starts. In other words this includes also the period of potentiality (*abādhakāla*) of *āyuskarma*.

Nāma karma

Nāma karma is that type of *karma* which determines the

1 (a) *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 11

(b) *Projñāpanā* 23—1

(c) *Uttarādhyayana* 33; 12

2 *Tattvārthasūtra* 2, 52. Pt. Sukhalāji kā vivecan, pp. 112-116.

3 *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 22.

4 *Bhagavati* 6, 3

status and other conditions of the individual *jīva*.¹ According to this theory, *nāma karma* determines the different formulations of the bodily forms of the different individual status and the determining experiences.²

The *nāma karma* has been very often compared to a painter who paints various pictures of men and animals. A good painter presents varieties of forms of animals and birds. Similarly, *nāma-karma* presents the determined life of individual soul in different stages like *naraka*, *mānava* (human) or heavenly status. This *karma* determines the bodily form, the different limbs of the body, sense-organs and the general stature of the individual body.³

Nāma karma primarily is of two types : (1) *Śubhanāma karma* which gives auspicious presentations and (2) *aśubhanāma karma* which gives inauspicious presentation. The first is the consequence of *puṇya* (merit) and the second is determined by demerit (*pāpa*).⁴ *Nāma karma* expresses itself into forty-two types of consequential forms.⁵ They are :

1. *Gatī nāma*—It determines the status of the individual soul in (a) hell, (b) lower animal states, (c) in the human states and (d) in the stage for the heavenly beings.

2. *Jāti nāma*—The *nāma karma* that determines the form of the individual with reference to sense-organs and the species of the animals is called the *jāti nāma*. It has five forms : 1. one-sensed organism, 2. two-sensed organism, 3. three-sensed 4. four-sensed and 5. five-sensed organisms. These are determined by the *nāma karma*.

3. *Śarīra nāmakarma*—It determines the type and the form of the *śarīra* that the *jīva* gets as the fruits of its *karma*. It has five

1 *Prajñāpanā* 23, 1, 288 *ṭikā* (b) *Ṭhānāṅga* 2, 4, 105 *ṭikā*.

2 *Gommaṭasāra karmakāṇḍa* 12.

3 (a) *Sihānāṅga* 2, 4, 105 *ṭikā*

(b) *Navatattva Sāhitya Sāṅgraha*, *avacūrṇi vṛtṭyādi same'arṇi*,
—*Navatattvaparakaraṇaṁ* 74

4 *Uttarā* 33, 13

5 (a) *Samavāyāṅga samavāya* 42, (b) *Prajāñāpanā* 23, 2-293.

(c) *Tattvārīhasūtra* 8, 12.

forms : (a) *audārika śarīra* (b) *vaikriyaka*, (c) *āhāraka* (d) *taijasa* and (e) *kārmaṇa śarīra* (*kārmic body*).

4. *Śarīra aṅgopāṅga nāma*—It determines the different parts of the bodies and also the limbs of the bodies. It is of three forms : (1) *audārika śarīra aṅgopāṅga* (2) *vaikriyaka śarīra aṅgopāṅga* and (3) *āhāraka śarīra aṅgopāṅga*. *Taijasa* and *kārmaṇa śarīras* (bodies) have no limbs.

5. *Śarīra bandhana nāma karma* is that body of the *kārmic* particles which associates the *kārmic* particles which were accrued previously and are being accrued in present. It has five forms : 1. *audārika śarīra bandhana nāma*, 2. *vaikriya śarīra bandhana nāma*, 3. *āhāraka śarīra bandhana nāma* 4. *taijasa śarīra bandhana nāma*, and 5. *kārmaṇa śarīra bandhana nāma*.

In the *Karmagrantha*, fifteen distinctions have been made regarding the *śarīra bandhana nāma karma*. We give below the same distinctions in their original form :

1. *Audārika-audārika bandhananāma*
2. *Audārika-taijasa bandhananāma*
3. *Audārika-kārmaṇa bandhananāma*
4. *Vaikriya-vaikriya bandhananāma*
5. *Vaikriya-taijasa bandhananāma*
6. *Vaikriya-kārmaṇa bandhananāma*
7. *Āhāraka-āhāraka bandhananāma*
8. *Āhāraka-taijasa bandhananāma*
9. *Āhāraka-kārmaṇa bandhananāma*
10. *Audārika-taijasa-kārmaṇa bandhananāma*
11. *Vaikriya-taijasa-kārmaṇa bandhananāma*
12. *Āhāraka-taijasa-kārmaṇa bandhananāma*
13. *Taijasa-taijasa bandhananāma*
14. *Taijasa-kārmaṇa bandhananāma*
15. *Kārmaṇa-kārmaṇa bandhananāma*

The *audārika*, *vaikriya* and *āhāraka karma* particles are not directly connected with each other. Therefore, their interconnected bondage has not been mentioned here.

6. *Śarīra saṅghāta nāmakarma* is concerned with the association and arrangement of the different *karmanas* which have been accumula-

ted due to various factors and the *kārmic* particles which are accruing due to the influx of *karmas*. It has five forms : (a) *āudārikaśarīra saṅghāta nāma karma*, where the *kārmic* particles of similar nature accrued and accruing are arranged in a proper way, so as to determine the form of the body, etc. Similarly, the functions of other four allied *karmas* can be mentioned, like (b) *vaikriyaśarīra saṅghāta nāmakarma*, (c) *āhāraka śarīra* (d) *tañjasa śarīra* and (e) *kārmaṇa śarīra saṅghāta nāmakarma*.

7. *Saṁhanana nāma karma* is concerned with the formation and structure of the bone in the body. There are six forms in this : (a) *vajra vṛṣabha nārāca saṁhanana nāma-karma* (formation of hard and strong bones), (b) *vṛṣabha nārāca saṁhanana nāma karma* (c) *nārāca saṁhanana nāma karma* (flexible and not brittle bones). (d) *ardha nārāca saṁhanana nāma karma*, (e) *kīlika saṁhanana nāma-karma* (joint bones), (f) *sevārta saṁhanana nāma karma* (auxilliary bones).

8. *Saṁsthāna nāma karma* is concerned with the determination of the size of the different parts of the body. It has also six forms like : (a) *samacaturasra* (even form), (b) *nyagrodha parimaṇḍala saṁsthāna* (globular and round forms), (c) *sādi saṁsthāna* (formation of the ends of the body), (d) *vāmana saṁsthāna* (formation of short bodies), (e) *kubja saṁsthāna* (formation of dwarfish bodies and (f) *huṇḍa saṁsthāna* (unequal bodies).

9. *Varṇa nāmakarma* is that type of *nāmakarma* which is responsible for determining the colour of the individual organism. It is of five types : (1) *kṛṣṇavarṇanāma* (black), 2. *nīlavarṇanāma* (indigo), 3. *lohītarṇanāma* (grey), 4. *hārīdravarṇanāma* (yellow) and 5. *śvetavarṇa nāma* (white) determining *karma*.

10. *Gandha nāmakarma* : This *nāma karma* determines the smell of the individual organism. It is of two types : 1. *surabhogandhanāma* (pleasant smell) and 2. *durabhogandhanāma* (unpleasant smell).

11. *Rasa nāmakarma* is connected with determination of the taste of the individual experiencing it. It is of five types : 1. *tiktarasa nāma* (pungent) 2. *kaṭurasanāma* (bitter) 3. *kaṣāyārasanāma* (astrin-

gent) 4. *āmlarasa nāma* (acidic) and 5. *madhura rasa nāma* (sweet).

12. *Sparśanāma karma* determines the nature of the touch of the individual organism. These are of eight types : 1. *karkaṣa sparśa* (hard) 2. *mṛdu sparśa* (soft) 3. *guru sparśa* (weighty) 4. *laghu sparśa* (unextended and light) 5. *snigdha* (greasy and smooth) 6. *rūkṣa sparśa* (hard and dry) 7. *śīta sparśa* (cool touch) and 8. *uṣṇa sparśa* (warm). The *sparśa nāma karma* determines them.

13. *Agurulaghu nāma* : This *karma* determines the extent of the intensity neither too little nor too much in its intensity and duration.

14. *Upaghāta nāma* : With the rise of this *karma* the individual *jīva* suffers hardships and physical tortures due to physical deformation like *pratijivhā* (defects in tongue or defects in teeth, etc.)

15. *Paraghāta nāma* : By the rise of this *karma* one can influence others even through his talk or appearance. It is also possible that due to this *karma*, the individual *jīva* would be able to harm other *jīvas*.

16. *Ānupūrvī nāma* : This type of *karma* enables an individual *jīva* to traverse a particular distance after it leaves its first body at the time of death and before it enters the other state of existence. It enables to cover some space so as to reach the next stage of existence. It has four types : 1. *nāraka ānupūrvī nāma* (leading towards hell) 2. *tiryak ānupūrvī nāma* (it has the capacity of leading the soul to a point which to enter the lower stage of animals) 3. *manuṣya ānupūrvī nāma* (leading to the human existence) 4. *devānupūrvī nāma* (leads to the next type of heavenly being).

17. *Ucchvāsa nāma* : By this *karma*, one can breath properly.

18. *Ātapa nāma* : By this *karma*, an individual organism can get warm for the sake of life.¹ Or, an organism, being himself cool,

1 This type of *karma* operates in the case of one-sensed organism, because the body of the one-sensed organism is first cold and then it can get hot.

can expedite warm-light, e. g., the light of gross *aṅkaratna* fixed below the sun.

19. *Udyotanāma karma* : By this *karma* the organism becomes cool and gets sufficient energy and light¹ or, expedites cool light.

20. *Vihāyogati nāma* : By this *karma* the individual *jīva* gets either the good or the bad *gati* (walk). It has two types : (*praśasta* (auspicious *gati*) and *apraśasta* (uncomfortable or inauspicious *gati*).

21. *Trasanāma karma* : It enables an individual organism to get the capacity of motion.

22. *Sthāvara nāma karma* : By this *karma* individual *jīva* cannot move at his will.

23. *Sūkṣma nāma* : This *karma* determines the subtle body of the individual *jīva*.

24. *Bādara nāma karma* determines the individual to have a *sthūla śarīra* (gross body).

25. *Paryāpta nāma* : By this, the individual soul gets appropriate functions (*paryāptis*) suitable for its status.

26. *Aparyāptanāma* : In this the individual soul may not get all the necessary and fitting functions of the organism.

27. *Sādhāraṇa śarīranāma* : By this *karma* the infinite *jīvas* get a common and normal body.

28. *Pratyekaśarīra nāma* : It determines the specific body of the *jīva*.

29. *Sthiranāma karma* : It determines the type of the bones, the teeth and flesh that a body gets in the proper form and proper place.

30. *Asthira nāma* is responsible for the disharmony and discordant arrangement of the bones, the flesh etc.

31. *Śubhanāma* : By this *karma* one acquires a beautiful body and limbs.

1 *The Śūtaprakāśa* (the cool night) arises from the *deva*, *labdhidhārī muni*, *vaikriya śarīra*, the moon and the stars.

32. *Aśubha nāma karma* is responsible for the acquisition of ugly body and limbs.

33. *Śubhaga nāma karma* : By this *karma* one becomes popular and the impression on the others would be pleasant, even if he does nothing for the good of others, he becomes *saubhāgyaśālī* i. e. he acquires good things of life.

34. *Durbhaga nāma karma* is responsible for the unpleasant experiences of life and he becomes unpopular.

35. *Susvara nāma karma* : This type of *karma* is responsible for the melodious voice one gets.

36. *Duḥsvara nāma karma* : By this one gets an unpleasant voice.

37. *Ādeya nāma karma* makes an individual *jīva* respected by his words.

38. *Anādeya nāma karma* : By this, even the true words of the individual *jīva* are not respected.

39. *Yaśaḥ nāma karma* : This brings fame to the individual soul.

40. *Ayaśaḥkīrti nāma karma* : By this *karma* one is unlucky and does not get success. He gets dis fame.

41. *Nirmāṇa nāma karma* : By this the limbs of the body are properly arranged.

42. *Tīrthaṅkara nāma karma* : By this *karma* one gets the opportunity and the capacity of establishing right path (*dharma tīrtha*).

*Prajñāpanā*¹ and *Gommaṣasāra*.² have given 93 types of *nāma karma*, and *Karmavipākā* mentions fifteen types of *bandhananāma* and 103 types of *nānakarma* distinctions.³ The distinctions in the *nāma-karma* on the basis of 67 *prakṛtis* are to be considered from the point of view of distinctions of auspicious and inauspicious *karma*. And also

1 *Prajñāpanā* 23, 2, 293.

2 *Gommaṣasāra karmakāṇḍa*, 22.

3 *Karmavipākā* (Hindi translation) Pt. Sukhālalji, pp. 48, 105.

from the point of view of four-fold distinctions of *varṇa*. Elsewhere also, 71 distinctions have been made in the consequential effects (*prakṛti*) in the same *nāma karma*, by which *śubhanāma karma* has been distinguished, into thirty seven¹; and thirty-four types² of *aśubhanāma karma*. This is a brief analysis of the different types of *nāmakarma*. This analysis has no ideological difference. The duration of the *nāma-karma* is 8 *muhūrta* in its lowest and 30 crores of crores *sāgaropama* in the highest³.

Gotrakarma

That type of *karma* which determines the status of the individual in the family and the society is called *gotra karma*. This has reference to the higher status or the lower status of the family in society.⁴ Ācārya Umāsvāti has given a description of the concept of *gotra* in terms of the higher and the lower status with reference to the *deśa* (country), *jāti* (community), *kula* (sub-section of the community), *sthāna* (status), *māna* (respect in society), *satkāra* (the type of honour in society) *aṅgavarya* (the extent of prosperity or otherwise). In the case of the individual in the lower state of society, Umāsvāti mentions some sections.⁵

Gotrakarma is primarily of two types : 1. *Uccagotra karma* which determines the higher status and the place of the individual in the family and in society. 2. *Nīcagotra karma* which determines the lower status of individual in the family and the society.⁶

Uccagotra karma is of eight types :

1. *Jāti uccagotra* associated with the high status of the family with reference to the mother side.

2. *Kula uccagotra*, high status of the family from the paternal side.

1 *Navatattva Sāhitya Saṅgraha*—*Navatattvaparakaraṇa* 7, *bāṣya* 37.

2 *Navatattva Sāhitya Saṅgraha* : *Navatattvaparakaraṇa* 8, *bhāṣya* 49.

3 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 23.

(b) *Tattvārthasūtra*, 8/17-20.

4 *Prañāpanā*, 23/1288 *Ṭikā*.

5 *Tattvārthasūtra*, 8/13 *Bhāṣya*.

6 *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 14.

3. *Bala uccagotra*, it concerns the power and strength of the individual with reference to his family also.

4. *Rūpa uccagotra* concerning the form of his body with reference to the heredity of the family.

5. *Tapa uccagotra*, the quality of virtues etc., with reference to the family.

6. *Śruta uccagotra* with reference to the knowledge and learning for the family and the individual.

7. *Lābha uccagotra* refers to the gains of the individual with reference to his family.

8. *Aiśvarya uccagotra* is concerned with the prosperity of the individual and the family.¹

Nīcagotra karma is also of eight types² :

1. *Jāti nīcagotra* associated with the maternal side.

2. *Kula nīcagotra* the lower state of the family from the paternal side.

3. *Bala nīcagotra*, it connotes the lower status of the family with reference to the strength and power.

4. *Rūpa nīcagotra*, it connotes the lower status of the family and individual with reference to the form, beauty etc.

5. *Tapa nīcagotra*, refers to the lack of self-control and higher virtues in the individual and with reference to the family.

6. *Śrutanīcagotra*, it refers to the lack of learning and intelligence.

7. *Lābha nīcagotra*, it refers to the loss of gains and profits for an individual with reference to the family.

8. *Aiśvarya nīcagotra*, it is absence of prosperity of the individual and family.

This *karma* has been compared to a potter (*kumbhakāra*). The potter makes a variety of pots out of the same clay. But some are

1 *Uttarā* 33, 14.

2 *Prajñāpanā* 23, 1, 292; 23, 1, 293,

used for the sake of making *kumbha* or *kalāśa* for the worship of gods. They are acquainted with fragrant ointment like *candana* etc. But some others are used for keeping wines and alcoholic drinks. In the same way, individual *jīvas* according to the type of *karma* get various types of existences with reference to their *kārmic* deserts. Some are poor, some are rich, some are virtuous, and some are vicious. Some are born in rich families and some in poor families.¹

Gotrakarma is of 8 *muhūrtas* in the minimum and 20 crores of crores *sāgaropama* as the maximum.

In general, *nāma* and *gotra karmas* are related to each other in the sense they are associated with the forms and the state of the body and the mental states. The various forms and mental states are due to these *karmas*. *Nāmakarma* determines the possession of *śubha* and *aśubha śarīra* (body). And *gotrakarma* is considered for determining the status of the individual organism with reference to the high or low status. The *śubha* (auspicious) *śarīra* brings pleasure and *aśubha śarīra* (inauspicious body) brings pain. Similarly, the high or the lower status of the individual is determined by the *gotrakarma*.

A question arises whether it would be necessary to distinguish between the *nāma* and *gotra karma* as separate, as they are closely associated with the same functioning regarding the form and the status and body and the mind.

For answer to this, we will have to refer to the distinction connected with the association of the *nāma karma* of the individual body while *gotra karma* with reference to the status of the individuals and their family status.

A second question arises of the form and the status of the individual bodies and the family status, where to be determined by the heredity and the heritage of the parent status, why should it be necessary to have two types of *karma* as *nāma karma* and *gotra karma*. Moreover, if the form and the status of the individual in the family are to be determined by heredity and family circumstances, individual *karma* will have very little place.

1 *Ṭhāṇāṅga* 2, 4, 105 *ṭikā*.

But it may please be noted that the determination of the individual status in the family and society is not only determined by the parents or the family, but this is possible with the *karma* that individual has earned in this respect. The individual is himself responsible for these; and he has earned it. The family and the society are only occasion and the environmental factors which enable the individual to be placed in good or bad comfort, in different status in society and family by his own *karma*.

Nāmakarma determines the individual concerning his birth as man or gods in the heaven or in the animal kingdom. It is also connected in the formation of the types of sense-organs that he possesses and the types of bodies that he inherits like *audārika*, *vaikriya* etc. *Gotra karma* is also concerned with the status of the individual. Therefore, again a question is asked whether *gotrakarma* has anything to do with the determination of the types of *śarīra* etc.

But *gotrakarma* is not directly connected in the formation of the individual bodies and the sense-organs etc. Because the higher or the lower *gotra* of an individual is not relevant for the possession of a particular body, short or tall, particular colours—black or brown, particular types of sense-organs like healthy sense-organs or deformities. For instance, a man born in the higher family may have deformities in the body, may be of dark colour and may be also ugly. On the other hand, a man who is born in a lower family may be handsome and healthy. Therefore, *gotra karma* has nothing to do with the determination of the bodily forms in their various aspects. It is concerned with the status of the individuals with reference to his family and mental make up. However, *nāmakarma* and *gotra karma* are closely associated with each other regarding the formation of the individual personalities.

Another question has been raised regarding the criteria of determining the lower and the higher status of an individual in the family and in society due to the operation of the *gotrakarma*. The answer to this, will have to refer to the biological and social heredity. We find that physical and mental poise of an individual as determined in society in a dignified way is largely due to the family upbringing.

ing. Just as a beautiful body is due to the biological heredity, similarly the status of the individual and upright behaviour and his character and personality are to a great extent influenced by the biological heredity and family up-bringing.

Antarāya karma

Antarāya karma obscures and also obstructs the inherent energy of the soul. By the rise of this *karma*, constructions would be created for the enjoyment of the normal pleasures of life and the experience of an individual.¹ This *karma* has been compared to the finance minister of the king. The king orders to give money to a person but the finance minister very often withholds and delays the disbursement, of what is given. He creates difficulty in the implementation of the king's order. So, also, is the function of *antarāya karma*. It obstructs the energy of *ātman* regarding the act of giving *dāna* (donation) and other forms of generous act.²

Antarāya karma is of five types : 1. *Dāna antarāya karma*—It creates obstructions in the giving of gifts and charity. 2. *Lābhāntarāya karma*—Due to the rise of this *karma*, one is prevented from enjoying the fruits of his labours. He does not get the profits that he earns. 3. *Bhogāntarāya karma*—It prevents the enjoyment of normal pleasures of life although the pleasures are at hand. For instance, one cannot eat delicious food kept on the table for dinner due to ill-health. 4. *Upabhogāntarāya karma*—This prevents the enjoyment of pleasures frequently available, as for instance, one is prevented from getting good house, wearing good clothes and ornaments. 5. *Vīryāntarāya karma*—It prevents an individual from performing actions and duties which require strength and drive.

Antarāya karma can also be considered of two types : 1. *Pratyutpanna vināśā antarāya karma*—By the rise of this *karma* the objects which are acquired are either lost or destroyed. 2. *Pihita āgāmipatha*

1 *Pañcādhyāyī* 2, 1007.

2 *Tīhāṇaṅga* 2, 4, 105 *īkā*.

antarāya karma—This refers to the obstructions created in the enjoyment of the forthcoming experiences and objects.¹

Antarāya karma is of one *antarmuhūrta* duration in the least and at the maximum it is of thirty crores of crores *sāgaropama*.

The soul has the inherent characteristics of moving upwards (*ardhvagati*), just as a gourd (*tumbā*) has the capacity of floating on the surface of water. But if the gourd is smeared with clay it becomes heavy and it does not flow.² Similarly, due to the encrustations of *kārmic* particles the soul is prevented from going upwards and from purifications; so it gets involved in the wheel of empirical existence, it goes down.³

Antarāya karma is concerned with the obstructions of the possibility of getting enjoyment of the possession and the fruits of activity.

The question arises whether *antarāya karma* is directly related to the external objects and the possession of enjoyment of external objects? For instance, in the possibility of giving charity etc. If there are obstructions these obstructions are due to *anuarāya karma*.

The possibilities of knowledge and other experiences and possessions depends upon the naturality and appropriateness of occasion which has reached the stage of maturity of experience. We may call this *labdhi*. *Labdhi* is the appropriateness of fructification. For instance, even when there is a donor to give charity and also when there is the preparedness of accepting charity, by an individual or an institution, it may not be possible that the act of charity may materialise due to some other external forces. But when all the forces are favourable for actualisation then charity is given. This is the *labhi* with reference to time and other circumstances. *Labdhi*, therefore, may be referred to the capacity, the potency and the fructification of realisation. Just as *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* obscures valid knowledge

1 *Sthānāṅga* 2; 4, 105.

2 *Uttarādhyayana* 33, 19.

3 *Jñātā sūtra*.

so also other forms of *karma* prevents the relevant experience. *Antarāya karma* refers to the inherent energy of the soul for knowledge experienced and action. *Antarāya karma* obstructs the energy to operate in the direction of getting experiences are external, for example the act of charity, the gains, the enjoyment of the objects and the objects connected with the inherent energy of the soul are external, but the acts connected with charity and experiences of their individual in experiencing the fruits of *karma* are internal in the sense that they are directly connected with the expression of soul energy.

There may be external objects ready to be given as charity, the conditions for giving charity may also be favourable, but if there is no internal urge on the part of one who gives charity is not yet aroused, the act of charity would not be possible. Due to the rise of *dānāntarāya karma*, the person who wants to give *dāna* is not mentally ready. This is *asadbhāva*. When he is willing to it becomes *sadbhāva*. But sometimes we find occasions when even in the absence of the desire to give charity the charity is given, while even with the best of intentions the desired charity, we may not give it. In these circumstances *dānāntarāya karma* operates in different ways. But the external circumstances are not directly related to *dānāntarāya karma*. It has a reference to the internal urge, the psychic factor which is responsible for the act of giving charity. The external circumstances are only occasions which are indirectly responsible for the rise, suppression and destruction (*kṣayopasaṃsāra*) of the *antarāyakarma*. The real cause is psychological. It is the inner urge which is the expression of *anantavīrya* (the infinite and inherent energy of the soul).

We also find that sometimes the circumstances are favourable, the objects are there, still we do not get the objects. This is due to the operation of *lābhāntarāya karma*, which does not permit the rise of the desire of for getting the objects. Sometimes, we may have a desire to have the object, but circumstances may not be favourable. Similarly, in some situations all the three factors, the desire to give, the desire to take and the object that is desired are all present, but

still we do not get the object due to some unfavourable and accidental circumstances. In this sense, we find that the operation of *antarāya karma* is directly connected with the internal factors of the individual and not with the objects which are external. The circumstances play an important part in the determination of the act of possession of the objects. Sometimes, the *lābhāntarāya karma* may not have origin to express itself, even then it is possible that we may not get the objects. In some situations even with the operation with the rise of the *lābhāntarāya karma*, we may get the objects. The *bhogāntarāya* and *upbhogāntarāya karmas* are also directly related to the inherent energy of *ātman* and not with external things. The same position is true about *vīryāntarāya*.

Therefore what is primarily important is that the *antarāya karma* obstructs the infinite energy of *ātman* (*anantu vīrya*) and is not directly related to get or not get the external things.

THE INTENSITY OF KĀRMIC EXPERIENCE

The intensity of the experiences of *kārmic* fruition is primarily dependent upon the emotional set and the operation of *kaṣāyas*. If the *kaṣāyas* (emotional set) is intense, the *kārmic* experiences will also be intense, it would give rise to *pāpa karma* and if the *kaṣāyas* are not intense the *kārmic* experiences would not be intense, it would give rise to *puṇya karma*.

KARMA-PRADEŚA

An empirical individual (*jīva*) is constantly engaged in activity through body, mind and speech. Due to these activities *kārmic* particles flow into the soul and envelope the soul. The extent of the enveloping of obscuration of the *kārmic* particles into the soul is referred to as *karma-pradeśa*. The influx of the *kārmic* particles into the soul are distributed into eight types of *kārmic* particles and they envelope the soul in their own way. There is bondage. The *āyu karma* receives the least of the amount of the *kārmic* particles among those which are glued to the soul. *Nāma karma* and *gotra karma* have a little more share than that of *āyu karma*, but equal share of the *kārmic*

flow: *Jñānāvaraṇīya*, *darśanāvaraṇīya* and *antarāya* have a little more quantity of *kārmic* particles that flow in; but they have equal share. *Mohanīya karma* gets more quantity and the *vedanīya karma* has still more, in other words *vedanīya karma* gets the greatest share. These *pradeśas* are again distinguished on the basis of consequential effects (*utītaraprakṛti*) and these varying degrees of *pradeśakarma* depend on the corresponding varying degrees of the influx of *kārmic* particles of their nature.

KARMA-BANDHA

We have already seen that the *kārmic* particles (*karma vargaṇās*) pervade every point in the universe. Individual soul is constantly in activity through the mind, speech and body. Due to these activities motivated and accompanied by *kaṣāyas* attract infinite number of particles of *karma vargaṇās* into the soul. In the case of the *ekendriyas* (one-sensed organisms) influx is of six directions. But if there are obstructions it would have influxes from three, four or five directions. But in the case of all other *jīvas* the influx of *karma* is from all directions.¹ With reference to the *kṣetra* (space), the *jīva* can attract the *kārmic* particles from the area where it exists itself but the *kārmic* particles outside this sphere of extension would not be attracted.² We should realise that the variation in the quantity of the influx of *karma* depends on the variations in the types of activity. If the activity is slow, the influx of *kārmic* particles also would be slow. This is called in the *āgamic* language, *pradeśabandha*. In other words, the *ātman* has numberless *pradeśas* (space points). On each *pradeśa*, there would be glued infinite number of *kārmic* particles and this *karma pradeśa* in the space point of a soul is called *pradeśa*

1 (a) *Uttarādhyayana* 32, 18.

(b) *Bhagavatī*, śataka 17, uddeśā 4.

2 (a) *Vīṣeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya*, gāthā 1941, p. 117, II Pt.

(b) *Pañcasanṅgraha* 284.

bandha. The bondage and the association of *kārmic* particles to the soul *pradeśas* is called *pradeśa bandha*.¹

Gautama asked Mahāvīra, “Bhagavan ! Can we say that *jīva* and *pudgala* are intimately associated with each other in the form of bondage, close knit association as if they are one like the water and milk ?”

Bhagavāna replied, Yes they are very closely bound together; and he explained the process of *pradeśa bandha*. “O Gautama”, he said, “just as a lake is full of water overflowing with the waves dashing against the banks and suppose a boat with innumerable holes at the bottom and the sides is left in the water, the water perforates into the boat and is full of water, the boat sinks, so also the soul is bound with *kārmic* particles and becomes one with each other.”²

The *kārmic* encrustations of the soul due to the activities of the soul creates *āvaraṇa* (veil) and it obscures the knowledge, intuition, experiences of pleasure and pain and other types of experiences on the basis of the different capacities and original nature of the *kārmic* particles. When the *kārmic* particles which are material in nature get bound to the soul, they form themselves into different types. This is called *prakṛtibandha*.

Prakṛtibandha and *pradeśabandha* are due to *yoga* and the different forms of activity.³ The bondage of the *kārmic* particles to the soul arising out of the *yoga* only and its forms of activity can be compared to the depositing of dust particles on a wall which is dry. They do not affect the wall and they can be blown away. Such types of *kārmic* bondage takes place in the 11th and 12th and 13th

1 (a) *Bhagavati* 1, 4, 40 vṛtti.

(b) *Navatattvasāhityasāhgraha avacūrṇi vṛtyādisa-ne'ah navatattva-prakaraṇa*, gāthā 71 k1 vṛtti.

(c) *Navatattvasāhityasāhgraha; Devānandasūrikṛta saptatattva-prakaraṇa* adh, 4.

2 *Bhagavati* 1, 6,

3 (a) *Pañcama Karmagrantha*, gāthā 96 –joga payādipaesaṃ.

(b) *Thāṇāṅga* 2, 4, 96 ṭikā.

stages of *guṇasthānas*. Because the normal human activity is in existence, but there is the total absence of the passions and emotional upsets (*kaṣāya*). By this, there is no bondage worth the name which leads to the furtherance of *saṃsāra*.

Yoga and *kaṣāya* operating together would create bondage which is more enduring and whose effects have to be experienced before their freedom. This type of bondage arising out of the *yoga* and passions (*kaṣāya*) is called *sthitibandha*. In other words, the *kārmic* bondage that the soul gets through *jñānāvaraṇa karma* etc. and the duration the *kārmic* bondage in the *ātma pradeśa* is called *sthitibandha*.¹

The soul by its activity and *kaṣāyas* attracts *kārmic* particles both of auspicious and inauspicious nature. If *kārmic* particles give rise to auspicious results it is called auspicious *karma* (*śubhakarma*); and the *kārmic* particles giving rise to inauspicious results is called *aśubhakarma*. After the rise of the *karma*, they experience the fruition of the *kārmic* bondage may be in various intensities and duration according to the nature of the *kārmic* particles. This type of variations is determined at the time of *kārmic* bondage. This is called *anubhāgabandha*.²

The *kārmic* bondage expresses itself on appropriate occasions and at that time there is the *udaya* or the rise of the *kārmic* experiences with various intensities. If the occasion is not appropriate the *kārmic* particles may rise, but without giving any fruition may disintegrate themselves as material particles. As long as the appropriate occasion for fruition does not arise, the experience would not be possible. The rise of the *kārmic* particles for fruition gives rise to the experiences of *karma* and the exhaustion of *karma*. The experiences of *karma* depend on the nature of the *kārmic* particles. For

1 *Sthitiḥ kālāvadhāraṇam*.

2 (a) *Bhagavati* 1, 4, 40 vṛtti.

(b) *Anubhāgo raso jñeyaḥ*.

(c) *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 22—vipākoṇanubhāvaḥ I.

instance, *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* obscures the knowledge and *darśanāvaraṇīya karma* obscures intuition and faith according to their nature of the *kārmic* particles and the strength. Similarly, the other types of *kārmic* particles creates obscuration like the *mohanīya* and *vedanīya* and *cāritra karma* according to the strength of the *kārmic* particles and their original nature. There can be no alterations in the original nature of the *kārmic* particles.

But in the case of the consequential effects of the experiences of the one *karma* may be changed to the experiences and the consequential effects of the same original *karma*. In other words, the *kārmic* consequential effects (*uttaraprakṛti*) may be transferred and transformed. For instance, *matijñānāvaraṇīya karma* may express itself in the obscuration of *śrutajñāna*. But this type of consequential transformation is possible in the case of similar types of *kārmic* particles (*sa-jātiya*), and not of dissimilar types of *kārmic* particles. As for instance, *darśana mohanīya* cannot be transformed into *cāritaramohanīya* and vice-versa. Similarly, *sa-myaktva vedanīya* (right form of feeling *karma*) and *mithyātva vedanīya*, consequential effects cannot be transformed. And also the consequential effect of (*uttaraprakṛti*) of *āyukarma* cannot also be transformed, as for instance, the *āyukarma* of a lower animal cannot be transformed into the *āyukarma* of the human being. The same is the case with other forms of *āyukarma*.¹

Just as there is transformation of the *kārmic* effect on the basis of the nature of the *kārmic* particles, so also there is possibility of transformation of the various *kārmic* bondage. The *karma* which has lower intensity may be transformed into the *karma* which is of higher intensity and vice-versa.

Gautama asked Mahāvīra, "Bhagavan ! it is said by some that all the *jīvas* experience the *karmas* according to the *kārmic* bondage that has been earned by them. Is it true?"

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- 1 (a) *Tattvārthasūtra* 8, 22 *bhāṣya*.
 (b) *Tattvārtha*; 8, 22 *Sarvārthasiddhi*.
 (c) *Viśeṣaśākyaka bhāṣya*, gāthā 1938.
 (d) *Tattvārthasūtra* Pt. Sukhlālji (Hindi) p. 293, 2nd edition.

Mahāvīra said, "O Gautama ! this is not completely true, because all the *jīvas* do not experience the *kārmic* experiences exactly the same way according to the nature of the intensity of their *kārmic* bondage. Some *jīvas* do experience the *kārmic* experiences exactly according to the nature and the intensity of the bondage. This I say, *evambhūta-vedanā*. But in some cases there are possibilities of variation of experiences due to the activity of the *jīva* and due to the transformation of the bondage intensities. This is called "*unevambhūta vedanā*."¹

Sthānāṅga mentions four types of consequential effects of *karma* with reference to its *kārmic* particles (*karmavipāka*) : (1) the *kārmic* particles may be of *śubha karma* (auspicious) and the consequential effects may also be *śubha* (auspicious), (2) the *karma* may be *śubha* but its consequential effects (*vipāka*) may be *aśubha*, (3) *karma* may be *aśubha* while the consequential effects may be *śubha* and (4) *karma* may be *aśubha* and the consequential effects also may be *aśubha*.²

Naturally a curiosity arises as to the causes of such consequential effects—why is it that the original *kārmic* particles may be auspicious while the consequential effects may be different ? Jainas have attempted to give a solution to this problem by the processes of transformation, fruition, suppression and destruction of *kārmic* particles. These have been called *avasthā* (position) and there are eleven *avasthās*, of the relation between the nature of the *karma* and the nature of the fruition of *karma* in varied forms.³ These states are : 1. *bandha*

1 *Bhagavatī* 5, 5.

2 (a) *Sthānāṅga* 4, 4, 312.

(b) In the *Aṅguttaranikāya* similar discussion regarding the transformation of the auspicious and inauspicious into their effects is to be found—*Aṅguttaranikāya* 4, 232-233.

3 (a) *Dravyasaṅgraha ṭīkā*, gāthā 33

(b) *Ātmanimāṃsā* Pt. Dalsukha Mālvaṇīā, p. 128.

(c) *Jaina Darśana*.

(d) *Sri Amar Bhāratī*, varṣa I.

(bondage) 2. *sūtā* (potential states) 3. *udvartanā* (increase in the intensity) 4. *apavartanā* (decrease in the intensity of fruition) 5. *saṅkramana* (transformation) 6. *udaya* (rise) 7. *udīraṇā* (premature actualisation) 8. *upaśamana* (suppression) 9. *nidhatti* (in which there is possibility of increasing and decreasing the intensity of the fruition of *karma* but cannot be transformation and premature realisation of *karmas*) 10. *nikācīta* (absence of increase or decrease or transformation or premature realisation) 11. *abādhākāla*, the period of potentiality before actualisation.

1. *Bandha*—*Bandha* is bondage in which the *kārmic* particles envelops the soul and become almost one with the soul just as the mixture of water and milk is indistinguishable. We have already seen the four types of *bandha*.¹

2. *Sattā*—*Sattā* is a state of the nature of the *kārmic* particles attached to the soul and they are in the state of potentiality not yet expressed. It is a state of the soul with reference to the *karma* after the bondage and before the realisation of the *karman*.

3. *Udvartanā*—It refers to the increase in the intensity of the experience in the fruits of *karma*. This variation and increase in the intensity of the fruits of *karma* depends upon the variation in the intensity of the emotional states.

4. *Apavartanā*—This refers to the process of decreased realisation and decrease in the intensity experienced with reference to the transformation of *sthiti* (duration) and *anubhāga* (intensity of fruition) of *karma*. Jains have worked out a complicated scheme of transformation of *sthiti* and *anubhāga* of *karma*. The increased realisation

1 (a) *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 4, *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

(b) *Uttarādhyayana* 28, 24 *Nemicandriya* *ṭikā*.

(c) *Sthānāṅga* 1, 3, 9 *ṭikā*.

(d) *Navatattvasāhityasaṅgraha* : *saptatattvaprakaraṇa*, *gāthā* 133

(e) *Dravyasaṅgraha* 2, 32, *Nemicandra Siddhānta Chakravartī*.

(f) *Ṭhānāṅga* 1, 4, 9 *ṭikā*.

(g) *Navatattvasāhityasaṅgraha* *vṛtyādisametam Navatattvaprakaraṇam*, *gāthā* 71, *kī prākṛta avacūrpi*.

of *āyukarma* is however not possible with all the beings, with celestial and infernal beings and the human beings in their last existence, *chakravartī* and *tīrthāṅkīras*.¹ The increase and the decrease in the realisation of the *karma* is based on the nature of suppression or the expression of *karma*. For instance, sometimes *aśubhakarma* may be accompanied by actions which are *śubha* or *śubhakarma* may be followed by the actions which are inauspicious and the consequential effects of these *kārmic* processes are therefore, affected by the nature of the *karma* and the later actions bring in different types of *karma*.

5. *Saṅkramaṇa*—*Saṅkramaṇa* is transformation of one type of *karma* into another in respect of (1) its nature (2) duration (3) intensity and (4) the strength of *kārmic* matter. For example, *asātāvedanīya karma* can be transformed into *sātāvedanīyakarma*. Similarly, a person having right faith (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) transforms the *mithyātva karma* into *samyak-mithyātva karma* and *samyaktva*. But any *karma* cannot be transformed into any other *karma*. Mutual transformation is not possible in the case of *darśana mohanīya* and *cārītramohanīya karma*, nor between any two of the four sub-types of the *āyukarma*. Transformation is possible between the sub-types of the particular type of *karma* except in the cases mentioned above. A person having wrong belief (*mithyātva*) cannot easily transform the *mithyātva* into the mixed or *samyaktva* as it requires greater energy. Similarly, a person of right belief is pure and it is not easy for him to fall back into the *kārmic* state of wrong belief.² The four types of *saṅkramaṇa* mentioned above are : (1) *prakṛti saṅkramaṇa*, (2) *sthiti saṅkramaṇa*, (3) *anubhāga saṅkramaṇa* and (4) *pradeśa saṅkramaṇa*.³

6. *Udaya*—It is the rise of the *karma* in the process of fruition. When the *karma* rises and after giving its fruits becomes transformed into mere particles of matter. It is *phalodaya*. But sometimes without

1 Kalghatgi (T. G.) *Karma and Rebirth* (L. D. Institutue of Indology, Ahmedabad) ch. 2.

2 Kalghatgi (T. G.) *Karma and Rebirth*, ch. 2.

3 *Sihānāṅga* 4, 216.

giving fruits, the *karma* gets disintegrated into particles of matter, and it is destroyed. It is called *pradeśodaya*.

7. *Udīraṇā*—It is a premature realisation of the *karma*. *Karma* does not immediately bear fruit as soon as it is bound. It arises after the period of potentiality or the period of non-production which is called *abādhākāla*. And it continues to operate till it fructifies fully. But it is not possible to make a defined predication rule about *udīraṇā*. However, in the normal course of thing *udīraṇā* is possible in the case of the same type of *karma* which is in operation.

8. *Upaśamana*—This is the process of the suppression of *karma*, before it bears effect. *Upaśamana* is possible where there is a possibility of *udvartanā* and *apavartanā* and transformation (*saṅkramaṇa*). *Upaśamana* is only suppression and not destruction of the *karma* in producing its effects, just as the burning embers of fire produced by coal are covered by ashes and they are prevented from giving their full effects of the fire. But as soon as the ashes covering the embers of fire are removed the effect of fire is felt in its intensity, so also the suppressed *karma* has to get itself exhausted and produce its effects in varying degrees after the process of suppression no longer operates.

9. *Nidhatti*—It is the process by which *karma* is made incapable of all processes except *udvartanā* and *apavartanā*—increased and decreased realisation. Under certain conditions the *kārmic* particles are so intensely glued that it becomes impossible to affect them in any way except by increased or decreased realisation.¹

10. In the *Nikācīla* even these processes are impossible. In this case the duration, intensity and strength of the *karma* are determined by the very time of the bondage of *karma*. *Jīva* is bound to suffer the fruition of this type of *karma*.

11. *Abādhākāla* - *Abādhākāla* is the duration of the *kārmic* state from the time of its bondage to the time of fruition. The extent of the *abādhākāla* has been measured with reference to the extent of

1 Kalghatgi (T. G.) : *Karma and Rebirth*, ch. 2.

the duration of the type of *karma*. Generally, the ratio is one hundred years to one *sāgaropama* period of time of its fruition as the original *karma*. For example, maximum duration of the *jñānāvaraṇīya karma* is thirty crores of crores *sāgaropama*. And the *abadhakala* will be measured as three thousand years. In the *Bhagavatī*, we get the calculations about the periods of *abādhākala* of the 8 types of *karma*.¹ In the *Prajñāpanā* also there is the calculation about the extent of the *abādhākala* with reference to the consequential effects of the original *karma*.²

The Jainas have made a systematic study of the theory of *karma*. The Jaina contribution to the theory of *karma* is unique. In the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali, there is the mention of the consequential effects of the fruition of the different *karmanas*. *Yoga darśana* mentions three such types, as : (1) *niyatavipākī*, in this the *karma* gets expression at a determined time, gives fruit and exhausts. (2) *aniyata-vipākī*, the *karma* rises and is destroyed without giving fruit. (3) *avāyagamī*, this refers to the process of the transformation of one type of *karma* with the similar type of *karma* or the sub-type of *karma*. These three concepts of *Yogadarśana* may be compared to the Jaina concepts *nikācīta*, *pradeśodaya* and *saṅkramaṇa*.

KARMA AND REBIRTH

The subject of rebirth is very closely associated with the doctrine of *karma*. The two are basal pre-supposition of Indian thought. They are postulates of Indian thought. Rebirth is a corollary of the principle of *karma*. If *karma* is fully exhausted, the series of births will come to an end; but it is not possible to exhaust all the *karma* that has been accumulated in one single life. The *karma* that we have accumulated in the past gives rise to various births. It is a cycle of existence and rebirth.³ Rebirth is very closely associated with the *karma* and *jīva*. The *karma* of the past life is responsible for the

1 *Bhagavatī* 2, 3.

2 *Prajñāpanā* 23, 2, 21-29.

3 *Ācārāṅga* 12, 6.

present life.¹ *Karma* of the present life will be responsible for the future life. The accretion of *karmas*, as *kārmic* particles of *āyu karma* enter the soul which is responsible in various ways for determining the states of existence in the succeeding life, the length of life and the status of the individual in all its different lives.² Bhagavāna Mahāvīra said that passion like *krodha* (anger), *māna* (egoity), *māyā* (deceit) and *lobha* (greed) are the root cause of the cycle of births.³ In the *Bhagavadgītā* we get an analogical description about rebirth and the chain of birth. As a man takes out the old clothes and wears the new one, similarly the soul casts away the worn out body and takes on a new body, after death.⁴ This is possible through the process of “*āvantana*” (transference).⁵ The Tathāgata Buddha once explained that the pricks of the thorn that he suffered were due to the violence and injuries caused to a human being in his ninetyone previous life.⁶

The new born infant expresses various emotions like joy, fear and sorrow. These are primarily due to its memories in the past life.⁷ The new born infant, the moment it is born, starts sucking the milk from the mother's breast. This is due to its learning and habits that it had acquired in the past life.⁸ As the young boy grows into a youth similarly the *jīva* enters a new life and the body, and grows, into full stature.⁹ The new born in fact experiences pleasure and pain and expresses various emotions. All these can be traced to the dispositions (*saṃskāras*) acquired by the infant from its previous life due to the heritage of its *karmas*, may call it collective uncon-

1 *Bhagavati* 2, 5.

2 *Sihānāṅga* 9, 40.

3 *Daśavaikālika* 8, 39.

4 *Gītā* 2, 22.

5 *Gītā* 8, 26.

6 *Iti ekanavatikalpe śiktyā me puruṣo hat ṭh.*

Tena *karma* vipākena pāle vidhoṣmi bikṣavaḥ.

7 *Nyāyasūtra*, 3, 1, 11.

8 *Nyāyasūtra* 3, 1, 12.

9 *Vīṣṇavaśyaka bhāṣya*.

scious, the rational-unconscious as Jung has said as equivalent to *karma*. These are due to the *saṃskāras* dragged on from previous life. In this way, the Indian philosophers have adduced arguments and have tried to show that the rebirth is a fact of life. The soul gets involved in the wheel of life, (*saṃsāra*) and is born and reborn in different existences.

As we said earlier, the *karma* and rebirth are basal pre-suppositions. If we do not accept the theory of *karma*, rebirth cannot be explained and rebirth can be explained only on the basis of the principle of *karma*. If rebirth were not to be accepted as a fact principle of life, it would be difficult to explain the prevalent inequality in this world and the experiences of various types of existences in this life and in this world without reference to *karma*.

The western philosophers also were not unaware of doctrine of rebirth although this doctrine was largely ignored in the western thought. Pythagoras was aware of the principle of the rebirth. Plato said that the soul always weaves new garment. The soul has a natural strength which will hold out and is born many times. Schopenhaur explicitly mentions the doctrine of rebirth and said that the doctrine has relevance for explaining the concept of distribution. He said that it is at once obvious to everyone who hears of the rebirth for the first time.

The Jainas have given an elaborate study of the doctrine of rebirth as based on the *karma* theory. There are four states of existence : the human, the lower animal, the heavenly being, and the infernal world. The soul moves one to the other according to its desserts. The *karma* that it has accumulated determines its existence and status in the next life. The time gap between the death in a particular life and rebirth in the next life is called *antarakāla*. This duration of time varies from one, to three or four *saṃayas*. In the *antarakāla* the gross physical body has already been left, *jīva* is without the gross physical body and is seeking to get into the new body. This process of movement from the old body to the new body is called "*antarāla gati*". This may be "*ṛju*" (short and direct) and *vakra* (curved and indirect). The direction of the movement depends upon

its previous performance. If the direction is straight and direct it is *ṛjugati*. If the direction of the movement is uneven and indirect, it is called *vakragati*. The direct movement (*ṛjugati*) requires one *samaya* and the least effort on the part of the *jīva* to enter from the previous to the next life. When the soul departs from the previous body it acquires the speed of that body and it darts off to its next destination like an arrow. In the case of the curved direction it has to make certain efforts. When the soul reaches the point of curve the previous body is to some extent arrested, then the *jīva* has to depend on the energy of the *sūkṣma* (subtle) *kārmic* body. The time required for traversing the distance from one birth to another birth in the next body depends on the number of curves in the direction of the next body. If there is only one curve it will require two *samayas*. If there are two curves it requires three *samayas* and if there are three curves, it requires four *samayas*. Generally, the universe is extended in three directions like : upwards, downwards and crosswise. In the case of the residence of the heaven, hell and crosswise in the case of *tiryak gati* (lower animals).

The soul requires two *samayas* in its movement generally from the direction of the upper world to the lower world. In the upper world (*ūrdhvaloka*), it takes the direction of the eastern side and in the lower world it turns to the direction of the western world. In the case of the duration of the three *samayas* for the movement there are two turns. One is north-eastern direction and the other south-west direction. In the first *samaya* it moves in the direction of the lower world, in the second *samaya* it takes a turn towards the western and in the third *samaya* there is turn to the north-western side.

In the case of the duration of the time in the movement upto four *samaya* there would be three turns. First, it moves towards the lower world, then turns towards the south-western side, then towards the western side and lastly north-western side. This movement in different directions is called "*tri-vakrā catuḥ samayikā*".

In all these cases the movement of the *jīva* is with the help of the *sūkṣma śarīra* (subtle body), as the gross body is no longer. But the gross body will be created in the next life with *sāṃskāra* and with the help of the subtle body and the energy available. According to the

karma there when the *jīva* casts off one body and moves towards the direction of assuming the next body it is guided and directed by *ānupūrvināma karma*. This type of *karma* is like the row that controls the movement of the bullock. However, in the case of the movement from the earlier to the next body in the straight direction (*ṛjugati*), there is no need for any guiding *ānupūrvināmakarma*. During the movement only the *taijasa* (electric) and *kārmaṇa* (*kārmic*) body accompany. *Audārika* and *vaikriya* bodies are created freshly for the new life on the basis of its *saṃskāras*.

A pertinent question has been raised regarding the absence of the sense-organs during the movement of the *jīva* from the previous body towards the formation of the new life. The question is asked, if the gross body is not there, there would be no sense-organs and if the sense-organs are not there, there would be no cognition or sensing of the direction. In that case how can the *jīva* proceed its journey in proper way?

The answer to this question has been given from the point of view of *anekānta*. Bhagavāna Māhāvira says it is true that there are no physical sense-organs (*dravyendriyas*). But the functions of the sense-organs are not altogether lost. They are expressed through *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa śarīra*, just as the modern machines like the aeroplane are controlled by electric motivations through the computers. We can, therefore, say during the movement of the *jīva* from one body to the other, there may not be the physical sense-organs, but there is the presence of the psychic sense-organs.

THE PATH TOWARDS MOKṢA

The Indian philosophers, except the Cārvākas, accept the *mokṣa* as the highest ideal and they have shown the way to *mokṣa*. The path to *mokṣa* given by different Indian philosophers may give different emphasis on one or the other aspect of the cognitive, the affective and the creative functions. For instance, *Sāṅkhya darśana* and the *Advaita Vedānta* give emphasis on *jñāna mārga*, while Rāmānuja and others emphasise the *bhaktimārga*. *Cāritra* is also given importance, in the way to attain to *mokṣa*. However, all are agreed that the *karma* has to be removed and the soul to be purified in order to

attain *mokṣa*. The soul can be purified by penance and meditation etc., as the ore of the gold has to be purified through various processes, like—heating etc. But the Jainas have not given only exclusive importance to the *jñānamārga* as is done in the case of *Sāṅkhya*, *Vedānta* and *Mahāyāna Buddhism*, nor it does emphasise exclusively the *kriyākāṇḍa*, the pathway through activity and ritualism, as is emphasised by the *Pārvamīmāṃsā*. But the Jainas say that *jñāna* and *kriyā* (*cāritra*) are both necessary for the *mokṣamārga*. There should be a synthesis of both these.¹ *Jñāna* with *cāritra* would be necessary. Even if the *Jñāna* were less, but *cāritra* were to be emphasised, then it would be a way to *mokṣa*. But knowledge without *cāritra*, however great it may be, will not lead to the highest end of perfection.² Ācārya Bhadrabāhu says that knowledge without good conduct may be compared to a donkey carrying sandle wood.³

The Jainas contend that the pathway to perfection lies in the synthesis and the harmony of the triple path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.⁴ In the *āgamas*, we find that the pathway to perfection is through *sinhyajñāna*, *samyagdarśana*, *samyagcāritra* and *tapas*.⁵ There are only terminological differences in the expression regarding the pathway to perfection. The perfection and the general contention is that right knowledge, right intuition and right conduct would be necessary as *mokṣamārga*.

Gautama, the Buddha, gave importance to the stoppage of *kārmic* bondage (*saṁvara*) as the first step to *Nirvāṇa*. Jainas also give importance to *saṁvara*.⁶ Ācārya Hemacandra says that just as a house with many windows and doors kept open attracts dust from all the directions, so also activities of the *jīva* bring about *kārmic*

1 *Āvaśyakaniryukti*, gāthā 94

2 *Āvaśyakaniryukti*, gāthā 99.

3 *Āvaśyakaniryukti*, gāthā 100

4 (a) *Tattvārthasūtra*. 1 (b) *Āvaśyakaniryukti*, gāthā 103.

5 *Uttarādhyayana* 28/2-3.

6 *Tattvārtha* 1, 4. *Sarvārthasiddhi*

particles. The first step therefore is to close these doors and windows so that the fresh *kārmic* particles do not enter the *jīva*. This is, as we have already seen, the process of *saṁvara*. We have also seen that the process of *saṁvara* can be compared to the stoppage of the inflow of water into the tank through the different inlets. For the sake of cleaning the tank we have first to stop the water, so that the fresh inflow of water is not possible. *Saṁvara* is such a process of the stoppage of the influx of *karma* through varied channels.¹ Once the influx of *karma* is stopped through the stoppage of the influx i. e., through *saṁvara*, next step would be to remove the *karma* that is already collected into the soul and that is process of *nirjarā*. This process may be compared to the cleaning of the accumulated water in a tank. One who seeks to attain *mokṣa* had also to clean the accumulated *karma*,² and the removal of *karma* from the *jīva pradeśa* is called *Nirjarā*.³

When all the *karmas* are removed the *ātman* reaches perfection⁴ and the liberated. Once the *karmas* are removed and the *ātman* reaches perfection, fresh *karma* would not enter into the soul, just as the fried seeds do not sprout.⁵

SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION

The Jaina contribution of the theory of *karma* is significant. It has developed a scientific theory of *karma* with its emphasis on the atomic nature of *karma* as *karmavargaṇās* and with its elaborate scientific description of the processes of *karma*. Maxmuller says that *karma theory* has influenced mankind to a great extent. When we know that our present actions are due to the effects performed in the past and that our present actions will be responsible for the future life, we become more conscious of the distinctions between the virtue and vice

1 *Navatattvasāhityasaṅgraha* : Sri Hemacandra *Sūtrikṛta Saptatattva-prakaraṇaḥ* 118-122.

2 *Uttarā*. 28, 35.

3 *Tattvārtha* 1, 4. *Sarvārthasiddhi*

4 (a) *Tattvārtha* 10, 3, *kṛtsnakarmakṣayo mokṣaḥ*.

(b) *Śivagītā* 13-32

5 *Tattvārthabhāṣyagatā antima kārīkā* 8

and we face the difficulties of life with equanimity of mind. We strive to become good.¹

Karma is infact a striking answer to the 'fathomless injustice to the nature of things, and it appeals to the overpowering strength of the necessity of justice. The conception of an all controlling law of natural distribution which links together successive earth lives of each individual soul both satisfied by sense of justice and through light on the problem of seemingly unmeritted suffering.²

Having discussed the arguments and counter-arguments of the logical justification of the doctrine of *karma*, we may say that from the real point of view (*niścaya naya*) logical justification of the doctrine of *karma* is not possible nor necessary. It is the expression of the highest knowledge and experience of the seers.³

□

1 *Darśana aur Cintana*, khaṇḍa II, p. 216.

2 Warren (H.C.) : *Buddhism in Transitions* (1922) p. 48.

3 Kālghatgi (T.G.), *Jaina View of Life* (Jivarāja Granthamālā no. 20) 1969, pp. 110-11.

PART V

Jain Darśna and the Philosophies of the World

1. *PHILOSOPHIES OF THE WORLD—A STUDY.*
2. *JAINA AND BUDDHISTIC PHILOSOPHIES :
A COMPARATIVE STUDY*
3. *JAINA AND SĀṆKHYA PHILOSOPHIES :
A COMPARISON*
4. *JAINA AND VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHIES :
COMPARISON & CONTRAST.*
5. *LEGACY OF THE JAINA DARŚANA TO THE
WORLD OF THOUGHT*

Philosophies of the World : A Study

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Indian philosophy is a synthesis of the two traditions, i. e., the *Vedic* and the *Śramaṇa* traditions. The *Vedic* tradition advocates the authority of the *Vedas*. It is traditionalistic and rationalistic in approach. The *Śramaṇa* tradition does not accept the authority of the *Vedas*. It is empiricist in outlook and analytic in its methodology. It is based upon the experiences of the seers for its fundamental truths and the empirical experiences for the understanding of the phenomenal world.

The Jaina tradition advocates authority of the teachings of the *Tīrthaṅkaras* as presented through the *āgamas* not because it is the final word of the *Tīrthaṅkara* but because of their omniscient experiences which have been transmitted to the disciples and which has been codified through the *sūtrāgamas*. The *Veda-darśana* and the teachings of the *Upaniṣads* belong to the *Vedic* tradition. Later systems of philosophy like the *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Pārvamīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* belong to the *Vedic* tradition. The philosophy of the *Vedic* tradition is also considered to be orthodox systems of philosophy and are called "*āstika darśanas*", primarily because they accept the authority of the *Vedas* and also because they believe in the creator God, and therefore atheistic. Buddhism, Jainism and *Cārvāka darśanas* belong to the *śramaṇic* tradition or *āvedic* tradition (non-vedic).

VEDIC THOUGHT

The earliest presentation of Indian thought can be traced to the *Vedas*. The *Rgveda* is the earliest document which is supposed to be

philosophical in content. The main problems of *Vedic* arjans were concerned with the worldly problems. Their outlook was to live a happy life in this world. The *Vedas* contain *hymns* addressed to the gods for getting the benefits of the world. Occasionally, the *Vedic* seers have expressed flashes of philosophical insights.

The main problem connected with philosophical study in the *Vedic* speculation was cosmic. A pertinent question was asked : 'What is the source of this Universe ?' This was presented with reference to the many Gods who were personalised forces of nature. In these discussions, we may however trace the philosophical development in the *Rgveda* in the direction of thought from 1. naturalistic polytheism to 2. monotheism in which the conception of henotheism as suggested by Maxmuller may also be included, and 3. monism. Naturalistic polytheism was the first current of philosophical thought. The phenomena of nature were symbolised as Gods and they were worshipped. For instance, *Varuṇa* was the sky God. *Mitra* his companion. *Sūrya* is the sun God. *Savitra* is the solar God and there were a host of many other Gods - about three hundred and thirty three were worshipped.

There was the idea of *Ṛta*. It was the conception of the order in the universe. It is a cosmic principle. *Varuṇa* is considered to be the custodian of this principle and it has been suggested that the doctrine of *karma* developed from the principle of *Ṛta*. From the naturalistic polytheism, evolved the monotheistic tendency. As we have seen earlier, Maxmuller mentions little intermediate stage of henotheistic tendency, by which one God became prominent for sometime. The highest position was granted to *Viṣvakarman* in the *Rgveda* at a later stage. Similarly, *Prajāpati* attained the highest rank.

Monotheism developed out of the tendency of the philosophic mood of the *Vedic* seers. In the contemplative mood, the seers asked some pertinent questions : 'What is the source of this universe ? and who has been the first born ?.' These questions lead to the philosophic development of monotheism. The philosophers and the *Rgveda* presented the monistic thought in their one famous statement : The ultimate reality is one and the wise call it by many names.¹

1 *ekam sat viprā bahudhā vadanti
agnim, yamam mātariṣyam āhuḥ.*

The *Upaniṣads* developed contemplative philosophy and presented rich and varied philosophic theories. There are 108 *Upaniṣads*. Of them, eleven are important on which Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written commentaries. The *Upaniṣads* state the divine and mystic contemplation about the ultimate principle of life. The idea of one God, a supreme and the principle of *Rta* were helpful in the development of philosophic thought in the monistic and absolutist direction. The fundamental philosophical concept of the *Upaniṣads* is the identity with the *ātman* and the *Brahman*, all else is the appearance. This is the cardinal principle of the *Upaniṣads*. The idea of self has been discussed in different *Upaniṣads* in different aspects. In the dialogues between Yājñavalkya and Janaka and between Prajāpati and Indra, we find the progressive development of the definition of the self. Similarly, in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* we find the description of the self as the charioteer and the body as the chariot. Similar idea is to be found in Plato's conception of the soul.

In the *Bhagavadgītā*, we get a beautiful synthesis of the triple path of knowledge (*jñāna*), performance of duty (*karma mārga*) and devotion (*bhaktimārga*) for the attainment of the highest and self-realisation. The *Bhagavadgītā* also gives the encyclopaedic information about the duty and responsibilities of the secular life. It is, therefore, a compendium of the harmony of the secular and the spiritual.

CĀRVĀKA DARŚANA

Cārvāka darśana is non-Vedic in its tradition. It is materialistic in approach. It refutes the arguments for the existence of God and of the authority of the *Vedas*. Its fundamental approach is secular, as this is worldly. It is difficult to give a list of authentic documents of the *Cārvāka darśana*, as the description of this school of thought is mainly found in other schools of Indian philosophy. The fundamental epistemological stand of the *Cārvāka* is : *Pratyakṣa* is the only *pramāṇa*. Sense experience is the only source of knowledge. All other sources of knowledge are not valid. Therefore, what is available through the sense-organs and what can be verified through the sense experience is alone real. All else is illusion. Therefore, the

cardinal injunction of the *Cārvāka* is "to seek pleasure, for tomorrow we die." "There is neither a permanent soul nor heaven nor hell; why fret about them, if today be sweet".

"When the body is destroyed nothing remains. Therefore, we should seek pleasure as long as we live."¹

JAINA DARŚANA

The Jaina philosophy is realistic and pluralistic. It is empiricist in its methodology. Jaina presents the seven categories which may be considered metaphysico-spiritual category. The *Jīva* and *ajīva* constitute the universe. *Jīva* is active and due to the activity of the *jīva*, the *kārmic* particles enter into the soul and obscure right knowledge, right intuition and right conduct. This obscuration and association of *karma* with the *jīva* is beginningless, but it has an end. When the *jīva* gets free from *kārmic* matter, it gains its purity and perfection which is its real nature. That stage is the stage of perfection, the *mokṣa* stage. This stage can be attained by triple path, as *śamyagdarśana*, *jñāna* and *cārita*. The doctrine of *anekānta* and *ahiṃsā* are the fundamental principles of metaphysics and ethics. The principle of *ātman*, *karmavāda*, *nayavāda*, *nikṣepavāda*, *pramāṇavāda*, *saptabhaṅgī* and *anekānta* are the foundation pillars of Jaina philosophy.

BAUDDHA DARŚANA

Buddhism also belongs to the *śramaṇa* current of thought. Buddhism is a religion preached by the Buddha, Siddhārtha Gautama. In his first sermon at Vārāṇasī, the Buddha presented his philosophy to his five disciples. That is called *dharmacakra pravartana*. He said that we should follow the *madhyama mārga* (the middle path). The fundamental philosophy of the Buddha can be presented in two principles : the four noble truths and the eight-fold path. *Dukha* is the first noble truth, *dukkha samudaya* is the second noble truth. It is the cause of suffering and explains this with reference to the theory of causation of *pratītyasamutpāda*. *Dukhanirodha* is the *nirvāṇa* and

1 Yāvatijīvet sukhaṃ jīvet, ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā ghṛtaṃ pibet.
Bhasmibhū tasya dehasya, punarāgamanam kutaḥ.

this is the third noble truth. *Dukhanirodha mārga* is the fourth noble truth, it gives a transcendental self. The self, what we call the *ātman* is not real and what we call the *ātman* is only a collection or an aggregate of the five states; physical and mental. It is the *skandha* of these states : 1. *viññāna*, 2. *vedanā*, 3. *saṃjñā* 4. *saṃskāra* and 5. *rūpa*. There is nothing more than this. This he calls the *nāmarūpa*.¹

Thus we find the foundational principle of Buddhism is *dukha*, and the ultimate aim is *dukha nirodha* or *nirvāṇa*.

It is difficult to say what he meant by *nirvāṇa*, although it has very often been interpreted as a state of nothingness. The origin of suffering arises out of our attachment to the various things of life, craving for the things of life.² Every thing is in a flux and nothing is permanent. It is all a temporary and in a flux. The highest end is the attainment of the state of *nirvāṇa* which is freedom from the state of misery.³

SĀṆKHYA & YOGA DARŚANA

Sāṅkhya and *Yoga* philosophy are complementary to each other. *Sāṅkhya* presents the metaphysical side while the *Yoga* according to Patañjali is the methodical effort to attain perfection, through the control of different elements of human nature, physical and psychical. *Cittavṛttinirodha* is the cardinal principle of *Yoga*. The *Sāṅkhya* metaphysics is accepted by *Yoga* and the *Yoga* methodology is largely accepted by *Sāṅkhya* philosophers. The *Sāṅkhya* is dualistic. It posits the two ultimate principles : 1. *puruṣa* and 2. *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* is passive, it is pure consciousness. *Prakṛti* is active, but unconscious. *Prakṛti* is the primordial matter and *puruṣa* is the self. *Sāṅkhya* postulates the plurality of self. The *Sāṅkhya* theory of the evolution

1 *dukha saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāste ca pañca prakīrtitāḥ. viññānaṃ, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāro, rūpameva ca.*

2 *Śaṅkharāṇa samuccaya, Bauddhadarśana — samudeti yato loka, rāgādīnāṃ gaṇo'ṅkilāḥ. ātmāṇātmīya bhāvāṅkhyāḥ samudayaḥ sa udāhṛtaḥ.*

3 *kṣipikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā, ityevaṃ vāsanā matā. sa mārga iha vijñeyo, nirodho mokṣa ucyate.*

of the universe is presented in the light of the association of *prakṛti* with *puruṣa*. When the *prakṛti* is in the proximity or in contact with *puruṣa*, activity starts. Then there are disturbances in the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*—*sattva* and *rajas* and *tamas*. These disturbances give rise to the various principles of the universe like *mahat*, *ahaṁkāra*, *manas*, the five sense-organs and five motor-organs; the five elements (*pañca tanmātrās*). Thus evolution consists of the twenty-five principles including the *puruṣa*. The ultimate ideal for the *puruṣa* is to realise. The *Yoga* presents the practical path for this realisation of *puruṣa* to attain its own pure nature. The *Yoga* gives eight-fold practical path in which 1. *yama* and 2. *niyama* are the ethical background and 3. *āsana* 4. *prāṇāyāma* and 5. *pratyāhāra* are the physico-psychological preparation, 6. *dhyāna* and 7. *dhāraṇā* are psychic exercises, 8. *Samādhi* is the culmination and the psychic process of the highest realisation. This is the *aṣṭāṅga mārga*.

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA DARŚANA

The *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika darśanas* are also complementary to each other. The *Nyāya* gives logic and epistemology; while *Vaiśeṣika* presents metaphysics. The *Nyāya* is also called *pramāṇasāstra*, because it presents the theory of *pramāṇas*. According to Gautama, there are four *pramāṇas* : 1. *pratyakṣa*, 2. *anumāna*, 3. *upamāna*, and 4. *śabda pramāṇa*. *Nyāya* is theistic in its approach. It accepts the creator God. The *Vaiśeṣika* gives the theory of atomism and the fundamental self-category like 1. *dravya* (substance), 2. *guṇa* (attribute), 3. *karma* (activity) 4. *sāmānya* (generality) 5. *vīśeṣa* (particularity) 6. *samavāya* (inherence) and 7. *abhāva* (non-existence). The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* ideal is also to attain *mokṣa* which is called *apavarga*. This is possible by the highest knowledge of the *padārthas* and by removing ignorance.

MĪMĀṂSĀ & VEDĀNTA DARŚANA

Mīmāṃsā and *Vedānta darśanas* are also related to each other very closely. *Mīmāṃsā* is considered to be *karmakāṇḍa*, while *Vedānta* is concerned with the knowledge of the *Brahman*. The object of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* is to help and support the situations for the attainment of salvation in two ways : 1. by giving methodology of interpretation

with the help of which complicated *Vedic* injunctions regarding the rituals may be understood and 2. by giving philosophical justifications of the beliefs on which ritualism depend. Rādhākṛiṣṇan says that the aim of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* is to examine the nature of *dharma*. It is practical in the sense. It prepares the ground for the performance of the *Vedic* injunction. This is based on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* epistemology wherein six *pramāṇa* have been mentioned : the four as given by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and others are *arthāpatti* (postulation) and *anupalabdhi*.

The *Vedānta darśana*s emphasises the identity of the *Brahman* and the self. The cardinal principle of *Advaita Vedānta* of *Śaṅkara* is the identity of the *Brahman* and *ātman* and the ultimate ideal is the merger of the *Brahman* and *ātman*. Rāmānuja emphasises the merger of the *ātman* with the *Brahman* and not the identity. The dualistic *Vedānta* (*dvaita*) advocates the reality of the *ātman* and *Brahman* even in the highest stage of *mokṣa*.

Thus, we find the cardinal and the foundational principle of all Indian thought is 1. the fact of misery and 2. the ideal of attainment of the state of freedom from misery and attainment of perfection. The *Cārvāka* system alone is phenomenalistic in its approach, and does not accept the trans-empirical reality.

The concept of *ātman* is one of the cardinal principles of all Indian thought, except the *Cārvākas* and in a sense of the nihilistic aspect of Buddhism. Thus we find that there is much common ground between the various systems of Indian philosophy. We should also realise that the ancient Indian thought was catholic in outlook. This can be very clearly evidenced by the fact that *Cārvāka* was the status of a *darśana*.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

Early Greek philosophy is also sufficiently ancient. We may consider the development of Greek philosophy from the seventh century B.C. to the 4th century B.C. The early beginning of Greek philosophers were still groping to find out the ultimate source of the universe in some physical phenomenon. When Mahāvira and the Buddha were preaching in India, Greek philosophy was in its

infancy. The early Greek philosophers were primarily concerned with the enquiry regarding the ultimate source of the universe. They sought to find out in some ultimate substance of this universe.

The earliest philosopher Thales, said that water is the source of the universe. Aleximander traced it to the unlimited and Aleximander said that air is the source of the universe.

There were two currents of thought which developed after the Ionic philosophers. They are the Electicus and the later philosophers who preached the doctrine of flux like Heraclitus. Permanedes said that reality "is". It is being and change is the appearance while Heraclitus advocated that change alone is real, and the being or permanence is unreal. He said we cannot step into the same water again. Heraclitus was called "Heraclitus the dark", because his sayings were obscure. Then came the philosophers like Democrates to preach the doctrine of elements and also the atomists. Pythagoras was a mystic. He was perhaps influenced by the Indian mystics. He talked of the rebirth and the influences of our action on the future life.

This was a stage of naturalist philosophy. But intellectualists at that time were aware to seek the ultimate reality in some phenomenal source. Various theories, sometimes conflicting, created confusion in the minds of the thinkers. There was intellectual chaos. This was reflected in the philosophy of the sophists, who made knowledge relative and subjective. Protogoras said "*Homo mensura*"—"man is the measure of all things." We cannot get objective criteria of reality. The sophists brought philosophy to the brink of extinction when they said that nothing can be known and anything can be known, it cannot be communicated.

This was the stage of intellectual chaos when Socrates came on the screen. From the period of Socrates onwards the search for the ultimate reality was inwards. Socrates was convinced that philosophy consists not in the knowledge of the external world, but in the knowledge of the self. "Know Thyself" was the cardinal principle of the Socratic teaching. Socrates said knowledge is virtue and virtue is knowledge. Knowledge and virtue are convertible terms. Socrates

was a simple man. He did not write any book but he discussed philosophy with the intellectual of his time sitting in the market of the Athens. He had many great disciples and one of them was Plato.

Plato was an aristocrat. He hated democracy. The ideal state is the 'Republic' in which the philosophers should be the king. The philosopher-king should have very simple and virtuous life and guide the destinies of the nation entirely for the good of the people. He made a distinction between the different classes on the basis of the function, like—the guardian class, the soldier class and those whose function was to obey i. e., the workers class.

Plato's political and social philosophy was based on metaphysical structure of the decrease of reality. The idea is real. It is perfect, it is eternal and it is simple. The things of the world are the imitations of the objects in the physical world. Ideas participate in the physical object and to the extent to which ideas participate, they are real.

Aristotle was Plato's disciple. It can be said that Aristotle gave the first lessons of rationalistic philosophy which synthesise the idealism and rationalism to some extent. Aristotle said that there are two fundamental principles of the universe : 1. form and 2. matter. Both of them are abstract principles. The phenomenal world is the expression of form and matter. Form is potentiality and matter is actuality.

Aristotle was a genius and he wrote books on many subjects like Philosophy, Mathematics, Astronomy, etc. It is said all the later philosophies are nothing but footnotes to the philosophy of Aristotle.

After Aristotle, philosophy in the west declined. The authority of Aristotle was so great that he was referred to as the only greatest authority and no development in philosophy took place till the end of the middle age. The middle ages were the dark ages.

Revival of philosophical speculation was to be found in the rationalist and empiricist schools in modern philosophy beginning with Descartes as a great rationalist and Locke as a great empiricist. In Kant, we get a synthesis again. Kant is considered to have brought a

Copernican revolution in philosophy and later philosophers like Bradley built a structure of the idealistic philosophy. Recent philosophy has gone off the tangent with logical positives and the analytical schools.



ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY

Arabic philosophy can be considered to have started with prophet Mohamed. Before the birth of Hazarat Mohamed, there were three different deities : 1. *Lāt* 2. *Lajjā* and 3. *Manāt*. There were three religious currents at that time. The Jews were the followers of Moses. The Christians were the followers of Jesus. These two religions were infact outside religions influencing the Arabic world. These religions were not indigenous to the Arabic world. The Arabs had their own religious practices. They worshipped different deities in Makkā. In this way, the Arabic world was full of many religious currents and men were practising various faiths. The Arabs were neither united nor affluent at that time. Jewish people were known for their trade and the use of horses and camels and Arabia was famous for dates. There was trade with other countries which was carried through the seas from their ports. Hazarat Mohamed gave the Holy *Kurān*. It is simple but very significant. Even an uneducated man can understand and practise righteousness, following its teachings.

When the people of Arabia came in contact with other countries because of their trade, there was the interaction of philosophical and religious thoughts. Because of that, different traditions developed like : 1. "*Motajalā* tradition", 2. *Karāmī* tradition and 3. *Asarī* tradition. All the Arabic current of thoughts former to *Motajalā* tradition were based on faith and does not permit differences of opinion and philosophic speculation. So this may be considered to be a religious tradition. But later the devotees of *Motajalā* tradition introduced philosophical discussion and so *Motajalā* tradition in Islām is the first philosophic tradition built on the basis of this new light.

The cardinal principles of the Islāmic philosophy can be mentioned in five principles :

1. The self (*Jīva*), is free to do activity (*karma*). It need not be considered to be a slave of any other higher beings. To believe

that the activities of living beings are determined by other higher being and to punish them would be injustice.

2. God is omnipotent and great and the world has good and evil alike. God is the symbol of the good and not of the evil. Therefore, God does not elevate his creatures to heaven or punish them to hell.

3. Like other Muslims the *Motajalā* tradition considers this world as a creation of God. The creation is out of nothing (*abhāva*). In this connection, it is against the Aristotelian conception of creation.

4. The *Motajalā* tradition considers *Kurān* as the sacred book written at a particular time. In this sense, it has a beginning. Unlike the orthodox Muslims, it does not accept the beginningless nature of the *Kurān*.

5. The *Motajalā* tradition brought about a synthesis between the orthodoxy as presented in the authority of the sacred texts and the function of reason. It also did not accept certain orthodox beliefs.

THE SUFI TRADITION

The term '*Sūfī*' comes from the Greek word "*Sophi*". It means 'Wisdom'. In the 8th century A.D., the works in Greek philosophy were translated into Arabic and the *sūfī* tradition developed in the Arabia on the basis of the Greek philosophy concerning mysticism. For the first time, the *Sūfī* epithet was given to Abū Hāshim who died in 770 A.D. At the time of *Paigambar*, and other philosophers who were preaching at that time were considered to be Asphists (*sahāvā* or companion) and even after *Paigambar* these were remembered by this name.

The Muslim philosophers have used the term *Sūfī* in different senses. It has been said that the *Sūfī* philosophers were those who renounced everything for the sake of realising the God. It has also been said that life and death are all dependent on God. The *Sūfī* philosophers were same and they spend their life for the practice of the self-realisation. According to the *Sūfī* philosophy, man is a part of God or an aspect of God. The highest realisation consists in the merger of the self with God. It comes nearer to the *Vedāntic* concep-

tion, specially of Rāmānuja, where he advocates the merger of the self in the *Brahman* in the highest state of self-realisation. The *Sūfī* philosophers presented the practical path of self-realisation which contains elements of *Pātañjala Yoga*. They say, that the realisation is possible through the practice of *dhyāna* (contemplation) and absorption in the God. It is analogous to the stages in *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇā* and *samādhi* of the *Pātañjala Yoga*. *Sūfism* is more a philosophy than a religion.

Mansūr is supposed to the founder and propagator of *Sūfism*. He is to pronounce and repeat the prayer "*Anal-huq*" meaning, 'I am the God'. This concept is analogous to the *Advaitic* concept of the identity of the *ātman* and the *Brahman* (*aḥuḥ brahmāsmi*). As we have seen earlier, the word *Sūfī* has its Greek origin and it also means "wool," and "standing in line". The ancient mystics practised the ascetic practices using wool directly touching the body. Since they were using suff (wool) they were known as *Sūfīs*. The other meaning which is popular is "standing in line". The *Sūfī* mystics practised asceticism by standing and concentrating with other practices like *prāṇāyāma*.

The *Sūfī* mystic, Malik Mohammed Jāyāsī has given his famous discourse on the aspect of love in his *Padmāvata* which is described as divine and is primarily spiritual.

MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

We have seen that after Aristotle, philosophy was stagnant for sometime. The middle ages were dark ages and whatever philosophy developed was merely theological. Subsequently, philosophical enquiry started with the scientific spirit became prominent. In the middle ages, philosophy was sustaining itself under the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive methods. But in modern western philosophy, we find the revival of the spirit of enquiry. This spirit expressed itself in two directions : 1. deductive rationalistic enquiry based on deductive and mathematical methods, and 2. empiricist enquiry which is founded on experience and analysis of common sense.

In the modern age, Descartes and Spinoza built systems of rationalism. From the *Cozito, ergo, sum* he went on to heaven and looked at the physical world with compliments, which is indeed, away from that of the common sense. Descartes split the world into two substances and postulated a God separate from each of them. He arrived at the conception of the self on the basis of his method of "doubt". He doubted everything but he could not doubt himself. However, his scepticism was only a means to an end and not an end in itself. Spinoza's task was to establish a connection between the God and the world on the basis of mathematical deduction. The result was Spinoza's substances became a lion's den to which all the tracks lead and from which none returned. Leibnitz continued the rationalistic tradition and arrived at metaphysical fantasy, in presenting his theory of monads. God was for him, the *monadus-monadum*. The empiricist philosopher used a *posteriori* and inductive methods. In the *Theavatus*, Socrates explains the protogoran doctrine that knowledge is through sense-experience. English empiricism repeats the logical movement, but does not save itself from its own conclusion of scepticism. We can see the empiricist's method steadily marching from Locke, Berkeley to Hume. Berkeley denied matter and Hume denied everything except impressions and ideas. Reid, summing up the English Empiricist movement, states that ideas first introduced for explaining the operation of the human understanding, under mind, everything by themselves, pitifully naked and destitute, "set adrift without a rag to cover them".¹ Knowledge became impossible and philosophy could go no further without a radical reconsideration of its fundamental position.

Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher, claimed to have brought Copernical revolution in philosophy. Empiricism faced the blind wall of scepticism and phenomenalism while rationalistic philosophy built up a philosophical fantasy in the theory of spiritual monads. Kant's was a critical philosophy. He wanted to examine

1 Kant : *Works*, p. 105.

the instrument of understanding. And he came to the conclusion that categories of understanding can at best explain the phenomenal world. The noumenal can be understood by practical reason. His critique of *Pure Reason* led to his critique of practical reason and judgement. Hegel gave a dialectic of reason and for him the real was the rational. Later philosophers like Bradley and Bosanquet built a structure of philosophy which can be called the absolutist philosophy. They rested in the absolute.

But the Humean tendency has been recently revised by the Cambridge philosophers, to the brink of extinction. *Widgenstein's Tractatus* discusses the problem of meaning, the nature of logic, facts and proposition and the task of philosophy. He states that all the truths of logic are tautologies and logical proofs are only mechanical devices for recognising the categories. Mathematics consist of equation and the proposition of Mathematics are without sense. The metaphysician talks non-sense in the fullest sense of the word, as he does not understand "the logic of our language". Metaphysical suggestion is like a composition of a new song. We are told that he made no essential change in his attitude towards the aim of philosophy.¹ Bertrand Russell writes that the influence the *Tractatus* made on him "was not wholly good", and the philosophy of the "*philosophical investigations*" remains to him completely unintelligible.² Logical positivism is the philosophical movement emanating from the "Vieana Circle". Logical positivists explain that they have completely overthrown speculative philosophy.³ Philosophy to them is only logical analysis ; not a theory, but an activity. Its function is analysis, logical classification of concepts, proposition and theories proper to empirical science. Thus philosophy was identified with the logical syntax, the higher level discussion of language and it is

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- 1 Stenius (Eric) : *Tractatus—A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines of Thought*, (1960). p. 226.
 - 2 Russell (B) : *My Philosophical Development* (1959), pp. 216-217.
 - 3 Ayer (A. J.) : *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 48,

important non-sense. Philosophy classes are converted into super-grammar classes.

Thus a survey of philosophy in the past shows that philosophy faced continually in past of the conflict between the consequences of the priori methods and empiricists favourish denial of metaphysics. To save philosophy from this impose we have to adopt a synoptic view towards the problem of philosophy. We should realise that reality is complex and life is a many-coloured door. Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood while realism could not see the wood in the tree.¹ These two ways of approaching the problems were exclusive and absolute ways and to realise this point that both these ways are partially view of the synoptic outlook. In this sense, philosophy is to see life steadily and to see the whole. In this sense, the Jaina view of *anekānta* comes nearer to the solution of the problems. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of the doctrine.² The Jaina view of *anekānta* steers clear of the conflicting existence of extremes of empiricism which resulted in the metaphysical impossibility and of rationalism which resulted in the philosophical fantasies of absolutism. The Jaina view asserts that the truth is many-sided and it can be looked at different angles. The Whitehead's fundamental attitude of philosophy is essentially the same as the Jaina *anekānta* view when he presented the theory of coherence.

THE NEW AGE IN THE INDIAN THOUGHT

The culmination of the *Vedāntic* philosophy is to be found in the age of Madhva. Later philosophy emphasise not so much the *karma-mārga*, nor the *jñāna-mārga*, but the *bhakti-mārga*. The influence of the Muslim conquest of India, brought a cultural impact on the philosophical traditions in India. The idol worship was gradually replaced by contemplation and devotional song. In the 15th

1 Broad (C.D.) : *Contemporary British Philosophy*, ed. Muirhead, (J.H.) Vol. (1924), *Critical and Speculative Philosophy*.

2 Kalghatgi (T.G.) : *Jaina View of Life*, Jivarāja Jaina Granthamālā 1969, p. 10.

century A.D., Kabīrdās was against the idol worship. The influence of this tendency could be traced in the Jaina tradition also in the thought and practices of the *Sthānakavāsī* tradition. In Saurāṣṭra, Dayānanda Sarasvatī was against the worship of idol and it developed into Ārya Samāj. In Bengal, witnessed a renaissance in the Brahma-samāj and Prārthanāsamāj. Swāmī Vivekānanda gave a new interpretation to the absolute idealism of *Vedānta*, with reference to the social and political problems. Dr. Rādhākṛṣṇan adopts a synoptic interpretation of the universal application of the *Vedāntic* conception to the problems of philosophy. Bāla Gangādhara Tilak presented the *karmayoga* in his interpretation of the *Bhagavadgītā*, in the *Gītā-rahasya*. Sri Aurobindo built a super structure of mystic philosophy presenting the concept of superannuated consciousness and the evolution of the matter into spirit from men to supermen. Mahatma Gandhi spiritualised politics. We find fresh scholars like Pt. Sukhlālji and Dalsukh Mālvaṇīā giving new interpretation of the Jaina philosophy.



Jaina and Buddhist Philosophy

COMMON POINTS BETWEEN THE TWO PHILOSOPHIES

Jaina and Buddhist *darśanas* have many common points between them. They belong to the *śramaṇa* current of thought. They revolted against the Vedic ritualism of the *Yajñas*. Both the *darśanas* gave prominence to the principle of *ahiṃsā*, although other *darśanas* in Indian thought have also given importance to the principle of *ahiṃsā*, but Tathāgata Buddha and Sramaṇa Bhagavāna Mahāvira went against violence committed during *Yajñas* for the sake of oblations and preached the practice of *ahiṃsā* in the daily life. Mahāvira gave a subtle analysis of the concept of *ahiṃsā*. The two *darśanas* were also against the classification and the distinction of society into the different types of *jātis*, like the *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya* and *śūdra*. The Vedic tradition is to believe that these distinctions were primarily concerned with the birth of the individuals into different classes. But the Jainas and the Buddhists did not accept such a distinction and they said that the distinctions are functional and have nothing to do with the high or the lowly character of the individuals. *Mīmāṃsakas* consider the Vedic authority as *apauruṣeya*, but Jainas and the Buddhists gave the status of *pauruṣeya* to the authority of *Vedas* as well as to their *āgamas* and *tripiṭakas*. The Jainas and the Buddhists did not accept the theistic conception of God. The Jaina philosophers have refuted the arguments of the *Naiyyāyikas* about the belief in the creator God. This worldly life (*samsāra*) is beginningless and the chain of action and reaction. Both of them accept the doctrine of *karma* and the good and evil fruits of *karma*.

METAPHYSICAL DISTINCTIONS

The Buddhists are phenomenalists and nihilists in their outlook. They advocate the transitoriness of the things of the world. They say everything is in a flux and nothing is permanent. The Jainas accept that though there is impermanence and flux in the world, but it is from the point of view of modes and *pariyāyas*. They say that the Buddhist approach is from the phenomenal point of view specially with reference to the momentary existence. It is the *ṛjūsūtranaya*. The Jainas say that reality is characterised by the origin (*utpāda*), *vyaya* (destruction) and *dhrauvya* (permanence). But these have to be looked from different points of view. The Jaina conception of *anekānta* is the basic point of view.

The Buddhist philosophy later developed into various schools both realistic and idealistic. The *Vaibhāṣikas* and *Sautrāntikas* were realist schools which posited the reality of external world and ultimate substances (elements) (*dharma*). The knowledge of these elements is possible, says *Vaibhāṣika* through perception while *Sautrāntika* make it an object of inference.

Yogācāra and *Mādhyamika* are idealistic schools of philosophy. *Yogācāra* advocated the reality of consciousness and the objective storehouse of consciousness (*ālaya vijñāna*) as the ultimate reality. The *Mādhyamikas* have denied reality except the *śūnya*. The *śūnya* has been interpreted in different ways, negatively as the white, but positively as the absolute which is *anirvacanīya*. Here it comes nearer to the *advaitic* conception of the *Brahman*.¹

We should realise that the *śūnya* of the *Mādhyamika* need not be interpreted as the void or the nothingness. The *Mādhyamika darśana* can be interpreted in terms of absolute idealism as the absolute which cannot be described either by negation or by affirmation or by the permutations of the two, i.e. through the *catuṣkoṭi*. So the absolute is indescribable. Hence it is called by the word '*Śūnya*.'

1 Mukhyo mādhyaṃiko vivartamakhilam śūnyasya mene jagata.

2 Mādhyamika kārikā 1, 7.

Jainism is dualistic. It posits the reality of *jīva* and *ajīva*. These have been considered from two points of view, from the noumenal (*nīścaya naya*) and phenomenal (*vyavahāra naya*). Similarly, in Buddhism we have two points of view which may be referred to as *svalakṣaṇa* which gives the noumenal point of view and *sāmānya lakṣaṇa* which gives the phenomenal point of view. Similarly, things of the world can be looked at from these points of view. Logically considered also, we can see the general in the particular and the particular in the general. For instance, we can see the general concept of man in individual man and we can also see the differentiating individual man and we can also see the human characteristics in different individuals. To affirm that the one alone is real and the other is an appearance is dogmatic assertion. The Buddhists take the one point only and i.e., as we have seen *ṛjūsūtra-naya*, the momentary point of view. *Svalakṣaṇa* has been interpreted as that which gives the functional meaning of a word or a thing. For instance, the function of a cloth is to cover and the function of the pot (*ghaṭa*) is to hold the water. This is the *arthakriyā* or the essential meaning of the word and the essential characteristic of a thing.

CONCEPTION OF ĀTMAN

The conception of the *ātman* as a permanent substance has been one of the problems of controversies and the difference between the Buddhists and the Jainas. The Buddhists advocate the conception of *anātma*. There is nothing permanent like the soul. For what we call the soul or the *ātman* is merely the aggregate of the physical and mental states (*nāma rūpa*). *Rūpa* is the physical state and *nāma* expresses the mental states like 1. *vedanā* (feeling) 2. *saṃjñā* (cognition) 3. *saṃskāra* (disposition) and 4. *viññāna* (psychic energy.) These different states are not permanent, they are fleeting. Therefore, there is nothing like the permanent *ātman*, yet the Buddhists believe in the cycle of birth and death and in the rebirth.

CONCEPTION OF NIRVĀṆA

Similar differences would be found in the conception of *nirvāṇa*

and *mokṣa*. The Buddhist conception of *nirvāṇa* is negative, it is the state of freedom of vision. It is a state of nothingness. It is the flowing out of the empirical states just like the blowing out the flame of the lamp. It is the *Dukhanirodha*.¹ We have already seen that attempts have also been made to interpret the state of *nirvāṇa* as a positive state of bliss. Some philosophers say that the Buddha carried the tradition of the *Upaniṣads*. Therefore his conception of *nirvāṇa* is positive in content, as referring to the state of bliss (*ānanda*). The Buddha very often refers to the attainment of the *Brahmatva*. This type of differing interpretations have been given due to the Buddha's silence on metaphysical problems.

The way to the attainment of *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* have also been presented by the Jainas. The Jainas say that the way to the highest realisation of *mokṣa* is possible through the synthesis of the triple path of *samyagdarśana* (right intuition), *samyagjñāna* (right knowledge) and *samyagcāritra* (right conduct). The Buddha enunciated the eight-fold path as the fourth noble truth which is mentioned as the *dukkhanirodha mārga*, the way to the cessation of the suffering. This path is the eight-fold path : *samyagdṛṣṭi* (right attitude), *samyak-saṅkalpa* (right resolve), *samyakvāca* (right speech), *samyak-karma* (right effort), *samyakajīva* (right way of living), *samyakvyāyāma* (right action), *samyaksmṛti* (right thoughts) and *samyaksamādhi* (right concentration). It is also called middle path (*madhyama mārga*)

PRAMĀNAVĀDA

There are variations in the emphasis on the importance of the different *pramāṇas* by the Buddhists and the Jainas. The Jainas consider valid cognition corresponding to the external reality as the *pramāṇa*, (*yathārthajñāna*). But the Buddhist philosophers refer to the *pramāṇa* as that knowledge which is inconsistent, which is not incoherent and which leads to the knowledge of the unknown². The

1 *Saudarānanda* 16/28, 29

2 *Pramāṇamavisaṃvādi jñānamajñātārthaprakāśo vā*.

Jainas have distinguished *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa pramāṇas*. *Pratyakṣa* is that knowledge which the soul gets directly without the help of the sense-organs; and the knowledge through the sense-organs and indirect knowledge through inference etc., are *parokṣa jñāna*. For instance, *avadhi*, *manañparyaya*, and *kevala* are *pratyakṣajñāna* while *mati*, *śruta* are *parokṣa jñānas*. But later the Jainas have modified their terminology and say that the later was also *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* but it is *vyāvahārika pratyakṣa*. This knowledge arises through the co-operation of the *indriyas* and the *manas*. But according to the Buddhists coherent knowledge is *pramāṇa*, knowledge which is inconsistent is not *pramāṇa*. Similarly, *pratyakṣa* is that type of knowledge which is free from intellectual discrimination or intellectual superimposition.¹ Intellectual super-imposition refers to the categories of understanding like *nāma*, *jāti*, *gūṇa kriyā* etc. The knowledge without the association of the activity of the mind (*kalpanarahita*) is indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpa*). *Pratyakṣa* has been distinguished into *indriya pratyakṣa*, *mānasa pratyakṣa*, *svasamvēdaṇa pratyakṣa* and *yogaja pratyakṣa*. *Anumāna* is knowledge which is indirect and which is of *samānya lakṣaṇa*. The Buddhists recognise *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* as the *pramāṇa*.

The Jainas recognise *āgama pramāṇa* and this can be considered to be of two type as : (1) *arthāgama* which is the direct teaching of the *Tīrthaṅkara* to his disciples. (2) *Sūtrāgama* is the codification of the teaching the *Tīrthaṅkaras* in the form of *sūtras*. In the case of the Buddhists contention regarding the distinction of the *śabda* and the *artha*, the word and the meaning is different. They find that the two may not cohere and be identical. There may be contradictions and opposition as in the case of the enmity between the snake and the mungoose. There is not much of a relation between the word and the meaning. The relation between the word and the meaning is to be considered as not clarifying the meaning of the word but only as giving the negative function of denying the contrary function for instance, the word cow does not signify the animal cow but it only

1. *Kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntaṁ pratyakṣaṁ.*

denies the possibility of other meanings of the objects other than the cow.

THE DOCTRINE OF PERMANENCE AND IMPERMANENCE

The Buddhists have advocated the doctrine of impermanence (*kṣāṇikavāda*). Their cardinal principle is *sarvaṃ kṣāṇikaṃ, sarvaṃ pṛithak*, everything is a flux, nothing is permanent. But the Jainas do not find out any contradiction in the two categories of permanence and change. A thing may be permanent and also it may change. Change and permanence are the two stages of existence considered from different points of view. For instance, a thing may be permanent from the point of view of substance, but from the point of view of modes, it is changing. For example, the gold may be turned into an ornament or an idol of God. The same thing will be melted and turned into a necklace. In this example, gold as a substance does not change, but its modes are changing and therefore the modes and permanence are both real from different points of view.

Thus we find that the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers have many points of agreement although there are certain important differences. Primarily, the two currents of thought are the *śramaṇic* currents of thought.



Jaina and Sāṅkhya Philosophies : a Comparison

The Jaina and Sāṅkhya philosophies are very eminent. They belong to the *śramaṇic* current of thought. Sāṅkhya thought has no relation to the *Vedic* tradition. It is sometimes suggested that Kapila, the founder of Sāṅkhya thought was the disciple of Marici and Marici was the disciple of the first Tīrthaṅkara Ṛṣabhadeva. This has been corroborated by scholars. We cannot say anything about it. The *śramaṇic* tradition of Sāṅkhya thought has been accepted by other philosophies in India. Śaṅkarācārya was very clear that Sāṅkhya thought was against the *Vedic* tradition, and also against the *śruti* and *smṛti* coming from the *Vedic* tradition. The Padmapurāṇa made it clear that Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Patañjali's Yoga philosophies also are contrary to the *śruti*. Therefore, it was unacceptable. The composition of Nyāya sūtra must have been in the second century or the third century B.C. Vaiśeṣika sūtra must have been written during the same time and also the Yoga sūtra of Patañjali. The writers of these sūtras were very much influenced by the *śramaṇic* current of thought and the *śramaṇic* thought was very popular during that period. This is also clear from the fact that several terms like kevali, śukladhyāna, jñānāvaraṇīya karma, samyagdarśana etc., are to be found in the Pātañjala-Yoga; and these terms are nowhere in *Vedic* tradition.

Some scholars believe that the Sāṅkhya is very ancient. Jainism must have been influenced by the Sāṅkhya thought. If we glance at the Jaina āgamas, we do not find such evidence that it was influenced by the Sāṅkhya darśana. Perhaps, those scholars who maintained the view of the antiquity of Sāṅkhya darśana to the Jaina darśana,

may not have seen the Jaina *āgamas*. They might not have been available to them.

The Jainas *darśana* is dualistic. According to the Jainas the universe is constituted of two fundamental principles. We may call them *dravyas*, the *jīva* and the *ajīva*. The *jīva* is pure and simple. It is characterised by consciousness and *upayoga*. It is also characterised by infinite knowledge and intuition, and infinite energy. It is active. Due to its activity it comes into contact with the material *karma* and gets involved in the wheel of *saṁsāra*. This involvement is beginningless. But it has an end. One can attain *mokṣa* by removing the *kārmic* particles.

Just as Jainism is dualistic, *Sāṅkhya* is also dualistic. According to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophers, there are two ultimate principles—the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The *puruṣa* is pure consciousness, but it is passive. *Prakṛti* is *jaḍa*, it is unconsciousness, but is active. When the *prakṛti* comes into the proximity of the *puruṣa*, the disturbance in the *guṇas* of the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* takes place and the evolution of the universe starts. This entire universe is the product of *prakṛti*, in the presence of *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* is only a spectator of the dance-drama of *prakṛti* through which the universe evolve.

The Jaina *darśana*'s *ajīva tattva* with reference to *pudgala* is alluded to *prakṛti* of *Sāṅkhya*. The universe is the product of *prakṛti* according to *Sāṅkhya* and according to Jainism the variegated universe is due to the infinite modes of the *pudgala* (matter). The major aspect of the *prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya* can be compared to the Jaina conception of *pudgala* and *ākāśa*.¹

The *Sāṅkhya* philosophers say that the reality of *puruṣa* is self evident. There is no need to prove the existence of the self. Similarly, *puruṣa* is self-illuminative, just as the lamp illumines itself and illumines the surrounding area. It is not necessary to prove this essential characteristic of the *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* is neither the *indriyas* nor the

1 (a) Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha, *Darśana aur Jaina darśana*.
Muni Sri Nathamalji p. 125.

(b) Muni Nathamalji : *Sūya kī Khoj, Anekānta ke Āloka me*.

body nor the *manas*. It is different from these. It is characterised by *caitanya*; and *caitanya* (consciousness) is the essence of the *puruṣa* and not its quality. The Jainas consider the *ātman* or the *jīva* characterised by bliss (*ānandamāya*), but the *Sāṅkhya* philosophers differ in this respect and say that *ānanda* (bliss) is not a characteristic of the *puruṣa*, but it is the attribute of *prakṛti*. And therefore, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, in the highest state of self-realisation there is no place for *ānanda*. We have also seen that the *puruṣa* is only the spectator of the dance of the *prakṛti* in its evolution of the world. The self is pure and simple and eternal. According to the Jainas the self has the characteristics of pervading the body that it occupies (*dehamātra*). This is from the point of its substance. The *Vedāntin* considers the *ātman* as the one with the *Brahman*. The *Advaitin* advocates the identity of the *ātman* with *Brahman* and according to *Viśiṣṭādvaita* the *ātman* is the nature of the *Brahman* and in the highest stage of the *ātman* merges with the *Brahman*, just as the waters of river merge with the sea-water.

The *Sāṅkhya* philosophers postulate the plurality of selves (*puruṣa*). If the self were one, then certain logical difficulties would have arise, to explain the variety of experiences and status. If one self were to die, all the selves would have died. The experiences of the one self would have been the experiences of all other selves. But the facts of experiences are different. There are wide variety of individual experiences and the status of different individual self. Some are rich and some are poor. Some are happy and some are miserable. Therefore, it is clear that there are many selves. The Jainas have also advocated the reality of many selves. The Jainas say that an object can be studied from different points of view and permanence and impermanence can be predicated of individual self from two different points of view. From the point of view of substances the selves are permanent, but from the point of view of modes as expressed in infinite number of organism, the selves are changing and are impermanent. Origination and destruction are characteristics of the self, if viewed from the point of view of modes. But the self is permanent from the point of view of substance.

What Jaina *darśana* calls *pariyāya* (mode) *Sāṅkhya* calls it *asar*

(appearance or unreal). *Dhruvya* or permanence is analogous to *sat*. According to the *Sāṅkhya* philosophers, every object in action is *asat* but *sat* in its causation. The *prakṛti* is constituted of three *guṇas* : the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. These *guṇas* get modified. But Jainas use the *guṇas* as something permanent.

There is no modification of the *guṇas*. *Sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas* in the *Sāṅkhya darśana* are causes of the mental states of pleasure and pain. Ācārya Samantabhadra has also presented a similar conception regarding the three-fold aspect of origination, destruction and permanence of things.

According to the Jainas *jīva* is *kartā* (doer) and *bhoktā* (enjoyer) of the fruits of *karma*. It is characterised by consciousness. *Upayoga* is the energy and *jñāna* and *darśana* are the expressions of *upayoga*. When the object is grasped in its generality, it is *darśana* and when it is grasped in its specific aspect it is *jñāna*. In this *jñāna* and *darśana* are the characteristics of *jīva*. *Jīva* is also the doer (*kartā*). And it says 'I see' 'I hear' and 'I do'. But in the case of the *Sāṅkhya darśana* the *ātman* is *juddha* (pure), *nitya* (eternal) and *buddha* (enlightened) in all its parts and states, even in the empirical experiences, the *ātman* does not really undergo all the modifications and experiences of pleasure and pains. It is reflections of the modifications of *prakṛti*, which undergoes these modifications and the *ātman* imagines that it is undergoing modifications. Just as rose flower if kept near a crystal, the crystal appears to be rosy, although the crystal does not have that colour. But if the *ātman* is to experience its fruits, it must be *kartā* also. *Bhoktā* and *kartā* are inter-related. In general *kartṛtva* or activity implies freedom of action. *Kartṛtva* is of two types : 1. *Adhiṣṭhāna kartṛtva* and 2. *Upādāna kartṛtva*. In the *Sāṅkhya darśana*, *puruṣa* is *adhiṣṭhātā* as well as the *upādāna*. The world is the product of *prakṛti* just as the pot is the product of clay. In the *Sāṅkhya darśana*, *prakṛti* is also considered to be the agent (activity). And it means that *prakṛti* is responsible for the variety in the world. Without the presense of the *ātman*, *prakṛti* cannot produce anything, although the *ātman* or *puruṣa* itself does not do anything. But it falsely believes, it is active. In this sense, there is the sense of the

appearance of the activity in the *puruṣa*, but really the *puruṣa* is not active.¹ *Guṇas* are necessary for the modifications of things in the *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa*'s presence is also necessary. *Guṇas* are of the capacities of the production (*prasavadharmī*) and in this sense they are *kartā*. This is the causal meaning of the *kartā*. Vācaspati Miśra has suggested that *akartṛtva bhāva* is present in the *puruṣa* because *puruṣa* himself is not directly responsible for the production of the things of the world.²

In other sense *puruṣa* may be considered to be *akartā* because he is not directly responsible for the variegated things of the world. But in another sense, we may say that *prakṛti* is *kartā*, but with the presence of *puruṣa* which is responsible for the creation of the universe. When *prakṛti* comes in the vicinity of the *puruṣa* evolution starts, just as the iron filings get disturbed and are attracted towards the magnet in the presence of the magnet.

The evolution of the universe therefore depends in a sense on the co-operation of the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* is passive, it is the spectator, but the presence is necessary for creating the disturbance in the *guṇas* in the *prakṛti*. As long as the *prakṛti* is not in the presence of *puruṣa* the *guṇas* are in a state of equilibrated tension. The moment the *prakṛti* comes into proximity of *puruṣa*, there is a disturbance in the *guṇas* and the evolution starts—starting from the *mahat* to the *pañcānaḥ ibūtas*. We have already discussed the twenty-five principles of evolution which is the canvas of the universe. In this sense, we can say that *puruṣa* or the *ātman* according to the *Sāṅkhya* is characterised by *cetanā* and is both *karta* and *bhoktā*.³

Thus we find that there are some prominent features common to both schools of philosophy although there are certain differences concerning the nature of *prakṛti* and the characteristics of *puruṣa*.



1 *Sāṅkhya saptati*, Jayamaṅgalā vyākhyā—

Nirguṇasya puruṣasyāprasavadharmitvādakartṛtvaṁ.

2 *Aprasavadharmitvāccākartā*—Vācaspati Miśra.

3 *Rājendrasūri Smāraka Grantha*, pp. 335-343.

Jaina & Vedānta Philosophies

In India, philosophic development in its various aspects has been prominent. India is the cradle of philosophic thought. Many philosophical systems have arise. Some of them coherent to each and some are contrary to each other. We have seen that India has given respect to every school of thought. Even *Cārvāka* is considered to be a *darśana*. In this chapter we shall consider a comparative picture of Jaina *darśana* and *Vedānta*.

THE PHENOMENAL WORLD

According to the Jainas the universe is constituted of two fundamental principles of *jīva* (living substances) and *ajīva* (the non-living substance). *Ajīva* may be considered from two points of view. That which has a form is *pudgala* (matter). And that which does not have a form and it includes substances like *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest), *ākāśa* (space) and *kāla* (time). These are the six substances and we have already discussed about the Jaina conception of the universe, on the basis of these *dravyas*.

In the *Vedānta darśana* the universe or the phenomenal world is only an appearance (*asatya*) while *Brahman* the ultimate reality is the only real. Sri. Sāṅkarācārya says which is always *samarūpa* (uniform), is *satya*. The objects of the universe in this phenomenal world are not always uniform. They undergo constant change and modifications. Therefore, it is an appearance and unreal. The ultimate reality is the *Brahman*. It is one, uniform and constant. Therefore, it is real. The *satya* or the real is constantly

real for all times. And that is noumenal reality (*pāramārthika satya*). From the phenomenal point of view, the phenomenal world is real. But from the noumenal as, therefore, the reality of the phenomenal world is unreal. Therefore, the reality of the phenomenal world can be considered to be the real from the phenomenal point of view. But things of this physical world are unreal from the noumenal point. Just as the rope appears to be the snake so also this phenomenal world appears to be real. In this sense, we cannot predicate absolute unreality to the phenomenal world nor can we predicate absolute reality. There are degrees of reality and Śāṅkara postulated the concept of the degrees of reality. F. H. Bradley followed the tradition of Śāṅkara, in describing the degrees of reality. The appearance of the phenomenal world appears to be real due to ignorance (*avidyā*).

According to the *Vedānta* the *avidyā* has two functions : (i) the function of *āvaraṇa* (covering), and (ii) the function of *vikṣepa* (distortion). The principle of *āvaraṇa* may be considered to be the power of *avidyā* which created intellectual discrimination and it is the cause of this *samsāra*, the phenomenal world. Due to the influence of this *āvaraṇa śakti* which creates intellectual discrimination, man considers himself to be the doer and the enjoyer of the pleasure and pain. Similarly, due to the power of ignorance *ākāśa* was created. From *ākāśa* comes wind, from the wind *agni* (fire), from the *agni* comes *jala* (water) and from *jala* comes *pṛthivī* (earth). In this way the subtle bodies were created from subtle elements and gross bodies were created by gross elements (*sthūla bhūta*). From the *sūkṣma śarīra* (subtle body) comes the sense-organs of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell—these are the five *jñānendriyas*. Speech, *pāṇi* (the hands), *pāda*, *pāyu*, *upastha*—these are the five *karmendriyas*. *Buddhi* is the determining nature of *antaḥkāraṇa* while *manas* is the expression and modifying sense of the *antaḥkāraṇa*.

There are three types of *kośas* (covers) : 1. *Vijñānamavakōśa* which includes the *jñānendriyas* and the *buddhi*. It is responsible for the experiences and the knowledge. 2. *Manomayakōśa* which includes the sense-organs and the *manas*. It has the discriminating function and connotive in aspect. *Prāṇamaya kōśa* includes *karmendriyas* and *pañc vāyus*. This is the energising source. The *sūkṣma śarīra* is the expression of the synthesis of all the three *kośas*.

PRAMĀNAVĀDA

The Jainas presented the theory of *anekāntadṛṣṭi* for understanding the infinite varieties of the universe. They said that reality is complex and substance has its infinite modes and aspects. The *ekānta* point of view i. e., the one-sided point of view cannot understand the complexity of the universe. The various points of view by which the universe was looked at and understood presents the *pramāṇa śāstra* of the Jainas. It refers to the *naya* and *pramāṇa* and we have already discussed this topic in detail.

The *Vedāntin* has mentioned five *pramāṇas* for the sake of understanding the noumenal and phenomenal truth : 1. *pratyakṣa* 2. *anumāna*, 3. *upamāna*, 4. *āgama* and 5. *arthāpatti*. From a very broad point of view the Jaina conception of *pramāṇa* appears to be different from that of the *Vedāntic* conception. However, if we look at it very closely we find that there are not much discrepancies and differences between the *pramāṇas*. They present the same sense.

We have seen that the Jainas have mentioned *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* as two *pramāṇas* for understanding the noumenal and the phenomenal truths. *Pratyakṣa* is the direct knowledge. We have also seen that the terminology was adopted with modifications for the sake of consistent view of epistemology in the light of other schools of thought. Jainas used the term *nijapratyakṣa* and *sādhvyāvahārika pratyakṣa*. According to the Jainas *parokṣa jñāna* can be classified into 1. *smṛti* (memory), 2. *pratyabhijñā* (recognition), 3. *tarka* (hypothetical reason) 4. *anumāna* (inference) and 5. *āgama* (testimony). *Vedāntin* does not use the word *apratyakṣa* or *parokṣa*, although the *pramāṇas*—*anumāna*, *upamāna*, *āgama* and *arthāpatti* are indirect ways of cognition. *Anumāna* and *āgamas* are considered to be independent *pramāṇas* according to *Vedānta*. Jainas have classified as *parokṣa pramāṇa*. *Upamāna* of the *Vedāntin* is analogous to the *pratyabhijñā* of the Jainas. The *Vedāntic* conception of *arthāpatti* refers to the implication involved in the perception and the consequent implication for the sake of clarification. As we find in the *Mīmāṃsakas* for example, that 'Devadatta is getting fatter everyday although Devadatta is fasting

during day.' We have to conclude that Devadatta is eating at night. In these forms of expression of *arthāpatti*, there is the element of *vyāpti* and the presence of *vyāpti* would make it a form of inference. Therefore, the Jainas would consider it a form of inference.

IDEALISM AND REALISM

The Jainas have classified the philosophical theories as idealistic (*pāramārthika*) and realistic. This distinction depends upon the distinction of reality on noumenal (*pāramārthika*) and phenomenal (*vyāvahārika*). Consciousness and unconscious matter are the noumenal realistics. They are real and the Jainas have accepted the realities of the external world. In this sense, Jainism is realistic. And Jainism is dualistic also because there are two types of realities which are equally important and real, i.e., conscious *jīva* and the unconscious world emanating from *pudgala*. The Jainas say that to consider consciousness as unconsciousness and unconsciousness as consciousness is *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*. It is perversity of knowledge.

According to the *Vedānta* there are three grades of reality : 1. *pāramārthika satya* (noumenal reality) or ultimate reality, 2. *vyāvahārika satya* is the phenomenal reality and 3. *prātibhāsika satya*, the state of reality in the state of appearance as in the case of the experience of the real in the dream state. *Brahman* is the only reality and the world is an appearance. In this sense, the pure consciousness with characteristics may be ascribed to the *Brahman* only, and the non-living physical events as is the appearance. Right knowledge is that knowledge which knows the distinction between the real and the appearance.

THE DUALISTIC—NON-DUALISTIC THEORY

Jainism is a spiritualist philosophy which maintains that the *ātman* is real and independent spiritual substance. The other systems of philosophy which accept the reality of the *ātman* present in different way. The *Vedāntin* has described the nature of the *ātman* following the tradition of the *upaniṣads*. According to the *Vedāntin*, *ātman* is the ultimate principle and *Brahman* and *ātman* are identical. The vast expanse of the universe which is unconscious is rooted in the

ātman and this theory is called *Caitanyādvaitavāda*. Contrary to this theory, there are philosophers who maintain that the ultimate substance is the unconscious matter. This is the materialist or the naturalistic theory. It is called *Jaḍādvaitavāda*.

But the Jainas have reconciled the contraries in the two theories and advocate the reality of both the conscious *ātman* and the unconscious matter. Both are equally real. In this sense, it may be said that there are three currents of thought in India : 1. *Ātmādvaitavāda* which maintains the reality of the self as consciousness. 2. *Jaḍādvaitavāda*, which maintains the reality of the physical universe and 3. *Dvaitavāda* (dualistic) which maintains the reality of the both. And in this sense, Jainism is dualistic because it advocates the reality and independence of spirit and matter which constitute the matter and the universe.

The Jainas accept the principles of permanence and change as both real. From different point of view of substance, i.e., permanence and from the point of view of modes, change is equally real. Therefore, the Jainas formulate the triple principle of origination (*utpāda*) destruction (*vyaya*) and permanence (*dhrauvya*) as equally real. From the *nīścaya* point of view the consciousness and the unconsciousness are the two ultimate principles. But from the *vyavahāra* point of view the changing universe is equally real. But it should be realised that the *Advaita darśana* does not accept the reality of the changing universe on the same footing as the ultimate reality of the *Brahman*. The physical world is an appearance and this appearance is due to *avidyā* which is an expression of *māyā*.

In this sense, we can say the *Jaina anekānta* view has attempted to reconcile the conflicting claims of the living and the non-living, the one and the many and permanence and change for absolute reality. The *anekānta* outlook gives the solution to the problems.

THE PATHWAY TO REALISATION

The Jainas have presented the triple pathway to the realisation of *mokṣa*. *Samyagdarśana* (right intuition), *samyagjñāna* (right knowledge) and *samyagcāritra* (right conduct). There is the need

of the harmonisation of the three paths for the attainment of *mokṣa*. One alone will not do. The *Vedāntin*, specially the *advaitin*, has given importance to *jñāna mārga* for self-realisation. According to this theory, the way to realisation is the realisation of the highest truth of the identity of the *Brahman* and the *ātman* or as in other systems of *Vedāntic* philosophy the oneness of the *Brahman* and the *ātman* in their essential nature. Śrī Rāmānuja and the other *Vedāntins* like Madhvācharyā have given prominence to *Bhakti mārga*. Rāmānuja mentions *prapatti*. According to *Vedānta*, the forces of ignorance are threefold. Due to this force of ignorance, one feels that the phenomenal world is real. These three forms of ignorance are dependent on the three levels of experience the dream level, the waking state and the pure state, or the dreamless state, which is a pure state. When all the states of ignorance are removed, knowledge of the highest reality is possible and the bondage is removed. The *Vedānta* also mentions the triple path of *sādhana* of realisation. 1. *śravaṇa* (listening to the scriptures) 2. *manana* (grasping the truth) and 3. *nididhyāsana* (holding steadfast to the truth). Thus we find *Vedānta* has given prominence to *jñāna mārga* in addition to the *Bhakti* in Rāmānuja.

Thus we find, there are many points of agreement between the *Vedānta* and the Jaina *darśanas*.¹



1 (a) Muni Nathmalji, see—*Aṣṭa kā Anāvaraṇa*,
 (b) Muni Nathmalji : *Jaina Darśana : Manana aur Mīmāṃsā*.

Legacy of Jaina Philosophy to the World of Thought

Jainism has occupied an important place in ancient thought. It has made significant contributions to the stream of Indian thought. What we call Indian philosophy, or Indian culture is a long flow and the synthesis of the two streams of thought, the *Vedic* and the *Śramaṇa* current of thought coming together and harmoniously synthesising into each other. We find that Jainism has contributed immensely to the development of the Indian view of life. The Jainas have given equal emphasis on reason and state. We find the same type of emphasis in other systems of Indian philosophy. Śāṅkara gives importance to both reason and intuition.

Jainism may be considered from the point of view of its metaphysical structure and also of its emphasis on ethical values. The foundational principles of ethical structure would be *anekānta*, while the moral fibre is expressed and based on the all-pervading principle of *ahiṃsā* (non-violence). The Jaina contribution to the Indian philosophical thought may be considered to be *anekānta*, *ahiṃsā* and *aparigraha*. These constitute the perennial philosophy of Jainism.

The concept of *ahiṃsā* is to be found in other systems of Indian philosophy, but the systematic study of *ahiṃsā* as of theory and the way of life is presented by the Jainas in their all-pervading principle of *ahiṃsā*. *Ahiṃsā* is the highest principle of conduct. Therefore, Jainas have called it as *paramodharma*. It appears that the Jaina theory of *ahiṃsā* as a moral injunction has been a pre-*āryan* principle which was later assimilated in the *āryan* way of life. The Jainas made

non-violence as the most fundamental principle of religious life. They made a systematic analysis of the principles almost to the point of making it a perfect science. All other moral injunctions were subordinated to *ahimsā*.¹

The Jaina theory of *ahimsā* is based on the analytic conception of the universe. Jainism is dualistic and Jainas believe in the plurality of the *jīvas*. From the practical point of view, the *jīvas* have also been classified into various types on the basis of different principles like—the sense-organs, and the life forces possessed by them. *Ahimsā* is non-injury or non-violence to any living individual or any life-force of the individual by the three *yogas*, activity, and *trikarāṇa*. We are not to injure a living being, however, small it may be or a life-force of an organism, directly with our own hands, by causing someone to do so on our behalf or by giving consent someone else to do injuries. We are asked not to injure a living being physically or in speech or in mind. We should not speak about injuries nor should harbour any thoughts of injuring any living being. In the *Tattvārthasūtra*, *hiṃsā* is defined as injury (violence) caused to the living organism due to carelessness and negligence and actuated by passions like pride and prejudice, attachment and hatred.² The consequence of violating the principle of *ahimsā* is misery in the world and in the next world.³ He who commits violence is always afflicted and agitated. He is actuated by animosity. He suffers physical and mental torture in this world⁴. After death, he is reborn taking a despicable life. The Jaina conception of *ahimsā* has influenced the lives of many great votaries of *ahimsā*. Gandhiji socialised the spiritual principle of *ahimsā*. Gandhiji said, 'I believe in loving my enemies. I believe in non-violence as the only remedy opened to the Hindus and Muslims, I believe in the power of suffering to melt the stoniest heart.'⁵ Though the doctrine of *ahimsā*

1 Kalghatgi (T.G.) : *Jaina View of Life*, p. 164.

2 *Tattvārthasūtra* VII, 8.

3 *Sarvārthasiddhi* VIII, 5-9

4 *Ibid*

5 *Young India*, Dec. 1920—Love and Hate—1922.

is negative yet it has a positive content. It is not mere abstinence to injury to life. It is love. *Himsā* causes destruction of life and destruction of one's own personality. It lowers the personality of man, Gandhiji said "non-violence is the law of our species and violence is the law of the brute".¹ Non-violence would be panacea for the ills of life. It would bring lasting peace to us.

The Jaina conception of non-violence as an ethical principle has permitted the entire structure of the Jaina ethics and the way of life. Other codes of conduct and *vratas* like *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmacharya* and *aparigraha* are all geared to the promotion of the practice of non-violence as much rigorously as possible and as far as possible according to the functions of the individual in society, be an ascetic (*muni*) or a citizen (*śrāvaka*). All other virtues are expressions of *ahiṃsā*. Therefore, it is said that Jainism advocates the universality of the principle of non-violence—'*ahiṃsa paramodharmah*'. For instance, the individual is a social being and he has to aim at social betterment if self culture is to be pursued. The Jaina ethics has both the eyes of the individual as well as the social betterment. It envisages an individual as a social being, in as much as the individual depends on society for his intellectual, moral and material gains. Even the ascetic is incapable of transgressing this basic principle of individual and social justice. The adoption of *ahiṃsā* and other virtues can be seen to be expressed in the *aparigraha* also.

The Jaina view of *aparigraha* may be presented in the context of modern society in three cardinal principles : 1. Desireless, 2. non-possession and 3. develop an attitude of non-attachment towards the possession. An ascetic or a religious fanatic may be desireless but it may be out of a sense of superiority and out of arrogance of virtue, these are not the ideals of society. We should develop a healthy attitude of renunciation and non-attachment which would bring in us a confident calm in our daily life. They adopt the practice of *aparigraha* as a social virtue based on the spiritual principle of non-

1 Romain Rolland—*Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 48

attachment. It would foster spontaneous socialism in an age when we are trying to force upon people the socialistic pattern of society without the spiritual basis of non-attachment.

Anekānta is the intellectual expression of *ahimsā*. *Anekānta* forbids to be dogmatic and fanatic and aggressively insist upon expressing our attitude. *Anekānta* says that reality is complex. It can be looked at from different points of view and each point of view gives a picture of reality which is at once true but partial. But to insist that the particular point of view and the picture of reality are the only true picture would be dogmatic, and i. e., *ekānta*. Jainas wanted to avoid the aggressively dogmatic outlook towards looking at things. They have adopted a synoptic point of view which gives the comprehensive picture of reality in which all other aspects of reality are woven into a synthetic hold.

The *anekānta* is an attitude of mind. It is the foundational principle. *Nayavāda* expresses the point of view. It is psychological while *syādvāda* is the logical expression of *nayavāda* formulated in propositional forms. We have said that *anekānta* is the basic principle, *nayavāda* is analytic and *syādvāda* is synthetic. We have also considered the importance of *syādvāda* in the back-ground of the criticisms offered against it, by philosophers like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and some of the modern philosophers. These philosophers as we are aware, have considered *syādvāda* as a formulation of doubt and uncertainty. First, because, *syādvāda* mentions seven-fold predications of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. And secondly, because, the word *syāt* indicates the attitude of doubt as it means 'perhaps', but we have seen that *syāt* does not mean 'perhaps', it does not connote the expression of 'doubt,' the statement made in every predication is a certain statement but predicated from a particular point of view. All the propositional forms present the pictures of reality from the different points of view and *syādvāda* presents the synthetic picture or more aptly a comprehensive picture of reality. Modern science is slowly leaning towards the appreciation of *syādvāda* as a methodology of multi-valued logic for the solution of problems which are metaphysico-scientific. Physicists have begun to realise that *syādvāda* as multi-

valued logic and methodology which can solve many different problems of quantum physics and quantum mechanics. Similarly, eminent statisticians and biologists like Mehelnobis and J. B. S. Haldane have shown, the methodology of multi-valued logic as expressed in the *syādvāda* would be very useful in the study of theory of probability and the genetic evolution.

The metaphysical structure of Jainism is based in its formulation of the six-fold distinction of *dravya* like *jīva*, *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla*. We have already seen that the cosmic principles of *dharma* and *adharma* and *ākāśa* and *kāla* have been scientifically analysed like the Jainas. It is the special contribution of the Jainas in their analysis of the distinction of *ākāśa* into *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*. Similarly, the Jainas have made a significant contribution to the theory of time by pointing out that time (*kāla*) is mono-dimensional and therefore is not an *astikāya*. Similarly, the Jaina theory of atomism has its own significant contribution in the analysis of the nature of atom. The *Vaiśeṣikas* distinguished between different types of atoms like the earth atoms, water and fire atoms, but the Jainas have not made qualitative atoms. That atoms can be distinguished in their combinations in forming the objects. The same atoms can form water or earth etc. Democrites comes nearer to the Jaina theory in this conception.

The Jainas have also made significant contribution in their analysis of the theory of knowledge and their doctrine of *karma*. Knowledge for the Jainas is self-illuminating. *Pramāṇas* were distinguished into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, but *pratyakṣa* was that form of knowledge which the soul gets directly without the medium of sense-organs, they consider that sense-organs are impediments in the way of the soul for getting clear knowledge. Knowledge received through the sense-organs was considered to be *parokṣa*, but later with a view to accommodating the use of other Indian philosophers and with a view to avoiding academic chaos in understanding the problems of epistemology, the Jainas adopted the phrase of *nijapratyakṣa*, for the first and *sāṃvṛtyāvahārika pratyakṣa* for the knowledge arising out of the sense-organs and the contact of the mind.

The Jaina theory of *karma* is unique because Jainas have given a methodical and scientific analysis of the doctrine of *karma*. The *jīva* due to its activity attracts *kārmic* particles which are material in nature and these *kārmic* particles envelope the soul and obscure knowledge, intuition and activity.

This obscuration brings bondage (*bandha*). The way to the spiritual salvation is to remove *karma* and the removal of the *karma* has to pass through stages. We have first, to stop the fresh influx of *karma*, i. e., called *saṁvara* and then the annihilation of *karma* i. e., already accumulated by various means like suppression of the *kārmic* effect or destruction of *karma*. This is *nirjara*; and once all the *karmas* are removed, we reach the highest state of perfection.

We have so far given a brief resume of the essential features of the Jaina contribution, to the development of the Indian thought. The essential features of Jaina philosophy, we may call the perennial philosophy of the Jainas. The Jaina view of life is realistic-empiricist coupled with pragmatic outlook. It is not a quietistic optimism, it advocates a struggle towards perfection and the pathway towards the realisation of the highest end of perfection. In this sense, the Jaina *Weltanschauung* is meliostic.

PART VI

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX II

Index of Technical Terms

Akarmabhūmi—The world where there is no activity like agriculture, writing...etc.

Akāmanirjarā—It refers to the removal of *kārmic* particles by actions like—fasting, celibacy, sleeping on the floor . . . etc., not voluntarily but out of compulsion as in the case of a man who is imprisoned and who has to undergo these hardships.

Igurulaghu—It refers to the absence of the two characteristics of heaviness and lightness.

Agurulaghuguṇa—It is the characteristic which expresses neither the lightness nor the heaviness as in the case of the characteristics of the soul. It is infinite in character.

Ajīva—Non-living substance.

Ajñāna—Ignorance due to the perversity of attitude which arises due to the rise of *jñānāvaraṇīya karma*.

Aṇu—An atom.

Atyantābhāva—Absolute negation; for example, the sky flower or the son of barren women or horns of a rabbit.

Addhāsamaya—It refers to time or the indivisible part of time.

Adharma—The unrighteous attitude which is responsible for the downfall of the soul in the spiritual path.

Adharmadravya—Principle of rest.

Adhigama—Sense experience of the objects.

Adholoka—The lower world.

Adhruvabandha—The bondage of the *kārmic* matter of a soul in the cases where there is the possibility of the non-bondage of the *kārmic* matter and the consequent freedom from bondage.

Adhruvabandhinī—It refers to the psychic attitude by which there is the possibility of bondage or there may not be any bondage of any *karma*.

Adhruvodaya—The rise of the *sātavedanīya karma* etc., on subsequent occasions due to the non-destructions of the previous dispositions.

Ananta—Endless or infinite. For instance, *kevalajñāna* is *ananta*.

Anantavīrya—Infinite energy of the soul.

Anantānubandhī—It is a process by which *samyagdarśana* is withheld and if the right knowledge has already arisen it vanishes. It is an endless series of the expressions of passions (*kaṣāya*) or emotional states.

Anapavartanīya—It refers to the exhaustion of *āyukarma* as per schedule without any decrease in the duration or intensity. The *āyukarma* of this life is determined due to the previous *karma* needs to be completely exhausted.

Anabhigrahīta mithyātva—*Mithyātva* is the perversity of attitude which arises due to wrong teaching and due to the clinging of wrong teaching.

Anākāropayoga—Indeterminate *upayoga* i. e. *darśanopayoga*.

Anabhigrahika mithyātva—This is the perversity of attitude which arises due to the belief that all other views and theories are equally true.

Anikācita—It is contrary to *nikācita* in which the processes of *utkarṣaṇa* (increase), *apakarṣaṇa* (decrease) and *saṅkramaṇa* (transformation) of *kārmic* matter are possible.

Anekānta—The many-sided approach to reality.

Antarāya Karma—*Karma* which determines and obstructs the inherent energy of the soul. For instance, it obstructs the activity of giving alms etc.

Antyasākṣma—The ultimate subtlety which is to be found in the atom.

Antyasthūla—Ultimate vastness for graspness. This refers to the entire cosmos and the matter of the cosmos.

Apakarṣaṇa—Decrease in the intensity of the *kārmic* effect.

Apavartanā—It is the transformation or the decrease in the states and intensities of the effects of bondage.

- Apavartanā saṅkramaṇa**—It is the process of the reduction of the experience and the effects of the *kārmic* intensities.
- Apavartya**—It is the premature realisation of the *āyukarma* as in the case of death by accident or poisoning.
- Apratipāti**—It is a form of *avadhijñāna* (clairvoyance) which lasts upto the *kevalajñāna* (omniscience).
- Apratyākhyāna kaṣāya**—It refers to the *kaṣāyas* or passions which inhibit the expression of right conduct of a house holder i. e., *krāvaka*.
- Abādhākāla**—It is the duration of time from the bondage of the *karma* to the rise of the *kārmic* effect.
- Abhigrahita**—It is the *mithyātva* or perversity of belief which is acquired due to the teaching of others.
- Arūpi**—Formless matter. It has no characteristics of *śabda* (sound), *rūpa* (form), *rasa* (taste), *gandha* (smell) and *sparsa* (touch).
- Arthanaya**—It is that point of view or *naya* which is different from *vyōñjana* and is distinguished from the other characteristics like gender, number, time and agency.
- Arihāvagraha**—It is determinate concessional stage in which there is the awareness of the sensation.
- Ardhamāgadhi bhāṣā**—It is the ancient language spoken half the part of the Magadhadeśa and it included the 18 dialects.
- Aloka**—It is space beyond the world. It is the limitless space.
- Avagraha**—It is a sensational stage of experience.
- Avasthita (dravya)**—It refers to the substance like *pudgala* which has a determinate space points, *dharma*, *adharma*, *lokākāśa* and *jīva* have infinite number of space points while *pudgala* and *alokākāśa* have endless space points. These substances never go beyond their space points hence they are called *avasthita*.
- Avāya (apāya)**—It refers to the stage of perceptual experience (*indriya pratyakṣa*). It is perceptual judgement.
- Avigrahagati**—Direct movement of soul. *Vigraha* means obstruction or uneven direction. The *jīva* in its movement gets uneven direction due to certain obstructions and that is called *vigrahagati*. Contrary to this is direct movement, it is called *jjugati*. So the direct movement of *jīva* for one *samaya* is also mentioned as *avigrahagati*.

Avipāka nirjarā—It refers to the *kārmic* matter which arises prematurely due to certain spiritual efforts and the *karma* is destroyed, just as a mango fruit is prematurely ripened by artificial methods.

Astikāya—It refers to the five substances, they are—*jīva*, *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa*, because the space points of these substances signify the collective nature or they are in collection.

Ākāśa—It is space. It accomodates the substances like *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *pudgala* and *kāla*.

Āgama—It is testimony of an authority who is pure and perfect. It is *āptavacana*.

Abādhakāla—It refers to the duration of time between the bondage of the *karma* and the fruition of the *karma* i. e., the potential state of the *kārmic* effect.

Abhigrahika—It is the state of mind which is dogmatic and which affirms that a particular view is right and all others are wrong. It is the form of *mithyātva* (dogmatic assertion).

Indriya—Sense-organs through which sense-experience is possible, due to the contact of the sense-organs and the *manas*.

Iryāpathakriyā—*Iryā* means *yoga* (activity). The *kārmic* flow which is accrued due to one type of activity is called *Iryāpathakarma* and activity is called *Iryāpathakriyā*.

Iśvara—The perfect soul which has attained *kevalajñāna* and which has reached the highest stage of perfection is called *Iśvara*.

Ihā—It is a stage of sensation. It may be called associative integration by which the stimulations are received and organised.

Uccagotra—It is the state of the individual existence in this life with reference to his position, society, his power, form and other status in social life. This high state of social existence is attained due to the good *karmas*.

Udīraṇā—*Udīraṇa* is that process by which the *kārmic* matter of long duration and fruition power are brought in *udayāvalikā* so that they can be experienced soon.

Udvartanā—It is the increase in the duration and intensity of experience of *karma*.

Udvartanākaraṇa—To increase the intensity of the *karmas* which are beyond *udayāvalikā*.

Upakaraṇendriya—These are the material sense-organs of the body, which are helpful in perception. For example, a man sees by the help of cornea, so cornea is *upakaraṇendriya*.

Upayoga—It refers to the energy of the soul which is responsible for the knowledge and intuition (*jñāna* and *darśana*).

Rjusūtranaya—It is the point of view of the momentary present. The Buddhist point of view is an example of *rjusūtranaya*.

Ekatva pratyabhijñāna—It is recognition in which perceptual judgement and the recollection are synthesised. In this form of experience we recognise an object as the one which has been experienced or seen in the past and say it is the "same".

Evambhūtanaya—It is the point of view which refers to the *śabdānaya* and it refers to the functional use of the term.

Audārikaśarīra—It refers to the gross body because 'udāra' means gross.

Audayika bhāva—It is the state of mind with reference to the effective state originating from the rise of the *kārmic* matter.

Karma—It is the technical term which refers to the after effect of reactivity. The Jaina theory of *karma* explains *karma* in terms of *kārmic* particles and makes distinction in the *karma* as of eight types. Similarly, the *kārmic* effect may be wholesome or may be bad. Jains have given a scientific theory of *karma*.

Kaṣāya—It arises due to *kārmic* influx. The *kaṣāyas* are the root cause of birth and death that is cycle of transmigration.

Kārmaṇa Śarīra—It is the *kārmic* body and is very subtle and is responsible for the various *kārmic* effects.

Kāla (Time)—The Jaina theory of *kāla* gives a realistic picture of *kāla* as an independent category. It is mono-dimensional and therefore it is not an *astikāya*.

Kevalajñāna—Omniscient perfect knowledge.

Kevala darśana—Omniscient intuitive knowledge.

Kṣaya—Destruction of *karma*.

Chadma—*Chadma* means *jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa karma*. The *jīva* who lives in the state of these two *karmas* is *chadma*.

Jina—One who has conquered the feelings of attachment and aversion and all the four types of passions. He is free from 18 types of defects.

Tapa (Austerity)—They are meant to destroy the eight types of *karma*.

Taijasa śarīra—In modern technology it can be called as Electric body.

Trasa nāma—*Trasa nāma karma* refers to the rise of the *karma* by which the two to five-sensed organisms are born.

Darśana—It refers to the belief or faith.

Dik—It refers to direction in space.

Dr̥ṣṭivāda—The twelfth holy scripture (*aṅga*) of Jainas. In it the elements with their modes etc., were vividly described.

Dravya (Substance)—It is the shelter of attributes and modes. It has origination, destruction and permanence. It is eternal.

Dravya nikṣepa—It is the understanding of the nature of the object from the point of view of substance based on the dialectical considerations.

Dravyāstika naya—It is the point of view of substance.

Dveṣa—Hatred, *krodha*—anger, *māna*—egoity, *arati*—dislike and *bhaya*—fear are expressions of *dveṣa*.

Dharma dravya—*Dharma* as substance, it is the principle of motion.

Dhāraṇā (Retention)—It is condition of recollection also. It is an element in *avagraha*.

Dhauvya—It refers to the duration or permanence of the aspect of the substance.

Naya—A point of view.

Naraka—The nether world where hellish beings reside.

Nāma nikṣepa—It refers to the understanding of a thing by mean of its name, i. e., proper names without reference to their nature. It is the dialectical process.

Nikācīta—It is a state of *kārmic* particles in which there is neither increase nor decrease in the intensity of the *kārmic* effect. Nor is there transformation of *kārmic* process.

Nikṣepa—It is a dialectical process which presents the various aspects

for understanding the nature of the things through the point of view of substance, *dravya*, its qualities and proper name etc.

Nigoda—The particular state of *jīva* is *nigoda*, in which it may reside for infinite period of time.

Nidhatta—It is the state of condition (*kārmic*) in which the increase or decrease of the intensity of the *karma* is determined by the capacity of the *kārmic* condition. It does not refer to the rise (*udaya*) or any other *kārmic* state.

Niyativāda—Determinism as a theory.

Nirjarā—It is a process of the removal of the accumulated *karmas*.

Nirvāṇa—Freedom from bondage of the worldly existence.

Niścaya naya—The noumenal point of view.

Nīca gotra—The lower and miserable state of an individual with reference to its individual and social status.

Naigama naya—The point of view which has a purpose or an end.

Noindriya pratyakṣa—It is the form of *pratyakṣa* which is due to the *noindriya* i. e. mind, without the help of the sense-organs.

Nyāsa—It is a method of knowing the nature of a thing from various points of view. It is also called *nikṣepa*.

Paryāyārthika naya—The point of view of modes.

Palyopama—It is a measure of time by the Jaina standards.

Pāpa—Demerit.

Piṇḍaprapakṣi—The aggregate of the many sub-types of *karma*.

Puḍgala—Matter.

Leśyā—A specific theory of the Jainas which says that the soul gets colour due to radiation from various activities.

Vyāpti—It is a foundational principle of inference. It refers to the universal relation between the middle term and the major term.

Śubhanāma—The *nāma karma* which brings auspicious bodily organs, sweet melodious sound, fame etc., to an individual.

Sahkramaṇa—Transformation of one form of the sub-type of *karma* into another form of sub-type of the same *karma*.

Samyāhā—Instincts. It refers to the instinctive urges of all animals including even the heavenly beings regarding hunger, fear, sex urge and the instinct of possession.

Saṃjñā—*Jīva* which possesses *saṃjñā*, i. e., mind, by the help of it, they can learn, think, understand etc.

Saṃghāta—It is the aggregate of the particles. The atomic aggregate.

Saṃvara—It is a process to stop the influx of the new *karmas*.

Saṃhanana—It is a state of the bondage due to the rise of certain types of *karma*. It refers to the bones of the body.

Sat—It is a reality which refers to the origination, the destruction and the permanence of the state of a thing.

Samiti (control)—A form of moral rule which refers to the control of movement, control of speech and control of *nikṣepaṇa*, etc.

Sūkṣma (subtle)—It neither causes hinderance to others, nor other things can hinder it.

Sthāpanā nikṣepa—It is the dialectical form of understanding the nature of a thing by the recognition of the present state.

Sthāvara—It refers to the stationery souls like *sthāvara jivas*, the earth and water-bodied beings, plant.....etc.

Syādvāda—It is the theory of seven-fold predications to express the comprehensive nature of the things. It is the special contribution of the Jainas to the world thought.

Svādhyāya—It is the self-study or the study of holy scriptures meant to promote the spiritual realisation of the self.



APPENDIX III

Jaina Philosophical Literature and Authors

ŚWETĀMBARA AND DIGAMBARA

Author	Time	Work
Abhayadeva	V. 11th cen.	<i>Sanmatīṭikā</i>
Abhayatilaka	V. 14th cen.	<i>Pañcaprastha nyāyatarka vyākhyā</i> <i>Tarkanyāya sūtra ṭīkā</i> <i>Nyāyāloṅkāra vṛtti</i>
Ajitasena		<i>Nyāyamaṇḍīpikā (Prameya ratnamālā ṭīkā)</i>
Ajñātakartṛka	...	<i>Saḍdarśana</i>
	...	<i>Ślokavārtikaṭippaṇī¹</i> <i>Saḍdarśanaprapañca¹</i> <i>Prameya ratnamālālaghuvṛtti¹</i> <i>Arthavyaṅjanaparyāya-vicāra¹</i> <i>Svamatasthāpana¹</i> <i>Sṛṣṭivāda parīkṣā¹</i> <i>Saptabhaṅgi¹</i> <i>Sanmatitarka¹</i> <i>Śabdakhaṇḍavyākhyāna¹</i> <i>Pramāṇasiddhi¹</i> <i>Pramāṇapadārtha¹</i> <i>Paramatakhāṇḍana¹</i> <i>Nyāyābhūta¹</i> <i>Nayasahgraha¹</i> <i>Nayalakṣaṇa¹</i> <i>Nyāyopramāṇabhedi¹</i>

Author	Time	Work
		<i>Nyāyapradīpikā</i> ¹
		<i>Pramāṇanaya prabandha</i> ¹
		<i>Pramāṇalakṣaṇa</i> ¹
		<i>Matakhāṇḍanavāda</i> ¹
		<i>Vijñānavāda</i> ¹
Akalankadeva	V. 7th cen.	<i>Laghīyasīraya (svopajñavṛtti sahita)</i>
	"	<i>Nyāyaviniścaya</i>
	"	<i>Pramāṇa saṅgraha</i>
	"	<i>Siddhivinīścaya (svopajñavṛttisahita)</i>
	"	<i>Tattvārtharājavārtika</i>
	"	<i>Aṣṭasatī (Āptamīmāṃsā kī vṛtti)</i>
Amarakīrti		<i>Samayaparīkṣā</i> ¹
Amṛtānanda Muni		<i>Nyāyadīpāvalīviveka</i>
Anantakīrti	V. 10th cen.	<i>Bṛhatsarvajñasidhohī</i> ¹
		<i>Laghusarvajñasiddhi</i>
		<i>Jīvasiddhi tīkā</i>
Ānanda sūri		<i>Vyātireka dvātriṅśikā (Not available)</i>
Anantavīrya	V. 12th cen.	<i>Prameyaraśnamālā (parīkṣā-mukha tīkā)</i>
Āśādihara	V. 13th cen.	<i>Prameya raśnākara</i>
Anantavīrya		
(vṛddha)	V. 9th cen.	<i>Siddhivinīścaya tīkā</i>
Bhāvaprabhasūri	V. 18th cen.	<i>Nayopadeśa tīkā</i>
Bhāvasena		
traividha	V. 12-13 cen.	<i>Vijñatattvaparakāśa</i>
Bhuvansundara		
sūri	V. 15th cen.	<i>Parabrahmotthāpana (In Jaina grantha-granthakāra)</i>
		<i>Laghu-mahāvīdyāvidambana</i>
		(. . .do. . .)
Bhavavijaya	V. 17th cen.	<i>Ṣaḍ trīṅśatjalpa saṅkṣepa</i> ¹
Candrasena	V. 13th cen.	<i>Utpādādi siddhi saṅkṣa</i>
Cārukīrti		
Panditācārya		<i>Prameya raśnālakṣā</i> ¹

Author	Time	Work
Devaratna	V. 17th cen.	<i>Nyāya ratnāvali (In Jaina grantha-granthakāra)</i>
Devabhadra sūri	V. 12th cen.	<i>Nyāyāvatāra tippaṇa</i>
Devanandi	V. 6th cen.	<i>Sāra saṅgraha¹</i>
Devaprabha	V. 13th cen.	<i>Jalpanirṇaya¹</i>
Devasena	990 V.	<i>Pramāṇa prakāśa¹</i>
Dharmabhaṅga	V. 15th cen.	<i>Bṛhatsarvaśāśiddhi¹</i>
Gūṇaratna	V. 15th cen.	<i>Nyāyadīpikā¹</i>
Haribhadra	V. 8th cen.	<i>Śaḍdarśana samuccaya kī tarkarahasya dīpikā</i>
		<i>Anekānta jayapaśākā (with commentary)</i>
		<i>Anekāntavāda praveśa</i>
		<i>Śaḍdarśana samuccaya</i>
		<i>Śāstravārtā samuccaya (with commentary)</i>
		<i>Nyāyapraveśa tīkā</i>
		<i>Dharmasaṅgrahaṇī</i>
		<i>Lokatattva nirṇaya</i>
		<i>Anekānta praghaṭṭa (In Jaina grantha-granthakāra)</i>
		<i>Tattva tarāṅgiṇī (. . . do. .)</i>
Hemacandra	V. 12th cen.	<i>Pramāṇa mīmāṃsā</i>
		<i>Anyayogavyavacchedadvā-triṅśatikā</i>
Jagannātha	V. s. 1703	<i>Kevalibhuktinirākaraṇa¹</i>
Jayasimha sūri	V. 15th cen.	<i>Ratnākarāvatārikā tippaṇa</i>
Jinadeva		<i>Kāruṇya kalikā¹</i>
Jinapati sūri	V. 13th cen.	<i>Vādasāhala¹</i>
Jineśvara sūri	V. 11th cen.	<i>Sanmati tīkā, Prabhālakṣya saṅgīka</i>
Jñānacandra	V. 15th cen.	<i>Ratnākarāvatārikā tippaṇa</i>
Khapḍanakanda		<i>Tattvadīpikā¹</i>
Kumārānandi	V. 8th cen.	<i>Vādanaya</i>

Author	Time	Work
Laghu Samantabhadra	V. 13th cen.	<i>Aṣṭasahasrī-tippaṇa</i>
Mūlīadbhavala	V. 11th cen.	<i>Dravyasvabhāva prakāśa</i>
Malayagiri	V. 13th cen.	<i>Dharmasahgrahaṇī tīkā</i>
Mallavadi	do	<i>Dharmottara tippaṇaka</i> (with Pt. Dalsukhbhāt)
Mallavadi	V. 6th cen.	<i>Nayacakra</i>
		<i>Sanmatitarka tīkā</i>
Mallisena	V. 14th cen.	<i>Syādvāda māñjari</i>
Mañikānta		<i>Nyāyaratna¹</i>
Māṇikyānandī	V. 11th cen.	<i>Parīkṣāmukha</i>
Mayācandra	V. 19th cen.	<i>Jñānakriyāvāda</i> (In <i>Jaina Grantha-Granthakāra</i>)
Merutuṅga	V. 15th cen.	<i>Saḍḍarśana nirṇaya²</i>
Municandra sūri	V. 12th cen.	<i>Anekānta jayapatākā vṛtti tippaṇa</i>
Naracandra sūri	V. 13th cen.	<i>Nyāyakandalī tīkā²</i>
Narendrasena		<i>Pramāṇa-pramēya kalīkā¹</i>
Nemicandra		<i>Pravacana parīkṣā¹</i>
Padmavijayagaṇi	V. 19th cen.	<i>Tarkasahgraha phakkikā</i> (In <i>Jaina Grantha Granthakāra</i>)
Pālya kīrti	V. 9th cen.	<i>Kevala Mukti prakaraṇa</i>
Pātrakeśari	V. 6th cen.	<i>Trilakṣaṇaka darśana</i>
Prabhācandra	V. 11th cen.	<i>Prameyakamalamārtanḍa</i> (<i>parīkṣāmukha tīkā</i>)
		<i>Nyāyakumudacandra</i> (<i>laghīyastraya tīkā</i>)
		<i>Paramatajhañjhāmīla</i>
Pradyumna sūri	V. 13th cen.	<i>Vādasihala²</i>
Pravarakīrti		<i>Tattvanīlācaya¹</i>
Ramaçandra sūri	V. 13th cen.	<i>Vyattreka dvātrīṣṭīkā</i>
Rājasekhara	V. 15th cen.	<i>Syādvāda kārīkā²</i>
		<i>Ratnākarāvatārikā</i> <i>pāñjikā</i>
		<i>Saḍḍarśana samuccaya</i>
		<i>Nyāyakandalī pāñjikā²</i>
Ratnaprabha sūri	V. 13th cen.	<i>Syādvāda ratnāvatārikā</i>

Author	Time	Work
Rddhisūgāra	V. 20th cen.	<i>Nirṇaya prabhākara</i> (In <i>Jaina Grantha Granthakāra</i>)
Sādhuvijaya	V. 16th cen.	<i>Vādayijaya prakaraṇa</i> (... do ...)
Śkaṭāyana		<i>Strīmukti prakaraṇa</i>
Samantabhadra	V. 4-5 cen.	<i>Āptamīmāṃsā</i> <i>Bṛhatsvayambhūstotra</i> <i>Jīvasiddhi</i>
Śānti sūri	V. 11th cen.	<i>Nyāyāvatāravārtika</i> <i>saṃṛiti</i>
(Pūrṇatallagacchīya)		
Satyarāja	V. 16th cen.	<i>Jalpamañjarī</i> (In <i>Jaina Grantha Granthakāra</i>)
Śāntisena		<i>Prameya ratnākara</i> ^a
Śāntivarṇi		<i>Prameyakarṇṭhikā</i> (<i>parīkṣāmukhavṛtti</i>) ¹
Subhacandra		<i>Samśayavadana vidāraṇa</i> <i>Saḍdarśanapramāṇa</i> <i>prameya saṅgraha</i> <i>Parīkṣāmukha vṛtti</i> ¹
Subhacandra deva		
Siddharṣi	V. 10th cen.	<i>Nyāyāvatāra-ṭīkā</i>
Siddhāntasāra	V. 16th cen.	<i>Darśana ratnākara</i> (In <i>Jaina Grantha Granthakāra</i>)
Siddhasena	V. 5th cen.	<i>Nyāyāvatāra</i>
Divākara		<i>Dvātrīṃśikā</i> <i>Sanmati tarka</i>
Somadeva	V. 11th cen.	<i>Syādvādo pañṣad</i>
Soma tilaka	V. s 1392	<i>Saḍdarśana ṭīkā</i> ^a
Śricandra sūri	V. 12th cen.	<i>Nyāya praveśa</i> <i>Haribhadra vṛtti pañjikā</i>
Subhaprakāśa		<i>Nyāyamakaranda vivecana</i> ¹
Subhavijaya	V. 17th cen.	<i>Tarkabhāṣāvārtika</i> (In <i>Jaina Grantha Granthakāra</i>)
		<i>Syādvād mālā</i>
Sukhaprakāśa Muni		<i>Nyāyadīpāvali ṭīkā</i> ¹

Author	Time	Work
Sumati	V. 6th cen.	<i>Sanmatitarka tīkā</i> ¹ <i>Sumati sapṭaka</i>
Umāsvāmi	V. 3rd cen.	<i>Tattvārtha sūtra</i>
Umāsvāti	V. 3rd cen.	<i>Tattvārthasūtra svopajñā bhāṣya</i>
Vādibhasimha	V. 8th cen.	<i>Syādvādasiddhi</i> <i>Navapadārtha niścaya</i> <i>Pramāṇanayatattvālokā- lakkāra</i>
Vādideva sūri	V. 12th cen.	<i>Syādvāda ratnakara</i>
Vādirāja sūri	V. 11th cen.	<i>Nyāya viniścaya vivaraṇa</i> <i>Pramāṇa nirṇaya</i>
Vajranandi		<i>Pramāṇagrantha</i> ¹
Vasunandi	V. 10-11 cen.	<i>Ātmamīmāṃsā vṛtti</i> <i>Aṣṭasahasrī</i> <i>Āptaparīkṣā</i> <i>Pramāṇaparīkṣā</i> <i>Paṭra parīkṣā</i> <i>Satyajñāna parīkṣā</i> <i>Tattvārthāṣṭhalokavārtika</i> <i>Vidyānanda mahodaya</i>
Vidyānanda		
Vimaladāsa		<i>Saptabhaṅgītarahṅiṇī</i>
Vinaya vijaya	V. 17th cen.	<i>Saḍ trīṣṭadjaḷpa saṃkṣepa</i> ¹
Yaśastava sāgara	V. 18th cen.	<i>Jaina sapta padārthī</i> <i>Pramāṇa vādārtha (in Jaina Grantha Granthakāra)</i> <i>Syādvāda muktāvalī</i> <i>Vādārtha nirūpaṇa (in Jaina Grantha Granthakāra)</i>

Author	Time	Work
Yaśovijaya (upādhyāya)	V. 17th cen.	<i>Anekānta praveśa</i> <i>Aṣṭasahasrī vivaraṇa</i> , <i>Anekāntavyavasthā</i> <i>Ātmakhyātī</i> (in <i>Jaina</i> <i>Grantha Granthakāra</i>) <i>Bhāṣā rahasya</i> <i>Devadharmaparīkṣā</i> <i>Dharma parīkṣā</i> <i>Dravyāloka vivaraṇa</i> <i>Dravya paryāya yukti</i> (in <i>Jaina Grantha Granthakāra</i>) <i>Dvātriṃśat dvātriṃśatikā</i> <i>Gurūtattva vinīścaya</i> <i>Jñānabindu</i> (In <i>Navya śailī</i>) <i>Jñānārṇava</i> <i>Jainatarkabhāṣā</i> <i>Mahāgalavāda</i> (in <i>Jaina</i> <i>Grantha and Granthakāra</i>) <i>Nyāya bindu</i> <i>Nyāyakhaṇḍa khāḍya</i> (navy <i>śailī</i>) <i>Nyāyāloka</i> (do) <i>Naya rahasya</i> <i>Nayapradīpa</i> <i>Nayopadeśa</i> <i>Pramāṇa rahasya</i> (in <i>Jaina</i> <i>Grantha Granthakāra</i>) <i>Śāstravārtāsamuccaya</i> <i>Siddhānta mañjarī</i> (ikā (in <i>Jaina Grantha Granthakāra</i>) <i>Siddhānta tarka parīṣkāra</i> (—do) <i>Syādvāda mañjūṣā</i> (com- mentary on <i>syādvāda</i> <i>mañjarī</i> (—do—)

Author	Time	Work
		<i>Tattvāloka vivaraṇa</i> (—do—)
		<i>Trisūtryāloka</i> (—do—)
		<i>Utpādavyayadhrauyasiḍḍhi</i> <i>ṭkā</i>
		<i>Vādamahārṇava</i> (in <i>Jaina</i> <i>Grantha Granthakāra</i>)
		<i>Vādamālā</i> (—do—)
		<i>Vedānta nirṇaya</i> (—do—)
		<i>Vidhivāda</i> (—do)



Note—¹These books are available in different *bhaṇḍāras*.

²Not published.

SCHEME OF PRONUNCIATION

VOWELS

अ	आ	इ	ई	उ	ऊ	ऋ	ॠ	ए	ऐ	ओ	औ	(अं)	(अः)
a	ā	i	ī	u	ū	r	ṛ	e	ai	o	au	m̐	ḥ

CONSONANTS

क	ख	ग	घ	ङ	च	छ	ज	झ	ञ
k	kh	g	gh	ṅ	c	ch	j	jh	ñ

ट	ठ	ड	ढ	ण	त	थ	द	ध	न
ṭ	ṭh	ḍ	ḍh	ṇ	t	th	d	dh	n

प	फ	ब	भ	म	य	र	ल	व
p	ph	b	bh	m	y	r	l	v, w

श	ष	स	ह	क्ष	त्र	ज्ञ
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s वह (हवह) अउ

ॐ aī (h.vaī) aū

Shri Devendra Muni Shastri, the author of this voluminous work, is a Jaina monk of higher order. He is a great thinker and reputed scholar of the various branches of literature—philosophy, logic, religion, metaphysics etc. He has written more than 60 books. This voluminous work is Jaina weltanschauung—the outlook on world philosophy.

Philosophy is a deep insight. It enables man to know the noumenal and phenomenal nature of the things. It discloses the mystery of the sufferings of mundane soul and shows the way to get rid of them. So, the philosophy is called a 'Divine Eye'.

This book will also prove a Divine Eye for you.